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Preface
As the economic regulator for the Australian energy 
sector, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) aims 
to keep stakeholders informed of policy, regulation and 
market developments. This is the AER’s second State 
of the energy market report, which provides a high-level 
overview of energy market activity in Australia. The 
report is written in accessible language to meet the needs 
of a wide audience, including government, industry and 
the broader community. The report supplements the 
AER’s extensive technical reporting on the energy sector.
The State of the energy market report consolidates 
information from various sources into a single 
user-friendly publication. In doing so, the report aims 
to better inform market participants and assist policy 
debate on energy market issues. It should be noted, 
however, that the AER is not a policy body. In that 
context, the report focuses on the presentation of facts, 
rather than advocating policy agendas.
This 2008 edition consists of an executive overview 
of the year in review, supported by 11 chapters on the 
electricity and natural gas sectors. The lead essay this 
year is an assessment by ACIL Tasman on developments 
and projections for the natural gas sector. There is also 
an appendix covering recent policy and regulatory 
developments in the energy sector.
The body of the report provides a more detailed survey 
of market activity and performance in the electricity 
and natural gas sectors. The chapters follow the supply 
chain in each industry — from electricity generation and 
gas production, through to energy retailing. There is 
also a survey of contract market activity in electricity 
derivatives. While the report focuses on activity in the 
southern and eastern jurisdictions, in which the AER 
has regulatory and compliance roles, there is also some 
coverage of market activity in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory.
vi STaTe Of THe eNerGY MarKeT
The State of the energy market report is an evolving 
project. Readers may notice some changes in approach 
to particular areas of reporting compared to the 2007 
edition. For example, this year’s report includes more 
detailed coverage of wholesale market activity in the 
electricity and natural gas sectors, the expansion of 
the wind generation sector and reliability issues in 
natural gas. The appendix has a stronger focus on 
recent policy and regulatory developments. In addition, 
the executive overview includes some perspectives on 
possible implications of climate change policies for the 
energy sector. More generally, the coverage of Western 
Australian issues has increased this year. The AER will 
continue to explore ways to improve the quality of 
information in this report over time and, as always, seeks 
the views of stakeholders in this regard.
In the meantime, I hope that this 2008 edition will 
provide a valuable resource for market participants, 
policymakers and the wider community.
Steve Edwell 
Chairman
vii
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Australia’s energy sector has faced some complex 
challenges in 2008, presenting both risks and 
opportunities for the market. Although the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) has returned to more stable 
conditions in recent months, the last two years have seen 
heightened volatility. South Australia experienced record 
prices early in 2008, triggering the unprecedented use 
of administered pricing. Sluggish generation investment 
over the last few years has raised some concerns about 
future supply risk, but the investment response in most 
regions is finally picking up. Ageing infrastructure, 
strong demand growth and rising costs are also driving 
record increases in electricity network investment.
Market conditions in the natural gas sector differ 
between the east and west coasts. The industry 
is expanding rapidly on the east coast, underpinned 
by the burgeoning coal seam gas (CSG) sector and rising 
demand to supply gas-fired power stations. In the longer 
term, proposed liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects are 
likely to raise east coast prices. In contrast, in Western 
Australia, tight supply conditions, combined with 
a major plant outage, have led to record prices in 2008. 
Across Australia, rising wholesale prices in electricity 
and gas are starting to flow through to the retail sector.
At a policy level, the yet to be finalised Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme has created some uncertainty for the 
market, but it will also create investment opportunities. 
In particular, it will add further momentum to the 
natural gas sector and over time will spur greater interest 
in clean coal and renewable generation technologies.
Against this landscape, there have been significant 
changes in the regulatory framework. There was further 
progress in 2008 towards the consolidation of economic 
regulation under a single agency — the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER). The transfer of electricity distribution 
regulation from state regimes to the national framework 
commenced on 1 January 2008, and gas distribution 
followed on 1 July 2008. In addition, the regulation 
of gas transmission pipelines transferred from the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to the AER on 1 July 2008. Moves are 
continuing for a transfer of non-price retail regulation.
Work is also continuing on the establishment of the 
Australia Energy Market Operator (AEMO) by June 
2009. This new agency will have wide-ranging 
responsibilities in electricity and gas, including a national 
transmission planning role. A significant reform for the 
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gas sector was the launch of a gas market bulletin board 
on 1 July 2008. In combination with a new short-term 
trading market in gas, scheduled for 2010, this is an 
important move towards enhanced transparency and 
efficiency in natural gas markets.
National	Electricity	Market
To promote market transparency, the AER reports 
weekly on wholesale prices in the NEM, which 
covers Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, 
South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT). The AER also publishes more detailed 
coverage of price events above $5000 per megawatt hour 
(MWh). Overall, the market exhibited more stability 
in 2007 – 08, with the notable exception of record prices 
for South Australia during the March quarter (figure 1). 
However, the market has tended to trade at higher prices 
in 2007 and 2008 than in previous years, which may 
be indicative of the exercise of market power during 
periods of tight supply and demand.
Figure	1	
National	Electricity	Market	prices
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MWh, megawatt hours.
Note: Weekly volume-weighted averages.
Source: NEMMCO; AER.
3
	
	
	
E
xE
c
u
tivE
 
o
vE
r
viE
w
Wholesale electricity prices began to rise from 
around March 2007, when the drought constrained 
hydroelectric generation capacity in New South Wales, 
Tasmania and Victoria, and limited the availability 
of water for cooling in some coal-fired generators. 
These conditions were exacerbated in winter 2007 
by strategic bidding by some New South Wales 
generators, which led to record prices. The drought 
continued to affect wholesale electricity prices in New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania during 
the September quarter of 2007. South Australia was 
less affected as its generators do not rely on fresh water 
for cooling.
Drought conditions in New South Wales and 
Queensland began to ease by the end of 2007, taking 
pressure off prices. Queensland experienced some high 
price events due to network outages and constraints, 
and aggressive bidding by a number of generators. More 
serious problems emerged in South Australia, where 
monthly prices averaged $325 per MWh in March 
2008 — the highest monthly price for any region since the 
NEM began in 1998.
A number of factors contributed to the high 
prices in South Australia. Adelaide experienced 
an unprecedented 15-day heatwave in March 2008, 
which led to record demand. During peak periods, 
a significant proportion of South Australia’s electricity 
is sourced from Victoria. In December 2007, the South 
Australian transmission network owner, ElectraNet, 
reduced the maximum allowable flows on the Heywood 
interconnector by about 25 per cent. This constrained the 
supply of lower cost generation from Victoria. Against 
a backdrop of high demand and tight supply, AGL 
Energy — which owns 39 per cent of South Australia’s 
generation capacity — bid a significant proportion of its 
capacity at close to the price cap.
In combination, these factors led to extreme prices 
in South Australia over 15 consecutive days in March 
2008, including 26 price intervals above $5000 per 
MWh. For the first time in the history of the NEM, 
the extent and duration of extreme prices triggered 
an administered price cap on 17 March. This led 
to South Australia’s spot price being capped at $100 per 
MWh on 11 occasions. The AER is investigating these 
price events and, in particular, whether generator bidding 
breached the National Electricity Rules. The AER is also 
investigating the flow limits placed on the Heywood 
interconnector by ElectraNet.
While NEM prices tended to stabilise over the period 
from April to September 2008, they nonetheless 
remained significantly above long-term averages. 
This is consistent with higher generation costs, 
a continuation of tight supply – demand conditions and 
occasional opportunistic bidding by generators. There 
was a significant price spike across the mainland NEM 
regions on 23 July, due to an unplanned outage of two 
transmission lines in Victoria. The AER is investigating 
this incident.
The general easing of NEM prices during 2007 – 08 
was reflected in lower contract prices on the Sydney 
Futures Exchange. Futures prices indicate that 
the market is expecting higher spot prices in the 
short to medium-term in South Australia and 
Queensland — notably in the first quarter of 2009. 
This may reflect concerns about a recurrence of the 
market structure and network issues that affected these 
regions in the first quarter of 2008.
The NEM experienced its first regional boundary 
change on 1 July 2008, when the Snowy region (located 
in southern New South Wales) was abolished to improve 
pricing signals and reduce network congestion. The area 
formerly covered by the region is now split between the 
Victoria and New South Wales regions of the NEM. 
The other regions — Queensland, South Australia and 
Tasmania — continue to follow jurisdictional boundaries.
Generation	investment	and	reliability
Over the past couple of years, some concerns have 
been raised about the future reliability of electricity 
supply in the NEM. In particular, the Australian 
Energy Market Commission (AEMC) Reliability 
Panel reported in 2007 that forecast demand is growing 
faster than forecast supply and that a shortfall was 
possible by around 2011. The panel cited stakeholder 
uncertainty about policy settings — including government 
4 StAtE oF tHE ENErGY MArKEt
ownership in the generation sector and the possible 
effects of climate change policies — as factors that may 
be delaying new investment.1
The panel proposed a number of refinements to enhance 
reliability over the longer term. This included a proposal 
to change the National Electricity Rules to raise the 
NEM price cap to $12 500 per MWh from 1 July 
2010, to provide greater incentives to invest in peaking 
generators. The panel released an exposure draft of the 
proposed Rule change in September 2008. In addition, 
the panel recommended greater flexibility for the market 
operator to source extra generation reserves when 
needed. The panel also recommended a new energy 
adequacy assessment projection to improve information 
about the impact of generation input constraints 
on energy availability.
Generation investment has been slow to respond 
to rising demand, high prices and the need to replace 
some ageing plant. However, some investment response 
has started to emerge. The bulk of commissioned, 
committed and proposed new investment is in gas-fired 
and wind generation technologies, which are expected 
to become more cost competitive under climate change 
policies. Table 1 sets out major committed projects 
(excluding wind) as at September 2008.
Origin Energy has announced a number of projects, 
including a 630 megawatt (MW) gas-fired power 
station in the Darling Downs region of Queensland 
(scheduled to commence operation in early 2010) and 
a 550 MW gas-fired power station near Mortlake 
in Victoria (scheduled to commence operation in the 
summer of 2010 – 11).
The Darling Downs project builds on a strong 
investment cycle in Queensland over the past 
decade. Recently completed projects include the 
450 MW Braemar 1 power station (owned by Babcock 
& Brown Power) and the 750 MW Kogan Creek power 
station (owned by CS Energy), which began operation 
in 2007. In July 2008, ERM Power and Arrow Energy 
reached financial closure on the 450 MW Braemar 2 
power station (to commence in the first half of 2009).
Table	1	 Major	committed	generation	investment	in	the	National	Electricity	Market	(excluding	wind)
DEvElopEr powEr	sTaTioN TEchNoloGy capaciTy	(Mw) plaNNED	coMMissioNiNG
NeW South WaleS
Delta electricity 
(NSW Government)
Colongra oCGt 668 2009 – 10
origin energy uranquinty oCGt 640 2008 – 09
tRuenergy tallawarra CCGt 400 2008
QueeNSlaND
origin energy Darling Downs CCGt 630 2010
eRM Power/arrow energy Braemar 2 oCGt 450 2009
Rio tinto Yarwun alumina Refinery Gas 145 2010 – 11
Queensland Gas Company Condamine CCGt 135 2009
ViCtoRia
aGl energy Bogong hydro 140 2009
origin energy Mortlake oCGt 550 2010 – 11
South auStRalia
origin energy Quarantine oCGt 120 2008 – 09
taSMaNia
tasmanian Government tamar Valley CCGt 191 2009
OCGT, open cycle gas turbine; CCGT, combined cycle gas turbine.
Sources: NEMMCO; AER and company websites.
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1 AEMC Reliability Panel, Comprehensive Reliability Review — Fınal Report, December 2007, pp. 16, 17, 37, 43.
After a long period of inactivity, the investment response 
in New South Wales has also picked up recently. New 
gas-fired projects in development include TRUenergy’s 
400 MW generator at Tallawarra (scheduled for 
late 2008), Delta Electricity’s 668 MW generator 
at Colongra (scheduled for December 2009), and 
Origin Energy’s 640 MW Uranquinty plant (scheduled 
for November 2008).
Investment in wind generation has gathered pace 
since 2004, especially in South Australia, where it now 
accounts for around 17 per cent of installed generation 
capacity. The extent of new investment in wind 
generation has led to the AEMC determining that 
new wind generators be classified as semi-scheduled, 
which will require them to participate in the central 
dispatch process.
Electricity	transmission
There has been significant investment in transmission 
networks in the current decade and this trend 
is set to continue under recent AER revenue cap 
determinations (figure 2). Transmission investment 
across the NEM was forecast to exceed $1.2 billion 
in 2007 – 08. Although these outcomes are partly driven 
by rising labour and resource costs, they are also funding 
substantial upgrades and capacity expansions that should 
maintain the current high rates of network reliability.
Investment in the Queensland network is set to increase 
in the current regulatory period (2007 – 12) by around 
80 per cent compared with the previous period, 
reflecting significant capital requirements and cost 
pressures for that network. Transmission investment 
will increase by around 60 per cent for the Victorian 
and South Australian networks over their current 
regulatory periods.
Figure	2	
Electricity	transmission	investment
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4. For SP AusNet, actual expenditure is replacement expenditure only; forecast expenditure includes network augmentation by VENCorp.
5. Data series terminate in different years due to differing regulatory periods.
Source: ACCC/AER Annual Regulatory Reports and revenue cap decisions; ERA access arrangement decisions.
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There have been concerns that current approaches 
to transmission planning focus on perspectives and 
priorities within individual jurisdictions, rather 
than on a strategic, long-term view of the efficient 
development of the transmission grid on a national 
basis. To address this, a national transmission planning 
function will be housed within the new AEMO 
from July 2009. The AEMO will develop an enhanced 
annual transmission plan covering long-term strategies 
for the transmission grid as a whole. In addition, a new 
regulatory investment test will provide for an assessment 
of wider market benefits than those that are currently 
considered in assessing the merits of new projects. 
In particular, the new test will recognise the merits 
of investing in excess capacity in anticipation of future 
demand growth.
Although the reliability of the transmission network 
has been consistently high since the beginning of the 
NEM, network congestion sometimes impedes the 
dispatch of the most cost-efficient generation to satisfy 
demand. The AER publishes data on the economic 
costs of network congestion, which suggest that while 
the costs are relatively modest, they are increasing over 
time. Congestion has been most prevalent around 
southeast Queensland, northern New South Wales, 
and the interconnectors linking Victoria with South 
Australia and Tasmania. The AEMC published a review 
of congestion issues in the NEM in June 2008, which 
recommended a number of changes to current market 
arrangements to reduce this problem.
The AER has undertaken a number of measures 
to encourage lower congestion costs. Aside from the 
investment allowances noted above, the AER revised 
its service target performance incentive scheme in 2008 
to better reward network owners for cost-effective 
initiatives to improve operating practices (such as the 
scheduling and notification of network outages, live line 
work and equipment monitoring). The scheme permits 
a network business to earn an annual bonus of up 
to 2 per cent of its revenue if it can eliminate all outage 
events with a market impact of over $10 per MWh.2
climate	change	policies
A significant policy development over the past 
year has been progress towards implementation 
of a carbon emissions trading scheme. The Australian 
Government released a green paper on its approach 
to emissions trading in July 2008, to be known as the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. The scheme 
is scheduled to begin in 2010. The green paper sets out 
the government’s preferred approach to various aspects 
of the scheme and areas where further consideration 
is needed. It confirms that the scheme will be broadly 
based in terms of the greenhouse gases and economic 
sectors to be covered.
The design of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
will be refined after consideration of the final report 
of the Garnaut Climate Change Review and Treasury 
modelling of the economic impacts of the scheme. The 
government will undertake further consultation before 
releasing exposure draft legislation and an associated 
white paper, scheduled for December 2008. The 
government intends to give an indication of its planned 
medium-term emission reduction target by the end 
of 2008.
The Garnaut climate change review final report, released 
in September 2008, identified an urgent need to reduce 
carbon emissions through a broad-based trading scheme. 
The report recommended a 10 per cent reduction 
in carbon emissions (from 2000 levels) by 2020 
and an 80 per cent reduction by 2050 — assuming 
international cooperation in the mitigation effort. 
In the absence of an international agreement, the review 
recommended a 5 per cent reduction in emissions (from 
2000 levels) by 2020.
The scheme poses challenges and opportunities for 
the energy sector. In particular, coal-fired electricity 
generation, which accounts for around 83 per cent 
of Australia’s generation capacity, is emissions-intensive. 
The introduction of the scheme may result in some 
asset write-downs and sales, and it is possible that 
some brown coal generating plant may be shut down. 
7
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2 The level of performance improvement required to receive the full 2 per cent bonus is probably an unrealistic aim. However, it will be difficult to determine a realistic 
level of performance until the scheme has operated for a period of time.
Mitigating factors such as forward market trading, 
vertical integration and new investment in gas-fired and 
wind generation are likely to ease the risk of potential 
supply issues.
The government is also proposing to provide some one-
off assistance to existing coal-fired electricity generators. 
Although the Garnaut review argued that there was 
no economic or environmental reason for allocating free 
emissions permits to coal-fired electricity generators, 
this has been a contentious issue. The Energy Supply 
Association of Australia has argued that the scheme 
would reduce the economic lives of several coal-fired 
power stations, mostly in Victoria and South Australia, 
and substantially reduce the value of others.3
The AEMC Reliability Panel cited uncertainty over 
the details of climate change policies as one factor that 
may have delayed some investment in new generation 
capacity. As the details of climate change policies 
become more certain, the investment response will likely 
strengthen. Even so, considerable time lags between 
decisions to invest and the commissioning of new 
capacity could result in some supply issues in the short 
to medium term.
Climate change policies are likely to improve the 
competitiveness of gas-fired generation in relation 
to coal-fired technology. It is interesting to note 
that Origin Energy announced its commitment to a 
550 MW plant in Victoria on the day the Garnaut 
review released its draft report. There will be substantial 
opportunities for the natural gas industry, although 
rising demand for gas — both for electricity generation 
and the likelihood of LNG exports from eastern 
Australia — may increase gas prices and partly neutralise 
its cost advantages.
There is also likely to be higher demand for renewable 
generation technologies. While the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme may not be sufficient in isolation 
to significantly increase renewable generation, 
particularly in the scheme’s early years, the government 
has also committed to a 20 per cent mandatory 
renewable energy target (MRET) for Australia by 2020. 
The scheme obliges electricity retailers and large 
energy users to acquire a proportion of their electricity 
requirements from renewable sources. The 20 per cent 
target translates into around 60 000 gigawatt hours 
(GWh) of electricity to be generated from renewable 
energy sources. Currently, Australia generates around 
15 000 GWh from renewable sources.4 In July 2008, 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
released a discussion paper canvassing design options 
for an expanded scheme, combining the federal MRET 
with state and territory schemes.5
The intermittent nature of wind generation poses specific 
challenges for power system reliability and security. 
In particular, wind generation depends on prevailing 
weather conditions. In addition, momentary fluctuations 
in wind output raises issues for maintaining power flows 
within the capacity limits of transmission infrastructure. 
To maintain reliability and security, standby capacity 
is required. Typically, this must be provided by peaking 
plant (such as an open cycle gas turbine plant) that can 
respond quickly to changing market conditions.
In the longer term, there is also potential for carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technologies that extract 
carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel power plants and 
store it in deep geological formations. The permanent 
storage of CO2 is a relatively untried concept. Indicative 
costs for coal plant with CCS vary from around US$40 
to US$90 per tonne of CO2 captured and stored. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) anticipates that 
capture, transport and storage costs could fall below 
US$25 per tonne of CO2 captured for coal-fired plants 
by 2030. This amounts to about US$10 to US$20 per 
MWh of electricity generated.6
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3 ESAA, Care required in setting emissions reduction targets for the energy sector, media release, 25 July 2008.
4 COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water, Design Options for the Expanded National Renewable Energy Target Scheme, 2008, p. 4.
5 COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water, Design Options for the Expanded National Renewable Energy Target Scheme, 2008.
6 Betz R, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales and Owen AD, School of Economics and Fınance, Curtin University of Technology, 
Carbon emission reduction policies — Implications for Australia’s energy market (unpublished research for the AER), 2008; IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives, 
OECD/IEA, 2006.
In August 2008, the Ministerial Council on Energy 
(MCE) asked the AEMC to review the electricity 
and gas market frameworks to determine whether 
refinements are needed to accommodate climate 
change policies. The AER considers that, although 
some refinements may be needed to accommodate 
climate change policies, the market design of the NEM 
provides an efficient and robust framework for trading 
arrangements. In particular, the market allows price 
signals to be quickly transmitted to electricity users and 
investors, so that responses can be made on the basis 
of timely, transparent and market-based information. 
The electricity financial markets complement the 
physical electricity market by enabling parties to lock 
in price certainty into the future.
The introduction of climate change policies also raises 
issues for the network sector, which over time has 
developed around the location of coal-fired generation 
plant. A short to medium-term challenge will be to 
adapt to the increasing use of gas-fired generation. 
The sourcing of large volumes of electricity from new 
locations on the network may affect flows and create new 
points of congestion. This poses the risk that the output 
of some generators may be inefficiently constrained.
A longer term challenge relates to the increasing use 
of renewable generation, such as wind, geothermal 
and solar, in areas not presently serviced by networks. 
Specifically, there may be a need to augment the 
transmission network to deliver electricity from 
remote generators to load centres. Since, under current 
regulatory requirements, generators must pay the cost 
of connecting to the shared network and for related 
network augmentations, there may be incentives for 
connection investment to be scaled to accommodate 
only an individual generator’s output. This could 
pose risks of inefficient augmentation that lacks 
regard to the longer term requirements of the power 
system. There may also be issues in identifying and 
allocating congestion costs arising from the connection 
of new plant.
The ability of network businesses to satisfy demand 
for new connections, the costs involved, and the 
question of who bears the associated risks may affect 
the feasibility, location, and timing of new investment. 
The establishment of a national transmission planner, 
a revised regulatory investment test (as noted above) and 
the current AEMC review of energy market frameworks 
provide some response to these issues and should 
enhance the investment climate over time.
The likelihood of greater reliance on gas-fired generation 
also raises issues for the adequacy of natural gas supplies 
and gas pipeline capacity to transport gas to power 
stations. As the following section notes, recently there 
has been a rapid expansion in gas production and 
reserves in eastern Australia. The gas pipeline sector 
has also been active in expanding pipeline capacity 
in response to market requirements.
The planned introduction of a carbon price is also 
encouraging the development of energy efficiency 
and demand management initiatives. Many state 
governments are implementing programs to promote 
energy efficiency via the energy retail sector. Demand 
management refers to strategies to address growth 
in demand to encourage more efficient use of existing 
power supply infrastructure. In some circumstances, 
demand management can provide an efficient alternative 
to network investment.
Demand management initiatives are most commonly 
implemented via the network sector, particularly 
in distribution. For example, financial incentives are 
offered to distribution businesses in New South Wales 
to undertake demand management projects that defer 
network investment.7 Some jurisdictions are trialling 
the use of incentive payments or time-of-use tariffs 
to encourage small customers to reduce energy use 
at times of high system demand. More generally, 
the AEMC is reviewing whether there are barriers 
to effective demand management in the NEM, 
including in the regulation of electricity networks and 
network planning.8
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7 The AER is also looking to introduce demand management incentives and related mechanisms to promote the use of demand management practices 
by distribution businesses.
8 AEMC, Review of demand side participation in the National Electricity Market, Issues Paper, 16 May 2008.
Some demand management strategies require the 
use of smart meters to enable consumers to monitor 
their energy use. In 2007, COAG agreed to a national 
implementation strategy for the progressive rollout 
of smart meters where the benefits outweigh costs. 
A cost – benefit assessment published in March 2008 
found that a national rollout would deliver net benefits.9
Natural	gas
In a commissioned essay for this report, ACIL Tasman 
estimated that natural gas demand in Australia will 
more than double to around 4300 petajoules (including 
exports) over the next 20 years. It forecasts that 
demand growth will be principally driven by rising 
LNG production — in western, northern and eastern 
Australia — and increased gas-fired electricity generation 
in response to climate change policies.
The Western Australian gas market has experienced 
considerable tightening since 2006, with rising 
production costs and strong domestic demand. At the 
same time, Western Australia’s LNG export capacity 
creates exposure to international energy prices. Average 
LNG prices received by Australian producers rose 
by 48 per cent between the June quarters of 2007 
and 2008.10
In combination, these factors have led to a substantial 
rise in domestic prices in Western Australia, with some 
gas contracts in 2007 being negotiated at around $7 per 
gigajoule (GJ), compared to typical prices of around 
$2.50 per GJ earlier in the decade. Western Australia 
is likely to face difficulties achieving a supply – demand 
balance until at least 2010.11 In June 2008, an explosion 
at the Varanus Island gas facility reduced domestic gas 
supplies by 30 per cent for over two months and put 
further pressure on short-term prices (figure 3).
Gas market development on the east coast is increasingly 
driven by Queensland’s CSG sector, which now supplies 
almost 20 per cent of the eastern Australian market,12 
including around 70 per cent of the Queensland 
market.13 CSG reserves have continued to rise strongly, 
Figure	3	
indicative	wholesale	natural	gas	prices
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CSG, coal seam gas; LNG, liquefied natural gas.
Notes: 
1. Western Australian spot prices are indicative only: 2007 prices are estimates 
for new Santos contracts signed in July; 2008 prices are based on the weighted 
average price of gas trades notified to Western Australia’s Independent Market 
Operator in July 2008. Western Australian prices in July 2008 were unusually 
high due to a major plant outage at Varanus Island.
2. All series (except Western Australian spot) are data from the second quarter 
of the year.
3. Data for Producers A, B, C and D are average company realisations for specific 
Australian gas producers.
Sources: WA spot 2007: Department of Industry and Resources (WA), 
Western Australian Oil and Gas Review, 2008; other data: EnergyQuest, Energy 
Quarterly, August 2005, August 2006, August 2007 and August 2008; LNG data 
is sourced from the ABS.
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9 NERA, Cost – Benefit Analysis of Smart Metering and Direct Load Control Overview Report for Consultation, 29 February 2008, for Smart Meter Working Group, 
Phase 2.
10 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
11 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources/Ministerial Council on Energy, Fınal Report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, September, 
2007, p. 10.
12 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
13 Wilson G, Queensland Minister for Mines and Energy, Coal seam methane for a cleaner energy future, press release, 13 September 2007.
and Queensland production may rise by around 
60 per cent during 2008.14 The Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics forecasts that 
CSG will become the principal source of gas supply 
in eastern Australia by 2030.
There are several proposals to develop LNG export 
facilities in Queensland, based on CSG from the 
Surat – Bowen Basin. Although the exponential growth 
in reserves suggests that the domestic market is unlikely 
to be left short of supply, LNG exports would likely 
bring domestic gas prices into closer alignment with 
world prices, as has occurred in Western Australia.
In the short to medium-term, rising production 
is providing some cushioning against price increases, 
although Queensland prices edged higher in 2008 
(figure 3). ACIL Tasman has reported that some 
Queensland customers are now paying prices in excess 
of $4 per GJ.15 EnergyQuest reports that one CSG 
provider earned an average price of $7.79 per GJ for 
Queensland gas in the first quarter of 2008 ($5.77 in the 
second quarter), compared to $2.22 per GJ in the first 
quarter of 2006.16 Conversely, prices in the Victorian 
spot market eased in 2008 following the commissioning 
of new transmission pipeline infrastructure that reduced 
capacity constraints.
Rising demand for natural gas places greater demands 
on gas transmission infrastructure to transport the gas 
to markets. Lead times for investment in transmission 
pipelines are around three years. The gas pipeline sector, 
which is privately owned, has become increasingly 
entrepreneurial over time. There is evidence that the 
sector is responding to market signals, with several 
new projects underway or imminent (table 2). These 
include Epic Energy’s QSN Link from Queensland 
to South Australia and New South Wales, scheduled 
for completion by early 2009. The QSN Link will 
allow CSG producers in Queensland to market their 
gas throughout southern and eastern Australia. Other 
proposals include a planned pipeline from Wallumbilla 
(Queensland) to Newcastle.
In addition, a number of existing pipelines are being 
expanded to accommodate rising demand. For example, 
the APA Group is expanding the Moomba to Sydney 
Pipeline system by 20 per cent to support gas flows 
needed for the Uranquinty power station in New 
South Wales, which is scheduled for commissioning 
in late 2008. New pipeline investment is improving 
security of supply and providing improved options for 
gas customers to source gas from a variety of basins. 
Over time, rising natural gas demand is likely to lead to 
further meshing of the transmission pipeline network.
Significant changes have been occurring on the 
regulatory front in the gas sector. In July 2008, the 
new National Gas Law transferred the economic 
regulation of transmission pipelines outside Western 
Australia from the ACCC to the AER. However, 
evolving market conditions have led to the lifting 
of economic regulation — in whole or in part — from 
several major pipelines. These include the Moomba 
to Adelaide Pipeline and a significant portion of the 
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline. Most major pipelines 
constructed during the current decade are not regulated. 
The National Gas Law also introduced a light 
regulation option which avoids upfront revenue and 
price regulation.
In 2005, in light of rising demand for natural gas 
and concerns about adequacy of supply, the MCE 
appointed a Gas Market Leaders Group to consider 
the need for further market reforms.17 In 2006, the 
group recommended the establishment of a gas market 
bulletin board and a short-term trading market in gas. 
It also recommended the establishment of a national 
gas market operator to administer these reforms and 
produce an annual national statement of opportunities 
on the gas market, covering supply – demand conditions. 
The reforms aim to improve transparency and efficiency 
in Australian gas markets, and to provide information 
to help manage gas emergencies.
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14 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: the emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 3.
15 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: the emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 3.
16 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, May 2008.
17 The Gas Market Leaders Group comprises 12 gas industry representatives and an independent chairperson.
The gas market bulletin board, which began on 1 July 
2008, is a website covering major gas production fields, 
storage facilities, demand centres and transmission 
pipelines in South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, 
the ACT, Queensland and Tasmania.18 It aims to provide 
transparent, real-time and independent information 
on the state of the gas market, system constraints and 
market opportunities.
The proposed short-term trading market in gas, 
which is scheduled to begin by winter 2010, will 
be a mandatory price-based balancing mechanism 
at defined gas hubs in New South Wales and South 
Australia. Victoria has had a transparent balancing 
market in place since 1999. Structural and operational 
details of the market are undergoing further 
development during 2008.
Energy	distribution
The regulation of the energy distribution sector has 
been in transition in 2008. The transfer from state-based 
to national regulation of electricity distribution networks 
began on 1 January 2008, under amendments to the 
National Electricity Law and Rules. The enactment 
of the National Gas Law and Rules commenced the 
transfer of gas distribution to national regulation 
on 1 July 2008.
Table	2	 New	gas	pipeline	projects,	2008
pipEliNE locaTioN owNEr/propoNENT lENGTh	
(kM)
cosT	
($	MillioN)
projEcT	
coMplETioN
uNDeR CoNStRuCtioN
QSN link — Stage 1 Qld – Sa and 
NSW
epic energy 180 140 2009
eastern Gas Pipeline 
(addition of compressor)
Vic – NSW Singapore Power international Compressor 
(25% 
expansion)
n/a 2008
Bonaparte Gas Pipeline Nt aPa Group 285 150 2009
CoMMitteD
Berwyndale to Wallumbilla Pipeline Qld aGl energy and Queensland 
Gas Company
115 70 2009
Dampier to Bunbury Stage 5B expansion Wa Duet Group (60%), alcoa 
(20%), Babcock & Brown 
infrastructure (20%)
440 690 2010
South West Queensland Pipeline — Stage 1 Qld epic energy Compressor 
(expansion to 
170 terajoules 
a day)
n/a 2009
South West Queensland Pipeline — Stage 2 Qld epic energy Compressor 
(expansion to 
220 terajoules 
a day)
64 2013
Queensland Gas Pipeline expansion Qld Singapore Power international 25 petajoules n/a 2010
QSN link — Stage 2 expansion Qld – Sa and 
NSW
epic energy Compressors 64 2013
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline 
capacity expansion
NSW aPa Group 20% capacity 
expansion
100 progressive 
from 2008
n/a, not available.
Sources: ABARE, Energy in Australia 2008, 2008; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, August 2008; company websites and press releases.
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18 http://www.gasbb.com.au.
Figure	4	
Electricity	distribution	network	reliability
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NEM, National Electricity Market.
Notes: 
1. System average interruption duration index data: the data account for all 
outages experienced by distribution customers, including those attributable 
to generation and transmission.
2. The data for Queensland in 2005 – 06 and New South Wales in 2006 – 07 have 
been adjusted to remove the impact of natural disasters.
3. Victorian data is for the calendar year ending in that period (for example 
Victoria 2005 – 06 is for calendar year 2005).
4. The NEM averages are weighted by customer numbers.
Sources: Performance reports published by ESC (Vic), IPART (NSW), QCA 
(Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas), ICRC (ACT), EnergyAustralia, Integral 
Energy and Country Energy. The AER consulted with PB Associates in the 
development of historical data.
The AER’s first regulatory review in electricity 
distribution — to set revenues for the New South Wales 
and ACT networks — began in May 2008. The AER 
began a regulatory review of the South Australian and 
Queensland networks in July 2008. The AER’s first 
regulatory review in gas distribution will assess prices 
and other access terms and conditions for networks 
in New South Wales and the ACT.
The AER is working closely with jurisdictional 
regulators and network businesses to maintain 
regulatory certainty in the transition period. Since 
assuming responsibility for the economic regulation 
of distribution networks, the AER has published 
a number of guidelines. These include a national service 
performance incentive scheme, which provides incentives 
to electricity distribution network businesses to improve 
service quality — including reliability — over time.
Annual investment in electricity distribution networks 
in the NEM is running at around $3 billion, primarily 
driven by replacement of ageing infrastructure and 
rising demand. Investment is contributing to stable 
network reliability, with recent improvements in some 
jurisdictions. Fıgure 4 indicates that the average duration 
of distribution outages per customer in the NEM has 
remained in a range of about 200 – 270 minutes per year 
since 2000 – 01, with some convergence in jurisdictional 
outcomes over time. The data should be interpreted 
with caution due to significant differences in network 
characteristics, as well as differences in information, 
measurement and auditing systems.
In gas, annual investment in distribution networks 
is running at around $400 million. At present, there is no 
uniform approach to the publication of service quality 
data for the gas distribution sector. Although Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia 
publish data on a regular basis, the indicators vary 
between jurisdictions. The available data suggests that 
network reliability is generally high.
retail
State and territory governments are currently responsible 
for the regulation of retail energy markets. The legislation 
to transfer non-price elements of retail regulation 
to the AEMC and AER is scheduled for introduction 
in the South Australian Parliament by September 2009. 
Under current proposals, the states and territories will 
retain responsibility for price regulation unless they 
choose to transfer those arrangements.
The reform process to date has involved the release 
of a series of working papers (prepared by Allens Arthur 
Robinson on behalf of the MCE) on the regulatory 
functions to be transferred to the national framework, 
discussions with a stakeholder reference group on the 
recommendations for the national framework, and 
consultation with interested parties. A standing 
committee of the MCE published a policy paper in June 
2008 that will form the basis for the legislative package 
on the national framework.
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Energy retail competition has continued to develop 
over the past year. With the introduction of full 
retail contestability in Queensland on 1 July 2007, all 
customers nationally are eligible to choose their natural 
gas supplier. Similar arrangements for electricity apply 
in mainland NEM jurisdictions. Tasmania extended 
electricity contestability on 1 July 2008 to customers 
using more than 750 MW per year.
The leading private sector energy retailers are AGL 
Energy, Origin Energy and TRUenergy, which 
collectively account for most market share in Victoria, 
South Australia and Queensland. In 2007, International 
Power acquired the retail partnership it formerly 
operated with EnergyAustralia, and now retails in its 
own right as Simply Energy. This relatively new retailer 
has acquired market share in South Australia and 
Victoria. There has been ongoing new entry by niche 
retailers, although price volatility in the electricity 
wholesale market has raised challenges for a number 
of smaller retailers.
Customer switching between retailers provides one 
indicator of competitive activity. Switching rates 
in Victoria and South Australia are more than double 
those in New South Wales (figure 5). The low rates 
for Queensland reflect that small customer switching 
has only been possible since July 2007. Queensland 
nonetheless recorded a 20 per cent switching rate for 
electricity in the first year of full retail contestability. 
Across all jurisdictions, switching rates are higher 
in electricity than in gas, although the rates are 
comparable in Victoria, where gas is used widely for 
household purposes.
While most jurisdictions allow full customer choice, 
it can take time for a competitive market to develop. 
At August 2008, all jurisdictions applied some form 
of retail price regulation in electricity, and several 
jurisdictions applied similar arrangements in gas. 
Australian governments have agreed to review the 
continued use of retail price caps and to remove them 
where effective competition can be demonstrated. 
The AEMC is assessing the effectiveness of energy 
retail competition in each jurisdiction to advise on the 
appropriate time to remove retail price caps, with state 
and territory governments making the final decision 
on this matter.
Figure	5	
cumulative	retail	switching	to	30	june	2008	—	
small	customers
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Notes: 
1. Cumulative switching as a percentage of the small customer base since the 
start of full retail contestability: Victoria and New South Wales 2002; South 
Australia 2003 (electricity) and 2004 (gas); Queensland 2007.
2. If a customer switches to a number of retailers in succession, each move counts 
as a separate switch. Cumulative switching rates may therefore exceed 100 
per cent.
3. The data may overstate the extent of customer switching due to some retailers 
transferring customers between different participant codes owned by the 
same retailer.
Sources: Electricity customer switches: NEMMCO, MSATS transfer data to June 
2008; Gas customer switches: New South Wales and ACT: Gas Market Company, 
Market activity data from January 2002 – June 2008; South Australia: REMCo, 
Market activity report from August 2004 – June 2008; Victoria and Queensland: 
VENCorp, Gas market reports: Transfer history from January 2002 – June 2008, 
2008; Customer numbers: New South Wales: IPART, NSW electricity information 
paper no 1 – 2008 – Electricity retail businesses’ performance against customer service 
indicators, January 2008; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance 
report: performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007; 
Victoria: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for 
the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007; Queensland: QCA, Market and 
non-market customers as at 31 March 2007 (available at http://www.qca.org.au).
14 StAtE oF tHE ENErGY MArKEt
The AEMC completed a review of Victoria’s energy 
retail markets in February 2008, and found that 
competition is effective in both electricity and gas. 
In response to the review, the Victorian Government 
announced in September 2008 the introduction 
of new legislation to remove retail price caps. The 
legislation includes provisions for the Essential Services 
Commission of Victoria to undertake expanded price 
monitoring and report publicly on retail prices. Retailers 
will also be required to publish a range of their offers 
to assist consumers in comparing energy prices. Other 
obligations on retailers, including the obligation 
to supply and the consumer protection framework, are 
not affected by the removal of retail price regulation. 
The Victorian Government retains a reserve power 
to reinstate retail price regulation if competition is found 
in the future to be no longer effective.19
The AEMC is currently reviewing the South Australian 
market. The First final report, released in September 
2008, found that competition is effective for small 
electricity and gas customers in South Australia, with 
competition being more intense in electricity than 
in gas. Although the AEMC considered that overall 
competition was effective, it noted that new entry may 
be limited due to rising spot prices, increased spot price 
volatility and increasing vertical integration in South 
Australia’s electricity market.
Several jurisdictions have announced increases 
in regulated default prices in 2007 and 2008 in response 
to rising wholesale energy and hedging costs. Table 3 
summarises recent regulated electricity price movements. 
In addition, several jurisdictions have allowed for further 
price revisions if wholesale costs continue to rise.
Table	3	 Electricity	retail	prices	—	recent	regulatory	and	government	decisions
jurisDicTioN pErioD rETailErs iNcrEasE	
iN	rEGulaTED	TariFF
New South Wales 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 energyaustralia 
integral energy 
Country energy
CPi + 4.1% 
CPi + 4.9% 
CPi + 3.7% 
(annual adjustments)
Victoria 1 January 2008 
to 31 December 2008
aGl energy 
origin energy 
tRuenergy
CPi + 10.7% 
CPi + 10.9% 
CPi + 15.5%
Queensland 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 all licensed retailers 5.40%
South australia 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2011 aGl energy 12.3% in 1 Jan 2008 to 30 June 
2008; then CPi-only increase 
to July 2011
tasmania 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2010 aurora energy 16.0% in 1 Jan 08 to 30 June 08, 
4.0% in 2008 – 09 and 
3.8% in 2009 – 10
aCt 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 actewaGl Retail 7.11%
Western australia 1 July 2009 Synergy 
horizon Power
10.0%
CPI, consumer price index.
Sources: New South Wales: IPART, Regulated electricity retail tariffs and charges for small customers 2007 to 2010 2007; Electricity, final report and final determination, 
June 2007; Victoria: Department of Primary Industries, Victorian Energy Prices Fact Sheet, November 2007; Queensland: QCA, Benchmark retail cost index for electricity 
2008 – 09, final decision, May 2008; South Australia: ESCOSA, Review of retail electricity price path final inquiry report and price determination 2007, November 2007; 
Tasmania: OTTER, Investigation of prices for electricity distribution services and retail tariffs on mainland Tasmania, final report and proposed maximum 
prices, September 2007; ACT: ICRC, Fınal decision and price direction retail prices for noncontestable electricity customers, report 4 of 2008, June 2008; Western Australia: 
Energy Operators (Regional Power Corporation) (charges) By-laws 2006 (WA); Premier (WA) (Hon. Alan Carpenter), State government to phase in electricity price 
increases, media statement, 4 April 2007.
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19 Premier of Victoria, Brumby Government Boosts Transparency in Power Pricing, media release, 11 September 2008.
Retail price comparisons between the jurisdictions 
should be undertaken with care. In particular, 
there are differences in the operating environments 
of retail businesses, including the degree of retailer 
exposure to wholesale costs. There were also historic 
differences in price levels across jurisdictions. That 
said, several jurisdictions have agreed to significant 
increases in default prices. In the eastern states, these 
price increases have been mainly linked to the effects 
of drought on wholesale costs in 2007. In Western 
Australia, the government has announced that it will 
increase regulated prices after several years of declining 
real prices.
While price increases have been most evident for 
electricity, Western Australia, South Australia and — to 
a lesser extent — Victoria and New South Wales, 
have also announced significant increases in default 
retail prices for natural gas in response to rising 
wholesale costs.
Fıgure 6 estimates trends in average retail prices 
(reflecting both regulated and market contracts) over 
time. In the longer term, it is likely that climate change 
policies will add to upward pressure on retail prices. 
The Australian Government’s green paper on the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme estimates that 
a carbon emissions price of $20 per tonne could result 
in household electricity prices rising by up to 16 per cent. 
Retail gas prices are also likely to increase as demand for 
gas-fired generation increases.
asset	ownership
Table 4 summarises merger and acquisition activity 
in the energy sector since January 2007. The trend 
towards greater specialisation in asset ownership has 
continued. Capital market drivers have led to entities 
specialising in either the provision of network 
infrastructure services or non-network (production, 
generation and retail) services. At the same time, there 
is increasing integration within each sector.
Figure	6	
Electricity	and	gas	retail	price	index	(real)	—	australian	capital	cities
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Source: ABS, cat. no. 6401.1 and 6427.0.
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Table	4	 Energy	market	merger	activity,	1	january	2007	to	30	september	2008
DaTE proposal sEcTors	aFFEcTED sTaTus
Jan 2007 aGl energy acquisition of a 27.5% stake in Queensland Gas Company Gas: production acquired
Feb 2007 aGl energy acquisition of Powerdirect from the Qld Government electricity: retail acquired
Jul 2007 aGl energy and tRuenergy swap of electricity generation assets in South 
australia (aGl energy acquired the torrens island power station in return 
for $300 million and the hallett power station)
aPa Group acquisition of origin energy’s gas network assets, including a 
33% stake in the Sea Gas Pipeline and a 17% share in envestra
City Spring infrastructure trust (Singapore) acquisition of the Basslink 
interconnector from National Grid (uK)
electricity: generation  
 
Gas: transmission, 
distribution
electricity: 
transmission
acquired 
 
acquired 
acquired
aug 2007 international Power acquisition of remaining 50% of the ea – iP Retail 
Partnership, to acquire full ownership
electricity: retail 
Gas: retail
acquired
oct 2007 Babcock & Brown and Singapore Power acquisition of alinta electricity: generation, 
transmission, 
distribution, retail 
Gas: transmission, 
distribution, retail
acquired
Nov 2007 transfield Services acquisition of Qld Government wind farm assets electricity: generation acquired
Dec 2007 aGl energy and arrow energy joint venture acquisition of enertrade’s 
Moranbah gas assets
electricity: generation 
Gas: production, 
transmission
acquired
apr 2008 BG Group acquisition of around 20% of Queensland Gas Company Gas: production acquired
May 2008 BG Group acquisition of origin energy 
 
 
Petronas acquisition of 40% of Santos’ lNG project at Gladstone 
(joint venture)
electricity: generation, 
retail 
Gas: production, 
transmission, retail
Gas: production
Proposal withdrawn 
9 September 2008 
 
Regulatory approvals 
obtained
Jun 2008 Shell acquisition of 30% of arrow energy’s upstream gas assets
BBi announces a potential sale of up to 50% of Powerco
Victorian Funds Management Corporation acquisition of North Queensland 
Gas Pipeline from aGl energy – arrow energy joint venture
Gas: production
Gas: distribution 
Gas: transmission
Preliminary agreement
Formal price discovery 
acquired
Jul 2008 industry Funds Management acquisition of Babcock & Brown Power’s 
share of ecogen energy (73%), to obtain full ownership (ecogen energy 
owns the Newport and Jeeralang generators)
origin energy acquisition of BBP’s uranquinty generator
electricity: generation 
 
electricity: generation
acquired 
 
acquired
aug 2008 aPa Group acquisition of Country Pipelines (owner of the Central Ranges 
Pipeline)
tas Government acquisition of Babcock & Brown Power’s tamar generator 
 
Queensland Gas Company acquisition of Sunshine Gas
aRC energy and australian Worldwide exploration merger. Demerger of 
Buru energy (Canning Basin assets)
Gas: transmission 
electricity: generation 
 
 
Gas: production
Gas: production
Sales agreement 
entered into
aCCC accepted tas 
Government under-
taking to onsell the 
asset to aurora energy
Shareholders proposal 
Completed
Sep 2008 ConocoPhillips acquisition of 50% of origin energy’s CSG assets in 
Queensland (including associated lNG projects)
hydro tasmania acquisition of Momentum energy (51% immediately and 
balance in 2010)
ReSt acquisition of ClP Group’s 33% stake in the Sea Gas Pipeline
Gas: production 
electricity: generation, 
retail
Gas: transmission
Conditional agreement 
approved by company 
boards
acquired
ACCC, Australian Competition & Consumer Commission; BBI, Babcock & Brown Infrastructure; BBP, Babcock & Brown Power; CSG, coal seam gas; EA–IP, Energy 
Australia–International Power; LNG, liquefied natural gas; REST, Retail Employees Superannuation Trust.
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Table	5	 ownership	of	private	network	infrastructure	at	1	august	2008
ElEcTriciTy	
DisTribuTioN
Gas	
DisTribuTioN
ElEcTriciTy	
TraNsMissioN
Gas	
TraNsMissioN
Singapore Power international (includes Jemena & 
SP ausNet)
Vic, aCt Vic, NSW, aCt Vic, Basslink Qld, Vic-NSW
aPa Group Qld interconnectors NSW, Vic, Qld, Wa, 
Vic-Sa, Nt
Cheung Kong infrastructure/Spark infrastructure Vic, Sa
Babcock & Brown infrastructure (some with Duet) Wa, tas, Vic Wa, tas
epic energy (hastings) Sa, Qld, Qld-Sa, 
Wa
envestra Vic, Qld, Sa Nt
This has seen a rationalisation of the energy networks 
sector (table 5), with Singapore Power International 
(and related entities Jemena and SP AusNet), the 
APA Group (formerly Australian Pipeline Trust), 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure/Spark Infrastructure and 
the Babcock & Brown group emerging as key private 
sector players. Epic Energy (Hastings) and Envestra 
focus on the gas pipeline sector. There have been moves 
towards further ownership consolidation over the last 
year. Singapore Power International and the Babcock 
& Brown group completed their acquisition of Alinta 
in October 2007, establishing these businesses among 
the leading network owners.
A substantially different set of entities operate private 
generation and retail businesses, with significant 
ownership consolidation occurring between these 
sectors in Victoria and South Australia. Two major 
retailers — AGL Energy and TRUenergy — have 
significant generation interests. In July 2007, AGL 
Energy and TRUenergy completed a generator swap 
in South Australia that moved the generation capacity 
of each business into closer alignment with their 
retail loads. While the third major retailer — Origin 
Energy — currently has limited generation capacity, it has 
several major development projects under construction 
(see table 1). Another major generator — International 
Power — has launched a retail arm called Simply Energy.
There has also been vertical integration in the public 
electricity sector. Snowy Hydro owns Red Energy, which 
has acquired some retail market share in Victoria and 
South Australia. In September 2008, Hydro Tasmania 
acquired a controlling interest in the small private 
retailer Momentum Energy.
Towards the middle of 2008, capital market pressures 
led to Babcock & Brown Power announcing the sale 
of several generation assets, including the Uranquinty 
development (to Origin Energy) and the Victorian 
Newport and Jeeralang generators (to Industry Funds 
Management). It also announced the sale of the Tamar 
Valley power project (to the Tasmanian Government) 
and of its interests in generation projects in Western 
Australia. In addition, Babcock & Brown Infrastructure 
announced a possible partial sale of Powerco, which 
owns the Tasmanian gas distribution network.
In June 2008, the New South Wales Government 
announced that it planned to privatise its electricity 
generation and retail assets through a combination 
of trade sales and share offerings. The New South 
Wales Auditor-General reported in August 2008 
that the asset sales would raise no adverse issues for 
taxpayers. In September 2008, the New South Wales 
Premier announced that the sale of government retailers 
would proceed, but that the state would retain its 
generation assets.
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There has been significant merger and acquisition 
activity in the gas production sector, with interest 
focused mainly on CSG (and associated LNG 
proposals) in Queensland. Queensland Gas Company, 
the third largest producer in the Surat – Bowen Basin, 
has been a focus of acquisition interest. Following 
an unsuccessful takeover attempt by Santos in 2006, 
the company formed a strategic partnership with AGL 
Energy in 2007, which allowed AGL Energy to acquire 
a 27.5 per cent stake in the business. Queensland 
Gas Company sold a further 20 per cent stake in its 
assets to BG Group (formerly British Gas) in 2008. 
BG Group sought to further expand its market profile 
in 2008 by attempting to acquire Origin Energy. The bid 
failed in September 2008 when Origin Energy entered 
an agreement to develop its CSG and LNG projects 
with ConocoPhillips.
The	aEr’s	role
With the transition to national regulation, the AER 
is now the economic regulator of all energy network 
assets in southern and eastern Australia, as well as gas 
pipeline assets in the Northern Territory. It also monitors 
the wholesale electricity market for compliance with the 
underpinning legislation, and reports on market activity. 
It has similar monitoring and enforcement roles in the 
evolving gas market structure.
As the national regulator, the AER will continue 
to work closely with stakeholders in these roles. It will 
look to apply consistent and transparent approaches 
to encourage efficient investment and reliable service 
delivery. The AER is also looking to innovate in areas 
where improvement might be needed. In the past year, 
for example, the AER has launched new schemes that 
provide incentives for electricity network businesses 
to reduce congestion and provide more reliable services.
The AER will continue to work towards best practice 
regulatory and enforcement outcomes, including 
the provision of independent and comprehensive 
information on market developments.
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	 	AbbreviAtions
M
ar
k 
W
ils
on
1P	 proved reserves 
2P	 proved plus probable reserves
3P	 proved plus probable plus possible reserves 
AASB	 Australian Accounting Standards Board
ABARE	 Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics
ABS	 Australian Bureau of Statistics
AC	 alternating current
ACCC	 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACT	 Australian Capital Territory
AEMA	 Australian Energy Market Agreement 
AEMC	 Australian Energy Market Commission 
AEMO	 Australian Energy Market Operator
AER	 Australian Energy Regulator
AFMA	 Australian Financial Markets Association
AGA	 Australian Gas Association
AMIQ	 authorised maximum interval quantity
ANTS	 Annual National Transmission Statement
APPEA	 Australian Petroleum Production and 
Exploration Association
APT	 Australian Pipeline Trust (part of the APA Group)
ASE	 Australian Securities Exchange
B&B	 Babcock & Brown
BBI	 Babcock & Brown Infrastructure
BBP	 Babcock & Brown Power
boe	 barrel of oil equivalent
CAIDI	 customer average interruption duration index
CBD	 central business district
CCGT	 combined cycle gas turbine
CCS	 carbon capture and storage
CH4	 methane
CKI	 Cheung Kong Infrastructure
CNOOC	 China National Offshore Oil Company
CO2	 carbon dioxide
COAG	 Council of Australian Governments
CPI	 consumer price index
CPT	 cumulative price threshold
CSG	 coal seam gas
DBNGP	 Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline
DC	 direct current
EAPL	 East Australian Pipeline Limited 
EBIT	 earnings before interest and tax
EBITDA	 earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation
EGP	 Eastern Gas Pipeline
ERA	 Economic Regulation Authority (Western Australia)
ERCOT	 Electric Reliability Council of Texas
ERIG	 Energy Reform Implementation Group
ESAA	 Energy Supply Association of Australia
ESC	 Essential Services Commission (Victoria)
ESCOSA	 Essential Services Commission of South Australia
EST	 Eastern Standard Time 
ETEF	 Electricity Tariff Equalisation Fund 
FEED	 front end engineering design
FIRB	 Foreign Investment Review Board
FRC	 full retail contestability
Gas	Code	 National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas 
Pipeline Systems
GCV	 gross calorific value
GEAC	 Great Energy Alliance Corporation 
GGP	 Goldfields Gas Pipeline 
GGT	JV	 Goldfields Gas Pipeline Joint Venture
GJ	 gigajoule
GJ/a	 gigajoule per annum
GMC	 Gas Market Company
GMLG	 Gas Market Leaders Group
GSL	 guaranteed service levels 
GSOO	 Gas Statement of Opportunities
GWh	 gigawatt hour
HKE	 Hong Kong Electric Holdings
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ICRC	 Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission
IGCC	 integrated gasification combined cycle
IMO	 Independent Market Operator
IPART	 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
JV	 joint venture
JWG	 joint working group
kcal	 kilocalorie
kV	 kilovolts
KW	 kilowatt 
KWh	 kilowatt hour
LNG	 liquefied natural gas
MAIFI	 momentary average interruption frequency index
MAPS	 Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline System
MCC	 marginal cost of constraints
MCE	 Ministerial Council on Energy
MCMPR	 Ministerial Council on Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources
MSATS	 Market Settlement and Transfer Solution
MSP	 Moomba to Sydney Pipeline
MW	 megawatt
MWh	 megawatt hour
NCC	 National Competition Council
NECA	 National Electricity Code Administrator
NEL	 National Electricity Law
NEM	 National Electricity Market
NEMMCO	 National Electricity Market Management Company
NEMO	 National Electricity Market Operator 
NEMS	 National Electricity Market of Singapore
NER	 National Electricity Rules
NGERAC	 National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee
NGL	 National Gas Law
NGMC	 National Grid Management Council
NGPAC	 National Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee
NGR	 National Gas Rules
NGS	 National Greenhouse Strategy
NGT	 National Grid Transco
NPI	 National Power Index
NQGP	 North Queensland Gas Pipeline
NWIS	 North West Interconnected System
NWSG	JV	 North West Shelf Gas Joint Venture
OCC	 outage cost of constraints
OCGT	 open cycle gas turbine
OECD	 Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development
OTC	 over-the-counter
OTTER	 Office of the Tasmanian Energy Regulator
PASA	 projected assessment of system adequacy
PG&E	 Pacific Gas and Electric 
PJ	 petajoule
PJ/a	 petajoule per annum
PJM	 Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Pool
PNG	 Papua New Guinea
POE	 probability of exceedence
PPA	 power purchase agreement 
PPI	 producer price index
PV	 photovoltaic
PwC	 PricewaterhouseCoopers
Q	 quarter
QCA	 Queensland Competition Authority
QGC	 Queensland Gas Company
QNI	 Queensland to New South Wales interconnector
QPTC	 Queensland Power Trading Corporation
RAB	 regulated asset base
REMCo	 Retail Energy Market Company
SAIDI	 system average interruption duration index
SAIFI	 system average interruption frequency index
SCO	 Standing Committee of Officials
SEA	Gas	 South East Australia Gas
SECWA	 State Energy Commission of Western Australia
SEQ	 southeast Queensland
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SFE	 Sydney Futures Exchange
SOO	 Statement of Opportunities (published by NEMMCO)
SPCC	 supercritical pulverised coal combustion
SPI	 Singapore Power International
STEM	 short-term energy market
STTM	 short term trading market
SWIS	 South West Interconnected System
SWQJV	 South West Queensland Joint Venture
SWQP	 South West Queensland Gas Producers
TCC	 total cost of constraints
TJ	 terajoule
TNSP	 transmission network service provider
TW	 terawatt
TWh	 terawatt hour
TXU	 Texas Utilities
UIWG	 Upstream Issues Working Group
URF	 Utility Regulators Forum
VENCorp	 Victorian Energy Networks Corporation 
VoLL	 value of lost load
VTS	 Victorian Transmission System
WAGH	 WA Gas Holdings
WAPET	 West Australian Petroleum
WMC	 Western Mining Company
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E.1	 Background
The period following the first discovery of natural gas in 
Australia at Roma, southern Queensland, in 1900 saw 
decades of sporadic development activity but little real 
progress toward establishment of a viable natural gas 
industry. The inability to access mass markets meant that 
production was limited to small quantities for use in the 
local area. It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that 
the foundations of the Australian natural gas industry 
as we now know it were laid, with the discoveries of 
the Cooper Basin (1963), Gippsland Basin (1967) and 
North West Shelf gas fields (1971).
The key to making natural gas a mainstream fuel 
accessible to consumers in the major population 
centres was the establishment of gas transmission 
and distribution systems. The first of these, servicing 
Brisbane, was commissioned in 1967, followed by those 
servicing Melbourne (1968), Adelaide (1969), Perth 
(1972) and Sydney (1976).
The early phases of the development of the Australian 
natural gas industry were characterised by:
> limited competitive choice for customers: population 
centres and industrial sites with access to natural gas 
generally relied on a single source of supply delivered 
via a single transmission pipeline
	 Essay
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> significant government ownership of assets and 
businesses, particularly in gas transmission and 
distribution infrastructure and retailing
> underwriting of infrastructure development by state 
governments, notably in Western Australia, South 
Australia and Victoria, where the states signed long-
term foundation contracts that supported private 
investment in upstream and midstream developments.
The Australian natural gas industry has grown 
considerably over the past decade, and the structure 
and operation of the industry has changed as a result of 
privatisation, corporate activity and regulatory reform. 
The purpose of this essay is to provide an overview of 
the current gas market; to document the important 
policy reforms, structural changes and commercial 
developments that have reshaped the industry; and to 
look at the key drivers that will determine the direction 
of future developments.
Structure of the gas industry in Australia
The structure of the industry can usefully be 
considered from three perspectives: geographic, 
functional and commercial. These are discussed in 
the following sections.
Geographic structure of the industry
Geographically, the Australian natural gas industry can 
be separated into three regional markets, defined by the 
interconnected transmission pipeline systems that link 
upstream producers and downstream consumers:
> eastern Australia, including Queensland, New South 
Wales, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 
Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia
> the Northern Territory
> Western Australia.
Each of the regional markets can be subdivided into 
sub-regional market areas that represent clusters of 
supply and demand locations linked by transmission 
pipelines. These regional and sub-regional market areas 
are illustrated in figure E.1, which also indicates the size 
of the markets in terms of current levels of annual gas 
production and consumption.
In eastern Australia, Victoria has the strongest level 
of gas demand, currently estimated at around 244 
petajoules per year (PJ/a). Queensland is now the second 
largest regional market, with demand expected to reach 
190 PJ/a during 2008. Unlike Victoria, where demand 
is dominated by small customers with low individual 
consumption (residential, commercial and small 
industrial), the Queensland market is dominated by large 
industrial and power generation customers — both sectors 
that have grown rapidly in recent years.
Total gas demand in New South Wales (including 
the ACT) currently stands at around 150 PJ/a, and 
the state’s customer profile is more like Victoria than 
Queensland. In South Australia, gas demand currently 
stands at around 107 PJ/a, having declined in recent 
years as a result of industrial plant closures and increased 
electricity imports. The Tasmanian market is in its 
formative stages — natural gas only became available 
following the commissioning of the Tasmania Gas 
Pipeline (Longford to Bell Bay, Hobart and Port 
Latta) in 2002. Demand is currently estimated at 
12 PJ/a, principally for electricity generation, and will 
grow further with additional gas-fired power plant 
under construction.
For many years, the most important source of gas 
production in eastern Australia has been the Gippsland 
Basin, and it continues to be the largest producer in 
the region, at around 250 PJ/a. Over the past five years, 
new gas developments in the Bass Strait region (Otway 
and Bass basins) have seen the productive capacity of 
the region rise by more than 130 PJ/a, with further 
growth anticipated.
The other sources of conventional gas in eastern 
Australia are the Cooper Basin of South Australia and 
southwest Queensland — now in decline, with annual 
production currently between 140 and 150 PJ/a — and 
the Surat Basin and Denison Trough regions of southern 
Queensland, which produce around 26 PJ/a.
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Figure	E.1	
Geographic	distribution	and	size	of	gas	markets	in	australia
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In recent years, a major new source of gas supply for 
eastern Australia has emerged in the form of coal seam 
gas (CSG).1 From a virtually zero base a decade ago, 
CSG production has risen to over 100 PJ/a in 2007, and 
is expected to reach as much as 160 PJ/a in 2008, with 
further strong growth anticipated.
The Northern Territory market is self-contained, with 
the current demand of around 21 PJ/a met from fields 
in the Amadeus Basin in Central Australia. As these 
fields deplete over the next few years, domestic supply 
will be drawn from the offshore Bonaparte Basin: the 
Blacktip field and associated infrastructure are currently 
under development to service the domestic market. The 
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1 Coal seam gas, also known as coal seam methane and (particularly in the USA) as coal bed methane, is natural gas (principally methane) that occurs naturally in coal 
seams. Although its production characteristics differ from conventional natural gas, processed coal seam gas is effectively indistinguishable from conventional gas. 
Coal seam gas typically meets standard pipeline gas specifications and can be routinely co-mingled with conventional gas.
alumina refinery at Gove, on the east Arnhem Land 
coast of the Gulf of Carpentaria, represents an additional 
potential gas load of around 45 PJ/a. However, despite 
previous plans for gas supply from Blacktip, and 
subsequently from Papua New Guinea, Gove remains 
isolated from gas supply and continues to operate using 
fuel oil. In 2006, Darwin became Australia’s second 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) production centre, with 
the Darwin LNG plant now producing some 3 million 
tonnes of LNG per year (about 165 PJ/a) from the 
Bayu-Undan field in the Bonaparte Basin.
The Western Australian gas market remains isolated 
from the rest of the country. Over the past 40 years, 
there has been periodic enthusiasm for the concept of a 
transcontinental pipeline link, tying abundant and cheap 
gas production in the west with large domestic markets 
in the east. However, in recent times it has become clear 
that, while Western Australia’s undeveloped offshore 
gas resources are undoubtedly abundant, they will not 
be cheap to develop and there is no commercial basis 
for integration of the Western Australian and east coast 
gas markets.
Domestic gas demand in Western Australia, at around 
330 PJ/a, is currently higher than in any of the eastern 
states. Two-thirds of this demand is located in the 
southwest of the state (Perth – Kwinana – Bunbury), with 
the balance in the northwest (Burrup Peninsula and 
Pilbara region) and in the central Goldfields region. 
With the exception of a small contribution from the 
Perth Basin, all gas produced in Western Australia 
currently comes from the offshore Carnarvon Basin. 
Around two-thirds of this supply comes from the 
domestic gas production facilities associated with the 
North West Shelf gas project, which also supplies gas 
to Australia’s first and largest LNG facility. With the 
commissioning of a fifth LNG train during 2008, the 
North West Shelf LNG project will have a production 
capacity of 16.3 million tonnes per year — equivalent 
to 900 PJ/a.
Australia’s total production of LNG for export now 
stands at 1065 PJ/a — very close to the country’s total 
domestic gas demand.
Functional structure of the industry: the natural gas 
supply chain
The natural gas industry involves a supply chain that 
includes the following functions:
> Upstream — exploration, development, production and 
processing of raw gas to produce sales gas that meets 
established quality specifications.
> Midstream — transportation of sales gas from upstream 
producers to downstream customers through high- 
and mid-pressure transmission pipeline systems.
> Downstream — wholesale supply of gas to major 
industrial and power generation facilities; low pressure 
pipeline distribution; and retail supply of gas to smaller 
industrial, commercial and household customers.
Upstream industry
The upstream gas industry covers the activities 
associated with exploration (seismic acquisition and 
exploration drilling), field development, gas gathering 
and processing. Typically, gas produced from a number 
of fields within a geological basin is transported to a 
central processing facility that effectively forms a hub 
around which subsequent exploration and development 
is focused. Examples of these processing hubs include 
the Moomba facility that services fields in the Cooper 
Basin in Central Australia, the Longford gas plant 
that processes gas from fields in the Gippsland Basin 
in Bass Strait, and the Wallumbilla hub that serves 
production facilities in the Surat Basin and Denison 
Trough areas of southern Queensland.
In order to spread risk, upstream activities are commonly 
carried out under joint venture arrangements in which 
several parties share the costs and risks of exploration 
as well as production entitlements. Commercial 
agreements between the joint venture parties set out 
the rights and obligations of the parties, as well as 
decision-making processes.
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In the past, joint venturers typically chose to market 
their gas on common terms and conditions, including 
price, and to guarantee their income streams through 
long-term sales contracts with gas utilities and other 
large customers. Nowadays, it is more common for joint 
venture parties to engage in separate marketing, although 
there may be circumstances where joint marketing 
is seen to be commercially desirable.2 To ensure that 
such activities are not in breach of the anti-competitive 
conduct provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974, the 
parties may seek authorisation from the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) by 
demonstrating that, in the circumstances applying, the 
public benefits of joint marketing exceed any anti-
competitive costs.
In terms of regulation, the view has generally been 
taken that the upstream gas industry does not have high 
enough barriers to entry, or great enough economies 
of scale, to warrant regulation of third party access (or 
the pricing of access) to facilities. This is largely non-
contentious in relation to exploration activities but less 
clear cut in relation to processing facilities, where there 
may well be benefits to be gained from at least some 
degree of consolidation and centralisation of activities. 
In the absence of regulated access, the upstream industry 
has established a code of practice for third party access 
to processing facilities. This is further discussed in 
section E.2.
Midstream industry
The midstream industry functions relate to gas 
transmission — the transportation of gas, generally at 
high pressure and often over long distances, from the 
upstream sources of production to the downstream 
gas consumers.
Characteristically, gas transmission pipelines exhibit 
significant economies of scale. It is generally cheaper to 
expand an existing pipeline, either through installation 
of additional compression or through duplication of 
sections of the pipeline where capacity is constrained 
(a process known as looping), than it is to build a new 
pipeline. These characteristics mean that there is rarely 
any incentive for pipeline owners to invest in speculative 
spare capacity, since additional capacity can usually be 
added without incremental cost penalties as and when 
market demand arises. Because it is generally cheaper 
for an existing pipeline owner to expand capacity than 
for a new entrant to build a second pipeline between the 
same producer – customer pairing, transmission pipelines 
have natural monopoly characteristics. For this reason, 
the midstream industry is subject to access regulation.3 
Upstream competition may, however, emerge where 
there are multiple sources of supply that could service a 
particular market if transport pathways are available.
The objective of access regulation is to ensure that 
where the pipeline service provider is not subject to 
effective market competition, transportation services 
are nevertheless available to third party users on a 
non-discriminatory basis and at prices that reflect 
the efficient cost of providing the service. Regulation 
therefore seeks to achieve the outcomes that effective 
competition in the supply of transmission services, if it 
existed, would be expected to deliver. As discussed in 
section E.2, the number of transmission pipelines subject 
to third party access and tariff regulation is declining 
as new investment leads to an increasing number of 
gas wholesale and retail markets being serviced by 
multiple pipelines.
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2 For example, the proponents of the PNG Gas Project, which was to deliver gas by pipeline from PNG to eastern Australia, successfully sought authorisation for 
joint marketing.
3 The regulatory instrument is the National Gas Rules, which took effect on 1 July 2008, replacing the National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline 
Systems (commonly referred to within the industry as the ‘National Code’).
Downstream industry
The downstream industry involves the wholesale supply 
of gas to large consumers, including major industrial 
and power generation sites, and the retail supply of gas 
primarily to small industrial, commercial and residential 
customers. It includes both transportation functions 
(distribution and reticulation) and sales functions (retail).
Transportation
The transportation of gas from the midstream high-
pressure pipeline terminus (often referred to as the city 
gate) to small industrial, commercial and residential 
customers is a key function of the downstream gas 
industry. Gas distribution and reticulation is a regulated 
business function. Regulation under the National 
Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline 
Systems (National Code) requires separation (ring-
fencing) of gas distribution businesses from gas retail 
sales businesses and provides for non-discriminatory 
third party access under standardised terms, including 
reference tariffs.
Gas sales: wholesale and retail
The second area of downstream activity relates to the 
selling of gas and associated services. Sales activities are 
commonly separated into wholesale and retail, although 
the distinction is less clear cut than might be imagined: 
large-scale gas users — which might be thought of as 
‘wholesale customers’ — have the choice of purchasing 
gas through a retailer or contracting directly with a 
gas producer. Some direct contracts are for supply on a 
delivered basis (in which case the gas producer arranges 
for transportation) or on an ex-plant basis (in which 
case the purchaser separately arranges with the relevant 
pipeline service provider for the gas to be delivered). 
Most very large users contract for supply directly, but 
this is not generally a practical approach for smaller 
users. Even some large gas consumers prefer to have a 
retailer deal with the upstream and midstream issues of 
gas procurement and transportation. Retailers may be 
able to use their purchasing power to secure gas supply 
and transportation on better terms than individual users. 
They may also be better able to manage supply risk by 
having access to a diverse portfolio of supply options that 
leaves the end-user less prone to interruption as a result 
of disruptions to any one source of supply.
The primary functions of gas retailers are:
> the sale and marketing of gas (both pipeline natural 
gas and liquefied petroleum gas) to customers
> the wholesale purchase of gas for retail on-sale to 
customers
> the provision of billing and other information to 
customers
> revenue collection and credit management
> customer service and contact (including the provision 
of telephone call centres for customer enquiries).
Natural gas retailing differs from electricity retailing due 
to the physical nature of the product. Gas retailers must 
ensure sufficient supply and transportation capability 
to maintain physical delivery to customers. As a result, 
retailers bundle together natural gas with transportation 
services when selling to customers.
Another key difference for retailers in the natural gas 
market is the lower degree of integration across the 
states. There is no single market operator providing 
standardised market clearing and other functions (as the 
National Electricity Market Management Company 
provides in electricity), with regulation and market 
management being the responsibility of the various 
state regulators.
Emergence of retail competition
Energy retailing in eastern Australia has undergone 
rapid development over the past decade:
> In most states monopoly (franchise) retailers have 
been replaced or augmented by private retailers 
as markets have been progressively opened 
to competition.
> Significant consolidation has occurred as competitors 
seek to gain economies of scale and pursue growth 
via merger and acquisition activity.
> Major private sector retailers have diversified 
geographically in order to grow their businesses 
and to diversify sources of risk and exposure to state 
wholesale markets.
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> Retailers have sought to further increase customer 
numbers and reduce risks by diversifying into both 
gas and electricity where possible.
> Asset intensive, highly regulated network businesses 
have been split off from energy retailing businesses 
wherever privatisation has occurred.
> The largest private sector energy retailers have 
developed vertical integration strategies.
Typically, smaller customers and those in more remote 
locations (relative to the core of the distribution 
networks) face higher fixed costs of service. Prior to the 
era of deregulation, it was common for governments 
to regulate prices so that residential and rural regional 
customers paid prices below full cost recovery, while 
prices for larger users were often set above efficient 
levels. While many jurisdictions continue to regulate 
default retail gas prices, regulatory reform over the 
past decade has been directed toward removing cross-
subsidies and achieving cost-reflective pricing across the 
full range of users.
Retail convergence and dual fuel services
Increasingly the Australian market has seen a 
convergence in the retail sector between electricity 
and gas, with most retailers now offering both gas and 
electricity as part of a comprehensive energy services 
offering. There have even been moves — in line with 
trends in some overseas countries — to incorporate data 
and telecommunication services, although the integrated 
utilities retailer model has yet to find much traction here.
The primary benefits of operating as a dual fuel 
retailer are:
> cost savings associated with retail costs by combining 
separate gas and electricity retail functions such 
as billing systems, call centres, marketing and 
administration
> offering bundled dual fuel products to customers, 
potentially providing discounts unable to be matched 
by single fuel retailers.
Retail gas pricing
The delivered price of gas to retail consumers includes 
charges for each element in the supply chain: payments 
to the upstream producers for the gas itself; to the 
transmission pipeline and distribution system operators 
for use of their transport systems; and to the retailer 
for provision of retail services including gas portfolio 
management, meter reading, and customer account 
maintenance and billing.
There are significant fixed cost components in the 
overall service package, and those costs vary considerably 
depending on the geographical location of the customer. 
As a result, prices vary significantly for customers 
with different volume requirements and at different 
locations. Because of the many differences in costs and 
circumstances across regional supply chains, comparing 
the retail price of gas at different locations needs to be 
approached cautiously: ‘apples with apples’ comparisons 
are difficult. Customers vary greatly both within 
and between regions, and the prices they face vary 
accordingly. So, for example, the average residential gas 
customer in Victoria consumes around 65 GJ/a — more 
than three times the annual consumption of the average 
Queensland residential customer. It is nevertheless 
revealing to examine how indicative gas prices vary by 
location, and what components make up those prices. 
Fıgure E.2 illustrates the components of retail residential 
gas prices in the mainland state capital cities for typical 
residential customers in those locations. Total prices 
range from around $15.50 per GJ in Melbourne to 
almost $28 per GJ in Brisbane
Upstream costs associated with the extraction and 
production of the gas itself account for a relatively small 
proportion of total cost — between 11 and 21 per cent. 
Transportation through the high pressure transmission 
system is the smallest contributor to delivered costs 
for residential consumers in the capital cities (2 to 
7 per cent). The total upstream and midstream costs 
therefore account for only around 15 per cent of 
delivered cost to residential customers. For larger 
industrial users, this proportion rises steadily with scale 
as the fixed costs associated with downstream services 
are spread across much larger gas supply volumes.
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facilities development (production projects and major 
gas-consuming plants) are still often settled for terms 
of up to 20 years. Indeed, it is commonly argued that 
such long-term contracts are essential to the financing 
of new projects because they provide reasonable security 
of long-term gas supply as well as a degree of cost and 
revenue stability.
Periodic price review mechanisms, which provide some 
protection to both buyers and sellers against prices 
moving and remaining seriously ‘out of market’, are a 
feature of most long-term gas supply contracts. Between 
reviews, prices are typically defined according to a base 
price indexed regularly (most often to the consumer 
price index (CPI)). Contract prices therefore do not 
tend to fluctuate on a daily or seasonal basis. However, 
the many variations in detailed commercial provisions 
such as term, volume, volume flexibility (minimum bill 
or ‘take-or-pay’ levels; banking rights; relationships 
between annual contract quantities and maximum daily 
quantities), penalties associated with failure to supply, 
and so forth mean that there can be very significant price 
differences between contracts. Hence, the idea of a single 
market clearing price has little relevance in the current 
Australian market.
The only state where there is a formal short-term 
trading market is Victoria. In Victoria, a spot market 
has operated since privatisation of the state-owned 
transmission, distribution and retail gas businesses 
during the 1990s. As well as trading functions, the 
Victorian market operator (VENCorp) also provides 
market-based system balancing. In other jurisdictions, 
system balancing is physically managed by system 
operators (such as REMCo), but financial arrangements 
are otherwise undertaken by transmission and 
distribution system operators. The Victorian market is 
discussed in more detail below.
The predominance of long-term gas supply and 
transportation contracts, together with the lack of active 
spot markets (outside Victoria) has resulted in a lack of 
market transparency. The long-term contracts that define 
the market commercially are typically subject to strict 
confidentiality provisions. As a result, there is little public 
domain information regarding levels of uncontracted 
By far the highest proportion of total cost is associated 
with the low pressure distribution system (38 to 
58 per cent) reflecting the high capital cost to service 
each customer. The proportionate cost associated with 
distribution is greatest in Queensland, where average 
gas consumption per customer is lowest, and conversely, 
is lowest in Victoria, where average gas consumption 
per customer is highest. Retailing typically accounts for 
around 30 per cent of total costs and is relatively uniform 
across the regions, ranging from $5.50 to $8.00 per GJ.
Commercial structure of the industry
The final basis of characterisation of the Australian 
natural gas industry is in terms of the commercial 
relationships between the functional participants.
Historically most of the gas in Australia has been bought 
and sold on the basis of long-term bilateral contracts. 
These contracts between gas producers and wholesale gas 
buyers, between producers and transporters, and between 
transporters and wholesale consumers, have typically 
been for terms of 10 to 20 years. There has been a trend 
in recent years toward shorter term supply, but most 
gas supply and transportation contracts still run for at 
least five years. Foundation contracts underpinning new 
Figure	E.2	
Components	of	retail	residential	gas	price
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gas prices for residential customers.
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gas supply, demand, price and other commercial 
variables. Steps are being taken to address this lack of 
transparency through the Gas Market Reform initiatives 
currently being pursued by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG). These reforms are discussed 
in section E.2.
Victorian spot market
The Victorian spot market, operated by VENCorp, 
operates to balance daily requirements between retailers 
and suppliers. While the market is still underpinned 
by long-term bilateral contracts, the spot market 
provides both a balancing mechanism and a means by 
which sellers and buyers are able to trade contractual 
entitlements on a short-term basis.
Spot price volatility and volumes of natural gas sold in 
the Victorian pool from March 2007 to March 2008 
are summarised in figure E.3.
The wide range in volume from less than 400 terajoules 
per day (TJ/d) to 1200 TJ/d reflects the large seasonal 
load swing in the Victorian market, with high demand 
during the cool winter months and much lower demand 
during summer. Significant volatility in spot prices 
occurred in mid-2007, partly due to water shortages 
curtailing electricity generation by hydro plants, which 
in turn drove up demand for gas for generation. While 
spot prices peaked at very high levels (up to $336 per GJ 
in July 2007), prices in the Victorian spot market mostly 
reflect underlying contract prices, currently ranging 
between $3.35 and $3.60 per GJ. The Victorian market 
therefore provides a clearing house in which gas can 
be bought and sold on an intra-daily basis, with prices 
reflecting the short-term supply – demand balance, while 
underlying long-term supply contracts insulate major 
buyers and sellers from price volatility in much the same 
way that hedge contracts operate to manage price risk 
for electricity generators and retailers in the National 
Electricity Market.
Market participants
Fıgure E.4 summarises the main participants in the 
upstream, midstream and downstream sectors of the 
east coast, Northern Territory and Western Australian 
gas markets.
Figure	E.3	
Victorian	natural	gas	spot	prices	and	volumes
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Figure	E.4	
Gas	market	participants
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E.2	 	a	decade	of	regulatory	reform	and	
policy	development
Major regulatory reform of the Australian gas industry 
commenced in the mid-1990s driven by two separate 
but related developments:
> The Competition Policy Reform agenda of COAG 
following the release of the Hilmer Report on 
National Competition Policy. In particular, COAG 
drove the removal of barriers to interstate trade in gas. 
It oversaw the industry-led review of impediments 
to competition in upstream gas exploration and 
production, the establishment of the National 
Code regulating third party access to natural gas 
transmission and distribution systems, and the 
transition to full contestability in retail energy markets 
(gas and electricity).
> Privatisation of government-owned gas businesses 
(principally midstream and downstream).
As a result of these reforms, the gas industry in 2008 
is vastly different from the industry a decade earlier. 
Ownership and operation of gas transmission pipelines 
is now entirely in private hands; new transmission 
pipelines have been built to service a greatly increased 
level of interstate trade in gas (Victoria to New South 
Wales, Victoria to South Australia, Victoria to Tasmania 
and, by early 2009, Queensland to New South Wales and 
South Australia). Government-owned gas distribution 
businesses have also been privatised in Western 
Australia, South Australia, Victoria and Queensland, as 
have gas retail businesses in the mainland eastern states.4 
This section discusses these reforms in more detail.
Upstream gas industry reform
A number of industry reviews have addressed potential 
impediments to competition in the upstream gas 
industry, starting with the Upstream Issues Working 
Group (UIWG) convened by COAG in 1998. The 
UIWG focused on three main issues:
> joint marketing
> third party access to production facilities
> management of exploration acreage and, in particular, 
administration of relinquishment requirements to 
ensure that prospective land is not locked up by 
titleholders that lack either the resources or the 
commercial incentives to explore for and to develop 
viable resources.
Subsequent consideration of upstream issues (the Parer 
Report, 2002;5 the Ministerial Council on Minerals & 
Petroleum Resources (MCMPR) and the Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE)6) has focused primarily 
on these same issues. The current position is that the 
MCMPR has recommended, and the MCE has agreed, 
that:
> there is no case for prohibiting joint marketing of gas: 
applications for authorisation of joint marketing under 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 should continue to be 
considered on a case by case basis
> there is ‘no systematic problem concerning exploration 
effort in production licence areas’ and hence no change 
to current administrative policy and practice for 
acreage management is required
> the industry code of practice governing third party 
access to upstream production facilities should 
be reviewed.
Midstream reform — the National Code
In November 1997, the Australian Government, states 
and territories agreed to enact legislation to apply a 
uniform national framework for third party access to all 
gas pipelines. This framework included the Gas Pipelines 
Access Law and the National Code. The National 
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4 The New South Wales gas distribution and retail sectors have always been privately owned.
5 Parer, Warwick & others: Towards a Truly National and Efficient Energy Market, Commonwealth of Australia, 20 December 2002.
6 Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) Statement on upstream gas issues, December 2004; Terms of Reference, MCE and MCMPR Joint Working Group on Natural 
Gas Supply, January 2007.
Code establishes the rights and obligations of pipeline 
operators and users in relation to third party access to 
natural gas transmission and distribution. It is designed 
to replicate competitive market outcomes where the 
monopoly characteristics of pipelines facilities might 
otherwise hinder third party access and the competitive 
supply of gas.
These regulatory arrangements recognised that 
transmission pipelines play a critical role in promoting 
effective competition in the Australian gas market. For 
new sources of production to enter the market, and to 
ensure that consumers are able to take advantage of 
competitive supply as those new sources emerge, access 
to transmission pipeline capacity on fair and reasonable 
terms is essential. Conversely, unregulated power to 
control access to transport services through transmission 
and distribution systems would have the potential to 
suppress competition by denying alternative producers 
a pathway to market.
Upon its introduction, the National Code applied 
to most of the major natural gas transmission 
and distribution pipeline systems. Subsequently, 
new pipelines meeting the coverage criteria of the 
National Code have also been covered. However, 
over the past 10 years, new pipeline interconnections 
and the expansion of existing pipeline systems have 
seen a significant increase in the level of supply-
side competition in major gas markets, particularly 
in South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria. 
Major new transmission pipelines, including the 
Eastern Gas Pipeline (Longford – Sydney), the SEA 
Gas Pipeline (Western Victoria – Adelaide) and the 
Tasmania Gas Pipeline, are not covered under the 
National Code (though their operators typically offer 
access to uncontracted capacity under voluntarily 
offered standard terms and conditions). The trend 
to increased interconnection and reduced regulation 
is shown in figure E.5, which compares the extent of 
the transmission pipeline network and the incidence 
of regulatory coverage between commencement of the 
National Code in 1997 and the present. As shown, 
coverage on a number of pipelines pre-dating the 
National Code has been partly or fully revoked, 
reflecting in a number of instances the increased level 
of competition within the interconnected markets.
Figure	E.5	
Natural	gas	transmission	pipeline	developments	since	introduction	of	the	National	Code
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Downstream reform
In the downstream sector, the regulatory reform process 
can be divided into reforms to distribution and retail 
market reform. Distribution sector reform has largely 
followed the transmission sector, although given the 
nature of distribution there has been less activity 
in terms of entry of new competitors in particular 
distribution regions, with new investment mainly 
related to incremental expansion of service areas by 
the incumbent operators.
Within the retail sector, the key area of reform has 
been the move to full retail contestability (FRC), which 
has in effect removed the monopoly service rights and 
obligations under the former franchise arrangements, 
and replaced them with a competitive market 
environment in which any qualified service provider 
may compete for retail customers, subject to certain 
consumer protection arrangements. The introduction 
of FRC has occurred in a staged manner across each of 
the state jurisdictions, with larger industrial customers 
becoming contestable first and smaller customers 
later. For example, customers consuming more than 
500 TJ/a became contestable in New South Wales from 
August 1996, whereas small residential and commercial 
customers (less than 1 TJ/a) did not become contestable 
until January 2002. The tranche definitions as well as 
the timing of contestability for individual tranches 
varied from state to state, with Queensland being the 
last of the eastern Australian mainland jurisdictions to 
move to FRC for all customer groups. Small customers 
(less than 1 TJ/a) became contestable in Queensland 
from July 2007.
Implementation of FRC in the small user segment has 
necessitated the introduction of retail market operators7 
to process customer transfers between retailers, to 
provide technical support and to administer market 
rules. The market operators are also responsible for daily 
gas usage allocation between retailers and gas balancing 
to maintain system security.
The retail market operators are funded by fees paid by 
distributors and retailers.
Regulation of transmission and distribution
The Gas Pipelines Access Law and the National 
Code provided, with limited amendment, the basis 
for regulation of gas transmission and distribution 
from 1997 until July 2008. Recognising the evolving 
requirements for regulation of the midstream gas 
industry, the Australian Energy Market Agreement 
signed by COAG in June 2004 included provisions for 
the development of a new national legal framework 
for the economic regulation of transmission and 
distribution pipeline assets. An independent expert 
panel was established to advise the MCE of issues to 
be addressed in implementing a national approach 
to energy access. The final recommendations of the 
expert panel were released in April 2006.8 These 
recommendations, together with the conclusions reached 
in the Productivity Commission’s earlier review of the 
National Code, have been incorporated into the new 
National Gas Law and the corresponding National Gas 
Rules, which effectively replaced the National Code on 
1 July 2008.
The National Gas Law transfers the administration 
and enforcement of the existing gas access regimes 
from state-based regulators to the national bodies, the 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) 
and the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). These 
changes are intended to provide a regulatory framework 
that supports efficient new pipeline investment while 
ensuring the interests of participants in both upstream 
and downstream markets, including users and customers, 
are appropriately considered.
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7 Victoria has had a market operator (VENCorp) in place for both electricity and gas since market establishment in 1997. The retail market operator in New South 
Wales and the ACT is the Gas Market Company (GMC), while in South Australia this function is carried out by REMCo. Queensland has appointed VENCorp 
as its market operator.
8 Expert Panel on Energy Access Pricing, Report to the Ministerial Council on Energy, April 2006.
Transfer of regulatory responsibilities
The National Gas Law sets out the basis for the 
AEMC as having responsibility for rule making and 
market development, and the AER as the national 
regulator. It provides for the AER to take on, amongst 
other responsibilities, the regulatory functions for gas 
transmission pipelines previously undertaken by the 
ACCC and the regulation of gas distribution, which 
is currently the responsibility of the various state 
jurisdictions. The role of gas transmission regulator 
transferred from the ACCC to the AER on 1 July 2008. 
The transfer of responsibility for regulation of gas 
distribution from jurisdictional regulators to the AER 
also occurred at that time. In Western Australia, the 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) will continue 
to regulate the gas pipeline sector.
Gas market reform looking forward
Despite the many changes that have occurred in the 
Australian gas market over the past decade, the reform 
agenda is by no means complete. Ongoing work is 
currently focused on the development of mechanisms to 
encourage greater transparency and efficiency in market 
operations; reform of transmission and distribution 
pipeline regulation; and long-term security of supply 
for domestic gas markets.
Gas market development
In December 2004, the MCE agreed to a set of 
principles designed to guide the future development 
of Australian gas markets:
> Increased transparency: up-to-date information 
on market and system operations and capabilities 
at all stages of the gas supply chain should be 
publicly available.
> Competitive structure: the gas market should be 
structured to facilitate a competitive market in all 
sectors and to promote further efficient investment 
in gas infrastructure.
> Freedom of trade: gas market participants should 
be able to freely trade between pipelines, regions 
and basins.
> Clear rules: there should be regulatory certainty 
and consistency across all jurisdictions, including 
arrangements for efficient management of supply and 
demand interruptions.
> Fitness for purpose: market design and institutional 
requirements should be responsive to and reflective of 
the needs of the market and market participants.
In November 2005, the MCE established an industry-
led Gas Market Leaders Group (GMLG) to prepare a 
Gas Market Development Plan.
The GMLG provided its plan in June 2006 and 
has since been reconvened to progress two key 
recommendations:
> Establishment of a bulletin board system: the 
gas market bulletin board, launched on 1 July 
2008, provides real time information to gas market 
participants and governments on the status of natural 
gas supplies around the country. It also supports 
the information requirements of the National Gas 
Emergency Response Protocol.
> Design of a short term trading market: the short-
term trading market, scheduled to commence before 
winter 2010, will provide a mandatory price-based 
balancing mechanism for wholesale gas trading.
Australian Energy Market Operator
Concurrently, the MCE agreed to a detailed 
implementation plan for a single Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO), responsible for the 
operation of both the electricity and gas industries. 
This AEMO would integrate the role of the National 
Electricity Market Management Company and existing 
state-based gas market operators. The timeline set 
by COAG for the establishment of the AEMO is 
June 2009.
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Long-term domestic gas supply
A joint working group ( JWG) established by the MCE9 
has considered how best to balance the dual objectives 
of building Australia’s LNG export capabilities while 
at the same time ensuring the long-term supply 
of competitively priced gas for domestic users. The 
significance of this issue has been highlighted by recent 
circumstances in Western Australia, where tight supply 
conditions and steeply rising domestic gas prices have 
emerged. At the same time, record oil prices have 
driven international gas prices to an all-time high, and 
proposals for new large-scale LNG export facilities 
are being progressed. Rapidly growing international 
demand, driven by strong economic growth in China, 
India and elsewhere in eastern Asia, is opening 
unprecedented opportunities for Australian LNG 
exports. At the same time, Australian governments are 
pursuing policies to ameliorate the effects of carbon 
emissions on climate change. These policies will place 
increased demands on natural gas as a cleaner fuel 
alternative for power generation, providing a bridge 
between current coal-based technologies and low 
emission technologies that may provide long-term 
solutions, but that are unlikely to be available for large-
scale commercial deployment for at least a decade.
In light of these developments, the JWG was asked to 
consider issues relating to the domestic gas supply and 
demand balance for gas; barriers to domestic supply; and 
strategies to ensure availability of competitively priced 
gas. The JWG also considered risks associated with 
major inter-regional projects, and policies to facilitate 
development of natural gas resources for both export 
and long-term domestic requirements.
The final report of the JWG, released in September 
2007, recommended that attention be centred on the 
following key priorities:
> Acreage management: further investigation into 
improving current acreage management processes — in 
particular, the granting and renewal of retention leases 
to ensure that processes are transparent and that tests 
of commerciality are rigorously applied and enforced.
> Improving the operation of existing market 
structures: development and implementation of 
a short – term trading market for natural gas and a 
bulletin board covering all major gas production fields, 
major demand centres and transmission pipeline 
systems.
> Developing an annual national gas statement 
of opportunities: a national gas statement of 
opportunities (GSOO), similar to existing opportunity 
statements for the electricity sector, to be prepared 
by the AEMO with the objective of assisting existing 
participants and potential new entrants to identify 
investment opportunities and manage their positions 
in the market. The GSOO would also be available 
as an information tool for policy makers examining 
the projected short- and long-term reliability of the 
nation’s gas supply.
> Obtaining a better understanding of new 
market developments: areas identified for 
further investigation include the likely impacts 
of a national emission trading scheme, east coast 
LNG developments, and increased use of gas in 
transport fuels.
E.3	 	Current	status	and	future	
market	directions
The success of competition reform in encouraging 
market growth and diversification in the gas industry can 
be gauged by comparing the patterns of production and 
investment prior to the commencement of the reform 
process with those currently prevailing.
Fıgure E.6 draws on statistics maintained by the 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association (APPEA) to compare the quantities of gas 
produced in Australia for domestic consumption in 1997 
with 2007 data, as well as the distribution of production 
between different producer companies. It is evident that, 
across that period, there has been considerable expansion 
and diversification in the upstream industry as reflected 
in domestic gas supply. Total domestic gas consumption 
over that period rose from 661 petajoules to 
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9 MCE and MCMPR Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply — Terms of Reference, January 2007.
976 petajoules, reflecting an average compound annual 
growth rate of 4 per cent. In terms of diversification, 
the three major producers in 1997 — Esso/BHP Billiton 
from the Gippsland Basin, the Cooper Basin and South 
West Queensland Joint Ventures (SWQJV) in Central 
Australia, and the North West Shelf Joint Domestic 
Gas JV (NWSJV) in Western Australia — represented 
more than 82 per cent of the total market. In 2007, the 
proportion of domestic supply from these sources had 
fallen to under 62 per cent.
Emerging supply sources
By the late 1990s, it had become clear that the 
established sources of gas supply in the Gippsland and 
Cooper Basins would not support longer-term market 
growth in eastern Australia, and that alternative sources 
of gas would be needed. With limited expectations of 
new conventional gas discoveries in eastern Australia, 
attention increasingly turned to the north — to Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), to the Timor Sea, and even to 
the Browse Basin off the northwest coast of Western 
Australia — for possible new sources of supply. For much 
of the past decade, the PNG Gas Project was seen 
by many as the most likely new, long-term source of 
competitive gas supply for markets in eastern Australia. 
However, what emerged was something quite different. 
The local market responded to the anticipated entry 
of PNG gas in various ways, and the emerging market 
reforms supported those responses. New sources of 
conventional gas were identified and developed in the 
Bass Strait region, both in the established Gippsland 
Basin province and further west in the Bass and Otway 
basins. New producers entered the market. Long-
term contracts for interstate supply were settled, with 
transportation of gas via new cross-border transmission 
pipelines occurring. Perhaps most significantly, 
exploration for CSG — which had enjoyed limited 
success in Queensland through the previous decade 
— began to gain real traction in terms of production and 
resources, and to achieve commercial acceptance. CSG 
won several major supply contracts that might otherwise 
have provided the market underpinning for the PNG 
Gas Project.
Figure	E.6	
Gas	production	for	the	domestic	market	—	1997	and	2007	(petajoules)
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Notes: Includes coal seam gas. 
Source: ACIL Tasman analysis using APPEA data.
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In the meantime, developments in world energy markets 
saw steep increases in the price of gas internationally, 
while gas prices in Australia remained low by world 
standards, constrained by competition from low-cost 
coal and cheap coal-fired electricity. By early 2007, value 
relativities had shifted to the point where the PNG 
gas proponents saw greater value in developing their 
resources for sale on international markets as LNG and 
the proposed pipeline to eastern Australia was shelved.
The emergence of coal seam gas
The extensive resources of black coal that support a 
world-scale export coal industry in Queensland and 
New South Wales also host vast quantities of gas (mainly 
methane) that is a close substitute for conventional 
natural gas. In Australia, this gas is most often referred 
to as coal seam gas (CSG). The key to commercial 
extraction of CSG lies in finding ways to extract gas 
from coal seams, which typically have low permeability, 
at sustainable rates high enough to justify the costs of 
drilling and production. The most prospective sites for 
CSG exploration and production are the Bowen and 
Figure	E.7	
Coal	seam	gas	prospects	in	eastern	australia
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Surat Basins in Queensland and the Sydney, Gunnedah, 
Gloucester and Clarence-Moreton Basins in New South 
Wales. The southern and central Queensland locations 
are now the clear leaders in terms of both reserves and 
production, and it is from these areas that much of the 
short-term supply growth is expected. However, there 
are good prospects also in New South Wales where 
coal measure sequences geologically similar to those 
in Queensland are now being tested in a number of 
locations. These locations are shown in figure E.7.
Both reserves and production of CSG have increased 
over the past five years, as illustrated in figure E.8.
Levels of independently certified reserves continue to 
grow rapidly. By the end of 2007, levels had reached 
around 7200 PJ of proven and probable reserves.
Production of CSG exceeded 100 PJ for the first time 
in calendar 2007, contributing almost 15 per cent of 
the total gas supply in eastern Australia. Production 
continues to rise and, with a number of projects ramping 
up to meet contractual commitments, there is no sign of 
a slow-down in production growth from the CSG sector.
Figure	E.8	
Eastern	australia	coal	seam	gas	reserves	and	
production	growth
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Source: ACIL Tasman compilation of various company disclosures.
Liquefied natural gas exports from 
eastern Australia?
Until recently, eastern Australia had not been considered 
a prospective location for LNG manufacturing, 
principally because uncommitted conventional gas 
resources in the region were inadequate to support a 
world-scale LNG facility. However, the recent surge 
in international energy prices, together with the 
identification of large resources of CSG in southern and 
central Queensland, has changed the prospects for east 
coast LNG. Since early 2007, four LNG proposals based 
on CSG feed from the Bowen and Surat Basins have 
been announced. The projects range in size from 0.5 to 
4 million tonnes per year, with potential in each case for 
increased production with the replication of the initial 
liquefaction plant.
While there are technical and commercial challenges, 
there is a compelling logic to the attempts of the 
proponents to access large, high value international 
markets at a time of burgeoning demand and tight 
supply. In particular, the current oil price environment 
has flowed on to high prices for internationally traded 
LNG, which are linked formulaically to crude oil 
prices. With oil selling at around US$100 per barrel, 
the delivered price of LNG under current price 
arrangements can be expected to lie in the range of 
US$12 to $17 per GJ. After allowing for the cost of 
liquefaction, shipping and regasification, the netback10 
value of gas delivered to the LNG plant currently stands 
in excess of A$7.50 per GJ. At these prices, and based 
on proponent estimates of capital costs, ACIL Tasman 
analysis suggests that the economics of the current 
proposed LNG projects may well be comparable to 
conventional LNG projects, many of which are based 
on large offshore gas fields for which development costs 
continue to rise rapidly.
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10 Netback value is the revenues from the sale of all products generated from one unit of oil/gas, less the costs associated with bringing that unit to market. The costs may 
include, but are not limited to, importing, transportation, production and refining costs, and royalty fees.
Whether or not any LNG proposals proceed to 
development, the fact that they offer a credible 
alternative market pathway for local gas suppliers means 
that they are starting to impact on domestic gas prices. 
Trends in pricing of domestic gas are discussed below.
Another significant issue arising from the proposed 
LNG developments relates to availability of gas 
for domestic use. A 4 million tonne per year LNG 
plant would require gas supply of between 225 and 
250 PJ/a (after allowing for gas used in processing and 
transportation). In order to provide a 20-year reserve 
backing, such a development would therefore require 
dedication of up to 5000 PJ of proven and probable gas 
(2P) resources. Total 2P resources of CSG in eastern 
Australia currently stand at between 7000 and 8000 
PJ. Given the rate of reserves built up over the past five 
years, there is every reason to believe that significantly 
more CSG reserves can be established. However, it 
is clear that the LNG proposals have the potential 
to divert very significant quantities of gas that might 
otherwise be available to domestic markets to exports. 
This does not necessarily mean that the domestic market 
will be left short of supply. However, it does mean that 
domestic supply will have to rely on higher-cost and less 
productive sources of CSG sooner than would be the 
case in the absence of the LNG projects, which in turn 
has implications for domestic gas prices.
Implications of increased pipeline 
interconnection
The rapid pace of development of the gas transmission 
pipeline system in Australia is illustrated in figure 
E.5. As the level of interconnection between regional 
markets has increased, a number of commercial and 
operational implications have become apparent. 
One important commercial opportunity afforded 
by interconnection of the transmission system is the 
potential for swap arrangements to reduce the need 
for physical transportation of gas. A swap involves the 
substitution of gas sources to meet the supply obligations 
under two separate contracts. So, for example, a producer 
with a contract to supply gas from its fields in central 
Australia to a customer in Brisbane might enter into a 
swap arrangement with a producer holding a contract to 
supply gas from its CSG fields in eastern Queensland 
to a customer in Sydney: the first producer diverts 
its supply to the Sydney customer, while the second 
producer supplies the Brisbane customer. A swap 
arrangement may be made between two different gas 
suppliers, or may be made by a single supplier within its 
portfolio of contracts (an internal swap). While physical 
interconnection of the two customer markets is not 
necessary for a swap to occur,11 increased interconnection 
of markets increases the number of swap opportunities 
that can be pursued.
Swap arrangements are potentially valuable because they 
can minimise the amount of physical transportation 
required. Savings may also come from avoiding 
or delaying the need for construction of physical 
interconnections.
While swaps can increase market efficiency by 
minimising the physical transportation of gas, reduced 
payments for transportation of gas could ultimately 
impact on the viability of pipeline service operators 
and on new pipeline investment. In the extreme, a 
network could be envisaged in which little if any flow 
occurs across the system, which instead acts as a large 
pressure balancing vessel, with physical flow being 
confined largely to peripheral areas of the network. 
High levels of interconnection and an active swap 
market that minimises the need for physical transport of 
gas therefore imply a move toward a different system of 
paying for pipeline services, one with a greater focus on 
paying for the rights to inject or withdraw gas from the 
system, rather than paying for the right to transport gas 
through the system.
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11 For example, Santos and Origin have in place a swap arrangement under which Origin meets supply obligations to Santos customers in Brisbane using eastern 
Queensland CSG, while Santos meets supply obligations to Origin’s customers in Sydney with gas from the Moomba facility. This swap does not require physical 
pipeline interconnection between Queensland and New South Wales, and one of the benefits from the swap arrangement is that it allows the contract for supply into 
New South Wales to be settled without the need to build the dry gas connection between Ballera and Moomba. However, such interconnections ultimately increase 
the opportunities for swaps to occur.
Increased interconnection also raises issues in relation 
to system management and balancing. To date, these 
functions have been undertaken on an asset by asset 
basis by individual pipeline owners (in conjunction with 
system operators such as REMCo). However, with 
increasing integration and differing ownership across 
various sections of the network, the need for effective 
coordination between assets will become more apparent. 
Current initiatives to establish a bulletin board system 
and short-term trading market (see section E.2) are 
important steps in this direction.
The outlook for gas demand
Underlying gas demand in Australia could reasonably be 
expected to increase at an average of around 2.4 per cent 
per year — broadly in line with historical trends in the 
industry — driven by both demographic growth and 
industrial expansion. This would see domestic demand 
in eastern Australia rise from 680 PJ to 1070 PJ over the 
next 20 years. Similar growth in Western Australia (well 
below historical rates, but reflecting current tight supply 
and a higher price outlook) would raise domestic gas 
demand in the west from 350 PJ to 550 PJ by 2027.
However, two factors have the potential to push total gas 
demand growth much more strongly:
> increased reliance on gas for power generation, driven 
by the expected introduction of a national emission 
trading regime within the next two to three years
> expansion of LNG production, including 
establishment of an east coast LNG industry based 
on CSG.
The introduction of emission trading, as part of a suite of 
policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, will 
make gas-fired electricity generation more competitive. 
As a result, it is likely that combined-cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) plant will be the preferred new-entrant 
technology for bulk electricity generation, at least until 
low emission coal-based technologies employing carbon 
capture and storage become commercially available 
— unlikely before 2020. The required capacity of new 
gas-fired plant to meet demand will depend on the price 
of carbon under emissions trading and other factors, 
such as the level of uptake of renewable technologies. 
For purposes of illustration, we have assumed that 
CCGT plant accounts for the majority of new base load 
generation plant in both eastern and Western Australia 
until 2020, and continues to meet half of demand 
growth as new low emission technologies are introduced. 
On this basis, the gas requirement for incremental power 
generation would add around 575 PJ to domestic gas 
demand by 2027.
Further demand growth will be driven by expansion 
of LNG production. A reasonable outlook would see 
LNG production capacity in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory increase from 16.2 million tonnes 
per year at present to 31 million tonnes per year by 2027, 
boosting feed gas requirements from 900 PJ/a to more 
than 1700 PJ/a. LNG developments in eastern Australia 
based on CSG could potentially add a further 400 PJ/a 
to demand, based on the development of 7.5 million 
tonnes per year production capacity.
Figure	E.9	
australian	gas	demand	outlook
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Fıgure E.9 summarises the growth outlook for 
Australian gas. It provides an indication of how overall 
demand could develop over the next 20 years, taking into 
account effects of emission trading and LNG expansion. 
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Under this view, total gas demand will more than double, 
to around 4300 PJ/a, by 2027.
There is, of course, considerable scope for variation in 
actual outcomes given the uncertainties surrounding 
carbon pricing and the size, timing and location of 
LNG developments. However, the analysis highlights 
the strong growth potential for the Australian 
gas market, driven by domestic policies as well 
as international opportunities.
The outlook for gas prices
Gas prices in Australia have historically been low by 
international standards. They have also been stable, 
defined by provisions in long-term supply contracts 
that reflect defined base prices periodically adjusted to 
reflect changes in a price index such as the CPI. Rarely 
have Australian domestic gas prices been linked to other 
commodities with a more volatile price, such as crude oil.
In this regard, the Australian market is quite different 
from many overseas markets, including the USA, 
UK, Europe and many Asian countries where gas 
prices closely follow oil prices. The principal reason 
for this difference is that in Australia, natural gas has 
generally been seen as a substitute for coal and coal-
based electricity, rather than for oil or other petroleum 
products. Australia’s abundant, low-cost coal sources 
have effectively capped gas prices, limiting the prices 
that large-scale users in power generation and industrial 
applications were willing and able to pay.
Through the early 2000s, wholesale domestic gas 
prices throughout Australia remained low. In southern 
Australia, prices generally moved in line with inflation. 
In Queensland, where the CSG industry was emerging 
and new producers were keen to establish market share, 
new supply contracts saw significant price discounting.
Over the past two years, a number of interacting 
factors have brought about a major shift in the outlook 
for prices:
> There has been sustained upward pressure on 
exploration and development costs. This trend is not 
confined to Australia, but has been observed around 
the world as a result of strong global demand and 
capacity constraints. It has been particularly evident 
in the offshore oil and gas sector where upstream 
development cost indicators have almost doubled 
since 2005.12
> High oil prices — now standing above US$100 per 
barrel — have flowed on to international gas prices, 
including to Australian LNG exports. This has 
accentuated the gap between international prices and 
Australian domestic prices. Producers in Western 
Australia have responded by focussing development 
efforts on higher value export markets and demanding 
steeply increased prices for incremental domestic 
supply. In eastern Australia, producers have sought 
to establish a nexus with international prices through 
proposed LNG developments. The credible threat 
of diversion of substantial volumes of CSG from 
domestic markets to LNG exports is now influencing 
both producer and consumer price expectations.
> Electricity prices rose sharply in eastern Australia 
during 2007 as drought impacted on some generators 
— and gas prices followed. While both electricity 
and spot gas prices have retreated with the easing of 
drought conditions and relaxation of other generation 
constraints, the demonstrated ability of the market 
to absorb higher gas prices will influence near-term 
price settlements.
> The anticipated introduction of a national emission 
trading scheme would make gas a more valuable 
commodity in the future. Both producers and 
consumers are now factoring this higher anticipated 
demand and value into the pricing of long-term 
contracts that will bridge into the period when 
emissions trading is in place.
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12 Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Upstream Capital Costs Index.
> Domestic coal prices are under sustained upward 
pressure as a result of the renegotiation of contracts 
for supply to Queensland and New South Wales 
generators at a time when international coal prices are 
very high and the range of coal qualities now being 
traded internationally is much wider than in the past. 
Higher coal prices effectively raise the cap on domestic 
gas prices.
The net result of these influences is that domestic gas 
prices are now rising. In the absence of any transparent 
spot market outside Victoria, and given that most 
prices continue to be settled in the context of long-
term supply contracts, it is difficult to say exactly how 
far prices have risen. However, there is anecdotal 
evidence that in Western Australia recent sales of gas 
(in limited quantities, and generally to consumers in 
remote locations) have been settled for prices above 
$7 per GJ: around three times higher than the prevailing 
wholesale price prior to the onset of supply constraints. 
ACIL Tasman understands that buyers in Queensland 
looking to secure new gas supplies are now finding 
that producers are seeking significantly higher prices, 
reportedly in excess of $4 per GJ.
The fact that most of the major CSG producers are 
currently looking to boost reserves and production 
capacity to underpin proposed LNG facilities means 
that the supply surplus which had prevailed in 
the Queensland market for several years has now 
been reversed.
Higher gas prices will, of course, encourage supply 
side responses from new entrant producers as well as 
alternative energy sources. ACIL Tasman does not 
expect to see a sustained move, in either eastern or 
Western Australia, to full export parity pricing of gas. 
On the other hand, we consider it likely that the drivers 
now in play will see gas prices rise in real terms with no 
current prospect of a reversion to former levels.
E.4	 Conclusions
Over the past 10 years, there have been profound 
changes in the Australian gas market across a number 
of dimensions. The decade has been marked by 
fundamental industry restructuring through privatisation 
of previously government-owned assets, while corporate 
mergers and acquisitions have seen shifting ownership 
and control across the supply chain. Regulatory reform 
has reshaped the industry. Ongoing investment in 
upstream exploration and production and in midstream 
transport infrastructure has given rise to the emergence 
of a much more competitive market, with greater 
interconnection and diversification of options for gas 
buyers and sellers.
While the past decade has seen profound changes in 
the industry, the next decade promises even greater 
changes. Ongoing regulatory reforms, including the 
development of new spot trading markets, will continue 
to promote competition and greater transparency 
in the market. This will, in turn, encourage a deeper 
and more liquid gas market. Meeting the challenge 
of climate change and emission abatement will place 
greater demands on gas as a cleaner source of energy 
for power generation and industrial purposes. Increased 
demand will create great opportunities, as well as pose 
commercial and technical challenges, for producers. 
Under reasonable demand projections, consumption 
of gas for domestic and export use will more than 
double over the next 20 years. This will require further 
investment in transport infrastructure and in facilities for 
peaking capacity and gas storage to manage short-term 
flexibility requirements.
With the introduction of emission trading in 2010 
and increased integration into global energy markets, 
the price of gas in Australia will more closely reflect 
its intrinsic value as a cleaner fuel as well as its 
potential alternative applications, both domestically 
and internationally.
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	 	Part	two	
ElEctricity
Electricity is a form of energy that is transported along a conductor, such as metal 
wire. Although it cannot be stored economically, it is readily converted to other 
forms of energy, such as heat and light, and can be used to power electrical machines. 
These characteristics make it a convenient and versatile source of energy that has 
become essential to modern life.
M
ar
k 
W
ils
on
The supply of electricity begins with generation in power 
stations. Electricity generators are usually located near 
fuel sources, such as coalmines, natural gas pipelines and 
hydroelectric water reservoirs. Most electricity customers, 
however, are located a long distance from electricity 
generators, in cities, towns and regional communities. 
The supply chain, therefore, requires networks 
to transport power from generators to customers. There 
are two types of network:
> high-voltage transmission lines transport 
electricity from generators to distribution networks 
in metropolitan and regional areas
> low-voltage distribution networks transport electricity 
from points along the transmission lines to customers 
in cities, towns and regional communities.
The supply chain is completed by retailers, which buy 
wholesale electricity and package it with transmission 
and distribution services for sale to residential, 
commercial and industrial customers.
Part Two of this report provides a chapter-by-chapter 
survey of each link in the supply chain. Chapter 1 
considers electricity generation in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM), the wholesale market 
in which most electricity is traded in eastern and 
southern Australia. Chapter 2 considers activity 
in the wholesale market, and chapter 3 surveys the 
electricity derivatives markets that complement the 
wholesale market.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide data on the electricity 
transmission and distribution sectors, and chapter 6 
considers retail. A survey of electricity markets in the 
non-NEM jurisdictions of Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory is provided in chapter 7.
	 		
ElEctricity
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Electricity	supply	chain
traNSMISSIoN
Transmission lines 
carry high-voltage 
electricity long 
distances
rEtaIL
Retailers meter 
electricity usage
Transformers  
convert low-  
voltage electricity  
to high-voltage 
electricity for  
transport
GENEratIoN
Electricity is 
generated at 
a power plant
DIStrIBUtIoN
Distribution lines 
carry low-voltage 
electricity to 
customers
CoNSUMPtIoN
Electricity is used 
for lighting and 
heating, and to 
power appliances
Substation 
transformers 
convert high- 
voltage electricity 
to low-voltage for 
distribution
Transformers  
convert electricity  
to safe, usable levels
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	 1	ElEctricity 
gEnEration
The supply of electricity begins with generation in power stations. This chapter 
provides a survey of electricity generation in the National Electricity Market, 
a wholesale market in which generators and retailers trade electricity in eastern 
and southern Australia. There are six participating jurisdictions, physically linked 
by a transmission network — Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital 
Territory, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania.
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1.1	 Electricity	generation
A generator creates electricity by using energy to turn 
a turbine, which makes large magnets spin inside coils 
of conducting wire. In Australia, electricity is mainly 
produced by burning fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, 
to create pressurised steam. The steam is forced through 
a turbine at high pressure to drive the generator. Other 
types of generators rely on the heat emitted through 
a nuclear reaction, or renewable energy sources such 
as the sun, wind or the flow of water to generate 
electricity. Fıgure 1.1 illustrates four types of electricity 
generation commonly used in Australia — coal-fired, 
open cycle gas-fired, combined cycle gas-fired and 
hydroelectric generation.
The fuels that can be used to generate electricity each 
have distinct characteristics. Coal-fired generation, for 
example, has a long start-up time (8 – 48 hours), while 
hydroelectric generation can start almost instantly. 
Lifecycle costs and greenhouse gas emissions also vary 
markedly with generator type.
This chapter considers:
> electricity generation in the National Electricity Market, including geographical distribution, 
types of generation technology, and the lifecycle costs and greenhouse gas emissions of different 
generation technologies
> the ownership of generation infrastructure
> new investment in generation infrastructure
> the reliability of electricity generation in the National Electricity Market.
	 1	ElEctricity 
gEnEration
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Figure	1.1	
Electricity	generation	technologies
<ZcZgVidg
<VhijgW^cZ
<Vhe^eZa^cZ
=ZVilVhiZY
EdlZgigVchb^hh^dc
6aiZgcVidg
IjgW^cZ
<ZcZgVidg
8dcYZchZg
6aiZgcVidg
EdlZgigVchb^hh^dc
=ZVi
<ZcZgVidg
HiVX`
<VhijgW^cZ
<Vhe^eZa^cZ
IjgW^cZ
GZaZVhZ
bZX]Vc^hb
9Vb
<ZcZgVidg
EdlZgigVchb^hh^dc
G^kZg[adldgYVb
HiZVba^cZ
HiVX`
8dVahjeean
IjgW^cZ
<ZcZgVidg
8dcYZchZg
EdlZgigVchb^hh^dc
9eWb#\_h[Z][d[hWj_ed Ef[dYoYb[]Wi#\_h[Z][d[hWj_ed
9ecX_d[ZYoYb[]Wi#\_h[Z][d[hWj_ed >oZhe[b[Yjh_Y][d[hWj_ed
Source: Babcock & Brown.
1.1.1 Lifecycle costs
Estimates of the economic lifecycle costs of different 
electricity generation technologies in Australia are 
provided in figure 1.2. To allow comparison, the 
costs of each generation option have been converted 
to a standardised cost per unit of electricity.1
Fıgure 1.2 includes technologies currently in use, as well 
as alternatives such as nuclear energy, and fossil fuel-
fired generators using carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology.2 The cost estimates for CCS, which can 
be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil 
fuel-fired generation (coal, gas and oil) technologies, are 
indicative only.
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1 The levelised cost of electricity is the real wholesale price of electricity that recoups capital, operating and fuel costs. The present value of expenditures is divided by the 
electricity generated over the lifetime of the plant to produce a cost per unit of electricity (in $ per MWh).
2 Carbon capture and storage, also known as carbon sequestration, is an approach to mitigating carbon dioxide emissions by storing the carbon dioxide. Potential storage 
methods include injection into underground geological formations, injection deep into the ocean, and industrial fixation in inorganic carbonates. Some industrial 
processes might use and store small amounts of captured carbon dioxide in manufactured products.
Developing a consistent evaluation of electricity 
generation costs across different technologies 
is difficult because of variations in the size and 
timing of construction costs, fuel costs, operating and 
maintenance costs, plant utilisation and environmental 
regulations. Site-specific factors can also affect electricity 
generation costs. Fıgure 1.2 therefore expresses the 
economic costs for each technology in wide bands.
Coal and gas are the lowest cost fuel sources for 
electricity generation in Australia. Of the renewable 
technologies currently used here, wind and hydroelectric 
generation are cheaper over their lifecycle than biomass 
and solar. It is estimated that the cost of nuclear 
generation would fall between that for conventional 
and renewable generation.
Figure	1.2	
Lifecycle	economic	costs	of	electricity	generation
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(in which steam is created at very high temperatures and pressures). 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Uranium mining, processing and nuclear 
energy — opportunities for Australia? Report to the Prime Minister by the Uranium 
Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Taskforce, December 2006.
1.1.2 Greenhouse gas emissions
Greenhouse gas emissions for a range of different 
electricity generation technologies, based on current 
best practice under Australian conditions, are shown 
in figure 1.3. The data takes account of full lifecycle 
emission contributions — including from the extraction 
of fuels — and estimates the emissions per megawatt hour 
(MWh) of electricity generated.
Renewable sources of electricity (hydroelectric, wind and 
solar) and nuclear electricity generation have the lowest 
greenhouse gas emissions of the generation technologies 
analysed. Of the fossil fuel technologies, natural gas 
has the lowest emissions and brown coal, the highest. 
Fıgure 1.3 does not account for CCS technologies, 
which could potentially reduce emissions from gas and 
coal-fired generators.
1.2	 	Generation	in	the	National	
Electricity	Market
Australia has about 244 large electricity generators 
(figure 1.4), of which around 190 are in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) jurisdictions in eastern and 
southern Australia.3 The electricity produced by major 
generators in the NEM is sold through a central 
dispatch managed by the National Electricity Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO). Chapter 2 of this 
report outlines the dispatch process.
The demand for electricity is not constant, varying with 
time of day, day of week and ambient temperature. 
Demand tends to peak in summer (when hot weather 
drives up air conditioning loads) and winter (when cold 
weather increases heating requirements). A reliable 
power system needs sufficient capacity to meet these 
demand peaks. In effect, a substantial amount of capacity 
may be called on for only brief periods and may remain 
idle for most of the year.
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3 This chapter has minimal coverage of Western Australia and the Northern Territory, which do not participate in the National Electricity Market. Chapter 7 provides 
more detailed information on the generation sectors in those jurisdictions.
It is necessary to have a mix of generation capacity 
that reflects these demand patterns. The mix consists 
of baseload, intermediate and peaking power stations.
Baseload generators, which meet the bulk of demand, 
tend to have relatively low operating costs but high start-
up costs, making it economical to run them continuously. 
Peaking generators have higher operating costs and are 
used to supplement baseload at times when prices are 
high. This normally occurs in periods of peak demand 
or when an issue such as a network outage constrains 
the supply of cheaper generators. While peaking 
generators are expensive to run, they must be capable 
Figure	1.3	
Lifecycle	greenhouse	gas	emissions	from	electricity	generation
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CCGT, combined cycle gas turbine; OCGT, open cycle gas turbine; PV, photovoltaic. 
Notes: 
1. The figure shows the estimated range of emissions for each technology and highlights the most likely emissions value; includes emissions from power station 
construction and the extraction of fuel sources.
2. kg CO2-e/MWh refers to the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (in kilograms, converted to a carbon dioxide equivalent) that are produced for every megawatt hour 
of electricity produced.
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Uranium mining, processing and nuclear energy — opportunities for Australia? Report to the Prime Minister by the Uranium Mining, 
Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Taskforce, December 2006.
of a reasonably quick start-up as they may be called upon 
to operate at short notice. There are also intermediate 
generators, which operate more frequently than peaking 
plants, but not continuously.
The NEM generation sector uses a variety of fuel 
sources to produce electricity (figure 1.5). Black and 
brown coal account for around two-thirds of total 
generation capacity across the NEM, followed 
by hydroelectric generation (17 per cent) and gas-fired 
generation (15 per cent).
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Figure	1.4	
Electricity	generators	in	Australia
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Note: Locations are indicative only.
Source: ABARE, Energy in Australia, 2008.
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Figure	1.5	
Scheduled	generation	capacity	by	fuel	source	—	
National	Electricity	Market,	2008
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Note: Excludes power stations not managed through central dispatch
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Figure	1.6	
Scheduled	generation	capacity	by	fuel	source	—	
regional,	2008
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Notes: 
1. Excludes power stations not managed through central dispatch.
2. New South Wales and Victoria include Snowy Hydro capacity allocated 
to those regions.
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Figure	1.7	
Wind	generation	in	the	National	Electricity	Market	
as	a	percentage	of	registered	capacity,	2008
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Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Fıgure 1.6 sets out regional data on generation capacity 
by fuel source. Victoria’s generation is mainly fuelled 
by brown coal, supplemented by gas-fired peaking 
generation. New South Wales and Queensland 
mainly rely on black coal, but there has been some 
recent investment in gas-fired generation. Victoria 
and New South Wales also have some hydroelectric 
generation, mainly owned by Snowy Hydro.4 Electricity 
generation in Western Australia, South Australia and 
the Northern Territory is mainly fuelled by natural gas. 
Tasmania relies primarily on hydroelectric generation.
Wind generation is often reported separately from other 
types of generation because its capacity is dependent 
on the weather and cannot be relied on for generation 
at specified times. The extent of new investment in wind 
generation has led the Australian Energy Market 
Commission (AEMC) to determine that new wind 
generators be classified as semi-scheduled, which will 
require them to participate in the central dispatch 
process. Wind generation is the equivalent of around 
2.8 per cent of registered capacity in the NEM. Wind 
has a significantly higher share in South Australia 
at 17 per cent (figure 1.7).
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4 The former Snowy region was abolished on 1 July 2008. The area formerly covered by the Snowy region is now split between the Victoria and New South Wales 
regions of the NEM.
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The pattern of generation technologies across the NEM 
is evolving over time. As indicated in figure 1.3, coal-
fired generators produce relatively more greenhouse gas 
emissions than most other technologies. The Australian 
and state and territory governments have implemented 
(and are developing) initiatives to encourage the 
development and use of low-emission technologies.
The Australian Government has announced that it will 
introduce an emissions trading scheme — called the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme — by 2010, with 
a detailed design to be finalised by the end of 2008. 
Some Australian governments also apply targets for 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction, renewable energy 
and other low-emission generation, and provide funds 
for technology development.
Over time, such initiatives are likely to increase the cost 
competitiveness and use of low-emission technologies 
in the generation sector.
1.2.1 Generation ownership
Table 1.1 and figures 1.8 and 1.9 provide background 
on the ownership of generation businesses in Australia. 
Across the NEM, around two-thirds of generation 
capacity is government-owned or controlled.
In the 1990s, Victoria and South Australia disaggregated 
their generation sectors into multiple stand-alone 
businesses and privatised each business. Most 
generation capacity in these jurisdictions is now owned 
by International Power, AGL Energy, TRUenergy, the 
Great Energy Alliance Corporation (GEAC) group 
(in which AGL Energy holds a 32.5 per cent stake) 
and Snowy Hydro. Some of these businesses have 
invested in new generation capacity — mainly gas-fired 
intermediate and peaking plants — since the NEM began.
There has been a significant trend in Victoria and South 
Australia towards vertical integration of electricity 
generators with retailers. In Victoria, AGL Energy and 
TRUenergy are key players in both generation and retail. 
In South Australia, AGL Energy is both the leading 
generator and the leading retailer. Across Victoria and 
South Australia, AGL Energy and TRUenergy own 
around 41 per cent of registered generation capacity.5 
In July 2007, AGL Energy and TRUenergy completed 
a generator swap in South Australia that moved the 
capacity of each business into closer alignment with 
their respective retail loads. International Power, which 
controls around 26 per cent of generation capacity 
in Victoria and South Australia, established a retail 
business (Simply Energy) in 2007 and is expanding its 
market share in that sector. Origin Energy is currently 
the only major retailer with limited generation capability, 
but has committed to major development projects.
New South Wales and Queensland have disaggregated 
their generation sectors, but retain significant 
government ownership. Generation capacity in New 
South Wales is mainly split between the state-owned 
Macquarie Generation, Delta Electricity and Eraring 
Energy. Snowy Hydro, jointly owned by the New South 
Wales, Victorian and Australian governments also has 
a significant amount of hydroelectric generation capacity. 
Two private sector entrants, Babcock & Brown Power 
and the Marubeni Corporation, each own around 
1.6 per cent of the generation capacity in New South 
Wales. The New South Wales Government announced 
in June 2008 its intention to privatise much of the 
state’s generation sector, but reversed this decision 
in August 2008.
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5 Includes AGL Energy’s 32.5 per cent stake in Loy Yang A and TRUenergy’s contractual arrangement for Ecogen Energy’s capacity. See table 1.1.
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Figure	1.8	
ownership	of	major	power	stations	in	the	National	Electricity	Market	—	major	stakeholders,	2008
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BBP, Babcock & Brown Power; GEAC, Greater Energy Alliance Corporation
Notes: 
1. Excludes power stations that are not managed through central dispatch.
2. AGL ownership excludes its 32.5 per cent stake in GEAC, which owns Loy Yang A.
3. Ecogen Energy capacity is included for TRUenergy, which has a power purchase agreement for that capacity.
4. Does not adjust ownership shares for power purchase agreements held over the capacity of some power stations.
5. Some corporate names have been shortened or abbreviated.
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Figure	1.9	
Private	and	public	sector	generation	ownership	
by	region,	2008
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Notes: 
1. Excludes power stations that are not managed through central dispatch.
2. Private/government PPA refers to capacity that is privately owned but 
contracted under power purchase agreements to government-owned 
corporations. PPAs are held by government-owned corporations over the 
Gladstone and Collinsville generators.
3. Government/private refers to joint venture arrangements between the private 
and government sectors. Tarong North and Callide C generators in Queensland 
are government/private joint ventures.
4. New South Wales and Victoria include Snowy Hydro capacity allocated 
to those regions.
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
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In Queensland, the state-owned Tarong Energy, 
Stanwell Corporation and CS Energy own around 
46 per cent of generation capacity.6 There has been 
considerable private investment in new capacity, 
including through joint ventures with state government 
entities — for example at Callide C and Tarong North. 
RioTinto, Intergen, Transfield Services Infrastructure 
Trust, Origin Energy and Babcock & Brown Power 
are among the private sector participants. Much 
of the privately owned capacity is contracted under 
power purchase agreements to state-owned wholesale 
energy providers.
The state-owned Hydro Tasmania owns virtually all 
generation capacity in Tasmania.
1.3	 investment
Investment in generation capacity is needed to meet the 
future growth in demand for electricity and to maintain 
the reliability of the power system. Investment includes 
the construction of new power stations and upgrades 
or extensions of existing power stations.
Some electricity markets (including Western Australia 
and most markets in the United States) use a capacity 
mechanism to encourage new investment in generation 
capacity. This may take the form of a tendering process 
in which capacity targets are determined by market 
operators and then built by the successful tenderers. 
Chapter 7 describes the Western Australian capacity 
market. By contrast, the NEM is an ‘energy only’ market 
in which investment is largely driven by price signals 
in the wholesale and forward markets for electricity 
(see section 1.4).
From the inception of the NEM in 1999 to July 2008, 
new investment added almost 6100 megawatts (MW) 
of generation capacity.7 Fıgure 1.10 illustrates investment 
in generation capacity (excluding wind generation) 
since the market started, while figure 1.11 illustrates 
annual investment in wind capacity. Fıgure 1.12 
illustrates cumulative investment since 1999, including 
wind capacity.
The investment profile has differed between regions. 
The strongest cumulative growth has been in 
Queensland and South Australia, with investment 
in both regions responding to high spot prices in the 
late 1990s. Queensland investment was mainly in 
baseload generation, whereas South Australian 
investment was mostly in intermediate and peaking 
generation. Investment in both regions has again 
accelerated since 2006.
There has been less investment in New South Wales and 
Victoria, but tight market conditions have recently led 
to the announcement of new generation projects in both 
regions. The bulk of new investment in Victoria has been 
in peaking capacity to meet summer demand peaks.
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6 This does not include joint ventures, such as Callide C and Tarong North, or government power purchase agreements for the capacity of privately owned generators 
(for example, Gladstone and Collinsville).
7 Includes only power stations that are managed by NEMMCO through central dispatch. There has also been investment in generators that bypass the central dispatch 
process — for example, small generators, wind generators, remote generators not connected to a transmission network, and generators that produce exclusively for self-
use (such as for remote mining operations).
Figure	1.10	
Annual	investment	in	new	generation	capacity	(excluding	wind)
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Notes: 
1. These are gross investment estimates that do not account for decommissioned plant.
2. Excludes wind generation and power stations not managed through central dispatch.
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Figure	1.11	
Annual	investment	in	new	wind	generation	capacity
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Source: NEMMCO/AER.
66 StatE oF tHE EnErgy MarKEt
Figure	1.12	
Cumulative	growth	in	net	generation	capacity	since	1999	–	2000	(includes	scheduled	wind	capacity)
%
&%
'%
(%
)%
*%
+%
H6K^XCHLFaY
'%%,Ä%-'%%+Ä%,'%%*Ä%+'%%)Ä%*'%%(Ä%)'%%'Ä%('%%&Ä%''%%%Ä%&&...Ä%%
Note: Growth is measured from market start in 1998 – 99. A decrease may reflect a reduction of capacity due to decommissioning or a change in the ratings 
of generation units.
Source: NEMMCO/AER.
Table	1.2	 Generation	investment	in	the	National	Electricity	Market,	January	2007	–	June	2008
REGioN PoWER	STATioN DATE	
CoMMiSSioNED
TECHNoLoGy CAPACiTy	(MW) ESTiMATED	CoST	
($	MiLLioN)
oWNER
Qld daandine Feb 2007 Biomass 33 29 ApA Group
Qld oaky Creek Feb 2007 Biomass 15 18 Envirogen
Qld Kogan Creek Apr 2007 Coal 750 1200 CS Energy
NSW Condong dec 2007 CCGt 30 n/a delta Electricity
NSW Eraring Jan 2008 Gas 42 n/a Eraring
NSW Broadwater Feb 2008 Biomass 30 n/a NSW Sugar 
Milling Cooperative
NSW hunter Economic Zone Apr 2008 diesel 29 n/a infratil Energy
CCGT, combined cycle gas turbine; n/a, not available. 
Note: Excludes wind generation.
Sources: NEMMCO, Statement of opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 2007; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
1.3.1 recent and committed investment
Investment in generation capacity needs to respond 
dynamically to projected market requirements for 
electricity. Table 1.2 sets out major new generation 
investment that has come on line since 1 January 2007. 
New investment in the Kogan Creek power station 
(750 MW) continues a trend of strong investment 
growth in the Queensland generation sector. In addition, 
investors have recently committed to a number 
of generation projects and have proposed several others 
(tables 1.3 and 1.4). The majority of committed and 
proposed projects involve gas-fired generation, reflecting 
the industry’s expectations in respect of government 
climate change policies.
Committed investment projects include those already 
under construction and those where developers and 
financiers have formally committed to construction. 
NEMMCO takes account of committed projects 
in making future projections of electricity supply 
and demand.
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At June 2008, developers had committed to around 
3900 MW of new capacity (table 1.3), of which around 
45 per cent was in New South Wales. The Tallawarra 
and Uranquinty gas-fired power stations are major 
private investments in the New South Wales generation 
sector. TRUenergy’s 400 MW Tallawarra plant 
is expected to become operational by summer 2008 – 09. 
Origin Energy’s Uranquinty plant is expected to be able 
to provide 471 MW by summer 2008 – 09 and be fully 
operational (640 MW) by mid 2009.
Origin Energy has also committed to new generation 
capacity in other regions, including a 550 MW gas-fired 
power station near Mortlake in Victoria (scheduled for 
the summer of 2010 – 11) and a 630 MW gas-fired power 
station in the Darling Downs region of Queensland 
(scheduled to commence operation in early 2010). Also 
in Queensland, ERM Power and Arrow Energy reached 
financial closure in 2008 on the 474 MW Braemar 2 
power station (to start in the first half of 2009).
1.3.2 proposed projects
Proposed projects include generation capacity that 
is either in the early stages of development or at more 
advanced stages, which might include a proposed 
commissioning date. Such projects are not fully 
committed, and may be shelved in the event of a change 
in circumstances such as a change in demand projections 
or business conditions.
NEMMCO’s annual Statement of Opportunities 
(SOO) for the NEM refers to proposed projects that are 
‘advanced’ or publicly announced. NEMMCO does not 
include these projects in its supply and demand outlooks 
as it considers them to be too speculative. In total, the 
2007 SOO referred to around 9460 MW of proposed 
capacity (excluding wind) in the NEM. The bulk is for 
New South Wales and Queensland. The significant 
amount of proposed capacity for New South Wales 
may reflect that the region is currently the highest net 
importer in the NEM.
Table	1.3	 Major	committed	generation	investment	in	the	National	Electricity	Market,	2008
DEvELoPER PoWER	STATioN TECHNoLoGy CAPACiTy	(MW) PLANNED	
CoMMiSSioNiNG	DATE
NEW South WALES
delta Electricity Colongra oCGt 668 2009 – 10
origin Energy uranquinty oCGt 640 2008 – 09
truenergy tallawarra CCGt 400 2008
QuEENSLANd
origin Energy darling downs CCGt 630 2010
ErM power/Arrow Energy Braemar 2 oCGt 474 2009
rio tinto yarwun Alumina refinery Gas 145 2010 – 11
Queensland Gas Company Condamine CCGt 135 2009
ViCtoriA
origin Energy Mortlake oCGt 550 2010 – 11
AGL Energy Bogong hydro 140 2009
South AuStrALiA
origin Energy Quarantine oCGt 120 2008 – 09
tASMANiA
tasmanian Government tamar Valley CCGt 191 2009
CCGT, combined cycle gas turbine; OCGT, open cycle gas turbine. 
Note: Excludes wind generation.
Sources: NEMMCO, Statement of opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 2007; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008; company websites.
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Table	1.4	 Major	proposed	generation	investment	in	the	National	Electricity	Market,	20081
DEvELoPER PoWER	STATioN TECHNoLoGy CAPACiTy	(MW) PLANNED	
CoMMiSSioNiNG	DATE
NEW South WALES
Wambo power Ventures Wellington oCGt 628 2009 – 10
Macquarie Generation tomago oCGt 500 n/a
Eraring Energy Eraring upgrade Coal 360 2009
AGL Energy Leaf’s Gully oCGt 350 2011
delta Electricity Marulan oCGt 300 2011 – 12
delta Electricity Bamarang oCGt 300 2011 – 12
delta Electricity Mt piper expansion Coal 180 n/a
Wambo power Ventures Bega CCGt 114 2009 – 10
delta Electricity Bamarang ii CCGt 100 2011 – 12
Metgasco richmond Valley oCGt 30 2009
QuEENSLANd
origin Energy Spring Gully CCGt 1000 2009
CS Energy Swanbank F CCGt 400 2012
AGL Energy SE Qld 1 (ipswich) oCGt 350 2011
AGL Energy townsville oCGt 350 2012
ErM power Braemar 2 oCGt 290 2010 – 11
AGL Energy SE Qld 2 (Kogan) oCGt 250 2012
CS Energy/AGL Mica Creek upgrade CCGt 70 2010
ViCtoriA
origin Energy Mortlake Stage 2 CCGt 450 n/a
Snowy hydro Laverton North conversion CCGt 440 2012
hrL/harbin power Latrobe Valley idGCC 400 2011 – 12
Snowy hydro Valley power upgrade oCGt 100 2010
Loy yang power unit 4 upgrade Coal 25 2008
Loy yang power unit 2 upgrade Coal 25 2009
tASMANiA
Gunns Ltd Bell Bay pulp Mill Biomass 188 2009 – 10
CCGT, combined cycle gas turbine; IDGCC, integrated drying and gasification combined cycle; OCGT, open cycle gas turbine; n/a, not available. 
Notes: 
1. Excludes wind generation.
Sources: NEMMCO, Statement of opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 2007, EnergyQuest, August 2008; various company websites.
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1.3.4 Wind projects
Wind generation is reported separately in the SOO 
as non-scheduled generation because the capacity 
is dependent on the weather and cannot be relied 
on to generate at specified times.8 Wind projects can, 
however, play an important role in providing electricity 
for future demand growth. The 2007 SOO listed about 
5840 MW of committed or proposed wind capacity, 
predominantly in South Australia, Victoria and New 
South Wales.
1.4	 Reliability	of	the	generation	sector
Reliability refers to the continuity of electricity 
supply to customers. Various factors — planned and 
unplanned — can lead to plant outages that interrupt 
power supplies. These may occur in generation or in the 
networks that deliver power to customers. A planned 
outage may occur for maintenance or construction 
works, and can be timed for minimal impact. Unplanned 
outages occur when equipment failure causes the supply 
of electricity to be disconnected.
The AEMC Reliability Panel reports annually on the 
reliability of the generation sector. The panel has set 
a reliability standard that requires sufficient generation 
and bulk transmission capacity to ensure that, in the 
long term, no more than 0.002 per cent of customer 
demand in each region of the NEM is at risk of being 
unserved. To ensure the standard is met, NEMMCO 
determines the necessary spare capacity for each 
region that must be available (either within the region 
or via transmission interconnectors). These minimum 
reserves provide a buffer against unexpected demand 
spikes and generation failure. The Reliability Panel 
also recommends a wholesale market price cap, which 
is aimed at a level to stimulate sufficient investment 
in generation capacity to meet the reliability standard. 
The panel recently completed a comprehensive review 
of reliability settings in the NEM and recommended 
a number of refinements (see box 1.1).
The AEMC Reliability Panel reports performance 
against the reliability standards and the minimum 
reserve levels set by NEMMCO. In practice, generation 
has proved highly reliable. Reserve levels are rarely 
breached and generator capacity across all regions of the 
market is generally sufficient to meet peak demand and 
allow for an acceptable reserve margin. The performance 
of generators in maintaining reserve levels has improved 
since the NEM began in 1998, most notably in South 
Australia and Victoria. This reflects significant 
generation investment and improved transmission 
interconnection capacity between the regions.
There were only two instances of insufficient generation 
capacity to meet consumer demand from the 
commencement of the NEM to 30 June 2007. The first 
occurred in Victoria in early 2000, when a coincidence 
of industrial action, high demand and temporary loss 
of generating units resulted in load shedding. The 
second occurred in New South Wales on 1 December 
2004, when a generator failed during a period of record 
summer demand. The restoration of load began within 
ten minutes. NEMMCO has published three drought 
reports to assess the impact of drought on reliability. 
For the 2006 – 07 period, it found there was no unserved 
energy due to drought.
Table 1.5 sets out the performance of the generation 
sector in selected states against the reliability standard. 
All states now operate within the standard.
Table	1.5	 unserved	energy,	long-term	averages	
to	30	June	2007
STATE uNSERvED	ENERGy
New South Wales 0.00%
Victoria 0.01%
Queensland 0.00%
South Australia 0.00%
Note: Long-term average since December 1998.
Sources: AEMC Reliability Panel, Annual Electricity Market Performance Review: 
Reliability and Security 2007 (and previous years).
70 StatE oF tHE EnErgy MarKEt
8 The AEMC published a final Rule determination on 1 May 2008 that requires new intermittent generators to register under the new classification of Semi-Scheduled 
Generator. These generators will be required to participate in the central dispatch process. Additionally, the South Australian regulator, ESCOSA, implemented licence 
conditions preventing wind farms from being classified as non-scheduled. Accordingly, all wind farms commissioned in South Australia since that date are currently 
classified as scheduled generation. Some pre-existing South Australian wind farms also have changed classification from non-scheduled to scheduled.
1.4.1 Excluded data
The power system is operated to cope with credible 
(foreseeable) supply interruptions. These events can 
be avoided through investment in generation capacity. 
But some power supply interruptions are caused 
by events that are ‘non-credible’. Typically, such events 
occur simultaneously or in a chain reaction. For example, 
several generating units might fail or ‘trip’ at the same 
time, or a transmission fault might occur at the same 
time as a generator trips. It would not be economically 
efficient to operate the power system to cope with non-
credible events (also called multiple contingency events). 
For this reason, non-credible events are excluded from 
reliability statistics.
Multiple contingency events caused a significant 
amount of unserved energy in 2006 – 07, including 
outages caused by bushfires in Victoria on 16 January 
2007 and lightning storms in Tasmania on 22 February 
2007. The bushfires in northern Victoria resulted 
in two transmission lines tripping, and the power 
system subsequently separating into three electrical 
islands. A major imbalance followed which resulted 
in 2490 MW of lost load. The lightning storms 
in Tasmania caused two 220 kV lines to trip, resulting 
in the power system on the west coast being islanded 
(disconnected from the rest of the state). A number 
of generating units then tripped, and the west coast 
transmission system eventually collapsed. The Victorian 
and Tasmanian incidents led to losses of consumer load 
but did not result in a breach of the reliability standard. 
The Reliability Panel noted that events such as these 
can seriously affect continuity of supply and that, from 
a consumer perspective, the effects are indistinguishable 
from that of reported reliability events.
1.4.2  investment in generation and  
long-term reliability
The NEM combines a number of mechanisms to ensure 
high levels of reliability in the generation sector. 
In the short term, NEMMCO can manage shortfalls 
in reserves by directing peak generators to come on line, 
or by contracting for reserve capacity (which occurred for 
Victoria and South Australia in February 2006). In the 
longer term, a reliable power supply needs sufficient 
investment in generation to meet the needs of customers.
Price signals
A central element in the design of the NEM is that spot 
prices respond to a tightening in the supply – demand 
balance. Wholesale prices and projections in the 
supply – demand balance are also factored into forward 
prices in the contract market (see chapter 3). Regions 
with potential generation shortages (which could lead 
to reliability issues) will therefore exhibit rising prices 
in the spot and contract markets. High prices may help 
to attract investment to the areas where it is needed, 
and may lead to some demand-side response if suitable 
metering and price signals are available to end users. 
For example, retailers might offer a customer financial 
incentives to reduce consumption at times of high 
system demand to ease pressure on prices.
Seasonal factors (for example, summer peaks in air 
conditioning loads) create a need for peaking generation 
to cope with periods of extreme demand. The NEM 
price cap of $10 000 per MWh is necessarily high 
to encourage investment in peaking plant, which 
is expensive to run. Over the longer term, peaking 
plants play a critical role in ensuring there is adequate 
generation capacity (and therefore reliability) in the 
NEM. Victoria and South Australia have invested 
in significant peaking generation capacity, and investors 
have committed to new peaking plant in Queensland 
and New South Wales (see figure 1.6 and table 1.3).
Historical adequacy of generation to meet demand
Fıgure 1.13 compares total generation capacity 
with national peak demand since the NEM began. 
The chart shows actual demand and the demand 
forecasts published by NEMMCO two years in advance. 
The data indicates that the NEM has seen sufficient 
investment in new capacity over the past decade to keep 
pace with rising demand (both actual and forecast levels), 
and to provide a safety margin of capacity to maintain 
the reliability of the power system.
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box	1.1	 Comprehensive	reliability	review
the AEMC reliability panel conducted a comprehensive 
review of the NEM reliability settings in 2007. it was the 
first review of its kind since the inception of the NEM. 
the panel reviewed the following reliability standards 
and parameters:
>	 the NEM reliability standard — currently set at 
0.002 per cent.
>	 Administered price mechanisms — which aim to 
ensure the reliability standard is met, while avoiding 
unmanageable risks for market participants. these 
mechanisms are the market price cap (known as the 
value of lost load or VoLL), the market floor price, 
and a cap on financial exposure (the cumulative price 
threshold or Cpt).
>	 intervention mechanisms — which come into effect 
if price mechanisms fail. NEMMCo operates a reserve 
trader mechanism which allows it to enter into reserve 
contracts with generators to ensure that supply meets 
the reliability standard. When entering into such 
contracts, NEMMCo must give priority to facilities 
which would result in the least possible distortion 
to spot prices. NEMMCo can also intervene in the 
market by requiring generators to provide additional 
supply at the time of dispatch to ensure that minimum 
reserve levels are met.
the reliability panel found that the reliability standard 
has worked satisfactorily to date. Nevertheless, it noted 
that stakeholders had perceived future risks that 
may delay investment and impact on reliability over 
time. the risks identified by stakeholders included 
uncertainty in relation to greenhouse gas emission 
policies, government ownership of generation assets, 
the risk of investment by government-owned businesses 
being driven by non-commercial considerations, and 
inadequate long-term contracting.
the review considered a number of adjustments to the 
current reliability settings to maintain confidence in the 
NEM’s ability to deliver long-term reliability. Specifically, 
the review considered:
>	 clarifying the reliability standard
>	 adjusting administered price mechanisms 
such as VoLL
>	 improving the reserve trader mechanism
>	 increasing the range and quality of information 
on reliability matters to assist the market 
in addressing potential energy constraints.
in terms of the reliability standard, the panel concluded 
that the existing standard of 0.002 per cent unserved 
energy is satisfactory. however, the panel considered 
that the measurement should more clearly specify its 
purpose. in this regard, a new version of the formal 
reliability standard will be published.
in relation to administered pricing, the reliability panel 
recommended raising VoLL in the medium term, and 
proposed to make a rule change proposal to the AEMC 
to raise VoLL to $12 500 per MWh from 1 July 2010. the 
Cpt would be similarly raised to $187 500 by specifying 
its value as fifteen times the value of VoLL.
the reliability panel also recommended a review of the 
VoLL price in the context of the reliability settings every 
two years, with at least a two-year notification period for 
any proposed change. it recommended that, for the VoLL 
to reflect its true nature as a market price cap, it should 
be renamed the market price limit. the market floor 
price should remain unchanged at –$1000 per MWh.
the reliability panel suggested that the current 
reserve trader mechanism be changed to a reliability 
and Emergency reserve trader mechanism, whose 
operation should be reviewed as part of the regular 
review of reliability settings.
in terms of increasing the range and quality 
of information, the panel recommended a new Energy 
Adequacy Assessment projection to provide information 
on projected response times to address energy 
constraints in the market that may affect reliability. the 
panel also recommended that, where possible, long-
term contract prices such as those traded on the Sydney 
Futures Exchange should be published alongside spot 
prices to provide more balanced information about the 
financial exposure of market participants in extreme 
conditions. it considered that improved transparency 
would make the market more responsive to the 
reliability settings, particularly price mechanisms.
Further information: AEMC reliability panel, 
Comprehensive reliability review, Final 
report, december 2007.
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Figure	1.13	
National	Electricity	Market	peak	demand	and	
generation	capacity
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Notes: 
1. Demand forecasts are taken two years in advance, based on a 50 per cent 
probability that the forecast will be exceeded (due, for example, to weather 
conditions) and a coincidence factor of 95 per cent.
2. NEM capacity excludes wind and power stations not managed through 
central dispatch.
Sources: NEMMCO, Statement of opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 
various years.
Reliability outlook
The relationship between future demand and capacity 
determines both electricity prices and the reliability 
of the power system looking forward. Fıgure 1.14 charts 
forecast peak demand in the NEM against installed, 
committed and proposed capacity. The chart indicates 
the amount of capacity that NEMMCO considers 
would be needed to maintain reliability, given the 
projected rise in demand. While wind generation is not 
classified as installed capacity, it is included as a possible 
source of electricity.
Fıgure 1.14 indicates that current installed and 
committed capacity will be sufficient to meet 
NEMMCO’s peak demand projections and reliability 
requirements until at least 2010 – 11, with a safety margin 
provided by wind generation.
Figure	1.14	
Demand	and	capacity	outlook	to	2012	–	13
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Notes: 
1. The maximum demand forecasts for each region in the NEM are aggregated 
based on a 50 per cent probability of exceedence and a 95 per cent 
coincidence factor.
2. Reserve levels required for reliability are based on an aggregation of minimum 
reserve levels for each region. Accordingly, the data cannot be taken to indicate 
the required timing of new generation capacity within individual NEM regions.
Data source: NEMMCO, Statement of opportunities for the National Electricity 
Market, 2007.
While the uncertain nature of proposed projects means 
they cannot be factored into NEMMCO’s reliability 
equations, they do provide an indicator of the market’s 
awareness of future capacity needs. In particular, they 
can be seen as an indicator of the extent of competition 
in the market to develop electricity infrastructure. 
Fıgure 1.14 indicates the extent of proposed capacity 
that may need to be constructed to meet projected 
shortfalls beyond 2011 – 12. While many proposed 
projects may never be constructed, only a relatively 
small percentage would need to come to fruition 
to meet demand and reliability requirements into the 
next decade.
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Generators in the National Electricity Market sell electricity to retailers through wholesale 
market arrangements in which the dynamics of supply and demand determine prices 
and investment. The Australian Energy Regulator monitors the market to ensure that 
participants comply with the National Electricity Law and National Electricity Rules.
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2.1	 	Features	of	the	National	
Electricity	Market
The National Electricity Market (NEM) is a wholesale 
market through which generators and retailers trade 
electricity in eastern and southern Australia. There are 
six participating jurisdictions — Queensland, New South 
Wales, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria, 
South Australia and Tasmania — that are physically 
linked by an interconnected transmission network.
The NEM has around 275 registered generators, 
six state-based transmission networks1 (linked 
by cross-border interconnectors) and 13 major 
distribution networks that collectively supply electricity 
to end-use customers. In geographical span, the NEM 
is the largest interconnected power system in the world. 
It covers a distance of 4500 kilometres, from Cairns 
in northern Queensland to Port Lincoln in South 
Australia and Hobart in Tasmania. The market has 
five regions: New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, 
South Australia and Tasmania (see figure 2.1).2
This chapter considers:
> features of the National Electricity Market
> how the wholesale market operates
> the demand for electricity by region, and electricity trade between regions
> spot prices for electricity, including international comparisons.
	 2	national 
ElEctricity 
MarkEt
76 StatE oF tHE EnErGy MarkEt
1 In New South Wales there are two transmission networks: TransGrid and EnergyAustralia. EnergyAustralia’s transmission network assets support the 
TransGrid network.
2 The former Snowy region was abolished on 1 July 2008. The area formerly covered by the Snowy region is now split between the Victoria and New South Wales 
regions of the NEM.
Figure	2.1	
Regions	of	the	National	Electricity	Market
>ciZgXdccZXidghIVhH6FaY CHL K^X
I]Zh]VYZYVgZVgZegZhZcihi]ZVeegdm^bViZ\Zdad\^XVagVc\Z
d[i]Z^ciZgXdccZXiZYcZildg`^cZVX]CVi^dcVa:aZXig^X^inBVg`ZigZ\^dc
Source: AER.
The NEM supplies electricity to approximately 
8.7 million residential and business customers. 
In 2007 – 08, the market generated around 208 terawatt 
hours (TWh)3 of electricity with a turnover of almost 
$11.1 billion (see table 2.1).
Table	2.1	 National	Electricity	Market	at	a	glance
Participating jurisdictions Qld, NSW, Vic, SA, ACT, Tas
NEM regions Qld, NSW, Vic, SA, Tas
Registered capacity 44 390 MW
Number of registered generators 275
Number of customers 8.7 million
NEM turnover 2007–08 $11.1 billion
Total energy generated 2007–08 208 000 GWh
National maximum winter demand 
2007–08 (18 July 2007)
34 422 MWh
National maximum summer 
demand 2007–08 (14 January 2008)
31 990 MWh
NEM, National Electricity Market; MW, megawatt; GWh, gigawatt hour; MWh, 
megawatt hour. 
Sources: NEMMCO; ESAA, Electricity Gas Australia, 2008, p. 26.
2.2	 	How	the	National	Electricity	
Market	works
The NEM is a wholesale pool into which generators sell 
their electricity. The main customers are retailers, which 
buy electricity for resale to business and household 
customers. While it is also possible for an end-use 
customer to buy directly from the pool, few choose 
this option.
The market has no physical location, but is a virtual pool 
in which a central operator aggregates and dispatches 
supply bids to meet demand. The National Electricity 
Market Management Company (NEMMCO) has 
managed the operation of the NEM since 1998, but 
this role is scheduled to transfer to a new body, the 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), on 1 July 
2009. The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) monitors 
the market to ensure that participants comply with the 
National Electricity Law and Rules.
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3 One TWh is equivalent to 1000 gigawatt hours (GWh), 1 000 000 megawatt 
hours (MWh) and 1 000 000 000 kilowatt hours (KWh). One TWh is enough 
energy to light 10 billion light bulbs with a rating of 100 watts for one hour.
The design of the NEM reflects the physical 
characteristics of electricity. This means:
> Supply must meet demand at all times because 
electricity cannot be economically stored. This requires 
coordination to avoid imbalances that could seriously 
damage the power system.
> One unit of electricity cannot be distinguished from 
another, making it impossible to determine which 
generator produced which unit of electricity and 
which market customer consumed that unit. The 
use of a common trading pool addresses this issue 
by removing any need to trace particular generation 
to particular customers.
The NEM is a gross pool, meaning that all sales 
of electricity must occur through a central trading 
platform. In contrast, a net pool or voluntary pool would 
allow generators to contract with market customers 
directly for the delivery of some electricity. Western 
Australia’s electricity market uses a net pool arrangement 
(see chapter 7). Both market designs require the market 
operator to be informed of all sales so that the physical 
delivery of electricity can be centrally managed.
Unlike some overseas markets, the NEM does not 
provide additional payments to generators for capacity 
or availability. This characterises the NEM as an 
‘energy-only’ market and explains the high price cap 
of $10 000 per megawatt hour (MWh).4 Generators earn 
their income in the NEM from market transactions, 
Box	2.1	 Development	of	the	National	Electricity	Market
Historically, governments owned and operated the 
electricity supply chain from generation through 
to retailing. There was no wholesale market because 
generation and retail were operated by vertically 
integrated state-based utilities. Typically, each 
jurisdiction generated its own electricity needs, with 
limited interstate trade.
Australian governments began to reform the 
electricity industry in the 1990s. The vertically 
integrated utilities were separated into generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail businesses. For 
the first time, generation and retail activities were 
exposed to competition. This created an opportunity 
to develop a wholesale market that extended beyond 
jurisdictional borders.
The Special Premiers’ Conference in 1991 agreed 
to establish the National Grid Management Council 
to coordinate the development of the electricity industry 
in eastern and southern Australia. In early 1994, 
the Council of Australian Governments developed 
a code of conduct for the operation of a national grid, 
consisting of the transmission and distribution systems 
in Queensland, New South Wales, the ACT, Victoria and 
South Australia. In 1996, these jurisdictions agreed 
to pass the National Electricity Law, which provided the 
legal basis to create the NEM.
During the transition to a national market, Victoria and 
New South Wales trialled wholesale electricity markets 
that used supply and demand principles to set prices. 
The NEM commenced operation in December 1998, with 
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia 
and the ACT as participating jurisdictions.
While Queensland was part of the NEM from inception, 
it was not physically interconnected with the market 
until 2000 – 01 when two transmission lines (Directlink 
and the Queensland to New South Wales interconnector) 
linked the Queensland and New South Wales networks. 
Tasmania joined the NEM in 2005 and was physically 
interconnected with the market in April 2006 with the 
opening of Basslink, a submarine transmission cable 
from Tasmania to Victoria.
The NEM experienced a regional boundary change 
on 1 July 2008 when the Snowy region was abolished. 
The area formerly covered by the region is now split 
between the Victoria and New South Wales regions of the 
NEM. The other regions — Queensland, South Australia 
and Tasmania — follow jurisdictional boundaries.
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4 The Australian Energy Market Commission’s (AEMC) Reliability Panel stated in its 2007 reliability review that it intends to put forward a Rule change proposal 
to the AEMC to raise the market price cap to $12 500 effective 1 July 2010. See AEMC, Comprehensive reliability review, Fınal report, December 2007, p. 51.
either in the spot or ancillary services5 markets or by 
trading hedge instruments in financial markets6 outside 
NEM arrangements.
2.2.1 Market operation
NEMMCO coordinates a central dispatch to manage 
the wholesale spot market. The process matches 
generator supply offers to demand in real time. 
NEMMCO issues instructions to each generator 
to produce the required quantity of electricity that will 
meet demand at all times at the lowest available cost, 
while maintaining the technical security of the power 
system. NEMMCO does not own any physical network 
or generation assets.
Some generators bypass the central dispatch process: 
they might only generate intermittently (such as wind 
generators)7, may not be connected to a transmission 
network, and/or might produce exclusively for their own 
use (such as in remote mining operations).
2.2.2 Demand and supply forecasting
NEMMCO continuously monitors demand and 
capacity across the NEM and issues demand and 
supply forecasts to help participants respond to the 
market’s requirements. While demand varies, industrial, 
commercial and household users each have relatively 
predictable patterns, including seasonal demand peaks 
related to extreme temperatures. NEMMCO uses data 
such as historical load (demand) patterns and weather 
forecasts to develop demand projections. Similarly, 
it estimates the adequacy of supply in its projected 
assessment of system adequacy (PASA) reports. 
It publishes a seven-day PASA report that is updated 
every two hours, and a two-year PASA report that 
is updated weekly.
2.2.3 Central dispatch and spot prices
Market supply is based on the offers of generators 
to produce particular quantities of electricity at various 
prices for each of the five-minute dispatch periods 
in a day. Generators must lodge offer bids ahead 
of each trading day.
Generator offers are affected by a range of factors, 
including plant technology. For example, coal-fired 
generators need to ensure their plants run constantly 
to cover their high start-up costs and may offer 
to generate some electricity at low or negative prices 
to guarantee dispatch.8 Peaking generators face high 
operating costs and normally offer to supply electricity 
only when prices are high.
NEMMCO determines which generators are dispatched 
by stacking the offer bids of all generators in ascending 
price order for each five-minute dispatch period. 
NEMMCO dispatches the cheapest generator bids 
first, then progressively more expensive offers until 
enough electricity is dispatched to satisfy demand. This 
results in demand being met at the lowest possible cost. 
In practice, the dispatch order may be modified by a 
number of factors, including generator ramp rates — that 
is, how quickly generators can adjust their level of 
output — and congestion in transmission networks.
The dispatch price for a five-minute interval is the offer 
price of the highest (marginal) priced megawatt (MW) 
of generation that must be dispatched to meet demand. 
For example, in figure 2.2, the demand for electricity 
at 4.15 is about 350 MW. To meet this level of demand, 
the four generators offering to supply at prices up to 
$37 must be dispatched. The dispatch price is therefore 
$37. By 4.20, demand has risen to the point where 
a fifth generator needs to be dispatched. This higher cost 
generator has an offer price of $38, which drives the 
price up to that level.
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5 NEMMCO operates a market for a number of ancillary services. These include frequency control services that relate to electricity supply adjustments to maintain 
the power system frequency within the standard. Generators can bid offers to supply these services into spot markets that operate in a similar way to the wholesale 
energy market.
6 See chapter 3.
7 The AEMC published a final Rule determination on 1 May 2008 that requires new intermittent generators to register under the new classification of ‘semi-scheduled 
generator’. These generators will be required to participate in the central dispatch process, including by submitting offers and by limiting their output whenever 
requested by NEMMCO.
8 The minimum allowed bid price is –$1000 per MWh.
Figure	2.2	
Illustrative	generator	offers	(megawatts)	
at	various	prices
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Source: NEMMCO.
A wholesale spot price is determined for each half-hour 
period (trading interval) and is the average of the five-
minute dispatch prices during that interval. In figure 2.2, 
the spot price in the 4.00 – 4.30 interval is about 
$37 per MWh. This is the price all generators receive 
for their supply during this 30 minute period and the 
price market customers pay for the electricity they use 
in that period. A separate spot price is determined for 
each region, taking into account the physical losses in the 
transport of electricity over distances and transmission 
congestion that can sometimes isolate particular regions 
from the national market (see section 2.4).
The price mechanism in the NEM allows spot prices 
to respond to a tightening in the supply – demand 
balance. This creates signals for demand-side responses. 
For example, if suitable metering arrangements are 
available, some customers may be able to reduce their 
consumption during peak demand periods when prices 
are high (see section 2.6). In the longer term, price 
movements also create signals for new investment 
(see sections 1.3 and 2.6).
2.3	 Demand	and	capacity
Annual electricity consumption in the NEM rose from 
under 170 000 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 1999 – 2000 
to about 208 000 GWh in 2007 – 08 (see figure 2.3(a)). 
The entry of Tasmania in 2005 accounted for around 
10 000 GWh. Demand levels fluctuate throughout 
the year, with peaks occurring in summer (for air 
conditioning) and winter (for heating). The peaks are 
closely related to temperature. Fıgure 2.3(b) shows that 
seasonal peaks have risen nationally from around 26 000 
MW in 1999 – 2000 to over 33 000 MW in 2007 – 08. 
The volatility in the summer peaks reflects variations 
in weather conditions from year to year.
Table 2.2 sets out the demand for electricity across the 
NEM since 1999 – 2000. Reflecting its population base, 
New South Wales has the highest demand for electricity, 
followed by Victoria and Queensland. Demand 
is considerably lower in the less populated regions 
of South Australia and Tasmania.
Fıgure 2.4 compares seasonal demand across the regions. 
Victoria, South Australia and Queensland experience 
high demand in summer due to air conditioning loads. 
Tasmania tends to experience its maximum demand 
in winter due to heating loads. New South Wales has 
alternated between summer and winter peaking for 
several years.
2.4	 Trade	between	the	regions
The NEM promotes efficient generator use by allowing 
trade in electricity between the five regions, which are 
linked by transmission interconnectors. Trade enhances 
the reliability of the power system by allowing the 
regions to draw on a wider pool of reserves to manage 
system constraints and outages.
Trade also provides economic benefits by allowing high-
cost generating regions to import electricity from lower 
cost regions. For example, on a day of peak electricity 
demand in South Australia, low-cost baseload power 
from Victoria may provide a competitive alternative 
to South Australia’s high-cost peaking generators. 
NEMMCO can dispatch electricity from lower cost 
regions and export it to South Australia until the 
technical capacity of the interconnectors is reached.
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Figures	2.3a	and	2.3b	
National	Electricity	Market	energy	consumption	and	peak	demand	since	1999
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Sources: NEMMCO; AER.
Table	2.2	 Annual	energy	demand	(terawatt	hours)
Qld NSW Snowy2 Vic SA Tas1 National
2007–08 51.5 78.8 1.6 52.3 13.3 10.3 208.0
2006–07 51.4 78.6 1.3 51.5 13.4 10.2 206.4
2005–06 51.3 77.3 0.5 50.8 12.9 10.0 202.8
2004–05 50.3 74.8 0.6 49.8 12.9 189.7
2003–04 48.9 74.0 0.7 49.4 13.0 185.3
2002–03 46.3 71.6 0.2 48.2 13.0 179.3
2001–02 45.2 70.2 0.3 46.8 12.5 175.0
2000–01 43.0 69.4 0.3 46.9 13.0 172.5
1999–00 41.0 67.6 0.2 45.8 12.4 167.1
Notes: 
1. Tasmania entered the market on 29 May 2005.
2. The Snowy region was abolished on 1 July 2008.
Source: NEMMCO.
Figure	2.4	
Seasonal	peak	demand	in	the	National	Electricity	Market
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Figure	2.5	
Trade	flows	across	National	Electricity	Market	regions	in	2007	–	08
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GWh, gigawatt hour. 
Notes: 
1. Energy refers to electricity consumption.
2. Capacity factor refers to the proportion of local generation capacity in use.
3. The Snowy region (not shown) was a net exporter of 1809 GWh in 2007 – 08. The region was abolished on 1 July 2008. The area formerly covered by the Snowy region 
is now split between the Victoria and New South Wales regions of the National Electricity Market.
Sources: NEMMCO; AER.
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Fıgure 2.5 shows annual electricity consumption and 
trade between the regions in 2007 – 08. The figure also 
shows each region’s generation capacity factor (the 
utilisation of local generation capacity). The NEM’s 
inter-regional trade relationships are also reflected 
in figure 2.6, which shows the net trading position of the 
regions since the NEM commenced.
Fıgures 2.5 and 2.6 show that:
> New South Wales is a net importer of electricity. 
It relies on local baseload generation, but has limited 
peaking capacity at times of high demand.9 This puts 
upward pressure on prices in peak periods, making 
imports a competitive alternative. New South Wales 
continued to be a net importer in 2007 – 08, although 
at a lesser rate than in 2006 – 07. Imports have 
accounted for between 5 and 13 per cent of the state’s 
energy consumption since the NEM commenced.
> Victoria is a net exporter because it has substantial 
low-cost baseload capacity. This is reflected in the 
region’s 73 per cent capacity factor, the highest for 
any region. Victoria tends to import mainly at times 
of peak demand when its regional capacity is stretched. 
While Victoria has consistently been a net exporter, 
its exports as a share of consumption have fallen from 
around 10 per cent in the early years of the NEM 
to about 2 per cent in 2007 – 08.
> Queensland’s installed capacity exceeds its demand 
for electricity, making it a significant net exporter. 
Queensland exports have steadily risen since 2001 – 02 
and have exceeded 10 per cent of the state’s annual 
energy consumption since 2005 – 06.
> South Australia, historically the most trade-dependent 
region, imported over 25 per cent of its energy 
requirements in the early years of the NEM. This 
reflected the region’s relatively higher fuel costs, 
resulting in high-cost generation. South Australia 
has significantly reduced its reliance on imports since 
2005 – 06, and in 2007 – 08 it became a net exporter 
for the first time. The shift reflects new investment 
in generation since 1999, including substantial recent 
investment in wind capacity. South Australia was 
less affected by the drought than other regions as it 
has no hydroelectric generation and its baseload 
generators use cooling technologies that do not rely 
on fresh water.
Figure	2.6	
Inter-regional	trade	as	percentage	of	regional	energy	consumption
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9 The New South Wales region gained additional hydroelectric peaking capacity following the abolition of the Snowy region on 1 July 2008.
> Tasmania has been a net importer since its 
interconnection with the NEM in 2006. Tasmanian 
imports rose to over 20 per cent of its electricity 
requirements in 2007 – 08, mainly because drought 
has constrained its ability to generate hydroelectricity. 
This also contributed to Tasmania’s extremely low 
capacity factor.
2.4.1 Market separation
The NEM central dispatch determines a separate 
spot price for each region of the NEM. In the 
absence of network constraints, interstate trade 
brings prices across the regions towards alignment. 
Due to transmission losses that occur when 
transporting electricity over distances, it is normal 
to have some disparities between regional prices. 
More significant price separation may occur if an 
interconnector is congested. For example, imports 
may be restricted when import requirements exceed 
an interconnector’s design limits. Import capability 
may also be reduced when an interconnector 
is undergoing maintenance or due to an unplanned 
outage. The availability of generation plant and the 
bidding behaviour of generators can also contribute 
to transmission congestion.
When congestion restricts a high-demand region’s 
ability to import electricity, prices in that region may 
spike. For example, if low-cost Victorian electricity 
is constrained from flowing into South Australia 
on a day of high demand, more expensive South 
Australian generation — for example, local peaking 
plant — would need to be dispatched in place of imports. 
This would drive South Australian prices above 
those in Victoria.
Figure	2.7	
Regional	price	alignment	as	a	percentage	
of	trading	hours
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Sources: NEMMCO; AER.
Fıgure 2.7 indicates that the NEM operates as an 
‘integrated’ market with price alignment across all 
regions for around 75 per cent of the time. The market 
is considered aligned when every interconnector in the 
NEM is unconstrained and electricity can flow freely 
between all regions. There may still be price differences 
between regions due to loss factors that occur in the 
transport of electricity.
While the extent of alignment is an indicator 
of how effectively the market is working, it should 
be noted that full alignment would require significant 
investment to remove all possible causes of congestion. 
AER research indicates that the economic costs 
of transmission congestion are relatively modest given 
the scale of the market, although these costs have risen 
since 2003 – 04 (see section 4.7).
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Figure	2.8	
Settlement	residues
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2.4.2 Settlement residues
When there is price separation between regions, 
electricity tends to flow from lower priced regions to 
higher priced regions. The exporting generators are 
paid at their local regional spot price, while importing 
customers (usually energy retailers) must pay the higher 
spot price in the importing region. The difference 
between the price paid and the price received multiplied 
by the amount of electricity exported is called a 
settlement residue. Over time, these residues accrue 
to the market operator.
Fıgure 2.8 charts the annual accumulation of inter-
regional settlement residues in each region. There 
is some volatility in the data, reflecting that a complex 
range of factors can contribute to price separation: for 
example, the availability of transmission interconnectors 
and generation plant; weather conditions; and the 
bidding behaviour of generators.
New South Wales recorded settlement residues ranging 
from around $90 million to $200 million each year 
from 2001 – 02 to 2006 – 07. This reflects the region’s 
status as the largest importer of electricity (in dollar 
and volume terms) in the NEM, which can make 
it vulnerable to price separation events. In 2007 – 08, 
New South Wales settlement residues fell by around 
75 per cent due to more benign market conditions. 
Conversely, South Australian residues increased from 
a low base to almost $88 million in 2007 – 08 due 
to record summer and autumn prices in the region. 
As net exporters, Queensland and Victoria tend not 
to accumulate large settlement residue balances.
Price separation creates risks for parties that contract 
across regions. NEMMCO offers a risk management 
instrument by holding quarterly auctions to sell the 
rights to future residues. An explanation of the auction 
process is provided in section 4.7.
2.5	 National	Electricity	Market	prices
The central dispatch process determines a spot price for 
each NEM region every 30 minutes. As noted, prices can 
vary between regions because of losses in transportation 
and transmission congestion, which sometimes restricts 
inter-regional trade.
The AER closely monitors the market and reports 
weekly on wholesale and forward market activity. It also 
publishes more detailed analyses of extreme price events. 
Fıgure 2.9 charts quarterly volume-weighted average 
prices since the NEM commenced, while table 2.3 
sets out annual volume-weighted prices. Fıgure 2.10 
provides a more detailed snapshot of weekly prices 
since November 2006. Overall, prices tended to fall 
in the early years of the NEM — especially in Queensland 
and South Australia — following investment in new 
transmission and generation capacity. In the past two 
years, drought, record peak demands and other factors 
have seen prices rise to record levels.
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Figure	2.9	
Quarterly	volume-weighted	average	prices	—	National	Electricity	Market
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Table	2.3	 Annual	average	National	Electricity	Market	prices	by	region	(dollars	per	megawatt	hour)
Qld NSW Snowy2 Vic SA Tas3
2007–08 58 44 31 51 101 57
2006–07 57 67 38 61 59 51
2005–06 31 43 29 36 44 59
2004–05 31 46 26 29 39
2003–04 31 37 22 27 39
2002–03 41 37 27 30 33
2001–02 38 38 27 33 34
2000–01 45 41 35 49 67
1999–2000 49 30 24 28 69
1998–19991 60 25 19 27 54
Notes: 
1. Six months to 30 June 1999.
2. The Snowy region was abolished on 1 July 2008.
3. Tasmania entered the market on 29 May 2005.
Source: NEMMCO.
A variety of factors led to significantly higher prices 
in 2006 – 07. In January 2007, bushfires caused an outage 
of the Victoria – Snowy interconnector, causing price 
spikes in Victoria and South Australia. Network issues 
in Queensland in late January also affected prices. From 
around March 2007, drought began to impact on prices. 
The drought constrained hydroelectric generating 
capacity in New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria 
and also limited the availability of water for cooling 
in some coal-fired generators.
These conditions were exacerbated in winter 2007 
by a number of generator outages, network outages and 
generator limitations. Tight supply was accompanied 
by record electricity demand as cold winter days 
increased heating requirements.
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2.5.1 Wholesale market update: 2007 – 2008
The drought continued to affect wholesale electricity 
prices in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and 
Tasmania during the September quarter of 2007. South 
Australia was less affected as its generators do not 
depend on fresh water for cooling. By the end of the 
quarter, drought conditions in New South Wales and 
Queensland had eased and prices across the NEM had 
fallen back towards pre-drought levels.
Wholesale prices in the December quarter were 
relatively subdued across most of the NEM. Queensland 
experienced some high-price events due to planned 
and unplanned network outages and aggressive bidding 
by a number of generators.
The March quarter of 2008 was characterised by high 
electricity prices in South Australia, Queensland and 
Victoria. South Australia experienced record high prices, 
averaging $243 per MWh over the quarter compared 
to the previous NEM record of $146 per MWh.10 
Figure	2.10	
National	Electricity	Market	prices,	November	2006	–	September	2008
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Note: Weekly volume-weighted average prices.
Sources: NEMMCO; AER.
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10 The previous highest quarterly average was for New South Wales in the June quarter of 2007.
A number of factors contributed to South Australia’s 
record high prices:
> Adelaide experienced high temperatures in January 
and February and an unprecedented 15-day heat 
wave in March 2008. The extreme temperatures led 
to record demand.
> A significant proportion of South Australia’s electricity 
is sourced from Victorian generators via the Heywood 
and Murraylink interconnectors. In December 2007, 
the South Australian transmission network owner, 
ElectraNet, reduced the maximum allowable flows 
on the Heywood interconnector by about 25 per cent. 
This constrained the supply of low-cost generation 
from Victoria.
> AGL Energy, which owns about 39 per cent of South 
Australia’s generation capacity, bid a significant 
proportion of its capacity at close to the price cap 
during the periods of high demand.
In combination, these factors led to extreme prices 
in South Australia in March 2008. The National 
Electricity Rules provide a mechanism that triggers 
an administered price cap during times of sustained 
high prices. When the sum of the prices over the 
previous week exceeds $150 000 (the cumulative price 
threshold),11 administered pricing automatically caps the 
price at $300 per MWh until the end of that trading day.
On the last day of the South Australian heatwave, prices 
reached the cumulative price threshold and administered 
price caps were applied.12 This was the first time that 
administered pricing had been triggered since the 
commencement of the NEM in 1998.
The AER is investigating the high price events in South 
Australia and, in particular, whether generator bidding 
behaviour breached the National Electricity Law and 
Rules.13 The AER is also investigating the flow limits 
placed on the Heywood interconnector by ElectraNet.14
In the June quarter of 2008, prices across the NEM 
were relatively subdued, with no extreme price events. 
This is consistent with the normal historical tendency 
for peak demand and prices to be relatively stable 
during autumn. The unusually high prices in autumn 
2007 mainly reflected drought conditions. More 
benign weather conditions in 2008 led to a return 
to lower prices.
The market in the third quarter of 2008 remained 
relatively quiet, apart from a price spike across the 
mainland NEM regions on 23 July due to an unplanned 
outage of two transmission lines in Victoria. The AER 
is investigating this incident.
2.6	 Price	volatility
Spot price volatility in the NEM reflects fluctuating 
supply and demand conditions. The market is sensitive 
to changes in these conditions, which can occur 
at short notice. For example, electricity demand can rise 
swiftly on a hot day. Similarly, a generator or network 
outage can quickly increase regional spot prices. The 
sensitivity of the market to changing supply and demand 
conditions can result in considerable price volatility.
While figure 2.10 provides an indicator of volatility 
in weekly prices, it masks more extreme spikes that can 
occur during half-hour trading intervals. On occasion, 
half-hour spot prices approach the market cap 
of $10 000 per MWh. Two indicators of the incidence 
of extreme price events are:
> the number of trading intervals where the price 
is above $5000 per MWh (see figures 2.11 and 2.12)
> the number of trading intervals per week where the 
price is more than three times the volume-weighted 
average price (see figure 2.13).
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11 The AEMC Reliability Panel stated in its 2007 reliability review that it intends to put forward a Rule change proposal to the AEMC to raise the cumulative price 
threshold to $187 500 (being 15 times the level of the recommended market price cap) effective 1 July 2010 (See AEMC, Comprehensive reliability review, Fınal 
report, December 2007, p. 85).
12 In March 2008, the administered price cap was $100 per MWh during peak periods and $50 per MWh at other times. The AEMC completed a review of the 
administered price cap on 21 May 2008 and determined that from 25 May 2008, the administered price cap would be $300 per MWh for all regions at all times.
13 AER, Quarterly compliance report January – March 2008, June 2008, p. 3.
14 AER, Quarterly compliance report April – June 2008, August 2008, pp. 3 – 4.
Figure	2.11	
Number	of	trading	intervals	above	$5000		
per	megawatt	hour	(annual)
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Sources: NEMMCO; AER.
The AER’s weekly reports on wholesale market activity 
highlight factors contributing to spot prices that are 
more than three times the volume-weighted average 
price for the week. The AER also publishes a report 
on every price event above $5000 per MWh.
The incidence of trading intervals with prices above 
$5000 per MWh has increased since the NEM 
commenced (see figure 2.11). The number of events 
more than doubled from 2004 – 05 to 2005 – 06 and 
continued to rise to 76 events in 2007 – 08. Fıgure 2.12 
sets out the data on a quarterly basis since January 2005 
and highlights some of the factors responsible for the 
price spikes. Fıgure 2.13 indicates that trading intervals 
with prices three times above the volume-weighted 
average for the week occur most frequently in summer 
and winter, when peak demand is highest.
Many factors can cause price spikes. While the cause 
of a high-price event is not always clear, underlying 
causes might include:
> high demand that requires the dispatch of high-cost 
peaking generators
> a generator outage that affects regional supply
> transmission network outages or congestion that 
restricts the flow of cheaper imports into a region
> a lack of effective competition in certain 
market conditions
> a combination of factors.
Table 2.4 summarises key features of extreme price 
events in 2007 – 08, noting the regions in which they 
occurred and indicating identified causes. In many 
instances, the table groups multiple events based on the 
AER’s public reporting of these events in 2007 – 08.
The most common causes of high-price events identified 
by the AER in 2007 – 08 were:
> extreme weather
> network availability flow limits placed on particular 
transmission lines and interconnectors
> generator bidding behaviour.
On two occasions, errors by NEMMCO also 
contributed to high spot prices.
As noted, a combination of several factors contributed 
to high prices in South Australia during the March 
quarter of 2008. South Australian spot prices exceeded 
$5000 per MWh on 51 occasions and, on 17 March 
2008, administered pricing was triggered (see 
section 2.5).
Price spikes can have a material impact on market 
outcomes. If prices approach $10 000 per MWh for 
just three hours in a year, the average annual price may 
rise by almost 10 per cent. Generators and retailers 
typically hedge against this risk by taking out contractual 
arrangements in financial markets (see chapter 3).
Extreme price events help to provide solutions to tight 
supply conditions. In particular, they create incentives 
to invest in peaking generation plant for operation 
during periods of peak demand.
Extreme price events may also create incentives for 
retailers to contract with customers to manage their 
demand in peak periods. This might involve a retailer 
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Figure	2.12	
Number	of	trading	intervals	above	$5000	per	megawatt	hour	(quarterly)
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Figure	2.13	
Trading	intervals	with	prices	above	three	times	the	weekly	volume-weighted	average
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offering a customer financial incentives to reduce 
consumption at times of high system demand to ease 
price pressures. Effective demand management requires 
suitable metering arrangements to enable customers 
to manage their consumption. The Energy Reform 
Implementation Group noted in 2007 that demand 
management activity in the NEM was mainly confined 
to the large customer segment. It estimated that the 
extent of potential demand-side response in the NEM 
is around 700 MW across a range of energy-consuming 
industries.15 At the small customer level, the Council 
of Australian Governments agreed in 2007 to a national 
implementation strategy for the progressive rollout 
of ‘smart’ electricity meters to encourage demand-side 
response (see section 6.6.4 of this report).
Table	2.4	 Price	events	above	$5000	per	megawatt	hour	in	2007	–	08
DATE	oR	PERIoD REgIoNS NuMBER	
oF	EVENTS
CAuSES	IDENTIFIED	By	AER
17 March 2008 Victoria and 
Snowy
2 Extreme temperatures in Victoria and South Australia led to record high demand.
5 to 17 March 2008 South 
Australia
26 Extreme temperatures in Victoria and South Australia led to record high demand. AGL 
Energy’s strategy of offering a significant proportion of generation capacity at prices 
above $5000 per MWh, and a limit placed on the flow of electricity on the interconnector 
between Victoria and South Australia, contributed to the high-price events.
22 to 23 February 
2008
Queensland 14 High temperatures in Queensland led to high demand. Generator bidding — including 
a large proportion of capacity being priced at above $5000 per MWh and rebids by several 
generators — contributed to the high prices.
30 January 2008 
and 7 February 2008
Queensland 2 On 30 January 2008, NEMMCO reclassified as credible the potential loss of two lines 
in Queensland due to lightning. This reduced the supply of generation from central 
and north Queensland to Brisbane. A number of generators close to Brisbane offered 
capacity at prices above $5000 per MWh.
On 7 February 2008, lightning again led to the reclassification of the potential loss 
of a line. To manage the event, NEMMCO constrained off all generation in Queensland 
and limited flows from New South Wales. The constraints were inappropriate and caused 
the spot price to exceed $5000 per MWh.
26 January 2008 Snowy 1 A planned network outage in Victoria forced very large flows from Snowy to Victoria. The 
impact of this outage was not accurately predicted and the direction of flow between 
these regions was counter to normal spot price signals. Rebidding by Snowy Hydro 
to reallocate generation between its power stations contributed to the high-price events.
4 and 10 January 
2008 and 
18 and 19 February 
2008
South 
Australia
25 Extreme temperatures in South Australia led to record high demand. AGL Energy’s 
strategy of offering a significant proportion of generation capacity at prices above 
$5000 per MWh, and a limit placed on the flow of electricity on the interconnectors 
between Victoria and South Australia, contributed to the high-price events.
31 December 2007 South 
Australia
1 Extreme temperatures in South Australia led to near-record demand. A multiple 
unplanned network outage near Melbourne led to network constraints being invoked that 
forced electricity flows from Snowy and South Australia into Victoria. The forced exports 
from South Australia further tightened supply and raised prices in that region.
4 November 2007 Queensland 2 A planned network outage limited generation capacity in southwest Queensland. The 
outage, combined with rebidding by Stanwell power station and an unplanned outage 
at the Swanbank power station (unit E), caused high prices in Queensland.
22 October 2007 New South 
Wales
1 NEMMCO applied incorrect limits to manage the power system during a planned network 
outage in New South Wales. As a result, imports from Queensland into New South Wales 
and generation at several New South Wales power stations were significantly reduced.
Sources: AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — New South Wales 22 October 2007, 2007; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — Queensland 4 November 2007, 
2007; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — South Australia 31 December 2007, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — South Australia 4 and 10 January 
and 18 and 19 February 2008, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — Snowy 26 January 2008, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — Queensland 
30 January and 7 February 2008, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — Queensland 22 to 23 February 2008, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/
MWh — South Australia 15 to 17 March 2008, 2008; AER, Spot prices greater than $5000/MWh — Victoria and Snowy 17 March 2008, 2008.
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15 Energy Reform Implementation Group, Energy reform: The way forward for Australia — a report to the Council of Australian Governments, 2007.
Box	2.2	 International	electricity	prices
Wholesale electricity prices in Australia rose significantly 
during 2007 towards levels experienced in many 
overseas markets. However, over the longer term, 
electricity prices in Australia have been low relative 
to liberalised markets overseas. The principal reason 
is Australia’s access to low-priced fuel such as brown 
and black coal.
Table 2.5 compares annual load-weighted average 
wholesale prices in the NEM with selected international 
markets on a calendar year basis. Comparisons across 
markets should be made with caution. Various factors 
can affect wholesale market outcomes, including:
>	 market design (for example, the use or absence 
of a capacity market)
>	 the stage of the investment cycle
>	 overcapacity that may be a legacy from previous 
regulatory regimes
>	 meteorological conditions
>	 fuel costs and availability
>	 exchange rates
>	 requirements under a carbon trading scheme
>	 regulatory intervention.
Prices in the Nord Pool (an electricity market linking 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) increased 
significantly over the period from 1999 to 2006. Heavily 
reliant on hydroelectric power, prices in this region have 
a strong negative correlation with rainfall levels. The 
sharp price increase in 2006 resulted from a combination 
of factors, including increased load, rising fuel costs, 
low reservoir levels, unavailability of nuclear plants 
in Sweden and the introduction of a carbon trading 
scheme in Europe. In 2007, an increase in hydroelectric 
generation led to prices falling by almost 43 per cent.16
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas operates 
a wholesale market that supplies electricity 
to 75 per cent of Texas. Price fluctuations in this 
market — as in Canada’s Alberta market — largely reflect 
changes in the cost of natural gas. The fall in average 
Table	2.5	 Average	wholesale	prices	in	selected	markets	($A	per	megawatt	hour)
NEM INTERNATIoNAl
YEAR Qld NSW Vic SA Nord Pool 
(Scandinavia)
Alberta 
(Canada)
ERCOT 
(Texas)
NEMS 
(Singapore)
PJM 
(USA)
2007 72 76 70 65 46 75 67 73 74
2006 28 35 38 45 81 95 73 111 71
2005 27 41 28 37 48 76 95 86 83
2004 37 53 32 47 49 57 61 66 60
2003 24 30 25 29 64 69 68 82 64
2002 52 45 35 38 47 52 47 n/a 57
2001 37 36 40 52 40 92 n/a n/a 71
2000 56 39 40 65 20 n/a n/a n/a 53
1999 46 24 24 60 22 n/a n/a n/a 53
n/a, not available.
Nord Pool, a market between Norway, Sweden, Fınland and Denmark; ERCOT, Electric Reliability Council of Texas; NEMS, National Electricity Market of Singapore; 
PJM, Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland Pool. 
Notes: 
1. Prices for Alberta are unweighted.
2. The PJM includes a capacity market.
3. Rounded annual volume-weighted price comparison based on calendar year data. Price conversions to Australian dollars based on average annual exchange rates.
Sources: Nord Pool; PJM; Electricity Market Company of Singapore; ERCOT; Alberta Electric System Operator.
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16 Nord Pool Spot AS, 2007 Annual review, 2008, p. 15.
prices in Alberta in 2007 was due to increased 
production from lower-cost generators.17
The Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland pool 
(PJM) links generating facilities in 12 states in the 
USA. Coal is the major fuel source for electricity 
in the market (accounting for over 55 per cent 
of generation), with uranium (34 per cent) and gas 
(8 per cent) also being significant.18 While PJM prices 
in 1999 were comparable to those in Queensland 
and South Australia, there was a significant increase 
in PJM prices to 2005. Average prices moved above 
$80 per MWh in 2005 following a 40 to 50 per cent 
increase in oil and gas costs.19
Unlike the NEM, the PJM operates a capacity market 
in conjunction with the energy market. Capacity 
markets provide an additional source of revenue for 
generators and so reduce revenue requirements 
in the energy market. Accordingly, spot prices 
in the PJM would likely be higher in the absence 
of a capacity market. Adjusting for this difference, 
table 2.5 may understate the price discount in the 
NEM compared to the PJM.
The National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS) 
commenced operating in January 2003. With close 
to 97 per cent of electricity generation fuelled 
by either oil or gas, prices in the NEMS have been 
substantially above those experienced in the NEM.20 
In 2007, average energy prices in the NEMS fell from 
2006 levels, despite a 19 per cent increase in fuel oil 
prices. This may reflect greater competition from 
two new gas generators that became operational 
in April 2007.21
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17 Alberta Electric System Operator, 2007 Annual report, 2008, p. 22.
18 PJM Market Monitoring Unit, 2007 State of the market report, 
2008, p. 14.
19 PJM Market Monitoring Unit, 2005 State of the market 
report, 2006.
20 Energy Market Company of Singapore, 2006 Market report to the 
National Electricity Market of Singapore, 2007.
21 NEMS Market Surveillance and Compliance Panel, Annual report 
2007, 2008, p. 10.
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Spot price volatility in the National Electricity Market can cause significant price risk 
to physical market participants. While generators face a risk of low prices impacting 
on earnings, retailers face a complementary risk that prices may rise to levels they cannot 
pass on to their customers. A common method by which market participants manage 
their exposure to price volatility is to enter into financial contracts that lock in firm prices 
for the electricity they intend to produce or buy in the future.
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While the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
does not regulate the electricity derivatives markets, 
it monitors the markets because of their significant 
linkages with wholesale and retail activity. For example, 
levels of contracting and forward prices in the financial 
markets can affect generator bidding in the physical 
electricity market. Similarly, financial markets can 
influence retail competition by providing a means for 
new entrants to manage price risk. More generally, the 
markets create price signals for energy infrastructure 
investors and provide a means to secure the future 
earnings streams needed to underpin investment.
This chapter considers:
> the structure of electricity financial markets in Australia, including over-the-counter markets 
and the exchange-traded market on the Sydney Futures Exchange
> financial market instruments traded in Australia
> liquidity indicators for Australia’s electricity financial markets, including trading volumes, open 
interest, changes in the demand for particular instruments, changes in market structure and 
vertical integration in the underlying electricity wholesale market
> price outcomes on the Sydney Futures Exchange
> other mechanisms to manage price risk in the wholesale electricity market.
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3.1	 Financial	market	structure
Fınancial markets offer contractual instruments — called 
derivatives — to manage forward price risk in wholesale 
electricity markets.1 While the derivatives provide 
a means of locking in future prices, they do not give rise 
to the physical delivery of electricity.
The participants in electricity derivatives markets 
include generators, retailers, financial intermediaries and 
speculators such as hedge funds. Brokers facilitate many 
transactions between contracting participants.
In Australia, two distinct electricity financial 
markets have emerged to support the wholesale 
electricity market:
> over-the-counter (OTC) markets, comprising direct 
transactions between two counterparties, often with 
the assistance of a broker
> the exchange-traded market on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange (SFE).
3.1.1 Over-the-counter markets
Over-the-counter markets allow market participants 
to enter into confidential contracts to manage risk. Many 
OTC contracts are bilateral arrangements between 
generators and retailers, which face opposing risks in the 
physical spot market. Other OTC contracts are arranged 
with the assistance of brokers that post bid (buy) and ask 
(sell) prices on behalf of their clients. In 2007 – 08, around 
54 per cent of OTC contracts were arranged through 
a broker.2 Fınancial intermediaries and speculators add 
market depth and liquidity by quoting bid and ask 
prices, taking trading positions and taking on market 
risk to facilitate transactions.
Most OTC transactions are documented under the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association master 
agreement, which provides a template of standard 
terms and conditions, including terms of credit, default 
provisions and settlement arrangements. While the 
template creates considerable standardisation in OTC 
contracts, the terms are normally modified by market 
participants to suit their particular needs. This means 
that OTC products can provide flexible solutions 
through a variety of structures.
The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 includes 
disclosure provisions that relate to OTC markets. 
In general, however, the bilateral nature of OTC markets 
tends to make volume and price activity less transparent 
than in the exchange-traded market.
3.1.2 Exchange-traded futures
Derivative products such as electricity futures and 
options are traded on registered exchanges. In Australia, 
electricity futures products developed by d-cyphaTrade 
are traded on the SFE.3 Participants (licensed brokers) 
buy and sell contracts on behalf of clients that include 
generators, retailers, speculators such as hedge funds, 
and banks and other financial intermediaries.
There are a number of differences between OTC trading 
and exchange trading on the SFE:
> Exchange-traded derivatives are highly standardised 
in terms of contract size, minimum allowable price 
fluctuations, maturity dates and load profiles. The 
product range in OTC markets tends to be more 
diverse and includes ‘sculpted’ products.
> Exchange trades are multilateral and publicly reported, 
giving rise to greater market transparency and price 
discovery than in the OTC market.
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1 Spot prices in the wholesale market can vary between –$1000 per megawatt hour (MWh) (the price floor) and $10 000 per MWh (the price cap). To manage risk 
resulting from volatility in the spot price, retailers can hedge their portfolios by purchasing financial derivatives that lock in firm prices for the volume of energy 
they expect to purchase in the future. This eliminates exposure to future price volatility for the quantity hedged and provides greater certainty on profits. Similarly, 
a generator can hedge against low spot prices.
2 AFMA, 2008 Australian Financial Markets Report, 2008 and supporting ‘Full report data’ spreadsheet.
3 In 2006 the Sydney Futures Exchange merged with the Australian Stock Exchange. The merged company operates under the name Australian Securities Exchange.
> Unlike OTC transactions, exchange-traded derivatives 
are settled through a centralised clearing house, which 
is the central counterparty to transactions and applies 
daily mark-to-market cash margining to manage 
credit default risk.4 Exchange clearing houses, such 
as the SFE Clearing Corporation, are regulated and 
are subject to prudential requirements to mitigate 
credit default risks. This offers an alternative to OTC 
trading, in which trading parties rely on the credit 
worthiness of electricity market counterparties. More 
generally, liquidity issues can arise in OTC markets 
if trading parties reach or breach their credit risk limits 
with other OTC counterparties (for example, due 
to revaluations of existing bilateral hedge obligations 
or credit downgrades of counterparties).
3.1.3 Regulatory framework
Electricity financial markets are subject to a regulatory 
framework that includes the Corporations Act 2001 and 
the Financial Services Reform Act 2001. The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission is the principal 
regulatory agency. Amendments to the Corporations 
Act in 2002 extended insider trading legislation and 
the disclosure principles expected from securities and 
equity-related futures to electricity derivative contracts. 
The Energy Reform Implementation Group (ERIG) 
noted in 2006 that there remains some uncertainty 
among market participants as to their disclosure 
requirements under the legislation.5
In 2004, the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) issued new or revised standards to harmonise 
Australian standards with the International Fınancial 
Reporting Standards. The new standards included 
AASB 139, which requires companies’ hedging 
arrangements to pass an effectiveness test to qualify 
for hedge accounting. The standards also outline 
financial reporting obligations such as mark-to-
market valuation of derivative portfolios. The standards 
require benchmarking financial derivative revaluations 
to observable market prices and adjustment for 
embedded credit default risk.
There are a number of further regulatory overlays 
in electricity derivative markets. For example:
> the Corporations Act requires that OTC market 
participants have an Australian Fınancial Services 
licence or exemption
> exchange-based transactions are subject to the 
operating rules of the SFE.
3.1.4  Relationship with the National 
Electricity Market
Fıgure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the 
financial markets and the physical trading of electricity 
in the National Electricity Market (NEM). Trading and 
settlement in the NEM occur independently of financial 
market activity, although a generator’s exposure in the 
financial market can affect its bidding behaviour in the 
NEM. Similarly, a retailer’s exposure to the financial 
market may affect the pricing and availability of supply 
contracts offered to customers.
3.2	 Financial	market	instruments
The financial market instruments traded in the OTC 
and exchange-traded markets are called derivatives 
because they derive their value from an underlying 
asset — in this case, electricity traded in the NEM. The 
derivatives give rise to cash flows from the differences 
between the contract price of the derivative and the spot 
price of electricity. The prices of these instruments reflect 
the expected spot price, plus premiums to cover credit 
default risk and market risk.
Table 3.1 lists some of the derivative instruments 
available in the OTC and exchange-traded markets. 
Common derivatives to hedge exposure to the NEM 
spot price are forwards (such as swaps and futures) and 
options (such as caps). Each provides the buyer and seller 
with a fixed price — and therefore a predictable future 
cash flow — either upon purchase/sale of the derivative 
or, in the case of an option, if the option is exercised. 
The following section describes some of the instruments 
in more detail.
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4 Mark-to-market refers to the valuation technique whereby unrealised profit or loss associated with a derivative position is determined (and reported in financial 
statements) by reference to prevailing market prices.
5 ERIG, Discussion papers, November 2006.
Table	3.1	 Common	electricity	derivatives	in	over-the-counter	and	Sydney	Futures	Exchange	markets
InSTRumEnT DESCRIPTIon
Forward	contracts 
> swaps (OTC market) 
> futures (SFE)
Agreement to exchange the NEM spot price in the future for an agreed fixed price. Forwards are called swaps 
in the OTC markets and futures on the SFE.
OTC swap settlements are typically paid or received weekly in arrears (after the spot price is known) based 
on the difference between the spot price and the previously agreed fixed price.
SFE electricity futures and options settlements are paid or received daily based on mark-to-market valuations. 
SFE futures are finally cash settled against the average spot price of the relevant quarter.
options 
> cap 
> floor 
> swaptions or 
futures options
> Asian options 
> profiled volume 
options for 
sculpted loads
A right — without obligation — to enter into a transaction at an agreed price in the future (exercisable option) 
or a right to receive cash flow differences between an agreed price and a floating price (cash settled option).
A contract through which the buyer earns payments when the pool price exceeds an agreed price. Caps are 
typically purchased by retailers to place a ceiling on their effective pool purchase price in the future.
A contract through which the buyer earns payments when the pool price is less than an agreed price. Floors 
are typically purchased by generators to ensure a minimum effective pool sale price in the future.
An option to enter into a swap or futures contract at an agreed price and time in the future. 
An option in which the payoff is linked to the average value of an underlying benchmark (usually the NEM spot 
price) during a defined period.
A volumetric option that gives the holder the right to purchase a flexible volume in the future at a fixed price.
NEM, National Electricity Market; OTC, over-the-counter; SFE, Sydney Futures Exchange.
Figure	3.1	
Relationship	between	the	national	Electricity	market	and	financial	markets
;>C6C8>6A8DCIG68IH
DkZg"i]Z"XdjciZgXdcigVXih
7gd`Zg
:cYjhZghVcYgZiV^aZgh <ZcZgVidghC:BB8D
E]nh^XVahZiiaZbZci E]nh^XVahZiiaZbZci
E]nh^XVaZaZXig^X^in[adl
7gd`Zg ;jijgZhZmX]Vc\Z
NEMMCO, National Electricity Market Management Company. 
Source: Energy Reform Implementation Group.
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3.2.1 Forward contracts
Forward contracts — called swaps in the OTC market 
and futures on the SFE — allow a party to buy or sell 
a given quantity of electricity at a fixed price over 
a specified time horizon in the future. Each contract 
relates to a nominated time of day in a particular region. 
On the SFE, contracts are quoted for quarterly base and 
peak contracts, for up to four years into the future.6
For example, a retailer might enter into an OTC contract 
to buy 10 megawatts of Victorian peak load in the third 
quarter of 2007 at $45 per megawatt hour (MWh). 
During that quarter, whenever the Victorian spot price 
for any interval from 7.00 am to 10.00 pm Monday 
to Friday settles above $45 per MWh, the seller (which 
might be a generator or financial intermediary) pays the 
difference to the retailer. Conversely, the retailer pays 
the difference to the seller when the price settles below 
$45 per MWh. In effect, the contract locks in a price 
of $45 per MWh for both parties.
A typical OTC swap might involve a retailer and 
generator contracting with one another — directly 
or through a broker — to exchange the NEM spot price 
for a fixed price that reduces market risk for both parties. 
On the exchange-traded market, the parties (generators, 
retailers, financial intermediaries and speculators) that 
buy and sell futures contracts through SFE brokers 
remain anonymous. The SFE Clearing Corporation 
is the central counterparty to SFE transactions. 
As noted, exchange trading is more transparent in terms 
of prices and trading volumes. While the SFE tends 
to offer a narrower range of instruments than the OTC 
market,7 there are up to 3000 futures and options 
products listed on the SFE at any given time.
3.2.2 Options
While a swap or futures contract gives price certainty, 
it locks the parties into defined contract prices with 
defined volumes — without an opt-out provision 
if the underlying market moves adversely to the 
agreed contract price. An option gives the holder the 
right — without obligation — to enter into a contract 
at an agreed price, volume and term in the future. 
The buyer pays a premium to the option seller for this 
added flexibility.
An exercisable call (put) option gives the holder the 
right to buy (sell) a specified volume of electricity 
futures (or swaps) in the future at a predetermined 
strike price — either at any time up to the option’s expiry 
(an ‘American’ option) or at expiry (a ‘European’ option). 
For example, a retailer that buys a call option to protect 
against a rise in NEM forward contract prices can 
later abandon that option if forward prices do not rise 
as predicted. The retailer could then take advantage 
of the lower prevailing forward (or NEM spot) price.
Commonly traded options in the electricity market are 
caps, floors and collars.8 A cap allows the buyer — for 
example, a retailer with a natural short exposure to spot 
prices — to set an upper limit on the price that they 
will pay for electricity while still being able to benefit 
if NEM prices are lower than anticipated. For example, 
a cap at $300 per MWh — the cap most commonly 
traded in Australia — ensures that no matter how high 
the spot price may rise, a buyer using the cap to hedge 
a natural short retail spot market position will pay 
no more than $300 per MWh for the agreed volume 
of electricity. In Australia, a cap is typically sold for 
a nominated quarter; for example, July – September 
2008. Base cap contracts are listed out two years ahead 
on a quarterly basis on the SFE and regularly trade 
in full year strips of quarters.
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6 A peak contract relates to the hours from 7.00 am to 10.00 pm Monday to Friday, excluding public holidays. An off-peak contract relates to hours outside that period. 
A flat price contract covers both peak and off-peak periods.
7 The OTC market can theoretically support an unlimited range of bilaterally negotiated product types.
8 While caps and floors are technically options — they are effectively a series of half-hourly options — they are typically linked to the NEM spot price and are 
automatically exercised when they deliver a favourable outcome. Other options, such as swaptions, are generally linked to forward prices and the buyer must nominate 
whether or not the option is to be exercised.
By contrast, a floor contract struck at $40 per MWh will 
ensure a minimum price of $40 per MWh for a floor 
buyer such as a generator with a natural long exposure 
to spot prices. Retailers typically buy caps to secure firm 
maximum prices for future electricity purchases, while 
generators use floors to lock in a minimum price to cover 
future generation output. A collar contract combines 
a cap and floor to set a price band in which the parties 
agree to trade electricity in the future.
The range and diversity of products is expanding over 
time to meet the requirements of market participants.
3.2.3 Flexible volume instruments
Instruments such as swaps and options are used 
to manage NEM price risk for fixed quantities 
of electricity. But the profile of electricity loads varies 
according to the time of day and the weather conditions. 
This can result in significant volume risk in addition 
to price risk. In particular, it can leave a retailer over-
hedged or under-hedged, depending on actual levels 
of electricity demand. Conversely, windfall gains can 
also be earned.
Structured products such as flexible volume contracts are 
used to manage volume risks. These sculpted products, 
which are traded in the OTC market, enable the buyer 
to vary the contracted volume on a pre-arranged basis. 
The buyer pays a premium for this added flexibility.
3.3	 Financial	market	liquidity
The effectiveness of financial markets in providing risk 
management services depends on the extent to which 
they offer the products that market participants require. 
Adequate market liquidity is critical in this regard. 
In electricity financial markets, liquidity relates to the 
ability of participants to transact a standard order within 
a reasonable timeframe to manage their load and price 
risk, using reliable quoted prices that are resilient to large 
orders, and with sufficient market participants and 
trading volumes to ensure low transaction costs.
There are various indicators of liquidity in the electricity 
derivatives market, including:
> the volume and value of trade
> open interest in contracts
> transparency of pricing
> the number and diversity of market participants
> the number of market makers and the bid – ask spreads 
quoted by them
> the number and popularity of products traded
> the degree of vertical integration between generators 
and retailers
> the presence in the market of financial intermediaries.
This chapter focuses mainly on liquidity indicators 
relating to trading volumes, but also includes some 
consideration of open interest data, pricing transparency, 
changes in the demand for particular derivative 
products, changes in the financial market’s structure and 
vertical integration.
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3.4	 	Trading	volumes	in	Australia’s	
electricity	derivative	market
There is comprehensive data on derivative trading on the 
SFE, which is updated on a daily and real-time basis. 
The OTC market is less transparent, but periodic survey 
data provide some indicators of trading activity.
3.4.1 Sydney Futures Exchange
Fınancial market vendors such as d-cyphaTrade 
publish data on electricity derivative trading on the 
SFE. Table 3.2 and figure 3.2 illustrate volume 
trends. Trading levels accelerated from 2005 – 06, with 
345 per cent growth in 2006 – 07. In that year, volumes 
were equivalent to around 124 per cent of underlying 
NEM demand. Trade in 2007 – 08 was down on the high 
levels seen in the first half of 2007, resulting in a slight 
decrease in overall volumes. There are early indications 
of a continuation of high trading volumes in 2008 – 09.
In 2007 – 08, Victoria accounted for 38 per cent of traded 
volumes, followed by New South Wales and Queensland 
(29 per cent each). Liquidity in South Australia has 
remained low since 2002, accounting for around 
4 per cent of volumes (figure 3.3).
Trading on the SFE comprises a mix of futures (first 
listed in September 2002) and caps and other options 
(first listed in November 2004). Trading in options 
represented around 16 per cent of traded volumes 
in 2007 – 089 but grew exponentially in the first 
quarter of 2008 – 09, reaching 51 per cent of volumes.10 
Fıgure 3.4 shows that trading volumes for 2010 options 
Table	3.2	 Trading	volumes	in	electricity	derivatives	—	Sydney	Futures	Exchange
2002	–	03 2003	–	04 2004	–	05 2005	–	06 2006	–	07 2007	–	08
Total trade (TWh) 7 30 24 55 243 241
Increase (per cent) 341 –19 129 345 –1
TWh, terawatt hours. 
Source: d-cyphaTrade.
Figure	3.2	
Regional	trading	volumes	in	electricity	derivatives	—	Sydney	Futures	Exchange
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9 d-cyphaTrade, Energy focus FY review 2007/2008, 2008.
10 From 1 July 2008 to 12 September 2008.
Figure	3.3	
Regional	shares	of	Sydney	Futures	Exchange	electricity	
derivatives	trade	(by	volume),	2007	–	08
FaY(/ K^X). H6*CHL(/
Source: d-cyphaTrade.
Figure	3.4	
Traded	volumes	for	2010	contracts	—	Sydney	Futures	Exchange
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recorded a step increase from around August 2008, 
with the bulk of activity in options. This may reflect 
increased hedging activity associated with the planned 
introduction of the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme in 2010.
Fıgure 3.5 shows the composition of futures and options 
trade on the SFE by maturity date, based on traded 
volumes. The SFE trades quarterly futures and options 
out to four years ahead, compared to three years in many 
overseas markets.11 Liquidity is highest for contracts with 
an end date between six months and two years out from 
the trade date. There are only a relatively small number 
of open contracts with an end date beyond 18 months. 
This is consistent with the trading preferences 
of speculators and the time horizons of electricity retail 
contracts, the majority of which are negotiated for one 
year and which rarely run beyond three years. Some 
retailers do not lock in forward hedges beyond the term 
of existing customer contracts.
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11 See, for example, http://www.eex.de (Germany) or http://www.powernext.fr (France).
Figure	3.5	
Traded	volume	in	electricity	futures	contracts	(by	maturity	date)	on	the	Sydney	Futures	Exchange,		
September	2002	to	August	2008
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Figure	3.6	
open	interest	on	the	Sydney	Futures	Exchange
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Source: d-cyphaTrade.
Fıgure 3.6 illustrates open interest in electricity futures 
on the SFE over time. Open interest refers to the total 
number of futures and option contracts that have been 
entered into and remain open — that is, have not been 
exercised, expired or closed out — at a point in time. 
An increase in open interest typically accompanies a rise 
in trading volumes and reflects underlying demand 
growth. As figure 3.6 illustrates, the SFE electricity 
futures market has experienced a steady increase in open 
interest since 2002. The number of open contracts rose 
from around zero in 2002 to over 48 000 in September 
2008. It is interesting to note that although total trading 
volumes in 2007 – 08 were similar to the previous year, 
the level of open interest continued to rise.
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3.4.2 Over-the-counter markets
There is limited data on liquidity in the OTC markets 
because transactions are only visible to the parties 
engaged in trade. The Australian Fınancial Markets 
Association (AFMA) conducts an annual survey 
of OTC market participants on direct bilateral and 
broker-assisted trade. AFMA reports that most, but not 
all, participants respond to the survey. A particular OTC 
transaction will be captured in the AFMA data if at least 
one party to the trade participates in the survey.
As figure 3.7 indicates, total OTC trades declined 
from around 235 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2002 – 03 
to around 177 TWh in 2005 – 06. This trend was reversed 
in 2006 – 07, with turnover increasing by more than 
90 per cent to around 337 TWh. Volumes remained 
above 300 TWh in 2007 – 08. This was consistent with 
significantly higher trading volumes on the SFE over the 
past two years.
On a regional basis, trading volumes more than doubled 
in 2006 – 07 in Queensland and South Australia. 
Turnover rose by around 90 per cent in Victoria and 
50 per cent in New South Wales. In 2007 – 08, turnover 
continued to rise in Victoria, accounting for around 
45 per cent of trade across all regions. Volumes fell in all 
other regions, with Queensland recording the largest 
fall (down 55 per cent). However, volumes in all regions 
remained above 2005 – 06 levels.
Around 67 per cent of OTC trade in 2007 – 08 was 
in swaps and around 20 per cent was in caps. Swaptions 
and options made up the balance (see figure 3.8).
Figure	3.7	
Regional	trading	volumes	—	over-the-counter	market
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Source: AFMA, 2008 Australian Financial Markets Report, 2008.
Figure	3.8	
Trading	volumes	by	derivative	type	
—	over-the-counter	market
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3.4.3 Aggregate trading volumes
Table 3.3 estimates aggregate volumes of electricity 
derivatives traded in OTC markets and on the SFE, 
and compares these volumes to underlying demand 
for electricity in the NEM. The data are a simple 
aggregation of AFMA data on OTC volumes and 
d-cyphaTrade data on exchange trades. The results 
should be interpreted with some caution, given that the 
AFMA data are based on a voluntary survey and are 
not subject to independent verification. This could result 
in the omission of transactions between survey non-
participants. AFMA considers that the survey captures 
most OTC activity.
It should be noted that derivative trading volumes 
can exceed 100 per cent of NEM demand, as some 
financial market participants take positions independent 
of physical market volumes and regularly readjust their 
contracted positions over time.
Based on the available data, the majority of financial 
trades continue to occur in the OTC markets. However, 
OTC trading is declining relative to trading on the 
SFE. The share of derivative trades occurring in OTC 
markets declined from 97 per cent in 2001 – 02 
to 56 per cent in 2007 – 08.
As table 3.3 indicates, OTC trades in 2007 – 08 were 
equivalent to 156 per cent of NEM demand, compared 
to a record 172 per cent in the previous year. Volumes 
on the SFE rose from near zero in 2001 – 02 to levels 
equivalent to over 120 per cent of NEM demand 
in 2006 – 07 and 2007 – 08. Across the combined OTC 
and exchange markets, trading volumes in 2007 – 08 were 
almost 280 per cent of NEM demand.
There are a number of reasons for the relatively strong 
growth in exchange-traded volumes. Amendments 
to the Corporations Act 2001 and the introduction 
of international hedge accounting standards 
to strengthen disclosure obligations for electricity 
derivatives contracts may have raised confidence 
in exchange-based trading. In addition, d-cyphaTrade, 
in conjunction with the SFE, redesigned the product 
offerings in 2002 to tailor them more closely to market 
requirements. These changes have encouraged greater 
depth in the market, including the entry of numerous 
financial intermediaries.
The increase in trading volumes on the SFE 
has also been driven by trading parties seeking 
to minimise mark-to-market OTC credit exposures. 
A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) survey of market 
participants also cited anonymity and credit benefits 
as being among the reasons for the shift away from 
OTC markets towards exchange trading.12
Table	3.3	 Volumes	traded	in	over-the-counter	markets	and	the	Sydney	Futures	Exchange
oTC	
(TWh)
oTC	(%	oF	
nEm	DEmAnD)
SFE	
(TWh)
SFE	(%	oF	
nEm	DEmAnD)
ToTAl	(%	oF	
nEm	DEmAnD)
2001 – 02 168 96 0 0 96
2002 – 03 235 131 7 4 135
2003 – 04 219 118 29 16 134
2004 – 05 199 106 24 13 118
2005 – 06 177 92 55 28 120
2006 – 07 337 172 243 124 296
2007 – 08 304 156 241 123 279
OTC, over-the-counter; SFE, Sydney Futures Exchange; NEM, National Electricity Market.; TWh, terawatt hour
Note: NEM demand excludes Tasmania, for which derivative products were not available.
Sources: d-cyphaTrade; AFMA; NEMMCO.
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12 PwC, Independent survey of contract market liquidity in the National Electricity Market, 2006, p. 21.
Fıgure 3.9 charts regional trading volumes in both the 
OTC and SFE sectors as a percentage of regional NEM 
demand. Trading volumes were generally equivalent 
to around 100 to 150 per cent of regional NEM demand 
in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria from 
2002 – 03 to 2005 – 06. Volumes rose sharply in 2006 – 07 
to 370 per cent of NEM demand in Queensland, 
330 per cent in Victoria and 250 per cent in New 
South Wales. South Australian volumes rose to around 
180 per cent of regional NEM demand, reversing a trend 
of declining volumes over the three preceding years. 
In 2007 – 08, only Victoria experienced growth in trading 
volumes relative to regional NEM demand, reaching 
over 415 per cent. Volumes fell sharply in Queensland, 
but remained significantly above 2005 – 06 levels.
The composition of Queensland trade is also changing. 
In 2007 – 08, Queensland was the only region in which 
SFE trading volumes exceeded OTC volumes. 
Queensland’s SFE trades accounted for almost 
60 per cent of regional trading volumes. In other regions, 
SFE trade accounted for between 35 and 45 per cent 
of trading volumes.
The PwC survey of market participants raised a number 
of possible reasons for a lack of liquidity in South 
Australia’s financial markets. Factors cited included the 
relatively small scale of the South Australian electricity 
market; perceptions of risk associated with network 
interconnection, generation capacity and extreme 
weather; and perceptions of high levels of vertical 
integration.13 ERIG also noted gaps in the liquidity and 
depth of financial markets in South Australia as well 
as for Tasmania, which was not physically connected 
to the NEM until 2006. More generally, there are gaps 
in the market for sculpted and flexible products, which 
are mainly traded in the OTC market.14
Figure	3.9	
Trading	volumes	by	region	as	a	percentage	of	regional	national	Electricity	market	demand
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OTC, over-the-counter; SFE, Sydney Futures Exchange.
Sources: d-cyphaTrade; AFMA; NEMMCO.
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13 PwC, Independent survey of contract market liquidity in the National Electricity Market, 2006, p. 28.
14 ERIG, Discussion papers, November 2006, p. 194.
3.5	 	Price	transparency	and		
bid	–	ask	spread
While trading volumes and open interest provide 
indicators of market depth, part of the cost to market 
participants of transacting is reflected in the bid – ask 
spread (the difference between the best buy and best sell 
prices) quoted by market makers and brokers. A liquid 
market is characterised by relatively low price spreads 
that allow parties to transact at a nominal cost.
d-cyphaTrade and other market data providers publish 
bid – ask spreads for the exchange-traded market. 
In 2007 – 08, most spreads for base futures products were 
less than $3. Spreads are generally higher in the market 
for peak futures, which tends to be less liquid than the 
market for base futures.
3.6	 number	of	market	participants
Ownership consolidation, such as vertical integration 
across the generation and retailer sectors, can affect 
participation in financial markets. In particular, vertical 
integration can reduce a company’s activity in financial 
markets by increasing its capacity to internally offset risk.
Fıgure 3.10 displays rough estimates of the current 
match of generation and retail load for Origin Energy, 
AGL Energy and TRUenergy across the Victorian 
and South Australian markets. All three businesses are 
moving over time towards more balanced portfolios 
between generation and retail assets. In 2007, AGL 
Energy acquired the 1260 megawatt (MW) Torrens 
Island power station in South Australia from 
TRUenergy in exchange for the Hallett power station 
(150 MW) and a cash sum. While Origin Energy’s 
retail load exceeds its generation capacity by a significant 
margin, it committed in 2008 to a 550 MW power 
station near Mortlake in Victoria to be commissioned 
in the summer of 2010 – 11. In addition, the major 
generator International Power operates a retail business 
in Victoria and South Australia (trading as Simply 
Energy) and has achieved significant market penetration. 
Figure	3.10	
Generator	capacity	and	retail	load	of	vertically	
integrated	players	in	Victoria	and	South	
Australia,	2007	–	08
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Note: Average retail loads are PwC estimates for 2005 – 06 based on the 
estimated market share of each retailer as a proportion of NEM demand. 
Market share has been estimated from annual reports. AGL Energy’s existing 
capacity (partial ownership) includes its 32.5 per cent share in the GEAC Group 
(owner of the Loy Yang A generator in Victoria). TRUenergy’s existing capacity 
includes its contractual arrangement for Ecogen Energy capacity in Victoria 
(around 890 megawatts). This chart is not intended to be an accurate reflection 
of participants’ positions, but rather provides an estimate of the possible degree 
of vertical integration.
Sources: PwC, Independent survey of contract market liquidity in the National 
Electricity Market, August 2006 (retail loads); NEMMCO and company websites 
(capacity and proposed capacity).
The United Kingdom market has significant vertical 
integration — six vertically-integrated firms dominate 
the market — and low levels of financial market liquidity. 
ERIG considered that if the Australian market were 
to evolve to a handful of balanced participants, little 
financial trade would be expected.15
While integration may have reduced the number 
of generators and retailers in Australia’s financial 
markets, there has been new entry by financial 
intermediaries. Fınancial speculators that have entered 
the market include BP Energy Asia, ANZ, Optiver, 
Attunga Capital, Commonwealth Bank, Arcadia 
Energy, DE Shaw and Co, Electrade Derivatives, 
IMC Pacific, Liquid Capital, Societe General, Tibra 
Capital and Westpac. Other market participants remain 
anonymous. ERIG considered that the increasing 
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15 ERIG, Discussion papers, November 2006, pp. 195 – 6.
involvement of financial intermediaries is evidence 
of a dynamic market.
3.7	 Price	outcomes
Base futures account for most SFE trading volumes 
and open interest positions. Accordingly, the following 
discussion of price outcomes focuses on base futures. 
Prices for peak futures tend to be higher than for base 
futures, but follow broadly similar trends.16
Fıgure 3.11 shows average price outcomes for electricity 
base futures, as reflected in the National Power Index 
(NPI). The index is published for each calendar year and 
represents a basket of the electricity base futures listed 
on the SFE for New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia. It is calculated as the average daily 
settlement price of base futures contracts across the four 
regions for the four quarters of the relevant calendar year. 
NPI data are available from June 2006 and are published 
daily by d-cyphaTrade.
Fıgure 3.11 shows that base futures prices were 
fairly flat throughout 2006, trading between $35 and 
$40 per MWh, before rising sharply in the first half 
of 2007. Prices for the 2007 calendar year basket peaked 
in June 2007 at close to $100 per MWh. This mirrored 
high prices in the physical electricity market, caused 
by tight supply – demand conditions (see section 2.5). 
Futures prices rose more sharply for the 2007 and 
2008 calendar years than for later years. This may have 
reflected expectations that the tight supply – demand 
conditions at that time were of a relatively short-
term nature.
A return to more benign conditions in the physical 
electricity market led to falling prices for base futures 
in the second half of 2007 and early 2008. The 2008 and 
2009 calendar year base futures prices converged below 
$50 per MWh in summer 2008, but edged back towards 
$55 to $60 per MWh in winter 2008.
In general, contract markets often trade at a premium to 
the physical spot market for an underlying commodity. 
On average, base futures prices on the SFE have 
reflected a fairly constant premium over NEM spot 
prices of around $2 per MWh over the past three years.17
Figure	3.11	
national	Power	Index	2007	–	2009
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16 Base futures cover the hours from 0.00 to 24.00 hours, seven days per week. Peak futures relate to the hours from 7.00 am to 10.00 pm Monday to Friday, excluding 
public holidays.
17 Based on a comparison of time-weighted calendar year wholesale market spot prices to the average NPI value for each calendar year.
3.7.1 Future forward prices
Fıgure 3.12 provides a snapshot in September 2008 
of forward prices for quarterly base futures on the SFE 
for quarters up to two years out from the trading date. 
These are often described as forward curves. The first 
four quarters of a forward curve are the prompt quarters. 
For comparative purposes, forward prices in June 
2007 — when electricity prices reached record levels 
in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria — are 
also provided.
In September 2008, prices for the prompt quarters were 
generally down on the levels seen in 2007. This may 
reflect lower than expected wholesale market prices over 
summer 2007 – 08, new generation capacity coming on-
line and the availability of previously drought-affected 
generators. The exception was South Australia, where 
futures prices were higher in 2008 than in 2007. This 
may indicate market concerns that high prices in South 
Australia’s physical electricity market in early 2008 — as 
a result of high temperatures, interconnector constraints 
and opportunistic bidding by generators — may 
recur in 2009.
Fıgure 3.12 also illustrates that first quarter (Q1, January 
to March) futures prices tend to be higher than for other 
quarters. This reflects the tendency for NEM spot prices 
to peak in summer and illustrates the linkages between 
derivative prices and underlying NEM wholesale 
prices. Box 3.1 provides a case study on the pricing 
of Q1 base and peak future contracts in Queensland 
over the past three years. Price movements in New 
South Wales and Victoria have followed broadly similar 
trends to Queensland.
While futures contracts typically relate to a specific 
quarter of a year, there is an increasing tendency for 
contracts to be traded as calendar year strips, comprising 
a ‘bundle’ of the four constituent quarters of the year. 
This tendency is more pronounced for contracts with 
a starting data at least one year out from the trade 
date. Fıgure 3.13 charts prices in September 2008 for 
calendar year futures strips to 2011. In September 
2008, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria had 
forward curves in strong contango — that is, prices are 
higher for contracts in the later years. This is indicative 
of market expectations that price risk may be greater 
in the medium to longer term, perhaps because 
Figure	3.12	
Base	futures	prices	at	September	2008
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Figure	3.13	
Base	calendar	strip	at	September	2008
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Figure	3.14	
Eastern	Power	Index	for	2010	contracts
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of concerns about the adequacy of supply and the 
anticipated effect of the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme on pool prices from 2010.
In September 2008, South Australian contracts were 
mostly trading flat or in backwardation — that is, prices 
for the nearest year (2009) were higher than for the 
later years. As noted, this may reflect expectations that 
the conditions that gave rise to record South Australian 
NEM prices in March 2008 may still be present in 2009, 
but are less likely to affect prices further into the future. 
Additionally, lower liquidity in South Australian 
contracts may result in less robust pricing in longer 
dated contracts.
The d-cypha Eastern Power Index provides an indication 
of average forward prices for calendar year strips across 
New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland (figure 3.14). 
In September 2008, the Eastern Power Index for calendar 
year 2010 shows a trend of steadily rising prices from 
January 2007, increasing 45 per cent to September 2008. 
This is consistent with the market’s anticipation that 
high carbon-emitting generators will face increased 
generation costs due to the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme and will attempt to recover those costs via 
higher pool price dispatch from July 2010 onwards.
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Box	3.1	Case	study	—	Queensland	first	quarter	futures	prices
The electricity supply – demand balance in most regions 
is tightest in summer, with hot days leading to high 
demand for air conditioning. Accordingly, Q1 futures 
prices are higher than those for other quarters. Over 
the 18 months to August 2008, Q1 futures prices were 
especially volatile in Queensland. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 
chart movements in the price of Queensland Q1 base 
and peak futures in 2007, 2008 and 2009, as measured 
in the preceding year.
>	 Q1 2007 prices were relatively stable throughout 2006, 
averaging around $50 per MWh for base futures and 
$85 per MWh for peak futures.
>	 Prices for Q1 2008 started to rise from March 2007. 
Between June and November 2007, base futures 
Figure	3.15	
Queensland	first	quarter	base	futures	prices	for	2007,	2008	and	2009	(January	2006	to	August	2008)
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Figure	3.16	
Queensland	first	quarter	peak	futures	prices	for	2007,	2008	and	2009	(January	2006	to	August	2008)
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averaged $125 per MWh and peak futures averaged 
$240 per MWh. These prices reflected market 
concern over the availability of generation capacity 
(due to the drought) and the impact of congestion 
in the Queensland transmission network. Information 
available closer to Q1 2008 indicated that constraints 
would not be as great as expected and prices closed 
out at about $70 for base futures and $100 for 
peak futures.
>	 Prices in 2008 for Q1 2009 futures are below the 
equivalent prices in 2007 but remain well above 
historic levels. In August 2008, base futures prices 
were about $85 and peak futures prices were 
around $150.
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3.8	 	Price	risk	management	
—	other	mechanisms
Aside from financial contracts, there are other 
mechanisms to manage price risk in electricity wholesale 
markets. As noted, some retailers and generators have 
reduced their exposure to NEM spot prices through 
vertical integration. In addition:
> In New South Wales, the Electricity Tariff 
Equalisation Fund (ETEF) provides a buffer against 
prices spikes in the NEM for government-owned 
retailers that are required to sell electricity to end users 
at regulated prices. When spot prices are higher than 
the energy component of regulated retail prices, ETEF 
pays retailers from the fund. Conversely, retailers pay 
into ETEF when spot prices are below the regulated 
tariff. The New South Wales Government has 
announced that it will phase out ETEF by June 2010.
> Auctions of settlement residues allow for some 
financial risk management in inter-regional trade, 
although the effectiveness of this instrument has been 
the subject of some debate (see section 4.7).
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	 4	ElEctricity 
transmission
Electricity generators are usually located close to fuel sources such as natural gas pipelines, 
coal mines and hydroelectric water reservoirs. Most electricity customers, however, are 
located a long distance from these generators in cities, towns and regional communities. 
The electricity supply chain therefore requires networks to transport power from 
generators to customers. The networks also enhance the reliability of electricity supply 
by allowing a diverse range of generators to supply electricity to end markets. In effect, 
the networks provide a mix of capacity that can be drawn on to help manage the risk of 
a power system failure.
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4.1	 Role	of	transmission	networks
Transmission networks transport electricity from 
generators to distribution networks, which in turn 
transport electricity to customers. In a few cases, large 
businesses such as aluminium smelters are directly 
connected to the transmission network. A transmission 
network consists of towers and the wires that run 
between them, underground cables, transformers, 
switching equipment, reactive power devices, and 
monitoring and telecommunications equipment.
This chapter considers:
> the role of the electricity transmission network sector
> the structure of the sector, including industry participants and ownership changes over time
> the economic regulation of the transmission network sector by the Australian Energy Regulator 
> revenues and rates of return in the transmission network sector
> new investment in transmission networks
> operating and maintenance costs of running transmission networks
> quality of service, including transmission reliability and the market impacts of congestion.
Some of the matters canvassed in this chapter are addressed in more detail in the Australian 
Energy Regulator’s annual report on the transmission sector.1
	 4	ElEctricity 
transmission
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1 AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008.
Electricity must be converted to high voltages for 
efficient transport over long distances. This minimises 
the loss of electrical energy that naturally occurs.2 In 
the National Electricity Market (NEM), transmission 
networks consist of equipment that transmits 
electricity at or above 220 kilovolts (kV) and assets 
that operate between 66 kV and 220 kV, which are 
parallel to, and provide support to, the higher voltage 
transmission network.
The high-voltage transmission network strengthens the 
performance of the electricity industry in three ways:
> Fırst, it gives customers access to large, efficient 
generators that may be located hundreds of kilometres 
away. Without transmission, customers would have 
to rely on generators in their local area, which may 
be more expensive than remote generators.
> Second, by allowing many generators to compete 
in the electricity market, it helps reduce the risk of 
market power.
> Third, by allowing electricity to move over long 
distances instantaneously, it reduces the amount of 
spare generation capacity that must be provided at 
each town or city to ensure a reliable electrical supply. 
This reduces inefficient investment in generation.
4.2	 Australia’s	transmission	network
In Australia there are transmission networks in each 
state and territory, with cross-border interconnectors 
that connect some networks. The NEM in eastern 
and southern Australia provides a fully interconnected 
transmission network from Queensland through to 
New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, as shown 
in figure 4.1. The transmission networks in Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory are not connected 
to the NEM (see chapter 7).
The NEM transmission network is unique in the 
developed world in terms of its long distances, low 
density and long, thin structure. This reflects that there 
are often long distances between demand centres 
and fuel sources for generation. For example, the 
290 kilometre link between Victoria and Tasmania is 
the longest submarine power cable in the world. By 
contrast, transmission networks in the United States and 
in many European countries tend to be meshed and of 
a higher density. These differences result in transmission 
charges being a more significant contributor to end 
prices in Australia than they are in many other countries. 
For example, transmission charges comprise about 
10 per cent of retail prices in the NEM3 compared to 
4 per cent in the United Kingdom.4
Electricity can be transported over alternating current 
(AC) or direct current (DC) networks. Most of 
Australia’s transmission network is AC, in which the 
power flow over individual elements of the network 
cannot be directly controlled. Instead, electrical power, 
which is injected at one point and withdrawn at another, 
flows over all possible paths between the two points. As 
a result, decisions on how much electricity is produced 
or consumed at one point on the network can affect 
power flows in other parts of the network. Australia also 
has three DC networks, all of which are cross-border 
interconnectors.
4.2.1 Interconnection
Aside from the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Scheme, which has supplied electricity to New South 
Wales and Victoria since 1959, transmission lines that 
cross state and territory boundaries are relatively new. 
In 1990, more than 30 years after the inception of the 
Snowy scheme, the Heywood interconnector between 
Victoria and South Australia commenced operation.
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2 While transportation of electricity over long distances is efficient at high voltages, there are risks, such as flashovers. A flashover is a brief (seconds or less) instance of 
conduction between an energised object and the ground (or another energised object). The conduction consists of a momentary flow of electricity between the objects, 
and is usually accompanied by a show of light and possibly a cracking or loud exploding noise. High towers, insulation and wide spacing between the conductors help 
to control this risk.
3 The contribution of transmission to final retail prices varies between jurisdictions, customer types and locations.
4 Source: ofgem, Factsheet 66, January 2008 (available at www.ofgem.gov.uk).
Figure	4.1	
Transmission	networks	in	the	National	Electricity	Market
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QNI, Queensland – New South Wales Interconnector; NEM, National Electricity Market.
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The construction of new interconnectors gathered pace 
with the commencement of the NEM in 1998. Two 
interconnectors between Queensland and New South 
Wales (Directlink5 and the Queensland – New South 
Wales Interconnector) commenced operation in 2000, 
followed by a second interconnector between Victoria 
and South Australia (Murraylink) in 2002. Murraylink 
is the world’s longest underground power cable. 
The construction of a submarine transmission cable 
(Basslink) from Victoria to Tasmania in 2006 completed 
the interconnection of all transmission networks in 
eastern and southern Australia. Fıgure 4.1 shows the 
interconnectors in the NEM.
4.2.2 Ownership
Table 4.1 lists Australia’s transmission networks and 
their current ownership arrangements. Historically, 
government utilities ran the entire electricity supply 
chain in all states and territories. In the 1990s, 
governments began to separate the generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail segments into stand-
alone businesses. Generation and retail were opened 
up to competition, but this was not appropriate for the 
transmission and distribution networks, which became 
regulated monopolies.
Fıgure 4.2 illustrates ownership changes in the NEM 
jurisdictions since 1995. Victoria and South Australia 
privatised their transmission networks, but other 
jurisdictions retained government ownership:
> Singapore Power International acquired Victoria’s state 
transmission network in 2000 following the network’s 
original sale to GPU Powernet in 1997. Singapore 
Power International floated its Australian assets as 
SP AusNet in 2005, but retained a 51 per cent stake.
> South Australia sold the state transmission network 
(ElectraNet) in 2000 to a consortium of interests led 
by Powerlink, which is owned by the Queensland 
Government. YTL Power Investments, part of a 
Malaysian conglomerate, is a minority owner. Hastings 
Fund Management acquired a stake in ElectraNet 
in 2003.
Victoria has a unique transmission network structure 
in which network asset ownership is separated from 
planning and investment decision making. SP AusNet 
owns the state’s transmission assets, but VENCorp 
plans and directs network augmentation. VENCorp also 
buys bulk network services from SP AusNet for sale 
to customers.
Private investors have constructed three interconnectors 
— Murraylink, Directlink and Basslink — since the 
commencement of the NEM. All have since changed 
ownership. As of March 2008 the APA Group owned 
Murraylink and Directlink. A Singapore-based trust 
with links to Singapore Power International acquired 
Basslink in 2007.
4.2.3 Scale of the networks
Fıgure 4.3 compares asset values and capital expenditure 
in the current regulatory period for transmission 
networks in the NEM. Western Power (Western 
Australia) is included for comparative purposes. The 
chart reflects asset values as measured by the regulated 
asset base (RAB) for each network. The RAB is the asset 
valuation that regulators use in conjunction with rates of 
return to set returns on capital to infrastructure owners. 
In general, it is set by estimating the replacement cost of 
an asset at the time it was first regulated, plus subsequent 
new investment, less depreciation. More generally, it 
provides an indication of relative scale.
Powerlink (Queensland) and TransGrid (New South 
Wales) have significantly higher RABs than other 
networks. Many factors can affect the size of the RAB, 
including the basis of original valuation, network 
investment, the age of a network, geographical scale, 
the distances required to transport electricity from 
generators to demand centres, population dispersion 
and forecast demand profiles. The combined RAB 
of all transmission networks in the NEM is around 
$12.4 billion. This will continue to rise over time with 
ongoing investment (see section 4.4).
Investment levels are relatively high in relation to the 
underlying RAB for Powerlink and SP AusNet. This 
reflects new investment programs approved under recent 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) regulatory decisions.
119
	
C
H
A
P
TER
	
4	E
lE
c
tr
ic
ity 
tr
a
n
sm
issio
n
5 Directlink is also known as the Terranora interconnector.
Table	4.1	 Transmission	networks	in	Australia
NETwoRk LoCATioN LiNE	
LENgTH	
(kM)	
2006	–	07
MAx	
dEMANd	
(Mw)	
2006	–	07
CuRRENT	
REguLAToRy	
PERiod1
REguLATEd	
AssET	bAsE	
($	MiLLioN	
NoMiNAL)2
iNvEsTMENT	
—	CuRRENT	
PERiod	
($MiLLioN	2007)3
owNER
NEM	REgioNs
NetWOrkS
transGrid NSW 12 489 13 458 2004 – 05 to 
2008 – 09
3 013 1 184 New South Wales Government
energy 
Australia
NSW 1 040 5 484 2004 – 05 to 
2008 – 09
636 230 New South Wales Government
SP AusNet Vic 6 500 9 062 2008 – 09 to 
2013 – 14
2 191 9474 Listed company (Singapore Power 
International 51%)
Powerlink Qld 12 000 8 589 2007 – 08 to 
2011 – 12
3 753 2 418 Queensland Government
electraNet SA 5 611 2 942 2008 – 09 to 
2012 – 13
1 251 655 Powerlink (Queensland Govern­
ment), YtL Power Investment, 
Hastings Utilities trust
transend tas 3 645 2 415 2004 to 
2008 – 09
604 362 tasmanian Government
NeM tOtAL 41 285 41 950 11 462 5 796
INtercONNectOrS5
Murraylink Vic – SA 180 2003 to 2012 103 APA Group
Directlink Qld – NSW 63 2006 to 2015 117 APA Group
Basslink Vic – tas 375 Unregulated 7806 citySpring Infrastructure trust 
(temesek Holdings (Singapore) 
28%)
NoN-NEM	REgioNs
Western 
Power
WA 6 623 2007 to 2009 1 387 626 Western Australian Government
Notes:
1. The AER regulates all networks and interconnectors in the NEM except for Basslink. Western Power is regulated by the Economic Regulation Authority of Western 
Australia. Power and Water is regulated by the Northern Territory Utilities Commission.
2. The RABs are as set at the beginning of the current regulatory period for each network. Values sourced from the National Electricity Rules, schedule 6A.2.1(c)(1); AER, 
Powerlink Queensland Transmission Network Revenue Cap 2007 – 08 to 2011 – 12, Fınal Decision, June 2007; SP AusNet Transmission Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 
to 2012 – 13, Fınal Decision, January 2008; ElectraNet Transmission Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, Fınal Decision, April 2008. Western Power’s RAB is as 
specified in the ERA’s Further Fınal Decision on the Proposed Access Arrangement for the South West Interconnected Network, April 2007.
3. Investment data is for the current regulatory period (typically five years). The data is based on reported actual expenditure where available and forecast expenditure in 
other years.
4. SP AusNet’s investment data includes forecast investment by VENCorp.
5. Not all interconnectors are listed. The unlisted interconnectors, which form part of the state-based networks, are Heywood (Vic – SA), QNI (Qld – NSW), Snowy — NSW 
and Snowy — Vic.
6. As Basslink is not regulated there is no RAB. $780 million is the estimated construction cost.
7. There are no electricity transmission networks in the Northern Territory.
Principal sources: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008, and previous years; AER/ACCC revenue cap decisions; 
company websites and press releases.
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Figure	4.2	
Electricity	transmission	network	ownership
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
viC SP AusNet Powernet Victoria GPU Powernet SPI Powernet (Singapore Power) SP AusNet (51% Singapore 
Power)
sA electraNet SA Government Powerlink 
(Queensland 
Government), YtL
Powerlink (Queensland Government), YtL, 
Hastings
Nsw transGrid NSW Government
energy­
Australia
NSW Government
QLd Powerlink Qld Government
TAs transend tas Government
iNTER-
CoNN-
ECToRs
Directlink Hydro­Quebec Group, NorthPower APA Group
Murraylink Hydro­Quebec Group, SNc­Lavalin APA Group
BassLink NGt citySpring
wA Western 
Power
WA Government
NGT, National Grid Transco.
Figure	4.3	
Transmission	network	assets	and	investment	(real)
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Note:
1. Network asset values are RABs at the beginning of the current regulatory period (See table 4.1). Basslink is estimated construction cost. 
2. Investment data is forecast capital expenditure for the current regulatory period (typically five years). 
3. SP AusNet includes augmentation investment by VENCorp.
4. Values are in real 2007 dollars.
Sources: National Electricity Rules, schedule 6A.2.1(c)(1); AER, Powerlink Queensland Transmission Network Revenue Cap 2007 – 08 to 2011 – 12, Final Decision, June 
2007; AER, SP AusNet Transmission Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, Final Decision, January 2008; AER, ElectraNet Transmission Revenue Determination 
2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, Final Decision, April 2008; ERA, Further Final Decision on the Proposed Access Arrangement for the South West Interconnected Network, April 2007.
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4.3	 Regulation	of	transmission	services
Electricity transmission networks are capital intensive 
and incur declining costs as output increases. This 
gives rise to a natural monopoly industry structure. In 
Australia, the networks are regulated to manage the 
risk of monopoly pricing.6 The Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was the industry 
regulator until this role transferred to the AER in 2005.
The AER regulates transmission networks under a 
framework set out in the National Electricity Rules. The 
approach is to determine a revenue cap for each network, 
which sets the maximum allowable revenue a network 
can earn during a regulatory period — at least five years. 
In setting the cap, the AER applies a building block 
model to determine the amount of revenue needed by a 
transmission company to cover its efficient costs while 
providing for a commercial return to the owner. The 
component building blocks cover:
> operating costs
> asset depreciation costs
> taxation liabilities
> a commercial return on capital.
To illustrate, figure 4.4 shows the components of the 
revenue cap for ElectraNet (South Australia) for the 
period 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13. For most networks:
> over 60 per cent of the revenue cap consists of the 
return on capital invested in the network
> around 70 per cent of the cap consists of the return on 
capital plus the return of capital (depreciation).
The regulatory process includes incentives for efficient 
transmission investment and operating expenditure. 
There is also a service standards incentive scheme to 
ensure that efficiencies are not achieved at the expense 
of service quality (see sections 4.6 and 4.7).
Figure	4.4	
Composition	of	ElectraNet	revenue	cap	2008	–	09	to	2012	–	13
IVmVi^dca^VW^a^i^Zh*
DeZgVi^c\ZmeZcY^ijgZ(+9ZegZX^Vi^dc/GZijgcdcXVe^iVa,(
Sources: AER, Powerlink Queensland Transmission Network Revenue Cap 
2007– 08 to 2011 – 12, Fınal Decision, June 2007, AER; ElectraNet Transmission 
Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, Fınal Decision, April 2008.
4.4	 Transmission	investment
New investment in transmission infrastructure is needed 
to maintain or improve network performance over time. 
Investment covers network augmentations (expansions) 
to meet rising demand and the replacement of ageing 
assets. Some investment is driven by technological 
innovations that can improve network performance.
The regulatory process aims to create incentives for 
efficient transmission investment. At the start of a 
regulatory period an investment (capital expenditure) 
allowance is set for each network. The process also 
allows for a contingent allowance for large investment 
projects that are foreseen at the time of the revenue 
determination, but where there is significant uncertainty 
about timing or costs of the project.
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6 The Murraylink, Directlink and Basslink interconnectors were constructed as unregulated infrastructure that aimed to earn revenue through arbitrage. That is, they 
profited by purchasing electricity in low-price NEM regions and selling it into higher-price regions. Murraylink and Directlink converted to regulated networks in 
2003 and 2006, respectively. Basslink is currently the only unregulated transmission network in the NEM.
The regulatory process also requires a regulatory test 
assessment for individual projects. The regulatory test 
is a decision-making tool used to assess proposed 
augmentation projects for economic efficiency. Under 
the two limbs of the regulatory test, a network business 
must ensure a proposed augmentation passes a cost-
benefit analysis or provides a least-cost solution.7
In determinations made since 2005, the AER has 
allowed network businesses discretion over how and 
when to spend their investment allowance, without the 
risk of future review. To encourage efficient network 
spending, network businesses retain a share of the 
savings (including the depreciation that would have 
accrued) against their investment allowance. There is a 
service standards incentive scheme to ensure that cost 
savings are not achieved at the expense of network 
performance.
There has been significant investment in transmission 
infrastructure in the NEM since the shift to national 
regulation (see table 4.2 and figures 4.5 and 4.6).8 
Transmission investment in the major NEM networks 
exceeded $800 million in 2006 – 07, equal to around 
6 per cent of the combined RABs. Investment is forecast 
to rise to around $1270 million in 2007 – 08. Investment 
over the seven years to 2008 – 09 is forecast at around 
$6.9 billion, including the Basslink interconnector. 
Rising investment outcomes reflect both substantial 
real investment in new infrastructure as well as rising 
resource costs in the energy construction sector (see 
figures 4.7 and 4.8).
Investment levels have been highest for TransGrid and 
Powerlink. The other networks typically have relatively 
lower investment levels, reflecting the scale of the 
networks and differences in investment drivers, such as 
the age of the infrastructure and demand projections. 
Recent AER revenue cap decisions project significantly 
higher investment into the next decade.9 Forecast 
investment indicates that a step-change increase in 
investment levels is taking place across the NEM.
Table	4.2	 Transmission	investment	in	the	National	Electricity	Market	(NEM)	(real)
NETwoRk LoCATioN 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 7	yEAR	ToTAL
ActUAL INVeStMeNt FOrecASt 
INVeStMeNt
NETwoRk
transGrid NSW 272 289 139 158 232 366 307 1 763
energyAustralia NSW 31 32 40 44 39 61 45 293
SP AusNet Vic 41 57 74 103 111 81 1161 583
Powerlink Qld 223 178 225 274 259 671 601 2 432
electraNet SA 38 37 57 55 77 47 126 438
transend tas 62 55 69 98 43 36 362
total networks 604 654 590 704 816 1 270 1 227 5 866
iNTERCoNNECToRs
Murraylink Vic — SA 1132
Directlink NSW — Qld 1242
Basslink Vic — tas 7963
NeM tOtAL 6 899
Note: Data is for years ended 30 June. Values are in real 2007 dollars.
1. Includes forecast investment by VENCorp.
2. Regulated value at conversion.
3. Estimated construction cost.
123
	
C
H
A
P
TER
	
4	E
lE
c
tr
ic
ity 
tr
a
n
sm
issio
n
7 The test comprises a reliability limb (a least cost test for reliability projects) and a market benefits limb (a cost benefit test for all other projects). See AER, Regulatory 
test for network augmentations — Version 3, November 2007.
8 Fıgure 4.5 includes Western Power for comparative purposes.
9 AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008.
Figure	4.5	
Transmission	investment	by	network	(real)
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Notes:
1. Actual data (unbroken lines) used where available and forecasts (broken lines) for other years.
2. Forecast capital investment is as approved by the regulator through revenue cap determinations.
3. Values are in real 2007 dollars.
4. For SP AusNet, actual expenditure is replacement expenditure only; forecast expenditure includes network augmentation by VENCorp.
5. Data series terminate in different years due to differing regulatory periods.
Source: ACCC/AER Annual Regulatory Reports and revenue cap decisions; ERA access arrangement decisions.
For example:
> The AER determination for Queensland’s Powerlink 
network for 2007 – 12 approved investment of around 
$2.4 billion to meet demand growth and replace 
ageing assets. This is an 80 per cent increase from 
the previous five years. The decision increases average 
nominal transmission charges by around 6 per cent.
> In Victoria the AER supported investment of around 
$750 million in SP AusNet’s network over the six 
years to 2013 – 14, a 60 per cent increase over the 
previous regulatory period. The decision increases 
average nominal transmission charges by around 
5 per cent annually. In addition, the AER supported 
network augmentation investment by VENCorp of 
around $200 million.
> In South Australia the AER approved investment of 
around $650 million for the ElectraNet network over 
the five years to 2012 – 13. This represents a 60 per cent 
increase over the previous regulatory period and 
will increase nominal transmission charges by about 
8 per cent.
These recent AER decisions continue a trend of rising 
investment over the current decade (see figure 4.6). 
Care should be taken in interpreting year-to-year 
changes in the data. Timing differences between the 
commissioning of some projects and their completion 
creates some volatility. In addition, transmission 
infrastructure investment can be ‘lumpy’ because of the 
one-off nature of very large capital programs. More 
generally, as regulated revenues are set for three to seven 
year periods, the network businesses have flexibility to 
manage and reprioritise their capital expenditure during 
these periods.
As noted, rising values for transmission investment 
reflect both real investment as well as higher real input 
costs. In particular, some resource costs have risen faster 
than general inflation as measured by the Consumer 
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Price Index (CPI). The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
wage index for the electricity, gas and water sectors 
shows that labour costs in the sector have risen faster 
over the past decade than both the CPI and the all-
industry average (see figure 4.7). The data reflects 
engineering and trades skills shortages in the sector.
In addition to cost pressures from rising labour costs, 
network service providers have experienced rising costs 
of materials. A report for the AER’s 2008 regulatory 
determination for SP AusNet found that costs of 
materials and equipment had risen substantially over the 
past few years. Fıgure 4.8 sets out average annual cost 
increases for materials and equipment between 2002 and 
2006. The data illustrates a sharp rise in costs. In part, 
this reflects demand pressures from Australia’s resource 
and mining boom and from industrial growth in China 
and other parts of Asia.10
Capital expenditure forecasts in recent AER 
determinations take account of the increased costs faced 
by electricity transmission businesses. Escalation factors 
used in recent regulatory decisions indicate that cost 
increases for materials may have peaked, while labour 
costs will continue to rise over the next few years.11
Figure	4.8	
Materials	and	equipment	costs
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CPI, consumer price index.
Source: SKM, Escalation factors affecting capital expenditure forecasts (Appendix C 
to SP AusNet Electricity Transmission Revenue Cap), February 2007.
4.4.1 National transmission planning
There have been some concerns that the current 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach to transmission 
planning might not adequately reflect a national 
perspective on new investment requirements. To address 
this, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
agreed in 2007 to enhance planning arrangements. The 
reforms include establishing the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO) to house a national 
transmission planning function. The AEMO will also 
replace the National Electricity Market Management 
Figure	4.6	
National	Electricity	Market		
transmission	investment	(real)
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Notes:
1. Excludes private interconnectors.
2. Values are in real 2007 dollars.
Source: ACCC/AER Annual Regulatory Reports and revenue cap decisions.
Figure	4.7	
Australian	bureau	of	statistics	wage	index		
for	electricity,	gas	and	water	supply	sector
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10 SKM, Escalation factors affecting capital expenditure forecasts (Appendix C to SP AusNet Electricity Transmission Revenue Cap), February 2007, p. 19. AER. 
ElectraNet Transmission Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, May 2008, p. 110.
11 AER, SP AusNet Transmission Revenue Determination 2008 – 09 to 2012 – 13, Final Decision, January 2008.
Company (NEMMCO) as the operator and 
administrator of the power system and wholesale market.
The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) has agreed 
to establish a national transmission planner by July 2009. 
It is expected that the national transmission planner 
will publish an annual national transmission network 
development plan to replace NEMMCO’s current 
annual national transmission statement. Part of the 
national planning arrangements will include revisions to 
the regulatory test to integrate its two limbs.12
4.5	 Financial	performance
The AER publishes an annual performance report on 
the electricity transmission network sector.13 In addition, 
new regulatory determinations include both historical 
performance data for the preceding regulatory period 
and forecasts of future outcomes.
4.5.1 revenues
Fıgure 4.9 charts the revenues allowed under national 
regulation for major transmission networks in the 
NEM. The year in which the data commences varies 
between networks, reflecting that the transfer to national 
regulation occurred in progressive stages. Different 
outcomes between the networks reflect differences in 
scale and market conditions. However, the revenues of 
all networks are increasing to meet rising demand over 
time. The combined revenue of the NEM’s transmission 
networks is forecast to reach around $1725 million 
in 2007 – 08, representing a real increase of about 
16 per cent over five years.
Figure	4.9	
Transmission	revenue	forecasts	(real)
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Notes:
1. Actual data (unbroken lines) is used where available, forecast data (broken lines) is used for other years.
2. Values are in real 2007 dollars.
Source: AER/ACCC Regulatory Reports and final and draft revenue cap decisions.
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12 See also Appendix A of this report. The current test comprises a reliability limb (a least-cost test for reliability projects) and a market benefits limb (a cost-benefit test 
for all other projects). See AER, Regulatory test for network augmentations — Version 3, November 2007.
13 AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008.
Some networks experienced a significant rise in 
revenues in their first revenue determination under 
national regulation. For example, in 2003 – 04 the 
ACCC allowed revenues for Transend (Tasmania) 
which were 28 per cent higher than those provided in 
its previous regulatory period. In addition, the start of 
a new regulatory period sometimes provides a sharp 
increase in revenues, reflecting a step-change in capital 
expenditure. For example, SP AusNet’s forecast revenue 
for 2008 – 09 (the first year of the new regulatory period) 
represents a 40 per cent increase in real revenues over the 
previous year.
4.5.2 return on assets
The AER’s annual regulatory reports contain a range of 
profitability and efficiency indicators for transmission 
network businesses in the NEM.14 Of these, the return 
on assets is a widely used indicator of performance.
The return on assets is based on operating profits (net 
profit before interest and taxation) as a percentage 
of the RAB.15 Fıgure 4.10 shows the return on assets 
for transmission networks over the five years to 2006 
– 07. In this period, government-owned network 
businesses typically achieved annual returns on assets 
ranging from 5 to 8 per cent. The privately owned 
networks in Victoria and South Australia (SP AusNet 
and ElectraNet) yielded returns in the range of 7 to 
10 per cent. There is some convergence of outcomes 
from 2005 – 06, including a sharp rise in returns for 
the small EnergyAustralia network.
A variety of factors can affect performance in this 
area, including differences in the demand and cost 
environments faced by each business, the regulated 
rate of return provided by the regulator, and variances 
in demand and costs outcomes compared to those 
forecasted in the regulatory process.
4.5.3 Operating and maintenance expenditure
In setting a revenue cap, the AER factors in an 
allowance to cover efficient operating and maintenance 
costs. In 2006 – 07, transmission network businesses 
spent about $400 million on operating and maintenance 
costs, about $8 million below regulatory forecasts. Real 
expenditure allowances are rising over time in line with 
rising demand and costs (see figure 4.11). Spending 
is highest for TransGrid (New South Wales) and 
Figure	4.10	
Return	on	assets
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Source: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 
for 2006 – 07, 2008.
Figure	4.11	
operating	and	maintenance	expenditure	(real)
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Note: Values are in real 2007 dollars.
Source: ACCC/AER Annual Regulatory Reports.
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14 AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008. See also previous years.
15 The RAB is recalculated annually (with new investment rolled in) for the purposes of this measure.
Powerlink (Queensland), which in part reflects the scale 
of those networks. It should be noted that several factors 
affect the cost structures of transmission companies. 
These include varying load profiles, load densities, asset 
age, network designs, local regulatory requirements, 
topography and climate.
The regulatory scheme provides incentives for network 
businesses to reduce their spending through efficient 
operating practices. The AER sets expenditure targets 
and allows a business to retain any underspend in the 
current regulatory period — and retain some savings 
into the next period. The AER also applies a service 
standards incentive scheme to ensure that cost savings 
are not achieved at the expense of network performance 
(see section 4.6).
The AER’s 2006 – 07 regulatory report16 compares 
target and actual levels of operating and maintenance 
expenditure. A trend of negative variances between 
these data sets may suggest a positive response to 
efficiency incentives. However, it may be that delays 
in undertaking some projects deferred the need to 
operate and maintain those assets. More generally, care 
should be taken in interpreting year-to-year changes 
in operating expenditure. As the network businesses 
have some flexibility to manage their expenditure over 
the regulatory period, timing considerations may affect 
the data.
On average operating and maintenance expenditure 
outcomes have been about 1.5 – 2.0 per cent below 
forecasts since 2003 – 04. SP AusNet (Victoria) and 
ElectraNet (South Australia) have spent below their 
target levels since the incentive scheme began in 
2002 – 03 (see figure 4.12). These businesses have 
reported that they actively pursue cost efficiencies in 
response to the scheme.17 The other networks have 
tended to spend above target, with TransGrid tracking 
close to its forecasts in most years.
Figure	4.12	
operating	and	maintenance	expenditure		
—	variances	from	target
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Source: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 
for 2006 – 07, 2008.
As noted, it is important that cost savings are not 
achieved at the expense of service quality. AER data 
indicates that all major networks in eastern and southern 
Australia have performed well against target levels of 
service quality (see section 4.6).
4.6	 Reliability	of	transmission	networks
Reliability refers to the continuity of electricity 
supply to customers. There are many factors that can 
interrupt the flow of electricity on a transmission 
network. Interruptions may be planned (for example, 
due to the scheduled maintenance of equipment) or 
unplanned (for example, due to equipment failure, 
bushfires, lightning strikes or the impact of hot weather 
raising air-conditioning loads above the capability of a 
network). A serious network failure might require the 
power system operator to disconnect some customers, 
otherwise known as load-shedding.
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16 AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 2006 – 07, 2008.
17 AER Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 2004 – 05, 2006, pp. 59 and 63.
As in other segments of the power system, there 
is a trade-off between the price and reliability of 
transmission services. While there are differences in 
the reliability standards applied by each jurisdiction, 
all transmission networks are designed to deliver high 
rates of reliability. They are engineered with sufficient 
capacity to act as a buffer against planned and unplanned 
interruptions in the power system. More generally, the 
networks enhance the reliability of the power supply as 
a whole by allowing a diversity of generators to supply 
electricity to end markets. In effect, the networks provide 
a mix of capacity that can be drawn on to help manage 
the risk of a power system failure.
Regulatory and planning frameworks aim to ensure 
that, in the longer term, there is efficient investment in 
transmission infrastructure to avoid potential reliability 
issues. In regulating the networks, the AER provides 
capital expenditure allowances that network businesses 
can spend at their discretion. To encourage efficient 
investment, the AER uses incentive schemes that 
permit network businesses to retain the returns on any 
underspend against their allowance. To balance this, 
a service quality incentive scheme rewards network 
businesses for maintaining or improving service quality. 
In combination, capital expenditure allowances and 
incentive schemes encourage efficient investment in 
transmission infrastructure to maintain reliability 
over time.
Investment decisions are also guided by planning 
requirements set by state governments in conjunction 
with standards set by NEMMCO. There is considerable 
variation in the approaches of state governments 
to planning, and in the standards applied by each 
jurisdiction. The Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) is currently completing a review of national 
reliability standards with the aim of developing a 
nationally consistent framework. The review involves 
examining existing transmission reliability standards 
(which are established within the National Electricity 
Rules and jurisdictional instruments) and options to 
establish nationally consistent reliability standards.
4.6.1 transmission reliability data
The Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) 
and the AER report on the reliability of Australia’s 
transmission networks.
Energy Supply Association of Australia data
The ESAA collects survey data from transmission 
network businesses on reliability, based on system 
minutes of unsupplied energy to customers. The data is 
normalised in relation to maximum regional demand to 
allow comparability.18
The data (see figure 4.13) indicates that the NEM 
jurisdictions have generally achieved high rates of 
transmission reliability. In 2006 – 07, unsupplied energy 
across New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
totalled only 6.2 minutes. Victoria and Western 
Australia recorded higher outage time than usual in 
2006 – 07, although the Victorian data remained below 
the national average.
Australian Energy Regulator data
As noted, the AER has developed incentive schemes 
to encourage efficient transmission service quality. 
The schemes provide financial bonuses and penalties 
to network businesses that meet (or fail to meet) 
performance targets, which include reliability targets. 
Specifically, the targets relate to:
> transmission circuit availability
> average duration of transmission outages
> frequency of ‘off supply’ events.
Rather than impose a common benchmark target for all 
transmission networks, the AER sets separate standards 
that reflect the individual circumstances of each network 
based on its past performance. Under the scheme, the 
over- or under-performance of a network against its 
targets results in a gain (or loss) of up to 1 per cent of 
its regulated revenue. The amount of revenue-at-risk 
may be increased to a maximum of 5 per cent in future 
regulatory decisions.
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18 System minutes unsupplied calculated as megawatt hours of unsupplied energy divided by maximum regional demand.
Table 4.4 sets out performance data for the major 
networks against their individual targets. While caution 
must be taken in drawing conclusions from short data 
series, it is apparent that the major networks have 
generally performed well against their targets.
The results are standardised for each network to 
derive an ‘s-factor’ that can range between –1 and 
+1. This measure determines financial penalties and 
bonuses. An s-factor of –1 represents the maximum 
penalty, while +1 represents the maximum bonus. 
Zero represents a revenue neutral outcome.
Table 4.3 sets out the s-factors for each network 
since the scheme began in 2003. The major networks 
in eastern and southern Australia have generally 
outperformed their s-factor targets. In 2007, Energy 
Australia, Murraylink and Directlink performed below 
their targets.
Figure	4.13	
Transmission	outages	—	system	minutes	unsupplied
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Note: Data not available for Queensland in 2006 – 07.
Source: ESAA, Electricity Gas Australia 2008.
Table	4.3	 s-factor	values
TRANsMissioN	
busiNEss
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
transGrid 0.93 0.70 0.63 0.12
energyAustralia 1.00 0.67 0.39 –0.14
SP AusNet1 –0.03 0.22 0.09 –0.17 0.06
electraNet 0.74 0.63 0.71 0.59 0.28
Powerlink 0.82
transend 0.55 0.19 0.06 0.56
Directlink –0.54 –0.62
Murraylink 0.21 –0.32
Note:
1. SP AusNet’s financial incentive is capped at +0.5% of its maximum allowable 
revenue, as SP AusNet is also required to comply with the Victorian 
Government’s performance incentive regime administered by VENCorp.
Source: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 
for 2006 – 07, 2008; and reports for previous years.
Fıgure 4.14 illustrates the net financial reward or penalty 
from the scheme for each major network. While the 
scheme encourages network businesses to improve their 
performance over time, it should be noted that the 
financial outcomes relate to individual targets for each 
network and are not a comprehensive indicator of service 
quality. For example, while SP AusNet was penalised 
in 2006, it has one of the lowest rates of transmission 
outages in the NEM (see figure 4.13).
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Table	4.4	 Performance	against	service	targets	—	major	networks
TRANsgRid	(Nsw) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
transmission circuit availability (%) 99.5 	 99.7 	 99.6 	 99.6  99.4
transformer availability (%) 99 	 99.3 	 98.9 	 98.8  97.5
reactive plant availability (%) 98.6 	 99.5 	 99.6 	 98.9  99.2
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.05 mins 5 	 0.0 	 1.0 	 2.0  4.0
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.40 mins 1 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0  1.0
Average outage duration (minutes) 1500 	 936.8 	 716.7 	 812.0  788
ENERgy	AusTRALiA	(Nsw) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
transmission feeder availability (%) 96.96 	 	 98.6 	 98.3 	 97.7  96.6
sP	AusNET	(viC) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
total circuit availability (%) 99.2 	 99.3 	 99.3 	 99.3 	 99.3  99.1
Peak critical circuit availability (%) 99.9 	 99.8 	 100.0 	 99.9 	 99.9  99.8
Peak non­critical circuit availability (%) 99.85 	 99.8 	 99.6 	 99.9 	 99.8  99.9
Intermediate critical circuit availability (%) 99.85 	 99.5 	 99.8 	 99.8 	 99.5  99.3
Intermediate non­critical circuit availability (%) 99.75 	 99.3 	 99.4 	 98.2 	 99.0  95.8
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.05 mins 2 	 3.0 	 2.0 	 5.0 	 5.0  n/a
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.30 mins 1 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 2.0 	 2.0  n/a
Average outage duration — lines (hours) 10 	 10.0 	 2.7 	 7.5 	 30.9  1.6
Average outage duration — transformers (hours) 10 	 7.7 	 4.9 	 6.6 	 7.2  5.4
ELECTRANET	(sA) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
transmission line availability (%) 99.25 	 99.4 	 99.6 	 99.4  99.4
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.2 mins 5 	 7.0 	 0.0 	 4.0  1.0
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 1 min 2 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.0  0.0
Average outage duration (minutes) 100 	 48.9 	 114.1 	 88.5  269.9
PowERLiNk	(QLd) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
transmission circuit availability — critical elements (%) 99.07  99.44
transmission circuit availability — non­critical elements (%) 98.40  98.70
transmission circuit availability — peak hours (%) 98.16  98.60
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.2 mins 5  1.0
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 1 min 1  0.0
Average outage duration (minutes) 1033  612
TRANsENd	(TAs) TARgET 	 2003 	 2004 	 2005 	 2006 	 2007
transmission line availability (%) 99.10 	 99.3 	 98.7 	 99.2  99.0
transformer circuit availability (%) 99 	 99.3 	 99.2 	 98.8  99.6
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 0.1 mins 16 	 18.0 	 13.0 	 16.0  10.0
Frequency of lost supply events greater than 2 mins 3 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 1.0  0.0
n Met target  n Below target
n/a, not available
Source: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report for 2006 – 07, 2008.
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Figure	4.14	
incentive	scheme	outcomes	—	service	performance
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Note:
1. SP AusNet’s financial incentive is capped at +0.5% of its maximum allowable 
revenue, as SP AusNet is also required to comply with the Victorian 
Government’s performance incentive regime administered by VENCorp.
Source: AER, Transmission network service providers: Electricity regulatory report 
for 2006 – 07, 2008; and reports for previous years.
4.7	 Transmission	congestion
Transmission networks do not have unlimited ability to 
carry electricity from one location to another. Rather, 
there are physical limits on the amount of power that 
can flow over any one part or region of the network. 
These physical limits arise from the need to prevent 
damage to the network and ensure stability in the face 
of small disturbances.
A transmission line can become congested or 
constrained due to events and conditions on a particular 
day. Some congestion is caused by factors within the 
control of a service provider — for example, through 
the way they schedule outages, their maintenance 
and operating procedures, their standards for network 
capability (such as thermal, voltage or stability limits), 
changes in network monitoring procedures and decisions 
on equipment upgrades. Factors beyond the control 
of the service provider include extreme weather. For 
example, hot weather can result in high air-conditioning 
loads that push a network towards its pre-determined 
limits, which are set by the network business. To protect 
system security, NEMMCO may then invoke network 
constraints. Similarly, line maintenance may limit 
available capacity. The potential for network congestion 
is magnified if these events occur simultaneously.
If a major transmission outage occurs in combination 
with other generation or demand events, it can 
sometimes cause the load shedding of some consumers. 
However, this is rare in the NEM. Instead, the main 
impact of congestion is on the cost of electricity. In 
particular, transmission congestion increases the total 
cost of electricity by displacing low-cost generation with 
more expensive generation. For example, if a particular 
transmission line is congested, it can prevent a low-cost 
generator that uses the line from being dispatched to 
satisfy demand. Instead, generators that do not require 
the constrained line will be used. If this requires the use 
of higher-cost generators, it ultimately raises the cost of 
producing electricity.
Congestion can also create opportunities for the exercise 
of market power. If a network constraint prevents low-
cost generators from moving electricity to customers, 
there is less competition in the market. This can allow 
the remaining generators to adjust their bidding to 
capitalise on their position, which is likely to result in 
increased electricity prices.
Not all constraints have the same market impact. Most 
do not force more expensive generation to be dispatched. 
For example, congestion which ‘constrains off ’19 a  
coal-fired plant and requires the dispatch of another 
coal-fired plant may have little net impact. But the costs 
may be substantial if cheap coal-fired generation needs 
to be replaced by a high-cost peaking plant such as a 
gas-fired generator.
With the assistance of NEMMCO, the AER completed 
a project in 2006 to measure the impact of transmission 
congestion in the NEM. The AER measures the cost 
of transmission congestion by comparing dispatch costs 
with and without congestion. The AER has developed 
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19 Under the National Electricity Rules, ‘constrained off ’ means: ‘in respect of a generating unit, the state where, due to a constraint on a network, the output of that 
generating unit is limited below the level to which it would otherwise have been dispatched by NEMMCO on the basis of its dispatch offer’.
three measures of the impact of congestion on the cost 
of electricity (see table 4.5). Two measures (the total cost 
of constraints, TCC, and the outage cost of constraints, 
OCC) focus on the overall impact of constraints on 
electricity costs, while the third measure (the marginal 
cost of constraints, MCC) identifies which particular 
constraints have the greatest impact.20
The measures estimate the impact of congestion on 
generation costs rather than spot prices. In particular, 
the measures reflect how congestion raises the cost 
of producing electricity, taking account of the costs 
of individual generators. If the bidding of generators 
reflects their true cost position, the measures will be an 
accurate measure of the economic cost of congestion. 
They therefore reflect the negative efficiency effects 
of congestion and make an appropriate basis to 
develop incentives to mitigate this cost. However, if 
market power allows a generator to bid above its true 
cost structure, then the measures will reflect a mix of 
economic costs and monopoly rents.
The AER assesses the impact of major constraints in its 
weekly market reports and in annual congestion reports. 
The AER has published four years’ data on the costs 
of congestion. This data (see figure 4.15) indicates that 
the annual cost of congestion has risen from around 
$36 million in 2003 – 04 to $107 million in 2006 – 07. 
Typically, most congestion costs accumulate on just a 
handful of days. Around two-thirds of the total cost for 
2006 – 07 accrued on just 16 days. Around half of total 
costs are attributable to network outages.
In addition:
> 40 network constraints significantly affected 
interconnectors in 2006 – 07 compared to 32 in 
2005 – 06, 15 in 2004 – 05 and five in 2003 – 04. 
Congestion on Basslink, which connects Victoria 
and Tasmania, is not included in this data.
Table	4.5	 Market	impact	of	transmission	constraints	—	Australian	Energy	Regulator	measures
MEAsuRE dEFiNiTioN ExAMPLE
total cost of 
constraints (tcc)
the total increase in the cost of producing electricity due 
to transmission congestion (includes outages and network 
design limits).
> measures the total savings if all constraints were 
eliminated.
Hot weather in New South Wales causes a surge in 
demand for electricity, raising the price. the Victoria 
– Snowy interconnector reaches capacity, preventing 
the flow of lower­cost electricity into New South Wales 
to meet the demand. Higher­cost generators in 
New South Wales must be used instead.
> tcc measures the increase in the cost of electricity 
caused by the blocked transmission line.
Outage cost of 
constraints (Occ)
the total increase in the cost of producing electricity due 
to outages on transmission networks.
> only looks at congestion caused by network outages
> outages may be planned (e.g. scheduled maintenance) 
or unplanned (e.g. equipment failure).
> excludes other causes, such as network design limits.
Maintenance on a transmission line prevents the 
dispatch of a coal­fired generator that requires the use 
of the line. A higher­cost gas­fired peaking generator 
(that uses a different transmission line) has to be 
dispatched instead.
> Occ measures the increase in the cost of electricity 
caused by line maintenance.
Marginal cost of 
constraints (Mcc)
the saving in the cost of producing electricity if the 
capacity on a congested transmission line is increased by 
1 MW, added over a year.
> identifies which constraints have a significant impact on 
prices.
> does not measure the actual impact.
> see tcc example (above).
> Mcc measures the saving in the cost of producing 
electricity in New South Wales if one additional MW 
of capacity was available on the congested line. At 
any time several lines may be congested. the Mcc 
identifies each network element while the tcc and 
Occ measure the impact of all congestion — and do 
not discriminate between individual elements.
Qualitative impact 
statements
A description of major congestion events identified by the 
tcc, Occ and Mcc data.
> analyses the causes of particular constraints, for 
example, network design limits, outages, weather, 
demand spikes.
Lightning in the vicinity of the Heywood interconnector 
between Victoria and South Australia led to reduced 
electricity flows for 33 hours in 2003 – 04.
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20 A more detailed discussion of this appears in: AER, indicators of the market impact of transmission congestion — decision, 9 June 2006; AER, annual congestion 
reports for 2003 – 04, 2004 – 05, 2005 – 06 and 2006 – 07.
> 14 network constraints in the NEM (mainland) 
caused congestion for 10 hours or more in 2006 – 07 
compared to nine constraints in the two previous years 
and seven in 2003 – 04. There were four constraints in 
Tasmania which caused congestion for 10 hours or 
more in 2006 – 07.
While the data outlines results for only four years, it is 
apparent that there are some significant constraints and 
that their impact has risen since 2003 – 04. Total costs 
are nonetheless relatively modest given the scale of the 
market. Recent regulatory decisions have provided for 
increased transmission investment that may help to 
address capacity issues and reduce congestion costs over 
time. The significant capital expenditure programs of 
transmission businesses suggest that the transmission 
sector as a whole is generally responding well to the 
needs of the market.
Figure	4.15	
Costs	of	transmission	congestion
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Source: AER.
Fıgure 4.16 shows that when the data is broken down 
into months, the bulk of congestion costs in 2006 – 07 
occurred in August, October, and June — in contrast to 
the previous year when congestion was concentrated 
in late spring and summer. The significant congestion 
costs in June 2007 reflect line outages and generator 
constraints (due to water shortages) at times of very high 
electricity demand. To manage transmission congestion 
on some lines, NEMMCO was obliged to constrain off 
some low-cost generation, which led to the dispatch of 
higher-cost plant (in some cases, gas peaking plant).
Figure	4.16	
Monthly	costs	of	transmission	congestion	for	2006	–	07
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4.7.1 Geography of transmission congestion
The MCC data, which identifies particular constraints 
with a significant impact, showed that around 750 
network constraints affected the market at least once 
in 2006 – 07. At any one time, between 350 and 450 
constraints were typically in place. Congestion may be 
significant in a particular area for only a few days a year, 
but this is sometimes sufficient to have a significant 
impact on congestion costs.
Fıgure 4.17 shows the locations of transmission 
infrastructure most affected by congestion over the 
past four years. Locations of congestion may change 
from year to year due to unique conditions such as 
drought, weather events and unscheduled line outages. 
Geographically, the impact of congestion was most 
evident in south-east Queensland and at interconnection 
points between regions. The duration of congestion 
within Queensland increased from 375 hours in 
2005 – 06 to 773 hours in 2006 – 07. A significant 
proportion of this related to flows between central 
Queensland and the load centre in Brisbane (see 
Queensland case study in box 4.1). Other recurring 
locations of significant congestion include the 
Heywood interconnector (Victoria – South Australia 
border), northern New South Wales and Basslink 
(Victoria – Tasmania).
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Figure	4.17	
Congestion	locations	in	the	National	Electricity	Market
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Source: AER.
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An example of the effects of transmission constraints 
on energy market outcomes occurred on Wednesday 
13 June 2007 on the 814 line between Gladstone and 
Gin Gin in Queensland.
On this day, the NeM experienced very high New South 
Wales demand. In addition, a number of generators were 
out of service. Drought had constrained the availability 
of water for cooling in some coal­fired generators — 
especially at tarong and Swanbank in Queensland and 
in some New South Wales and Victorian generators.
these conditions led to a very tight demand – supply 
balance, causing high prices across the NeM. Prices 
reached $6951 per MWh in Queensland at 6 pm, mostly 
driven by peak New South Wales demand. In this 
period, outages on the Gladstone – Gin Gin line also 
reduced transfer capability between central and south 
Queensland. to manage this issue, NeMMcO was 
obliged to invoke a constraint to reflect the network’s 
reduced capability. the limit on flows meant that 
generators in northern Queensland that rely on the 
network were ‘constrained off’, reducing the amount 
of electricity they could supply. this led to NeMMcO 
dispatching higher­cost generators when lower­cost 
generation would otherwise have been available. the 
outage cost of constraints on this day was estimated 
to be $2.5 million.
Long­term outages on the Gladstone – Gin Gin line 
accounted for a significant amount of the congestion 
in Queensland for 2006 – 07. the NeMMcO constraints 
invoked to manage this congestion limited the dispatch 
of central and northern Queensland generators. In June 
2007, the constraints restricted their output by as much 
as 550 MW.
box	4.1	 Case	study	—	Transmission	outages	in	Queensland
4.7.2 Measures to reduce congestion costs
The AER recognises the significance of congestion costs 
and has responded to the issue by:
> developing measures of the market impact of 
transmission constraints and publishing data against 
these measures (as outlined)
> implementing an incentive scheme to reduce 
transmission constraints
> providing for rising transmission investment in 
regulatory decisions (for example, the AER has 
approved a significant capital expenditure program for 
Powerlink over the next five years; Powerlink is the 
transmission provider in Queensland, a region that has 
experienced recurring congestion issues).
Other responses include the AEMC congestion 
management review, which aims to enhance mechanisms 
to manage congestion in the NEM. The review 
considers options such as congestion pricing, changes 
to regional pricing structures and deeper connection 
charges. In addition, the MCE is implementing national 
transmission planning arrangements which are expected 
to reduce congestion through enhanced whole-of-NEM 
network planning.
Congestion management incentive scheme
The AER introduced a new incentive mechanism in 
2008 to reduce the effects of transmission congestion. 
The mechanism forms part of the service performance 
incentive scheme to encourage network owners to 
take account of the impact of their behaviour on the 
electricity market.21 This new mechanism operates as 
a bonus-only scheme. The incentive aims to reward 
network owners for improving operating practices in 
areas such as outage timing, outage notification, live 
line work and equipment monitoring. In some cases, 
these may be more cost-efficient measures to reduce 
congestion than solutions that require investment 
in infrastructure.
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21 AER, Electricity transmission network service providers: Service target performance incentive scheme, March 2008.
The mechanism permits a transmission business to earn 
an annual bonus of up to 2 per cent of its revenue if it 
can eliminate all outage events with a market impact of 
over $10 per MWh.22
4.7.3 Settlement residue auctions
Congestion in transmission interconnectors can cause 
prices to differ across regions of the NEM (see section 
2.4). In particular, prices may spike in a region that is 
constrained in its ability to import electricity. To the 
extent that trade remains possible, electricity will flow 
from lower price to higher price regions. Consistent 
with the regional design of the NEM, the exporting 
generators are paid at their local regional spot price, 
while importing retailers must pay the higher spot price 
in their region. The difference between the price paid 
in the importing region and the price received in the 
generating region, multiplied by the amount of flow, is 
called a settlement residue. Fıgure 2.8 (chapter 2) charts 
the annual accumulation of settlement residues in each 
region of the NEM.
Price separation creates risks for the parties that contract 
across regions. NEMMCO offers a risk management 
instrument by holding quarterly auctions to sell the 
rights to future residues up to one year in advance. 
Retailers, generators and other market participants 
may bid for a share of the residues. For example, a 
Queensland generator, trading in New South Wales, may 
bid for residues between those regions if it expects New 
South Wales prices to settle above Queensland prices. As 
New South Wales is a significant importer of electricity, 
it can be vulnerable to price separation and often accrues 
high settlement residue balances.
Fıgure 4.18 charts the amount of settlement residues 
that accrued each year against the proceeds of residue 
auctions from 2000 to 2007. The total value of residues 
represents the net difference between the prices paid by 
retailers and the prices received by generators across the 
NEM. It therefore gives an approximation of the risk 
faced by market participants from inter-regional trade. 
The figure illustrates that the residues are frequently 
auctioned for less than their ultimate value. On average, 
the actual residues have been around 60 per cent higher 
than the auction proceeds.
Market participants tend to discount the value of 
settlement residues because they are not a firm hedging 
instrument.23 In particular, a reduction in the capability 
of an interconnector — for example, due to an outage — 
reduces the cover that the hedge provides. This makes 
it difficult for parties to assess the amount of hedging 
they are bidding for at the residue auctions. The auction 
units are therefore a less reliable risk management tool 
than some other financial risk instruments, such as 
those traded in over-the-counter and futures markets 
(see chapter 3).
Figure	4.18	
inter-regional	hedging:	auction	proceeds	and	
settlement	residues
b
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Source: NEMMCO.
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22 The AER decision to introduce the scheme noted that the level of performance improvement required to receive the full 2 per cent bonus is probably an unrealistic 
aim. However, it is difficult to determine what a realistic level of performance is at this time because the scheme is untried.
23 Energy Reform Implementation Group, Discussion papers, November 2006, p .177.
	 5	ElEctricity 
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Most electricity customers are located a long distance from generators. The electricity 
supply chain therefore requires networks to transport power from generators to customers. 
Chapter 4 provides a survey of high-voltage transmission networks that move electricity 
over long distances from generators to distribution networks in metropolitan and 
regional areas. This chapter focuses on the lower voltage distribution networks that move 
electricity from points along the transmission line to customers in cities, towns and 
regional communities.
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There are a number of possible ways to present and 
analyse data on Australia’s distribution networks. This 
chapter mostly adopts a convenient classification of the 
networks based on jurisdiction and ownership criteria. 
Other possible ways to analyse the data include by feeder 
— for example, a rural/urban classification. Section 5.6 
includes analysis based on a feeder classification.
While this chapter includes data that might enable 
performance comparisons to be made between 
networks, such analysis should note that geographical, 
environmental and other differences can affect relative 
performance. These factors are noted, where appropriate, 
in the chapter.
This chapter considers:
> the role of the electricity distribution network sector
> the structure of the sector, including industry participants and ownership changes over time
> the economic regulation of the distribution network sector
> financial outcomes, including revenues and returns on assets
> new investment in distribution networks
> quality of service, including reliability and customer service performance.
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5.1	 Role	of	distribution	networks
Distribution networks move electricity from 
transmission networks to residential and business 
customers.1 A distribution network consists of the poles, 
underground channels and wires that carry electricity, as 
well as substations, transformers, switching equipment, 
and monitoring and signalling equipment. While 
electricity moves along transmission networks at high 
voltages to minimise energy losses, it must be stepped 
down to lower voltages in a distribution network for 
safe use by customers. Most customers in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) require delivery at around 
230 – 240 volts.
Distribution networks criss-cross urban and regional 
areas to provide electricity to every customer. This 
requires substantial investment in infrastructure. The 
total length of distribution infrastructure in the NEM 
is around 700 000 kilometres — 16 times greater than for 
transmission infrastructure.
In Australia, electricity distributors provide the 
infrastructure to transport electricity to household and 
business customers, but do not sell electricity. Instead, 
retailers bundle electricity generation with transmission 
and distribution services and sell them as a package 
(see chapter 6). In some jurisdictions, there is common 
ownership of distributors and retailers, which are ring-
fenced (operationally separated) from one another.
The contribution of distribution costs to final retail 
prices varies between jurisdictions, customer types and 
locations. The Queensland Competition Authority 
(QCA) reported in 2008 that distribution services 
account for about 37 per cent of a typical residential 
electricity bill.2 The Essential Services Commission 
(ESC) of Victoria reported in 2004 that distribution can 
account for 30 to 50 per cent of retail prices, depending 
on customer type, energy consumption, location and 
other factors.3
5.2	 Australia’s	distribution	networks
Australia has 15 major electricity distribution networks, 
13 of which are located in the NEM. Table 5.1 provides 
summary details.4 New South Wales, Victoria and 
Queensland have multiple networks, each of which is 
a monopoly provider in a designated area. In the other 
jurisdictions, there is one major network. There are also 
small regional networks with separate ownership in 
some jurisdictions. Fıgure 5.1 illustrates the distribution 
network areas for Queensland, New South Wales, the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Victoria.
5.2.1 Ownership
Table 5.1 sets out ownership arrangements for 
Australian distribution networks. At June 2008:
> Victoria and South Australia’s networks are privately 
owned or leased and the ACT network has joint 
government and private ownership
> New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and the 
non-NEM jurisdictions of Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory have retained government 
ownership of the electricity distribution sector.
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1 There are exceptions. For example, some large businesses such as aluminium smelters can bypass the distribution network and source electricity directly from 
the transmission network. Conversely, embedded generators have no physical connection with the transmission network and dispatch electricity directly into a 
distribution network.
2 QCA, Draft decision — benchmark retail cost index for electricity: 2008–09, May 2008.
3 ESC, Electricity distribution price review 2006-10, Issues paper, December 2004, p. 5.
4 This chapter includes some high level information on Western Australia and Northern Territory, but focuses mainly on the NEM jurisdictions. Chapter 7 provides 
further information on Western Australian and Northern Territory electricity markets.
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Figure	5.1	
Electricity	distribution	network	areas	—	Queensland,	New	south	wales,	ACT	and	victoria
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5.2.2 Victoria and South australia
Victoria’s five distribution networks — CitiPower, Solaris, 
United Energy, SP AusNet and Powercor — are privately 
owned. The South Australian network (ETSA Utilities) 
is leased to private interests. Fıgure 5.2 tracks ownership 
changes since privatisation. At June 2008, there are two 
principal network owners:
> Cheung Kong Infrastructure and Hongkong Electric 
Holdings have a 51 per cent stake in two Victorian 
networks (Powercor and CitiPower) and a 200-year 
lease of the South Australian distribution network 
(ETSA Utilities). The remaining 49 per cent in each 
network is held by Spark Infrastructure, a publicly 
listed infrastructure fund in which Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure has a direct interest.
> Singapore Power International owns a 51 per cent 
stake in SP AusNet, which owns Victoria’s SP AusNet 
network. Singapore Power International acquired a 
second Victorian network (Solaris) and part ownership 
of a third network (United Energy) from Alinta in 
2007. It also owns a 50 per cent share in the ACT 
distribution network (ActewAGL). In August 2008, 
Singapore Power International rebranded its energy 
business as Jemena.
DUET Group has a majority interest in Victoria’s 
United Energy network. The minority owner, Singapore 
Power International, operates the network.5
5.2.3 Cross-ownership
In some jurisdictions, there are ownership linkages 
between electricity distribution and other segments 
of the energy sector (see table 5.2). New South 
Wales and Tasmania have common ownership in 
electricity distribution and retailing, with ring-fencing 
arrangements for operational separation. Queensland 
privatised most of its energy retail sector in 2006 – 07, 
but Ergon Energy continues to provide distribution and 
retail services to some customers.
A number of electricity distributors also provide 
other energy network services. The most significant is 
Singapore Power International, which owns electricity 
transmission and distribution networks, and gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines.
Figure	5.2	
Distribution	network	ownership	—	victoria	and	south	Australia
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Solaris 
(aGl/alinta) aGl, GPu aGl alinta
Singapore 
Power
CitiPower
entergy aeP Cheung Kong Cheung Kong (51%), Spark (49%)
Powercor
PacifiCorp Cheung Kong Cheung Kong (51%), Spark (49%)
SP ausNet
texas utilities (tXu) Sing Power
SP ausNet 
(Singapore Power (51%))
united energy
utilicorp, aMP, NSw State Super alinta (34%), duet (66%)
Sing Power 
(34%), 
duet (66%)
etSa utilities
Government Cheung Kong Cheung Kong (51%), Spark (49%)
Note: Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
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5 DUET Group comprises a number of trusts, the responsible entities for which are jointly owned by Macquarie Bank and AMP Capital Holdings.
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Table	5.2	 ownership	linkages	between	electricity	
distribution	and	other	energy	sectors
owNERsHiP	LiNkAgE DisTRibuTioN	busiNEss
electricity distribution 
and transmission
Singapore Power International (Vic)
energyaustralia (NSw)
western Power (wa)
electricity distribution 
and gas transportation
Singapore Power International (Vic)
Cheung Kong Infrastructure  
(via equity in envestra) (Vic and Sa)
electricity distribution 
and retail
actewaGl (aCt)1
energyaustralia, Integral energy  
and Country energy (NSw)
aurora energy (tas)
ergon energy (Qld)
Note:
1. ACTEW Corporation has a 50 per cent share in ActewAGL Retail and 
ActewAGL Distribution. The remaining shares are owned by AGL Energy 
and Singapore Power International respectively.
5.3	 	Economic	regulation	of	
distribution	services
Electricity distribution networks are capital intensive and 
incur declining costs as output rises. This gives rise to a 
natural monopoly industry structure. In Australia, the 
networks are regulated under the National Electricity 
Law and National Electricity Rules (Electricity Rules) 
to manage the risk of monopoly pricing.
On 1 January 2008, the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER) became responsible for the economic regulation 
of electricity distribution following the transfer of 
functions from state and territory regulators. The AER’s 
first regulatory review in electricity distribution — to set 
revenues for the New South Wales and ACT networks — 
began in May 2008. The AER commenced a regulatory 
review of the South Australian and Queensland 
distribution networks in July 2008. The amended 
Electricity Rules contain transitional arrangements 
for the ongoing administration of existing distribution 
determinations by jurisdictional regulators. The AER 
is working closely with jurisdictional regulators and 
network businesses to maintain regulatory certainty 
in the transition period. The regulation of distribution 
networks in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory remain under state and territory jurisdiction.
The Electricity Rules set out the framework for 
regulating distribution networks. The Electricity Rules 
require the use of an incentive-based approach, but allow 
the regulator to choose the form of price or revenue 
control. Regulatory frameworks currently applied in the 
NEM states include revenue yield models that control 
the average revenue per unit sold, based on volumes or 
revenue drivers; and weighted average price caps, which 
allow flexibility in individual tariffs within an overall 
ceiling. In South Australia, an electricity pricing order 
sets some elements of the regulatory framework. As 
table 5.3 illustrates, there are a range of approaches in 
the regulatory decisions currently in place.
In essence, each approach involves the setting of a ceiling 
on the revenues or prices that a distribution business 
is allowed to earn or charge during a regulatory period 
— typically five years. A building block model is generally 
applied to determine the revenue or price ceiling. 
The building blocks factor in a network’s operating 
costs, asset depreciation costs, taxation liabilities and 
a commercial return on capital. The setting of these 
elements has regard to various factors, including 
projected demand growth; price stability; the potential 
for efficiency gains in cost and capital expenditure 
management; service standards; and the provision of 
a fair and reasonable risk-adjusted rate of return on 
efficient investment.
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Table	5.3	 Current	forms	of	incentive	regulation	in	the	National	Electricity	market
FoRm	oF	
REguLATioN
How	iT	woRks REguLAToR NETwoRk(s)
weighted average 
price cap
Sets a ceiling on a weighted average of distribution tariffs (prices). the 
distribution business is free to adjust its individual tariffs as long as the 
weighted average remains within the ceiling.
there is no cap on the total revenue a distribution business may earn. 
revenues can vary depending on tariff structures and the volume of 
electricity sales.
essential Services 
Commission (Vic) 
 
 
Independent Pricing 
and regulatory tribunal 
(NSw)
Solaris 
CitiPower 
Powercor 
SP ausNet 
united energy
energyaustralia 
Integral energy 
Country energy
revenue cap Sets the maximum revenue a distribution network may earn during a 
regulatory period. It effectively caps total earnings. this mirrors the 
approach used to regulate transmission networks.
the distribution business is free to determine individual tariffs provided 
that total revenues do not exceed the cap.
Queensland Competition 
authority (Qld)
Office of the tasmanian 
energy regulator (tas)
eNerGeX 
ergon energy
aurora energy
Maximum average 
revenue cap
Sets a ceiling on average revenues during a regulatory period. total 
prescribed distribution service revenues are capped each year at the 
average revenue allowance for a year multiplied by actual energy sales. 
tariffs must be set to comply with this constraint.
Independent 
Competition and 
regulatory Commission 
(aCt)
actewaGl
revenue yield 
(average revenue 
control)
links the amount of revenue a distribution business may earn to the 
volume of electricity sold. total revenues are not capped and may vary 
in proportion to the volume of electricity sales.
the distribution business is free to determine individual tariffs 
— subject to tariff principles and side constraints — provided that total 
revenues do not exceed the average.
essential Services 
Commission of South 
australia (Sa)
etSa utilities
There have been variations between regulatory 
approaches to the treatment of specific building block 
components. Incentive schemes attached to some 
elements of the blocks also vary between jurisdictions. 
For example, in current determinations:
> There are differences between jurisdictions in 
the treatment of taxation in determining returns 
on capital.
> Jurisdictions applied different types of incentive 
mechanisms to encourage distribution businesses 
to manage their operating and capital expenditure 
efficiently.
> Some jurisdictions have conducted an ex post6 review 
of whether past investment was prudent when 
determining the amount of capital expenditure to 
be rolled into the regulated asset base (RAB).7
> Some jurisdictions have provided financial incentives 
for networks to improve service standards over 
time, while others have not applied such schemes 
(see section 5.6).
In applying any of the forms of regulation in table 5.3, 
a regulator must forecast the revenue requirement of a 
distribution business over the regulatory period. This 
must factor in investment forecasts and the operating 
expenditure allowances that a benchmark distribution 
business would require if operating efficiently. The aim 
is to provide incentives for the distribution business to 
reduce costs through efficient management and spend 
less than its forecast allowance. As will be discussed in 
section 5.6, these incentives should be balanced against 
a service standards regime to ensure any expenditure 
savings are not at the expense of network reliability 
and performance.
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 6 A retrospective (after the event) assessment.
 7 The RAB estimates the depreciated optimised replacement cost of an asset.
Figure	5.3	
Distribution	assets	and	investment	—	current	regulatory	period	(real)
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Notes: 
1. Asset valuation is the opening RAB for the current regulatory period. Investment is forecast capital expenditure over the current regulatory period. 
2. The regulatory period is 4.5 years for Aurora Energy (Tasmania), 3 years for Western Power (Western Australia) and 5 years for other networks. 
3. All estimates are converted to June 2007 dollars.
Source: Regulatory determinations published by ESC (Vic), IPART (NSW), QCA (Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas), ERA (WA) and ICRC (ACT).
Since assuming responsibility in 2008 for the economic 
regulation of distribution networks, the AER has 
published a number of guidelines on regulatory 
arrangements, including on:
> the post-tax revenue model, which is used to 
determine distribution businesses’ annual regulated 
revenues
> the roll-forward model, which is used to determine 
the RAB for each network
> an incentive scheme which allows network businesses 
to retain efficiency savings in operating and 
maintenance expenditure for five years from the year 
in which the gain is made (see section 5.5)
> a service incentive scheme, to maintain and improve 
service performance (see section 5.6)
> cost allocation guidelines, which outline the required 
contents of a regulated business’s cost allocation 
method and the basis on which the AER will assess 
that method for approval.
5.4	 Distribution	investment
New investment in distribution infrastructure is needed 
to maintain and, where appropriate, improve network 
performance over time. Investment covers network 
augmentations to meet rising demand and expand 
into new regional centres and towns; and upgrades to 
improve the quality of existing networks by replacing 
ageing assets. Some investment is driven by regulatory 
requirements on matters such as network reliability.
Fıgure 5.3 shows the opening RABs and forecast 
investment over the current regulatory period for the 
major networks.8 In the NEM, the combined opening 
RABs of distribution networks is around $27 billion, 
more than double the valuation for transmission 
infrastructure. Investment over the current regulatory 
cycle for the NEM networks is running at around 
$16 billion.9
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 8 At the end of the regulatory period, the RAB is adjusted to reflect new investment that has occurred.
 9 Investment estimates are for the current — typically five year — regulatory periods. The RAB and investment estimates are in June 2007 dollars.
Many factors can affect the value of RABs, including the 
basis of original valuation, network investment, the age 
of a network, geographical scale, the distances required 
to transport electricity from transmission connection 
points to demand centres, population dispersion and 
forecast demand profiles.
Fıgure 5.4 charts annual investment in each network, 
using actual data where available and forecast data 
for other years. The forecast data relates to proposed 
investment that the regulator has approved as efficient at 
the beginning of the regulatory period. The charts depict 
real data in June 2007 dollars.
In summary, investment in the NEM jurisdictions was 
forecast at over $3 billion in 2007 – 08, in addition to 
around $318 million forecast for Western Australia. 
Investment has risen steadily during the current 
decade in most networks. This appears to be reflected 
in stable or improving reliability outcomes in several 
jurisdictions.10
On average, investment during the current regulatory 
cycle is running at over 40 per cent of the underlying 
asset base in most networks, and over 60 per cent in 
Queensland and parts of New South Wales. Different 
outcomes between jurisdictions reflect a range of 
variables, including forecast demand, the scale and age 
of the networks, and investment allowances in historical 
regulatory determinations.
There is some volatility in the data, reflecting a number 
of factors. In particular, there is some lumpiness in 
investment because of the one-off nature of some capital 
programs. More generally, the network businesses have 
some flexibility to manage and reprioritise their capital 
expenditure over the regulatory period. Transitions 
between regulatory periods, and from actual to forecast 
data, also result in some data volatility. For example, 
network businesses tend to schedule a significant portion 
of investment in the early stages of a regulatory period 
— although some projects are ultimately delayed.
5.5	 	Financial	performance	of	
distribution	networks
The jurisdictional regulators have published annual 
performance reports on electricity distribution networks. 
In addition, new regulatory determinations include both 
historical performance data for the preceding regulatory 
period and forecasts of future outcomes.
Following the transfer to national regulation in 2008, the 
AER will publicly report on the financial performance 
of distribution networks in the future. The AER will 
consult with stakeholders on reporting arrangements, 
including appropriate measures.
5.5.1 revenues
Fıgure 5.5 charts real revenues for distribution 
networks in the NEM, based on forecasts in regulatory 
decisions. Allowed revenues are tending to rise over 
time as underlying asset bases expand to meet rising 
demand. The combined revenue of the NEM’s 13 major 
distribution networks was forecast at around $5.6 billion 
in 2007 – 08, a rise of about 2.6 per cent in real terms over 
the previous year.
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10 See section 5.6 and figure 5.9.
Figure	5.4	
Network	investment	(real)
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2. All data has been converted to June 2007 dollars.
Source: Regulatory determinations published by ESC (Vic); IPART (NSW), QCA (Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas) and ICRC (ACT).
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5.5.2 return on assets
A commonly used financial indicator to assess the 
performance of a business is the return on assets. 
The ratio is calculated as operating profits (net profit 
before interest and taxation) as a percentage of the 
average RAB. Fıgure 5.6 sets out the returns on assets 
for distribution networks in the NEM, where data 
is available. Over the past five years, the privately-
owned distribution businesses in Victoria and South 
Australia tended to yield returns of about 8 to 12 per 
cent. The government-owned distribution businesses in 
New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania achieved 
returns ranging from 4 to 10 per cent.
A variety of factors can affect performance in this area. 
These might include differences in the demand and 
cost environments faced by each business and variances 
in demand and costs outcomes compared to those 
forecasted in the regulatory process.
5.5.3  Operating and maintenance 
expenditure
Fıgure 5.7 charts forecast operating and maintenance 
expenditure for each network on a per kilometre basis 
in 2007 – 08. The forecasts reflect regulatory allowances 
for each network to cover efficient operating and 
maintenance expenditure. There is a range of outcomes 
in this area, reflecting differences in customer and load 
densities, the scale and condition of the networks, 
geographical factors and reliability requirements. 
Normalising on a per kilometre basis tends to bias 
against high-density urban networks with relatively 
short line lengths. This is reflected in the high outcomes 
for the three Victorian urban networks and the 
ACT network.
Figure	5.5	
Revenue	forecasts	(real)
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Figure	5.6	
Return	on	assets
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Note: Data for year ended 30 June. Victorian data are for previous calendar year (for example, 2006 – 07 refers to calendar year 2006).
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The AER published details in June 2008 of a national 
efficiency benefit sharing scheme as part of the national 
framework for distribution regulation.11 The scheme 
provides incentives for distribution businesses to 
reduce their spending against forecast targets through 
efficient operating practices. It allows the businesses 
to retain some or all of their underspending against 
target in the current regulatory period. The national 
scheme is designed to apply uniformly to all distribution 
businesses. The AER will first apply the scheme in its 
current price reviews of the Queensland and South 
Australian distribution networks, scheduled to take effect 
in July 2010.
Over time, the national scheme will replace the current 
state-based incentive schemes that jurisdictional 
regulators administer. Figure 5.8 compares actual 
expenditure against target expenditure for each network 
under the state-based schemes. A positive variance 
indicates that actual expenditure exceeded target in that 
year — that is, the distribution business overspent. A 
negative variance indicates underspending against target. 
A trend of negative variances over time may suggest a 
positive response to efficiency incentives. More generally, 
care should be taken in interpreting year-to-year changes 
in operating expenditure. As the network businesses 
have some flexibility to manage their expenditure over 
the regulatory period, timing considerations may affect 
the data. Delays in completing a project may also affect 
expenditure.
Fıgure 5.8 indicates that most Victorian networks and 
ENERGEX (Queensland) have underspent against their 
forecast allowances for most or all of the charted period. 
The New South Wales and South Australian networks 
and Ergon Energy (Queensland) have recorded sharply 
improved performance in this area since 2003 – 04.
Figure	5.7	
operating	and	maintenance	expenditure	per	kilometre	of	line	length	—	2008
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11 AER, Electricity distribution network service providers: Efficiency benefit sharing scheme, Fınal decision, June 2008.
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Figure	5.8	
operating	and	maintenance	expenses	—	variances	from	target
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5.6	 service	quality	and	reliability
Electricity distribution networks are monopolies that 
face little risk of losing customers if they provide poor 
service. In addition, regulatory incentive schemes for 
efficient cost management might encourage a business 
to sacrifice service performance to reduce costs. In 
recognition of these risks, governments and regulators 
monitor the performance of distribution businesses to 
ensure they provide acceptable levels of service.
Quality of service monitoring for electricity distribution 
typically relates to:
> reliability (the continuity of electricity supply through 
the network)
> technical quality (for example, voltage stability)
> customer service (for example, on-time provision of 
services and the adequacy of call centre performance).
All jurisdictions regulate the service performance of 
distribution networks through:
> the monitoring and reporting of reliability, technical 
quality and customer service outcomes against 
standards set out in legislation, regulations, licences 
and codes; there may be sanctions for non-compliance
> guaranteed service levels (GSLs) that, if not met, 
require a network business to make payments to 
affected customers; the guarantees relate to network 
reliability, technical quality of service and customer 
service; each of the NEM jurisdictions implements a 
GSL scheme.
In addition, some jurisdictions have applied financial 
incentive schemes for distribution businesses to maintain 
and improve service performance over time. The 
Victorian and South Australian networks are currently 
subject to an ‘s-factor’ incentive scheme.12 The South 
Australian scheme focuses on customers with poor 
reliability outcomes. Service incentive schemes do not 
currently apply to other networks.
The AER published details in June 2008 of a national 
service performance incentive scheme as part of the 
national framework for distribution regulation.13 
The scheme provides financial bonuses and penalties 
to network businesses that meet (or fail to meet) 
performance targets. The targets relate to reliability 
of supply and customer service and include a GSL 
component. The results are standardised for each 
network to derive an ‘s-factor’ which reflects whether 
service performance has improved over past average 
performance levels. A distribution business can earn an 
annual bonus of up to 3 per cent of its revenue if it meets 
all performance targets.
The national scheme is based on existing state-based 
incentive schemes in Victoria and South Australia 
and therefore has regard to industry and community 
expectations. Over time, the national scheme will replace 
the state-based schemes. The AER will first apply the 
national scheme in its current price reviews of the 
Queensland and South Australian distribution networks, 
scheduled to take effect in July 2010. While the AER 
considers that the scheme should apply on a consistent 
basis nationally where this is practical, there is some 
flexibility to allow for transitional issues and the differing 
circumstances and operating environments of particular 
businesses. The AER has also noted that the scheme 
will need to evolve over time to allow for such factors as 
changes in energy industry technology, climate change 
policies and other issues affecting customer expectations 
of service performance and the operating environment 
for the distribution sector.
The AER will publicly report on the service performance 
of distribution businesses in the future. It will consult 
with stakeholders on the reporting measures and future 
reporting arrangements.
5.6.1 reliability
Reliability refers to the continuity of electricity supply 
to customers, and is a key performance indicator that 
impacts on customers. Distribution outages account for 
over 90 per cent of the duration of all electricity outages 
in the NEM. Relatively few outages originate in the 
generation and transmission sectors.14
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12 The use of s-factor schemes is discussed in the context of electricity transmission in section 4.6 of this report.
13 AER, Electricity distribution network service providers: Service target performance incentive scheme, Fınal decision, June 2008.
14 See AER, State of the energy market 2007, essay B, pp. 38-53.
A reliable distribution network keeps interruptions or 
outages in the transport of electricity down to efficient 
levels. It would be inefficient to try to eliminate every 
possible interruption. Rather, an efficient outcome would 
reflect the level of service that customers are willing to 
pay for. There has been some research on the willingness 
of electricity customers to pay higher prices for a reliable 
electricity supply. For example, a 1999 Victorian study 
found that more than 50 per cent of customers were 
willing to pay a higher price to improve or maintain 
their level of supply reliability.15 However, a 2003 South 
Australian survey indicated that customers were willing 
to pay for improvements in service only to poorly 
serviced customer areas.16
Various factors, both planned and unplanned, can 
impede network reliability.
> A planned interruption occurs when a distributor 
needs to disconnect supply to undertake maintenance 
or construction works. Such interruptions can be 
timed for minimal impact.
> Unplanned outages occur when equipment failure 
causes the supply of electricity to be disconnected 
unexpectedly. There are often routine external causes, 
such as damage caused by trees, birds, possums, vehicle 
impacts or vandalism. Networks can also be vulnerable 
to extreme weather, such as bushfires or storms. There 
may be ongoing reliability issues if part of a network 
has inadequate maintenance or is utilised near its 
capacity limits at times of peak demand. Sometimes 
these factors occur in combination.
The impact of an outage depends on customer load, the 
design of the network, maintenance practices and the 
time taken by a distributor to restore supply after an 
interruption. The impact of a distribution outage tends 
to be localised to a part of the network.
Jurisdictions track the reliability of distribution networks 
against performance standards to assess whether they 
are operating at a satisfactory level. The standards take 
into account the trade-off between improved reliability 
and cost. Ultimately, customers must pay for the cost of 
investment, maintenance and other solutions needed to 
deliver a reliable power system.
The trade-offs between improved reliability and 
cost have resulted in standards for distribution 
networks being less stringent than for generation and 
transmission. These less stringent standards also reflect 
the localised effects of distribution outages, compared 
with the potentially widespread geographical impact 
of a generation or transmission outage. The capital 
intensive nature of distribution networks makes it 
very expensive to build in high levels of redundancy 
(spare capacity) to improve reliability. These factors help 
to explain why distribution outages account for such a 
high proportion of electricity outages in the NEM.
For similar reasons, there tend to be different reliability 
standards for different feeders (parts) of a distribution 
network. For example, a higher reliability standard is 
usually required for a central business district (CBD) 
network with a large customer base and a concentrated 
load density than for a highly dispersed rural network 
with a small customer base and a low load density. While 
the unit costs of improving reliability in a dispersed rural 
network are relatively high, few customers are likely to 
be affected by an outage. Conversely, the unit costs of 
improving reliability in a high density urban network 
are relatively low, and many customers are likely to be 
affected by an outage.
5.6.2 reliability data
All jurisdictions have their own monitoring and 
reporting frameworks for reliability. In addition, the 
Utility Regulators Forum (URF) has adopted four 
indicators of distribution network reliability that are 
widely used in Australia and overseas. The indicators 
relate to the average frequency and duration of network 
interruptions or outages (see table 5.4). The indicators do 
not distinguish between the nature and size of loads that 
are affected by supply interruptions.
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15 KBA and Powercor, Understanding customers’ willingness to pay: Components of customer value in electricity supply, 1999.
16 The survey found that 85 per cent of consumers were satisfied with their existing level of service and were generally unwilling to pay for improvements in these levels. 
It found that there was a willingness to pay for improvements in service only to poorly served consumers. On this basis, ESCOSA has focused on providing incentives 
to improve the reliability performance for the 15 per cent of worst served consumers, while maintaining average reliability levels for all other customers. See ESCOSA, 
2005-2010 Electricity distribution price determination, part A, April 2005; and KPMG, Consumer preferences for electricity service standards, March 2003.
Table	5.4	 Reliability	measures	—	distribution
iNDEx NAmE DEsCRiPTioN
SaIdI System average 
interruption duration 
index
average total number of 
minutes that a distribution 
network customer is 
without electricity in a year 
(excludes interruptions of 
one minute or less)
SaIFI System average 
interruption frequency 
index
average number of times 
a customer’s supply is 
interrupted per year
CaIdI Customer average 
interruption duration 
index
average duration of each 
interruption (minutes)
MaIFI Momentary average 
interruption frequency 
index
average number of 
momentary interruptions 
(of one minute or less) per 
customer per year
Source: URF, National regulatory reporting for electricity distribution and retailing 
businesses, 2002.
In most jurisdictions, distribution businesses are 
required to report performance against the system 
average interruption duration index (SAIDI), the system 
average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) and the 
customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) 
indicators. The national service performance incentive 
scheme, published in June 2008, includes the SAIDI 
and SAIFI indicators.17
Jurisdictional regulators audit, analyse and publish 
reliability outcomes, typically down to feeder level 
(CBD, urban and rural) for each network.18 Tables 5.5 
and 5.6 and figure 5.9 estimate historical SAIDI and 
SAIFI data for NEM jurisdictions. In the future, the 
AER will report on reliability outcomes as part of its 
performance reporting on the distribution sector.
The data in tables 5.5, 5.6 and figure 5.9 reflect and 
total outages experienced by distribution customers. 
In general, the data has not been normalised to exclude 
distribution outages that are beyond the reasonable 
control of the network operator — for example, outages 
that originate in the generation and transmission sectors, 
and outages caused by external factors such as extreme 
weather. However, the data for Queensland in 2005 – 06 
and New South Wales in 2006 – 07 have been adjusted to 
remove the impact of natural disasters (Cyclone Larry in 
Queensland and extreme storm activity in New South 
Wales), which would otherwise have severely distorted 
the data.
From a customer perspective, the unadjusted data 
presented here is relevant, but an assessment of 
distribution network performance should normalise data 
to exclude external sources of interruption. At present, 
there is no consistent approach to determining exclusions. 
The impact of excluded events is considered later in this 
chapter in relation to reliability at the feeder level.19
A number of issues limit the validity of performance 
comparisons between the networks. In particular, the 
data currently relies on the accuracy of the network 
businesses’ information systems, which may vary 
considerably. There are also differences in design, 
geographical conditions and historical investment 
between the networks. As noted, differences in customer 
density and load density can affect the costs and 
benefits of achieving high reliability. In addition, there 
are differences in the approach of each jurisdiction 
to excluded events. The URF agreed that in some 
circumstances, reliability data should be normalised to 
exclude interruptions that are beyond the control of 
a network business.20 In practice, there are differences 
between jurisdictions in the approval and reporting 
of exclusions. More generally, there is no consistent 
approach to auditing performance outcomes.
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17 AER, Electricity distribution network service providers: Service target performance incentive scheme, Fınal decision, June 2008
18 In New South Wales the distribution businesses publish this data in the first instance. The regulator (IPART) periodically publishes summary data.
19 The national service performance incentive scheme, published in June 2008, adopts a consistent approach to determine exclusions, based on a standard set by the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The standard is currently in use in a number of Australian jurisdictions. In addition, the scheme identifies specific 
events, for which the impact would be excluded (see: AER, Electricity distribution network service providers: Service target performance incentive scheme, Final decision, 
June 2008, section 6.7).
20 The URF definitions of SAIDI and SAIFI exclude outages that exceed a threshold SAIDI impact of three minutes; outages that are caused by exceptional natural 
or third party events; and outages for which the distribution business cannot reasonably be expected to mitigate the effect of by prudent asset management.
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Notes and Sources: See tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Noting these caveats, the SAIDI data indicates that 
distribution networks in the NEM have delivered 
reasonably stable reliability outcomes over the past few 
years, with recent improvements in some jurisdictions. 
The NEM-wide SAIDI remained in a range of about 
200 – 270 minutes from 2000 – 01 to 2006 – 07. While 
there are regional variations, some convergence is evident 
in 2006 – 07.
The average duration of outages per customer has 
tended to be lower in Victoria and South Australia 
than in other jurisdictions, despite some community 
concerns that privatisation might adversely affect service 
quality. The average duration of outages has tended 
to fall in New South Wales since 2003 – 04, despite a 
slight deterioration in 2006 – 07. Average reliability 
(as measured by SAIDI) is lower in Queensland than 
Table	5.5	 system	average	interruption	duration	index	(sAiDi)	(minutes)
1999	–	00 2000	–	01 2001	–	02 2002	–	03 2003	–	04 2004	–	05 2005	–	06 2006	–	07
Victoria 156 183 152 151 161 132 165 165
NSw 175 324 193 279 218 191 211
Queensland 331 275 332 434 283 351 233
South australia 159 143 179 159 164 201 184
tasmania 265 198 214 324 314 292 256
NeM weighted average 211 245 211 267 201 221 202
Table	5.6	 system	average	interruption	frequency	index	(sAiFi)
1999	–	00 2000	–	01 2001-02 2002	–	03 2003	–	04 2004	–	05 2005	–	06 2006	–	07
Victoria 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.94
NSw 1.7 2.5 2.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9
Queensland 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.7 2.2
South australia 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.75
tasmania 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.1 2.89 2.57
NeM weighted average 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.0
Notes:
1. The data reflects total outages experienced by distribution customers. In some instances, this may include outages resulting from issues in the generation and 
transmission sectors. In general, the data has not been normalised to exclude distribution network issues beyond the reasonable control of the network operator. The data 
for Queensland in 2005 – 06 and New South Wales in 2006 – 07 have been adjusted to remove the impact of natural disasters (Cyclone Larry in Queensland and extreme 
storm activity in New South Wales), which would otherwise have severely distorted the data.
2. Victorian data is for the calendar year ending in that period (for example, Victorian 2005 – 06 data is for calendar year 2005).
3. The NEM averages are weighted by customer numbers.
Sources: Performance reports published by ESC (Vic), IPART (NSW), QCA (Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas), ICRC (ACT), EnergyAustralia, Integral Energy and 
Country Energy. The AER consulted with PB Associates in the development of historical data.
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in other mainland jurisdictions. It should be noted 
that Queensland is subject to significant variations in 
performance, in part because of its large and widely 
dispersed rural networks, and extreme weather events. 
These characteristics make it more vulnerable to outages 
than some other jurisdictions. Queensland recorded 
improved reliability from 2003 – 04. This is particularly 
evident for 2006 – 07, when outage time fell considerably.
The SAIFI data appears to show an improvement in 
the average frequency of outages across the NEM since 
2000. The average frequency of outages is higher in 
Queensland than in other jurisdictions, although in 
2006 – 07, the state achieved its best performance in this 
area, moving closer to the results of the other mainland 
jurisdictions. On average, distribution customers in the 
mainland NEM regions experience outages around twice 
a year. The rate is a little higher in Tasmania.
The recent improvements in reliability in New South 
Wales and Queensland are consistent with the rising 
investment trends noted in section 5.4. In Queensland, 
the government took action to improve reliability 
when a 2004 review (the Somerville review) found that 
distribution service performance was unsatisfactory. 
The government introduced performance requirements 
aimed at improving reliability by 25 per cent by 2010. 
There was also a significant step-increase in investment 
allowances for Queensland’s distribution networks (see 
figure 5.4).21
5.6.3  reliability of distribution 
networks by feeder
Given the diversity of network characteristics, it may be 
more meaningful to compare network reliability on a 
feeder category basis than on a statewide basis. There are 
four categories of feeder based on geographical location 
(see table 5.7).
Fıgures 5.10a – d set out the average duration of 
supply interruptions per customer (SAIDI) for each 
feeder type, subject to data availability.22 The charts 
distinguish between outages that are deemed within 
the reasonable control of the networks (normalised 
outages) and outages deemed beyond their control. 
The latter exclusions cover outages that originate in the 
generation and transmission sectors, and outages caused 
by external events such as extreme weather. As a general 
principle, it would be unreasonable to assess distribution 
performance unless the impact of these external factors 
is excluded. Total network outages in a period are the 
sum of the normalised and excluded data.
As noted, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons 
between jurisdictions — even based on the normalised 
data — because of differences in approach to exclusions 
and auditing practices. Any attempt to compare 
performance should also take account of geographical, 
environmental and other differences between the 
networks. That said, it is apparent that CBD and urban 
customers tend to experience better network reliability 
than rural customers. This reflects that reliability 
standards take into account the differing cost-benefit 
reliability trade-offs in each part of a network. To 
illustrate, there are likely to be more severe economic 
consequences from a network outage on a CBD feeder 
compared to a similar outage on a remote rural feeder 
where customer bases and loads are more dispersed. 
Table	5.7	 Feeder	categories
FEEDER	CATEgoRy DEsCRiPTioN
Central business 
district
Predominately supplies commercial, high-
rise buildings through an underground 
distribution network containing significant 
interconnection and redundancy when 
compared to urban areas
urban a feeder, which is not a CBd feeder, 
with actual maximum demand over the 
reporting period per total feeder route 
length greater than 0.3 MVa/km
rural short a feeder, which is not a CBd or urban 
feeder, with a total feeder route length less 
than 200 km
rural long a feeder, which is not a CBd or urban 
feeder, with a total feeder route length 
greater than 200 km
Source: Utilities Regulators Forum, National regulatory reporting for electricity 
distribution and retailing businesses, 2002.
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21 For background on the Somerville review and Queensland reliability issues, see AER State of the Energy Market 2007, p. 53.
22 As of March 2008, the most recent published data for the ACT was for 2002 – 03.
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Similarly, the unit costs of improving reliability in a high 
density urban network will be lower than in a dispersed 
rural network. For these reasons, CBD networks are 
designed for higher reliability than other feeders, and 
include the use of underground feeders, which are less 
vulnerable to outages.
In summary, in the period from 2002 – 03:
> CBD feeders were more reliable than other feeders. 
Most CBD customers experienced outages totalling 
less than 20 minutes per year.
> Urban customers typically experienced outages 
totalling around 50 to 150 minutes per year. 
Normalised outage time tends to be lowest for 
Victorian customers, and highest for Ergon Energy 
(Queensland) customers. Networks in several 
jurisdictions experienced significant interruptions that 
were excluded from the normalised data. Extreme 
weather caused significant exclusions for Queensland 
in 2005 – 06 and New South Wales in 2006 – 07. The 
normalised data indicates that reliability is reasonably 
stable or improving over time in most networks.
> Rural short customers typically experienced 
normalised outages of around 100 to 300 minutes per 
year, with outages tending to be highest in New South 
Wales and Queensland. Ergon Energy (Queensland) 
customers typically experienced over 500 minutes 
of normalised outages. Weather-related factors led 
to major exclusions in Queensland in 2005 – 06 and 
New South Wales in 2006 – 07.
> With a feeder route length of more than 200 
kilometres, rural long customers experienced the least 
reliable electricity supply. Rural long customers in 
Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania experienced 
outages of around 200 to 400 minutes per year on 
average. The Victorian networks recorded the lowest 
rate of outages, and have improved their performance 
over time. In 2006 – 07, a typical customer in two New 
South Wales networks and the Ergon Energy network 
(Queensland) experienced over 1000 minutes of 
normalised outages, with additional substantial outages 
attributed to external factors.
5.6.4 technical quality of supply
The technical quality of electricity supply in a 
distribution network can be affected by issues such as 
voltage dips, swells and spikes, and television or radio 
interference. Some problems are network-related (for 
example, the result of a network limit or fault), but 
others may be traced to an environmental issue or to a 
network customer.
Network businesses report on technical quality of supply 
by disaggregating complaints into their underlying 
causes and categorising them. There are a number of 
issues in making performance comparisons between 
jurisdictions. In particular, the definition of ‘complaint’ 
adopted by each business may vary widely.
The complaint rate for technical quality of supply issues 
since 2004 – 05 is less than 0.1 per cent of customers for 
most distribution networks in the NEM.
5.6.5 Customer service
Network businesses report on their responsiveness to 
a range of customer service issues, including:
> timely connection of services
> timely repair of faulty street lights
> call centre performance
> customer complaints.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 provide a selection of customer 
service data published by state and territory regulators. 
As noted, it is difficult to make performance 
comparisons due to the significant differences between 
networks, as well as possible differences in definitions 
and in information, measurement and auditing systems.
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Table	5.8	 Timely	provision	of	service
NETwoRk PERCENTAgE	oF	
CoNNECTioNs	ComPLETED	
AFTER	AgREED	DATE
PERCENTAgE	oF	sTREETLigHT	
REPAiRs	ComPLETED	
AFTER	AgREED	DATE
AvERAgE	NumbER	
oF	DAys	To	REPAiR	
FAuLTy	sTREETLigHT
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
viCToRiA
Solaris (aGl/alinta) 0.14 0.12 0.09 6.1 6.9 1.1 2.0 3.0 2.4
SP ausNet 0.03 0.21 2.40 1.0 0.8 0.1 2.0 2.0 1.4
united energy 0.12 0.05 0.29 0.8 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.0 1.0
CitiPower 0.00 0.02 0.03 7.8 11.4 5.8 2.3 3.0 2.2
Powercor 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.3 0.1 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.2
NEw	souTH	wALEs
energyaustralia 0.01 0.02 n/a 6.6 6.0 n/a 8.0 9.0 n/a
Integral energy 0.01 0.02 n/a 5.5 0.9 n/a 2.0 2.0 n/a
Country energy 0.02 0.02 n/a 1.3 1.0 n/a 9.0 8.0 n/a
QuEENsLAND
ergon energy 6.62 0.84 0.48 9.7 21.5 17.9 2.8 3.9 3.5
eNerGeX 3.98 0.62 0.54 5.4 4.8 0.6 3.5 4.5 4.0
souTH	AusTRALiA
etSa utilities 0.91 1.33 0.51 4.5 5.5 2.6 3.8 3.6 2.6
TAsmANiA
aurora energy n/a 0.15 0.14 10.5 12.3 14.0 n/a n/a n/a
n/a, not available
Notes:
1. Victorian data is in calendar years. Data for other jurisdictions is for year ended June 30.
2. Completed connections data for Queensland and South Australia includes new connections only.
Source: Distribution network performance reports published by ESC (Vic), IPART (NSW), QCA (Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas), ICRC (ACT), EnergyAustralia, 
Integral Energy and Country Energy.
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Table	5.9	 Call	centre	performance
NETwoRk PERCENTAgE	oF	AbANDoNED	
CALLs	bEFoRE	REACHiNg	
HumAN	oPERAToR
PERCENTAgE	oF	CALLs	
ANswERED	by	HumAN	oPERAToR	
wiTHiN	30	sECoNDs
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
viCToRiA
Solaris (aGl/alinta) 0.9 5.0 7.0 73.8 75.2 77.4
SP ausNet 8.8 6.0 9.0 79.8 82.7 92.3
united energy 7.7 24.0 18.0 75.6 73.8 72.9
CitiPower 10.8 10.0 5.0 88.2 89.2 85.7
Powercor 5.9 7.0 7.0 90.9 88.7 86.7
NEw	souTH	wALEs	AND	ACT
energyaustralia 10.5 10.5 n/a 44.6 81.3 n/a
Integral energy 6.0 3.2 n/a 81.0 89.0 n/a
Country energy 41.2 42.6 n/a 48.4 47.2 n/a
actewaGl 16.9 22.5 n/a 65.6 39.7 n/a
QuEENsLAND
ergon energy 2.7 3.5 2.3 77.3 85.1 87.0
eNerGeX 4.1 3.9 3.0 80.6 89.4 79.1
souTH	AusTRALiA
etSa utilities 4.4 4.0 3.0 86.9 85.2 89.3
TAsmANiA
aurora energy 1.0 9.3 5.6 n/a n/a n/a
n/a, not available
Note: Victorian data is in calendar years. Data for other jurisdictions is for year ended June 30.
Source: Distribution network performance reports published by ESC (Vic), IPART (NSW), QCA (Qld), ESCOSA (SA), OTTER (Tas), ICRC (ACT), EnergyAustralia, 
Integral Energy and Country Energy.
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	 6	ElEctricity 
rEtail 
markEts
The retail market is the final link in the electricity supply chain. It provides the main 
interface between the electricity industry and customers, such as households and small 
businesses. Because retailers deal directly with consumers, the services they provide can 
significantly affect perceptions of the performance of the electricity industry.
Retailers buy electricity in the wholesale market and package it with transportation 
for sale to customers. Many retailers also sell ‘dual fuel’ products that bundle electricity 
and gas services. While retailers provide a convenient aggregation service for electricity 
consumers, they do not provide network services.
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State and territory governments are responsible for the 
regulation of retail energy markets. Governments agreed 
in 2004 to transfer several non-price regulatory functions 
to a national framework to be administered by the 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) and 
the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE) has scheduled the regulatory 
package to be introduced to the South Australian 
Parliament in September 2009.1
This chapter focuses on the retailing of electricity 
to small customers,2 including households and small 
business users. While large customers such as major 
industrial users buy the greatest volume of electricity, 
they are relatively few in number. The chapter focuses 
mainly on the retail sector in the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) jurisdictions in southern and eastern 
Australia, but also includes some high level information 
on Western Australia and the Northern Territory.3
This chapter provides a survey of electricity retail markets. It covers:
> the structure of the retail market, including industry participants and trends towards horizontal 
and vertical integration
> the development of retail competition
> retail market outcomes, including price and service quality
> the regulation of the retail market
> energy efficiency and demand management initiatives.
	 6	ElEctricity 
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1 Section 6.11 provides an update on the transition to a national regulatory framework.
2 In Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales, small customers are those consuming less than 160 MWh per year. In Queensland and the Australian Capital 
Territory, small customers are those consuming less than 100 MWh per year. Small customers in Tasmania are those consuming less than 150 MWh per year.
3 Chapter 7 provides further information on the Western Australian and Northern Territory electricity sectors.
While this chapter reports some data that might enable 
performance comparisons to be made between retailers 
and jurisdictions, such analysis should note that a variety 
of factors can affect relative performance.
6.1	 Retail	market	structure
The privatisation of energy retail assets is continuing. 
Victoria and South Australia privatised their energy 
retail businesses in the 1990s and Queensland 
privatised most of its energy retail entities in 2006 – 07. 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government 
operates a joint venture with the private sector to provide 
retail services. Western Australia, Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory retain government ownership in the 
retail sector.
New South Wales retains government ownership of its 
energy retail businesses, but in 2008 announced its 
intention to privatise electricity generation and retail. 
In June 2008, the New South Wales Government 
announced that it planned to privatise the retail 
businesses through a combination of trade sales and 
share offerings.4 The New South Wales Auditor-General 
reported in August 2008 that the asset sales would raise 
no adverse issues for taxpayers.5 In September 2008, the 
New South Wales Premier announced that the sale of 
government retailers would proceed, but that the state 
would retain its generation assets.
Alongside the privatisation of energy retail businesses, 
Australian governments have introduced retail 
contestability (customer choice). Most governments have 
adopted a staged timetable to introduce customer choice, 
beginning with large industrial customers followed 
by small industrial customers and finally small retail 
customers. Full retail contestability (FRC) is achieved 
when all customers are permitted to enter a supply 
contract with a retailer of choice.
The introduction of contestability arrangements has 
varied between jurisdictions (see figure 6.1):
> New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South 
Australia and the ACT have introduced FRC.
> Tasmania allows contestability for customers using 
at least 750 megawatt hours (MWh) per year. 
The Office of the Tasmanian Energy Regulator 
(OTTER) in 2008 conducted a public benefit 
assessment on the introduction of FRC for electricity 
customers. In May 2008, OTTER released a draft 
recommendation that contestability be extended 
to consumers using at least 50 MWh per year by 1 July 
2010 and that any further extension of contestability 
be undertaken only once certain market conditions 
have been met. It found that these conditions are 
unlikely to be satisfied by 1 July 2010.6
Figure	6.1	
Introduction	of	full	retail	contestability
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4 Treasurer (NSW) (Hon Michael Costa), Government announces next step in plan to secure NSW energy supplies, media statement, 25 June 2008.
5 New South Wales Auditor-General, Oversight of electricity industry restructuring, August 2008.
6 Office of the Tasmanian Energy Regulator, Public benefit assessment for electricity retail competition in Tasmania — Draft report, May 2008, pp. 81 – 82.
> Western Australia allows contestability for customers 
using at least 50 MWh annually. The Office of Energy 
in 2008 conducted a review of the electricity retail 
market, including whether FRC should be introduced 
for electricity customers.7 The Western Australian 
Government is also required under legislation 
to conduct a separate review of the benefits of FRC 
after April 2009.8 The recommendations arising from 
the 2008 review will be re-examined in the 2009 
review process.9
> The Northern Territory plans to introduce FRC 
in April 2010, subject to a public benefit test.10
The retail players in each jurisdiction include:
> one or more ‘host’ retailers that are subject to various 
regulatory obligations
> new entrants, including established interstate players, 
gas retailers branching into electricity retailing and 
new players in the energy retail sector.
State government-owned host retailers in New South 
Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory are the major players in those jurisdictions. 
The ACT Government operates a joint venture with 
a privately owned business to provide electricity 
retail services.
Privately owned retailers are the major players 
in Victoria, South Australia and Queensland. 
The leading private retailers are AGL Energy, Origin 
Energy and TRUenergy. Each has significant market 
share in Victoria and South Australia and is building 
market share in New South Wales. AGL Energy 
and Origin Energy entered the Queensland small 
customer market in 2006 – 07 following the privatisation 
of government retailers. International Power, trading 
as Simply Energy, has recently emerged as a significant 
retail business in Victoria and South Australia.
A number of niche players are active in most 
jurisdictions. Despite rising wholesale energy costs 
in 2007 – 08, which may reduce profit margins in the 
retail sector, a number of new businesses have recently 
obtained or are seeking retail licences. A number 
of businesses that held retail licences, but were not active 
in the market, have now commenced marketing to small 
customers. Table 6.1 lists licenced retailers that were 
active11 in the market for residential and small business 
customers in June 2008.12
The following survey provides background 
on developments in each jurisdiction.13
6.1.1 Victoria
At June 2008, Victoria had 29 licenced retailers, 
14 of which were active in the residential and small 
business market. These were:
> AGL Energy, Origin Energy and TRUenergy, each 
of which is the host retailer in designated areas 
of Victoria
> eleven new entrants, which were established interstate 
retailers (Country Energy and EnergyAustralia) and 
nine new players in the energy retail market (Click 
Energy, Jackgreen, Our Neighbourhood Energy, 
Powerdirect, Red Energy, Simply Energy, Victoria 
Electricity, Momentum Energy, and Australian Power 
& Gas).
Of the new entrants, Click Energy, Our Neighbourhood 
Energy and Simply Energy have only become active 
since July 2007.
Diamond Energy and Dodo Power & Gas were also 
granted retail licences but were not actively marketing 
to small customers. In response to increased wholesale 
electricity purchasing costs, Momentum Energy 
withdrew from the residential retail market in Victoria 
in July 2007 and its residential customers were 
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7 Office of Energy, Electricity retail market review — Issues paper, December 2007.
8 Section 55, Electricity Corporations Act 2005 (WA).
9 Office of Energy, Electricity retail market review — Issues paper, December 2007, p. 37.
10 Regulation 6(4), Electricity Reform (Administration) Regulations 2008 (NT). 
11 Active retailers are those retailers that are offering electricity supply contracts to customers.
12 See footnote 2 for jurisdictional classifications of ‘small customers’.
13 The number of licensed retailers may not correspond with the actual number of retail licences issued as several licence holders may operate under a single trading name.
transferred to Australian Power & Gas. Momentum 
Energy was actively retailing to small and medium sized 
businesses in June 2008.
Table 6.2 sets out the market share of Victorian retailers 
(by customer numbers) at 30 June 2007. The three host 
retailers account for about 79 per cent of the market and 
each has acquired market share beyond its local area. 
New entrant penetration in the market has increased 
from 13 per cent of small customers in June 2006 
to almost 20 per cent in June 2007 (see figure 6.2).
Table	6.1	 Active	electricity	retailers:	small	customer	market,	June	2008
RETAIlER1 OwnERsHIP nsw VIC Qld sA TAs ACT wA nT
ActewAGL Retail ACT Government & AGL Energy
AGL Energy AGL Energy
Alinta Sales Babcock & Brown Power
Aurora Energy Tasmanian Government
Australian Power & Gas Australian Power & Gas
Click Energy Click Energy
Country Energy NSW Government
EnergyAustralia NSW Government
Ergon Energy Queensland Government
Integral Energy NSW Government
Horizon Power Western Australian Government
Jackgreen Jackgreen Limited2
Momentum Energy Momentum Energy3
Our Neighbourhood Energy Our Neighbourhood Energy
Origin Energy Origin Energy
Perth Energy Infratil
Power and Water Corporation Northern Territory Government
Powerdirect AGL Energy
Queensland Electricity Infratil
Red Energy Snowy Hydro4
Simply Energy International Power
South Australia Electricity Infratil
Synergy Western Australian Government
TRUenergy CLP Group
Victoria Electricity Infratil
Active retailers 10 14 10 11 1 4 4 1
Approx. market size (’000 000 customers) 3.1 2.4 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.1
n Host (incumbent) retailer n New entrant
Notes: 
1. Not all licenced retailers are listed. Some generators are licenced retailers but are active only in the market for larger industrial users. Not all retailers listed supply 
electricity to all customers; for example, some retailers only market to small business users.
2. Major shareholders in Jackgreen Limited as at 1 July 2007 include Babcock & Brown Prime Broking (19.05 per cent) and Citicorp Nominees (15.89 per cent).
3. In September 2008, Hydro Tasmania acquired a controlling interest in Momentum Energy.
4. Snowy Hydro is owned by the New South Wales Government (58 per cent), the Victorian Government (29 per cent) and the Australian Government (13 per cent).
Sources: Jurisdictional regulator websites, updated by information on retailer websites and other public sources.
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Figure	6.2	
Electricity	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	Victoria

d
[h
b
Va
aW
jh
^c
Zh
h
Vc
Y
Yd
b
Zh
i^X
X
jh
id
b
Zg
h
%
&%
'%
(%
)%
*%
+%
,%
-%
.%
&%%
Di]ZgIGJZcZg\nDg^\^c:cZg\n6<A:cZg\n
'%%,'%%+'%%*'%%)
')&(&+.'(*()%&'(%)&%*''-+&++
Note: Fıgures at top of columns are total small customer numbers.
Source: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report, various years.
Table	6.2	 Electricity	retail	market	share	
(small	customers)	—	Victoria,	30	June	2007
RETAIlER CusTOmERs
Domestic Business Total retail
AGL Energy 28.0% 23.4% 27.4%
Origin Energy 29.8% 34.8% 30.4%
TRUenergy 22.5% 22.3% 22.5%
Other 19.7% 19.6% 19.7%
Total customers 2 132 226 280 943 2 413 169
Source: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 
2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007, p. 3.
6.1.2 South Australia
At June 2008, South Australia had 15 licenced electricity 
retailers, of which 11 were active in the small customer 
market. These were:
> AGL Energy, South Australia’s host retailer
> ten new entrants, which were South Australia’s 
host retailer in gas (Origin Energy), established 
interstate retailers (TRUenergy, Country Energy and 
Aurora Energy) and six new players in the energy 
retail market (Simply Energy, Momentum Energy, 
Powerdirect, South Australia Electricity, Red Energy 
and Jackgreen).
Of the new entrants, Red Energy and Jackgreen only 
became active since July 2007.
EnergyAustralia, Dodo Power & Gas, and Australian 
Power & Gas held retail licences but were not actively 
marketing to small customers.
Table 6.3 sets out the small customer market 
share of South Australian retailers (by customer 
numbers) at 30 June 2007. The host retailer — AGL 
Energy — supplies 59 per cent of small customers, down 
from 68 per cent in 2006. All other retailers have built 
market share, with Origin Energy, TRUenergy and 
Simply Energy each supplying more than 10 per cent 
of the small customer base. There has been only marginal 
penetration by niche retailers, with the four largest 
retailers accounting for almost 95 per cent of the market 
(see figure 6.3).
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Figure	6.3	
Electricity	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	south	Australia
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Note: Fıgures at top of columns are total small customer numbers.
Source: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007, p. 65.
Market penetration by new entrants has been more 
effective for large customers, with AGL Energy’s market 
share eroding to about 40 per cent of that market (based 
on sales volume).14
Table	6.3	 Electricity	retail	market	share	
(small	customers)	—	south	Australia,	30	June	2007
RETAIlER CusTOmERs
Domestic Business Total retail
AGL Energy 57.6% 67.3% 58.7%
Country Energy 0.6% 1.3% 0.6%
Origin Energy 12.7% 14.7% 12.9%
Powerdirect 1.7% 5.3% 2.2%
South Australia 
Electricity
2.4% 0.3% 2.2%
Simply Energy 11.8% 4.1% 10.9%
TRUenergy 13.0% 6.6% 12.3%
Other 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%
Total customers 687 826 87 310 775 136
Source: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of South 
Australian energy retail market, November 2007, p. 65.
6.1.3 New South Wales
At June 2008, New South Wales had 25 licenced 
retailers, of which 10 supplied (or intended to supply) 
residential and/or small business customers. The active 
retailers were:
> EnergyAustralia, Country Energy and Integral 
Energy, the government-owned host retailers
> seven new entrants, which were the state’s host 
retailer in gas (AGL Energy), established interstate 
players (Origin Energy, TRUenergy and ActewAGL 
Retail) and new players in the energy retail market 
(Powerdirect, Jackgreen and Australian Power & Gas).
Momentum Energy, New South Wales Electricity, Dodo 
Power & Gas, and Red Energy held retail licences but 
were not actively marketing to small customers.
New entrant retailers have acquired about 14 per cent of 
the small customer market (based on customer numbers) 
from the government-owned incumbents, with the 
greatest penetration occurring in the EnergyAustralia 
and Integral Energy local supply areas.15
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14 ESCOSA, 2006/07 Annual performance report: Performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007, Adelaide, p. 25.
15 IPART, NSW electricity information paper no. 1/2008 — Electricity retail businesses’ performance against customer service indicators, January 2008, p. 2.
6.1.4 Queensland
Until 2006, Queensland’s small customer market was 
divided between two government owned businesses: 
Ergon Energy and ENERGEX. Queensland 
restructured its electricity retail sector in 2006 
by creating two new businesses: Sun Retail and 
Powerdirect. Origin Energy acquired Sun Retail from 
the Queensland Government in January 2007 and 
AGL Energy acquired Powerdirect in February 2007. 
The Government has retained ownership of Ergon 
Energy’s retail business, which supplies ‘unprofitable’ 
customers in rural and regional areas.
At June 2008, Queensland had 23 licenced retailers, 
of which 10 were active in the small customer market. 
These were:
> Origin Energy (previously Sun Retail) and Ergon 
Energy, each of which is the host retailer in designated 
areas of Queensland
> Powerdirect (now owned by AGL Energy)
> seven new entrants, which were established interstate 
retailers (EnergyAustralia, Integral Energy, AGL 
Energy and TRUenergy); and three new players 
in the energy retail market ( Jackgreen, Queensland 
Electricity and Australian Power & Gas).
Table 6.4 sets out the estimated small customer 
market share of Queensland retailers (by customer 
numbers) at 30 June 2007. As FRC was not introduced 
in Queensland until July 2007, businesses could not 
compete for small customers. The small customer base 
was split between Ergon Energy (the government-
owned retailer), and Origin Energy and AGL Energy, 
which acquired retail businesses through privatisation 
in 2007.
Ergon Energy is restricted to providing customer retail 
services to non-market customers in its designated area 
(predominantly rural and regional customers).
Table	6.4	 Electricity	retail	market	share	
(small	customers)	—	Queensland,	30	June	2007
RETAIlER smAll	CusTOmERs
AGL Energy 23%
Ergon Energy 33%
Origin Energy 44%
Total customers 1 890 000
Source: AER estimates.
6.1.5 The Australian Capital Territory
At June 2008, the ACT had 15 licenced retailers, 
of which four were active in the residential market: 
ActewAGL Retail (the host retailer), EnergyAustralia, 
Country Energy and TRUenergy. Dodo Power & Gas, 
Integral Energy, Jackgreen, Red Energy, Australian 
Power & Gas and Origin Energy held retail licences but 
were not actively marketing to small customers.
In 2006 – 07, the host retailer maintained a significant 
market share of around 90 per cent.16
6.1.6 Tasmania
Aurora Energy, the government-owned host retailer, 
controls the small customer market in Tasmania. 
Legislative restrictions prevent new entrants supplying 
small customers (as of June 2008).
6.1.7 Western Australia
In Western Australia, only customers consuming at least 
50 MWh annually are contestable. The government-
owned host retailer — Synergy — has a market share 
of 96 per cent in the residential market and 92.5 per cent 
in the non-residential market. Horizon Power services 
the regional areas of Western Australia and is the 
second largest retailer with 3.9 per cent of the residential 
market and 6.4 per cent of the non-residential market.17 
The remaining customers are divided between Alinta 
Sales (owned by Babcock & Brown Power), Perth 
Energy and the Rottnest Island Authority.18
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16 Over 10 per cent of customers have switched to an alternative retailer since the introduction of FRC. ICRC, Annual report 2006 – 07, p. 14.
17 Economic Regulation Authority, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report — Electricity retailers, January 2008, p. 12.
18 The Rottnest Island Authority manages the Rottnest Island Reserve and retails to customers on Rottnest Island.
6.1.8 Northern Territory
The government-owned host retailer, Power and Water 
Corporation, provides electricity services to customers 
in the Northern Territory.
6.2	 Trends	in	market	integration
Various ownership consolidation activity has occurred 
in the energy retail sector in recent years, including:
> retail market convergence between electricity and gas
> vertical integration between electricity retailers 
and generators.19
6.2.1 Energy retail market convergence
Many energy retailers offer both electricity and 
gas services, including ‘dual fuel’ retail products.20 
For example, the leading retailers in Victoria and 
South Australia — AGL Energy, Origin Energy and 
TRUenergy — jointly account for around 81 per cent 
of small electricity retail customers and 89 per cent 
of small gas retail customers (see figure 6.4). The 
principal difference between the two sectors is the 
greater penetration by niche players in electricity 
than in gas.
Several factors have driven retail convergence, including 
business cost savings and convenience for customers. 
At the same time, convergence can create hurdles for 
new entrants — especially small players — that may need 
to deal with different market arrangements and different 
risks in the provision of electricity and gas services.
Figure	6.4	
Electricity	and	gas	retail	market	share	
(small	customers)	—	Victoria	and	south	Australia,	
30	June	2007
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Sources: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 
2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007; ESCOSA, Annual performance report: 
Performance of South Australia energy retail market 2006 – 07, November 2007.
6.2.2  Vertical integration in the 
electricity sector
In the 1990s, governments introduced reforms 
to structurally separate the power supply industry 
into generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail businesses. However, some linkages between 
different sectors of the power supply industry remain. 
In particular, the New South Wales, Queensland, 
Tasmanian and Northern Territory governments 
own joint distribution – retail businesses. The ACT 
Government has ownership interests in both the host 
retailer of electricity and gas and the electricity and gas 
distributor. Where linkages exist between contestable 
and non-contestable sectors, regulators apply ring-
fencing arrangements to ensure operational separation 
of the businesses.
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19 There has been debate as to whether this form of ownership consolidation might in some contexts pose a barrier to entry for new entrant retailers.  
See, for example, Energy Reform Implementation Group, Energy reform: The way forward for Australia, A Report to COAG, January 2007, pp. 125 – 6.
20 In the ACT, the host retailer in electricity and gas — ActewAGL Retail — also offers contracts that ‘bundle’ electricity and gas retail services with 
telecommunications services.
Je
ss
ic
a 
Sh
ap
ir
o 
(F
ai
rf
ax
)
176 statE OF tHE ENErGy markEt
Figure	6.5	
market	share	in	the	Victorian	and	south	Australian	
retail	and	generation	sectors,	2007
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Notes: 
1. The figures should be interpreted with caution as market shares in each sector 
are based on different variables. Retail shares relate to small customer numbers, 
while generation shares relate to capacity.
2. In Victoria, TRUenergy holds a long-term hedge contract with Ecogen Energy 
(owned by Industry Funds Management).
3. In South Australia, Babcock & Brown Power bids in the facility at Osborne 
power station (owned by ATCO Power and Origin Energy).
Sources: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 
2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007; ESCOSA, SA energy retail market 
06 – 07, November 2007 (customer numbers); NEMMCO (generation capacity  
and ownership); company websites.
There is also a continuing trend towards vertical 
integration of privately owned electricity retailers and 
generators. Vertical integration provides a means for 
retailers and generators to manage the risk of price 
volatility in the electricity spot market. If wholesale 
prices rise, the retailer can balance the increased cost 
against higher generator earnings.
Fıgure 6.5 compares generation and retail market 
shares in Victoria and South Australia in 2007. 
Two of the three major retailers — AGL Energy and 
TRUenergy — have significant generation interests. 
In July 2007, AGL Energy and TRUenergy completed 
a generator swap in South Australia that moved the 
capacity of each business into closer alignment with 
their retail loads. Origin Energy has limited generation 
capability at present but is developing new capacity. 
In addition, the major generator International Power 
operates a retail business in these jurisdictions (trading 
as Simply Energy) and achieved significant penetration 
in the South Australian market in the year to June 2007.
There has also been vertical integration in the public 
electricity sector. Snowy Hydro owns Red Energy, which 
has acquired some market share in Victoria and South 
Australia. In September 2008, Hydro Tasmania acquired 
a controlling interest in the small private retailer 
Momentum Energy.
6.3	 Retail	competition
While most jurisdictions have introduced or are 
introducing FRC, it can take time for a competitive 
market to develop. As a transitional measure, most 
jurisdictions require host retailers to offer to supply 
electricity services under a regulated standing offer (or 
default) contract (see section 6.4.1). Standing offer 
contracts cover minimum service conditions, information 
requirements and some form of regulated price cap 
or oversight. As of July 2008, all jurisdictions applied 
some form of retail price regulation.21
Australian governments have agreed to review the 
continued use of retail price caps and to remove them 
where effective competition can be demonstrated.22 
The AEMC is assessing the effectiveness of retail 
competition in each jurisdiction to advise on the 
appropriate time to remove retail price caps.23 
The relevant state or territory government makes 
the final decision on this matter. Box 6.1 includes 
a summary of progress with the AEMC reviews.
The following provides a sample of public data that 
may be relevant to an assessment of the effectiveness 
of retail competition in Australia. In particular, it sets 
out data on the diversity of price and product offerings 
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21 See section 6.4.1 for further details.
22 Australian Energy Market Agreement 2004 (amended 2006).
23 In Western Australia, the Economic Regulation Authority is responsible for this task.
Box	6.1	 Australian	Energy	market	Commission	reviews	of	the	effectiveness	of	retail	competition
In response to the review, the Victorian Government 
announced in September 2008 the introduction of 
new legislation to remove retail price caps. The 
legislation includes provisions for the Essential Services 
Commission of Victoria (ESC) to undertake expanded 
price monitoring and report publicly on retail prices. 
Retailers will also be required to publish a range of their 
offers to assist consumers in comparing energy prices. 
Other obligations on retailers, including the obligation 
to supply and the consumer protection framework, are 
not affected by the removal of retail price regulation. 
The Victorian Government retains a reserve power to 
reinstate retail price regulation if competition is found 
in the future to no longer be effective.
South	Australia
During 2008, the AEMC is reviewing the South Australian 
electricity and gas retail markets. In September 2008, 
it released a first final report on its review. The AEMC’s 
findings were that competition is effective for small 
electricity and gas customers in South Australia; 
however, competition was more intense in electricity 
than in gas:25
There has been strong rivalry between energy 
retailers as they offer customers alternative 
combinations of price, product and service. Large 
numbers of electricity and metropolitan gas 
customers have been willing and able to respond 
to competitive offers and to exercise choice 
between the available offers when approached 
by retailers and given sufficient incentive.26
The AEMC completed a review of the effectiveness 
of competition in electricity and gas retail markets 
in Victoria in February 2008. It is undertaking a review 
of the South Australian market in 2008 and reviews are 
scheduled for New South Wales in 2009 and the ACT 
(if required) in 2010.
In undertaking these reviews, the AEMC applies the 
following criteria to assess the effectiveness of retail 
competition:
>	 independent rivalry within the market
>	 ability of suppliers to enter the market
>	 exercise of market choice by customers
>	 differentiated products and services
>	 prices and profit margins
>	 customer switching behaviour.
Victoria
The AEMC review of the Victorian electricity and gas 
retail markets found that competition is effective in both 
the electricity and the gas markets:
The majority of energy customers are 
participating actively in the competitive market 
by exercising choice among available retailers 
as well as price and service offerings. There 
is strong rivalry between energy retailers, 
facilitated by the current market structures and 
entry conditions.24
Retail price regulation in Victoria currently extends only 
to residential customers. Standing offer retail prices 
are negotiated between the Victorian Government and 
host retailers, with the government retaining the reserve 
power to regulate these prices.
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24 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria — First final report, December 2007.
25 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in South Australia — First final report, September 2008, p. 19.
26 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in South Australia — First final report, September 2008, p. 21.
27 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in South Australia — First final report, September 2008, pp. 31 – 33.
28 NERA Economic Consulting, Review of the effectiveness of energy retail market competition in South Australia — Phase 2 Report for ESCOSA, 
June 2007.
While the AEMC considered that overall competition 
in electricity and gas markets was effective, 
it noted that the ease of entry for new retailers and 
expansions for existing retailers may be limited 
due to:27
>	 higher spot prices, increased spot price volatility 
and increased vertical integration in electricity 
markets
>	 structural limitations which restrict the ability 
of gas retailers to access firm transmission 
haulage services.
The South Australian regulator, the Essential 
Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA), 
undertook its own review of the effectiveness 
of competition in the South Australian electricity and 
gas retail markets in 2007. This review considered 
indicators that included the number of retailers, 
customer switching, barriers to entry and product 
innovation.
ESCOSA found that there appears to be effective 
competition in the electricity retail market, with the 
gas market moving towards effective competition. 
Customers for whom competition did not appear 
to be effective included small business gas 
customers and regional residential gas customers:
In sum, our assessment of the conduct 
of market participants in both the 
electricity and gas retail market in South 
Australia suggests that both retailers and 
customers are acting in a manner that 
is broadly consistent with an effectively 
competitive market.28
of retailers; the exercise of market choice by customers, 
including switching behaviour; and customer perceptions 
of competition. There is also some consideration 
of regulated prices and retail profit margins. 
Elsewhere, this chapter touches on other barometers 
of competition; for example, section 6.1 considers new 
entry in the electricity retail market.
The information provided here does not seek to draw 
conclusions. More generally, the AER is not assessing 
or commenting on the effectiveness of retail competition 
in any jurisdiction.
6.3.1  Price and non price diversity 
of retail offers
There is evidence of retail price diversity in electricity 
markets that have introduced FRC (see box 6.2). 
In particular, both host and new entrant retailers tend 
to offer market contracts at discounts against the ‘default’ 
regulated terms and conditions.
There is some price diversity associated with product 
differentiation. For example, retailers might offer 
a choice of standard products, green products, ‘dual fuel’ 
contracts (for gas and electricity) and retail packages that 
bundle electricity and gas services with other services 
such as telecommunications,29 each with different 
price structures.
Some product offerings bundle energy services with 
inducements such as customer loyalty bonuses, awards 
programs, free subscriptions and prizes. Discounts 
and other offers tend to vary depending on the length 
of a contract. Some retail products offer additional 
discounts for prompt payment of bills or direct debit 
bill payments. Many contracts carry a severance fee for 
early withdrawal.
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29 In the ACT, the host retailer in electricity and gas — ActewAGL Retail — offers 
discounts on electricity services if the customer elects to ‘bundle’ electricity 
retail services with gas and telecommunications services.
Box	6.2	 Case	study:	diversity	of	price	and	product	offerings	to	small	customers
retailer areas, as well as additional monetary benefits 
or inducements of up to around $100 a year. Table 6.5 
indicates that there was a price spread across retail 
offers of between $57 (in the TRUenergy host area) and 
$270 (in the AGL Victoria host area). The data does not 
account for additional benefits such as joining bonuses 
or discounts. Contracts varied significantly in respect 
of fixed terms and termination fees. The ESC also 
found that incentives offered by retailers under market 
contracts varied between host retail areas; for example, 
green energy products and joining bonuses were not 
offered by all retailers in all regions.
The AEMC also reported price information on retail 
market offers as part of its review of the effectiveness 
of competition in Victoria (see box 6.1). The AEMC 
found that in June 2007, five retailers were offering 
market contracts at a discount from the standing 
offer of 2 – 7 per cent for domestic customers and 
2 – 10 per cent for small business customers. When 
direct price benefits such as prompt payment discounts 
and joining bonuses were taken into account, the AEMC 
found that discounts of 10 per cent of the regulated 
tariff were available to both small business and 
domestic customers.30
Market analysis in Victoria undertaken by CRA 
International in August 2007 also found that market 
contracts typically have monetary and non-monetary 
inducements, that contract terms vary between 
retailers and that some retailers allow customers 
to choose the source of their electricity — for example, 
green energy.31 In addition, CRA found that market 
offers in the residential sector varied more than those 
offered to small businesses, although there was little 
innovation in market offers regarding pricing structures 
and levels.32
ESCOSA and the Queensland Competition Authority 
(QCA) provide estimator services that allow consumers 
to make rough but quick comparisons of retail offers 
in their respective states. Table 6.5 sets out the 
estimated price offerings in April 2008 for customers 
in Queensland and South Australia using 4000 kilowatt 
hours (kWh) a year, based on peak usage, and not 
using electricity for hot water. The estimator does not 
account for all elements of retail offers, including some 
discounts. For example, some retailers were offering 
price and non-price bonuses on sign up, and discounts 
for prompt payment. Others were offering a percentage 
of supplied electricity from accredited renewable 
energy sources.
Table 6.5 indicates some price diversity in the 
Queensland and South Australian retail markets, with 
a spread across all retail offers of around $600 in South 
Australia and $500 in Queensland. The spreads are 
greater when discounts and rebates are taken into 
account. Discounts off the standing offer contract price 
are available from a number of retailers in each state, 
with the lowest rates attached to fixed-term contracts 
with termination fees. Retail offers in the upper price 
range generally provide customers with higher levels 
of accredited renewable energy.
In May 2007, the Essential Services Commission 
of Victoria (ESC) undertook independent research that 
compared electricity market contract prices with the 
standing offers of host retailers. This research was not 
intended to provide an exhaustive survey of retail market 
offers. Table 6.5 compares the annual electricity bill 
for a consumer using 4000 kWh a year in different host 
retailer areas in Victoria in May 2007.
The ESC found that market offers at a discount from 
the standing contract price were available in all host 
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30 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria — First final report, 19 December 2007, pp. 54 – 55.
31 CRA International, Impact of prices and profit margins on energy retail competition in Victoria, November 2007, p. 43. 
32 CRA International, Impact of prices and profit margins on energy retail competition in Victoria, November 2007, p. 65.
Table	6.5	 Electricity	retail	price	offers	for	a	customer	using	4000	kwh	per	year	in	south	Australia	(April	2008),	
Queensland	(April	2008)	and	Victoria	(may	2007)
AnnuAl	COsT	($)1,2
PROVIDER
Nº OF 
PRODUCTS 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
ACCREDITED 
RENEWABLE ENERGy3
sOuTH	AusTRAlIA	(AGl	EnERGy)
Regulated price — N
AGL Energy 7 Joining bonus y (10%)
Momentum Energy 1 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
Origin Energy 7 Joining bonus; loyalty bonus y (20%; 100%)
Red Energy 3 Prompt payment discount N
Simply Energy 11 Direct debit rebate y (10%)
South Australia Electricity 3 Prize draws y (10%; 100%)
TRUenergy 3 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
QuEEnslAnd	(ORIGIn	EnERGy)
Regulated price — N
AGL Energy 2 Joining bonus y (10%)
Australian Power & Gas 5 Joining bonus; prompt payment discount y (10%; 50%; 100%)
EnergyAustralia 3 Joining bonus; direct debit rebate y (10%; 100%)
Integral Energy 2 — y (10%)
Jackgreen 4 — y (10%; 25%; 50%; 100%)
Origin Energy 4 Joining bonus; loyalty bonus y (20%)
Powerdirect 1 Direct debit rebate N
Queensland Electricity 3 Prize draws; prompt payment discount y (10%; 100%)
TRUenergy 3 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
VICTORIA	(AGl	VICTORIA)
Regulated price — N
AGL Energy 2 Joining bonus N
Country Energy 1 Joining bonus N
Simply Energy 2 Loyalty bonus y (10%)
Jackgreen 3 — y (10%; 25%; 50%; 100%)
Momentum Energy 1 Joining bonus N
Origin Energy 1 — N
Red Energy 1 Prompt payment discount N
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount N
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount N
Powerdirect 1 — N
VICTORIA	(ORIGIn	POwERCOR)
Regulated price — N
AGL Energy 2 Joining bonus y (10%)
Country Energy 1 Joining bonus N
Simply Energy 2 Loyalty bonus y (10%)
Jackgreen 1 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
Momentum Energy 1 — N
Origin Energy 2 Joining bonus y (20%)
Red Energy 1 Prompt payment discount N
TRUenergy 2 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount N
Powerdirect 1 — N
VICTORIA	(TRuEnERGy)
Regulated price — N
AGL Energy 1 — N
Country Energy 1 Joining bonus N
Simply Energy 2 Loyalty bonus y (10%)
Jackgreen 1 Prompt payment discount y (10%)
Momentum Energy 1 — N
Origin Energy 2 Joining bonus y (20%)
Red Energy 1 Prompt payment discount N
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount N
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount N
Powerdirect 1 Loyalty bonus N
Notes: 
1. Coloured bars represent the approximate range of annual charges for each retailer’s products.
2. The annual costs exclude additional benefits such as prompt payment discounts, joining bonuses and loyalty bonuses.
3. Percentages represent the proportion of electricity sourced from accredited renewable generation.
Sources: ESCOSA estimator, viewed 17 April 2008, http://www.escosa.sa.gov.au; QCA estimator, viewed 17 April 2008, http://www.qca.org.au; ESC, Energy 
retail businesses comparative performance report for the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007.
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The variety of discounts and non-price inducements 
makes direct price comparisons difficult. There is also 
variation in the transparency of price offerings. Some 
retailers publish details of their products and prices, 
while others require a customer to fill out online forms 
or arrange a consultation. Victorian retailers are required 
to publish product information statements on their 
websites. Additionally, the Queensland and South 
Australian regulators and a number of private businesses 
operate websites that allow customers to compare their 
current electricity and gas retail contracts with available 
market offers. Box 6.2 provides case study material 
on the diversity of price and product offerings to small 
customers in South Australia, Victoria and Queensland.
Note that the price offers set out in box 6.2 are not 
directly comparable between jurisdictions. The offers 
relate to different periods and product structures 
in each jurisdiction, and rely on different measurement 
techniques. Nor should the data be taken as indicative 
of actual price outcomes. Section 6.4.2 of this report also 
considers data on retail price outcomes.
6.3.2 Customer switching
The rate at which customers switch their supply 
arrangements is an indicator of customer participation 
in the market. While switching (or churn) rates can also 
indicate competitive activity, they should be interpreted 
with care. Switching is sometimes high during the early 
stages of market development, when customers are 
first able to exercise choice. Switching rates sometimes 
stabilise even as a market acquires more depth. Similarly, 
it is possible to have low switching rates in a very 
competitive market if retailers are delivering good quality 
service that gives customers no reason to switch.
The National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO) publishes churn data measuring the 
number of customer switches from one retailer to 
another. NEMMCO has published this data for 
New South Wales and Victoria since the introduction 
of FRC in 2002, for South Australia from October 2006 
and for Queensland from July 2007.
The data indicate gross or cumulative switching rates and 
cover the total number of customer switches in a period, 
including switches from a host retailer to a new entrant, 
switches from new entrants back to a host retailer, and 
switches from one new entrant to another (see table 6.6 
and figure 6.6).The data do not include customers who 
have switched from a default arrangement to a market 
contract with their existing retailer. This exclusion may 
understate the true extent of competitive activity as it 
does not account for the efforts of host retailers to retain 
market share.
Fıgure 6.6 illustrates that switching activity continued 
strongly in Victoria and South Australia throughout 
2007 – 08. Rapid switching growth has been observed 
in Queensland since the commencement of FRC in July 
2007. New South Wales continues to have a switching 
rate that is about half that of the other states.
Switches to market contracts
While NEMMCO reports on customer switching 
between retailers, an alternative approach is to measure 
customer switching from regulated ‘default’ contracts 
to market contracts. South Australia and Queensland 
periodically publish this data, while New South Wales 
and the ACT publish it on an irregular basis. In Victoria, 
the AEMC reported on customer switching to market 
contracts as part of its 2007 review of the effectiveness 
of retail competition.
Table 6.7 summarises the available data on switches 
to market contracts. The data are not directly comparable 
between jurisdictions because of differences in data 
collection methods and in the periods covered.
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Table	6.6	 small	customers	switching	retailers,	2008
IndICATOR nEw	sOuTH	
wAlEs
VICTORIA sOuTH	
AusTRAlIA
QuEEnslAnd
Percentage of small customers that changed retailer during 2007 – 08 10% 23% 18% 20%
Customer switches as a percentage of the small customer base from 
start of FRC to June 2008 (cumulative)
44% 105% 86% 20%
FRC, full retail contestability
Notes: 
1. If a customer switches to a number of retailers in succession, each move counts as a separate switch. Cumulative switching rates may therefore exceed 100 per cent.
2. The customer base is estimated as of 30 June 2008.
3. The data may overstate the extent of customer switching due to some retailers transferring customers between different participant codes owned by the same retailer.
Sources: Customer switches: NEMMCO, MSATS transfer data to June 2008; Customer numbers: New South Wales: IPART, NSW electricity information paper 
no 1 – 2008 — Electricity retail businesses’ performance against customer service indicators, January 2008; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: 
performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007; Victoria: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 2006 – 07 financial 
year, December 2007; Queensland: QCA, Market and non-market customers as at 31 March 2008, June 2008
Figure	6.6	
Cumulative	monthly	customer	switching	of	retailers	as	a	percentage	of	small	customers,	January	2002	to	June	2008
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Notes: 
1. In November 2006, the South Australian regulator (ESOCSA) determined 
(in its 2005 – 06 Annual performance report: performance of the South Australian 
energy retail market) that the electricity retail market had matured to the extent 
that it was appropriate for NEMMCO to publish customer transfer data 
comparable to that published in Victoria and NSW. There are no comparable 
public data for South Australia prior to June 2006.
2. The New South Wales data exclude switches in the ACT.
3. The data may overstate the extent of customer switching due to some retailers 
transferring customers between different participants codes owned by the same 
retailer.
Sources: Customer switches: NEMMCO, MSATS transfer data to June 2008; 
Customer numbers: New South Wales: IPART, NSW electricity information 
paper no 1 – 2008 — Electricity retail businesses’ performance against customer 
service indicators, January 2008; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual 
performance report: performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 
2007; Victoria: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for 
the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007; Queensland: QCA, Market and non-
market customers as at 31 March 2007, available at http://www.qca.org.au.
Table	6.7	 small	customer	transfers	to	market	contracts
JuRIsdICTIOn dATE smAll	CusTOmER	On	mARkET	COnTRACTs	(%	OF	smAll	CusTOmER	BAsE)
New South Wales 30 June 2006 42% of small customers in the EnergyAustralia supply area 
29% of small customers in the Integral Energy supply area 
5% of small customers in the Country Energy supply area
Victoria 31 December 2006 62% of residential customers 
43% of small business customers
Queensland 31 March 2008 12% of all small customers
South Australia 30 June 2007 65% of residential customers (22% with the host retailer and 43% with new entrants) 
38% of small business customers (5% with the host retailer and 33% with new entrants) 
61% of residential and small business customers (averaged)
ACT 30 June 2007 27% of all small customers (17% with the host retailer and 10% with new entrants)
Sources: New South Wales: IPART, Regulated electricity tariffs and charges for customers 2007 – 10 — Electricity final report and final determination, June 2007, p. 29; 
Victoria: AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria, Fırst Fınal Report, 19 December 2007, p. 89; Queensland: QCA, 
Market and non-market customers as of 31 March 2008; ACT: ICRC, Annual report 2006 – 07, pp. 14 – 15; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: 
Performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007, pp. iii, 21 – 22.
183
	
C
H
A
P
TER
	
6	E
lE
c
tr
ic
ity 
r
E
ta
il m
a
r
k
E
ts
Box	6.3	 The	utility	Customer	switching	Research	Project	assessment	of	Australian	retail	markets
wholesale energy costs — contributed to the ongoing high 
levels of customer switching, especially in Victoria where 
regulated retail prices rose to the greatest extent.
In its first year of full retail contestability, Queensland 
was one of the most active electricity markets. New South 
Wales was also considered as an active market despite 
being described as Australia’s least active market. The 
report states that differences betweenstates may be due 
to differing levels of price capping, state involvement and 
competitiveness within the respective markets.
Figure	6.7	
status	of	energy	retail	markets	—	June	2007
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Source: VaasaETT Utility Customer Switching Research Project, World retail energy market rankings, October 2008.
In its 2008 energy market switching report, VaasaETT 
noted that Australia retains its position as the most 
active region in the world (figure 6.7). Victoria topped the 
ranking, having experienced the highest level of switching 
ever recorded for any market. South Australia had the 
second highest switching levels despite the rate dropping 
off substantially from the middle of 2007.
The report stated that rising electricity retail prices 
throughout 2007 – 2008 — resulting from drought and 
increased gas-fired electricity generation pushing up 
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The data indicate that in addition to customer 
movement between retailers, a significant number 
of small customers in several jurisdictions are choosing 
to move away from standing offer contracts but remain 
with their host retailer. South Australia and Victoria 
have reported relatively high rates of customer switching 
to market contracts compared to the other states. 
The relatively low rate of movement to market contracts 
in Queensland reflects that the state only recently 
introduced FRC. In New South Wales, the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) has noted 
significant differences in the rate of switching to market 
contracts between host retail areas. For example, the 
switching rate of 42 per cent in EnergyAustralia supply 
areas compares with only 5 per cent in Country Energy 
areas. IPART considered this to indicate significant 
differences in competitive activity between metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas.33
International comparisons
The VaasaETT Utility Customer Switching Research 
Project published its fourth report on customer 
switching in world energy markets in 2008. The report 
classified competition on a scale ranging from ‘hot’ 
to ‘dormant’ (see box 6.3 and figure 6.7).
6.3.3 Customer perceptions of competition
Surveys on customer perceptions of retail competition 
are undertaken irregularly within jurisdictions. Recent 
surveys include:
> surveys as part of the AEMC’s review of the 
effectiveness of retail competition in Victoria (2007) 
and South Australia (2008)
> IPART’s survey of residential energy and water use 
in Sydney, the Blue Mountains and Illawarra (2006)
> surveys conducted as part of ESCOSA’s monitoring 
of the development of energy retail competition 
in South Australia (2006).
Issues covered by the surveys include:
> customers’ awareness of their ability to choose a retailer
> customer approaches to retailers about taking out 
a market contract
> retail offers received by customers
> customer understanding of retail offers.
Table 6.8 provides a summary of survey data 
on customer perceptions of retail competition. 
The surveys suggest that customer awareness of retail 
choice has risen over time. While it remains unusual for 
customers to approach retailers, there has been a steady 
rise in retailer approaches to customers.
Table	6.8	 Residential	customer	perceptions	of	competition
sOuTH	AusTRAlIA VICTORIA nEw	sOuTH	
wAlEs
INDICATOR 2003 2004 2006 2008 2002 2004 2007 2003 2006
Customers aware of choice 62% 79% 79% 82% n/a 90% 94% 74% 92%
Customers receiving at least one retail offer 5% 44% 52% 68% 17% 33% 73% 27%1 53%1
Customers approaching retailers about 
taking out market contracts
3% 10% 8% 10% 3% 8% 10% n/a n/a
n/a, not available.
Note:
1. Does not include customers approached to switch to a market contract by their current retailer. By 2006, 44 per cent of households in New South Wales had been 
approached to switch to a market contract by their existing retailer.
Sources: South Australia: McGregor Tan Research, Monitoring the development of energy retail competition — Residents, prepared for ESCOSA, February 2006, September 
2004 and November 2003; McGregor Tan Research, Review of effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets, prepared for AEMC, June 2008; 
Victoria: The Wallis Group, Review of competition in the gas and electricity retail markets — Consumer survey, prepared for AEMC, August 2007; 
New South Wales: IPART, Residential energy and water use in Sydney, the Blue Mountains and Illawarra — Results from the 2006 household survey, November 2007.
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33 IPART, Regulated electricity tariffs and charges for customers 2007 to 2010 — Electricity final report and final determination, June 2007, p. 29.
6.4	 Retail	prices
Retail customers pay a single price for a bundled 
electricity product made up of electricity, transport 
through the transmission and distribution networks, 
and retail services. Data on the underlying composition 
of retail prices are not widely available. Fıgure 6.8 
provides indicative data for residential customers 
in New South Wales and Queensland based on historical 
information. The charts indicate that wholesale and 
network costs account for the bulk of retail prices. Retail 
operating costs (including margins) account for around 
13 per cent of retail prices in New South Wales and 
10 per cent in Queensland.
6.4.1 Regulation of retail prices
As at July 2008 all jurisdictions continue to apply retail 
price regulation to protect small customers. Typically, 
host retailers must offer to sell electricity at default 
prices based on some form of regulated price cap 
or oversight. Small customers may request a standing 
offer contract — with default prices — from the host 
retailer or choose an unregulated market contract from 
a licensed retailer.
Price cap regulation was intended as a transitional 
measure during the development phase of retail 
markets. To allow efficient signals for investment 
and consumption, governments are moving towards 
removing retail price caps. As noted, the AEMC 
(and the Economic Regulation Authority in Western 
Australia) is reviewing the effectiveness of competition 
in electricity and gas retail markets to determine 
an appropriate time to remove retail price caps in each 
jurisdiction (see box 6.1).
In setting default tariffs, jurisdictions take into 
consideration energy purchase costs, network charges, 
retailer operating costs and a retail margin. The approach 
varies between jurisdictions.
Figure	6.8	
Composition	of	a	residential	electricity	bill
GZiV^abVg\^c+GZiV^adeZgVi^c\Xdhih.
CZildg `Xdhih*-L]daZhVaZZaZXig^X^inXdhih*&
GZiV a^deZgVi^ c\Xdhih+ GZiV a^bVg\^c+IgVchb^hh^dccZildg `Xdhih'&
9^hig^Wji^ dccZildg `Xdhih)-L]daZhVaZZaZXig^X i^nXdhih*)
D[mIekj^MWb[i
Gk[[dibWdZ
Sources: New South Wales: IPART, Regulated electricity tariffs and charges for 
customers 2007 to 2010 — Electricity final report and final determination, June 
2007, p. 2; Queensland: QCA, Final Decision — Benchmark Retail Cost Index for 
Electricity: 2008 – 09, May 2008.
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> The New South Wales regulator, IPART, sets 
a retail price cap for small customers that do not 
enter a market contract. IPART noted in its review 
of retail prices for 2007 – 10 that the New South Wales 
Government aimed to reduce customer reliance 
on regulated prices and had directed IPART to ensure 
that regulated tariffs are cost reflective by June 2010.34
> Since 2003, the Victorian Government has entered 
into agreements with host retailers on a pricing 
structure for default retail prices for households and 
small businesses. Default price arrangements ceased 
to apply to small businesses from 1 January 2008, and 
will cease for residential users from 1 January 2009.
> The South Australian regulator, ESCOSA, regulates 
default prices for small customers. In 2007 ESCOSA 
made a determination on default prices for 3.5 years 
commencing on 1 January 2008.
> In Queensland, the government bases annual 
adjustments in regulated price caps on changes 
in benchmark costs. In March 2007, the government 
delegated the calculation of benchmark costs 
to the QCA.
> When requested by the ACT Government, the 
ACT regulator (the Independent Competition and 
Regulatory Commission) determines the maximum 
prices for small customers on a standing offer contract. 
The regulator makes annual adjustments to the 
regulated tariff to reflect changes in benchmark costs.
> In Western Australia, electricity retail prices for 
non-contestable customers are regulated under 
statutory requirements and the prices for these 
customers are set out in by-laws. All non-contestable 
customers are entitled to a uniform price regardless 
of their geographic location. Regional customers are 
subsidised by the Tariff Equalisation Fund, which 
is administered by the Office of Energy.35
Table 6.9 in section 6.4.3 refers to recent retail price 
determinations.
6.4.2 Retail price outcomes
While retail price outcomes are of critical interest 
to consumers, the interpretation of retail price 
movements is not straightforward. Trends in retail 
prices may reflect movements in the cost of any one 
or a combination of underlying components: wholesale 
electricity prices, transmission and distribution charges, 
or retail operating costs and margins.
Particular care should be taken when interpreting 
retail price trends in deregulated markets. While 
competition tends to deliver efficient outcomes, it may 
sometimes give a counter-intuitive outcome of higher 
prices — especially in the early stages of competition — as 
in the following examples.
> Energy retail prices for some residential customers 
were historically subsidised by governments and other 
customers (usually business customers). A competitive 
market will unwind cross-subsidies, which may lead 
to price rises for some customer groups.
> Some regulated energy prices were traditionally 
at levels that would have been too low to attract 
competitive new entrants. It may sometimes 
be necessary for retail prices to rise to create sufficient 
‘headroom’ for new entry.
Sources of price data
There is little systematic publication of the actual prices 
paid by electricity retail customers. The Energy Supply 
Association of Australia (ESAA) previously published 
annual data on retail electricity prices by customer 
category and region but discontinued the series in 2004.
At the state level:
> All jurisdictions publish schedules of regulated prices. 
The schedules are a useful guide to retail prices, but 
their relevance as a price barometer is reduced as more 
customers transfer to market contracts.
> Retailers are not required to publish the prices struck 
through market contracts with customers, although 
some states require the publication of market offers.
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34 IPART, Regulated electricity tariffs and charges for customers 2007 – 2010 — Electricity final report and final determination, June 2007, p. 2.
35 Office of Energy, Electricity Retail market review — Issues paper, December 2007, p. 7.
> The Victorian and South Australian regulators (ESC 
and ESCOSA) publish annual data on regulated and 
market prices.
> ESCOSA, QCA and ESC websites provide an 
estimator service that consumers can use to compare 
the price offerings of different retailers (see box 6.2).
Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index
The consumer price index (CPI) and producer price 
index published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
track movements in household and business electricity 
prices.36 The indexes are based on surveys of the prices 
paid by households and businesses and therefore reflect 
a mix of regulated and market prices.
Fıgure 6.9 tracks real electricity price movements for 
households and business customers. There is some 
volatility in the data for business customers, reflecting 
that large energy consumers are exposed to price 
volatility in the wholesale and contract markets for 
electricity (see chapters 2 and 3). In most jurisdictions, 
residential prices are at least partly shielded from 
volatility by price cap regulation and retailers’ 
hedging arrangements.
Since 1991, real household prices have risen 
by 7 per cent, while business prices have fallen 
by 21 per cent (figure 6.10). In part, this reflects the 
unwinding of cross-subsidies from business to household 
customers that began in the 1990s. While business 
prices have fallen substantially since 1991, they rose 
in 2007 due to rising wholesale electricity costs (see 
section 6.4.3).
It is possible to estimate retail price outcomes for 
households by extrapolating from the historic ESAA 
data, using the CPI. Fıgure 6.11 estimates real electricity 
prices for households in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, 
Brisbane, Hobart, Canberra and Perth since 1 July 
1996. Price variations between the cities reflect a variety 
of factors, including differences in generation and 
network costs, industry scale, historical cross-subsidies, 
differences in regulatory arrangements and different 
stages of electricity reform implementation.
From 2001 to 2007, real electricity prices in Melbourne 
and Perth trended downwards. Sydney and Canberra 
prices trended upwards but remain low compared with 
the other capitals. In Brisbane (where small customer 
prices remained fully regulated until 2007) and Hobart 
(where small customer prices are still fully regulated), 
real prices have remained relatively stable since 2001. 
Price rebalancing to phase out cross-subsidies caused 
significant price rises in Melbourne and Adelaide early 
in the current decade.
6.4.3 Update: Retail price trends in 2007 – 08
Several jurisdictions announced significant increases 
in regulated default prices in 2007 and 2008 in response 
to rising wholesale energy and hedging costs. 
In particular, wholesale prices in the NEM reached 
record levels, flowing through to higher contract prices 
for electricity derivatives. These developments raised 
concerns about possible effects on retailer profitability 
and retail prices.
Differences in the level of default price increases 
between jurisdictions reflect a range of factors and 
should be interpreted with care. In particular, there 
are differences in the operating environments of retail 
businesses. The degree of retailer exposure to wholesale 
costs depends on a variety of factors, including 
the nature and shape of a retailer’s load, the extent 
of hedging in financial markets to provide protection 
against price volatility and the strike price of financial 
contracts. Some retailers have vertical relationships 
with generators to cushion the impact of volatile 
wholesale costs.
There were also differences in price levels prior to the 
current determinations. In addition, jurisdictions adopt 
different approaches to determining costs and margins. 
For example, until 2007 the New South Wales regulator, 
IPART, set relatively low retail margins because the 
Electricity Tariff Equalisation Fund (ETEF) managed 
energy purchasing risks for host retailers. IPART 
reviewed this position in its 2007 – 10 determination 
in light of the proposed phasing out of ETEF.
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36 The producer price index series tracks input costs for manufacturers.
Table 6.9 compares recent movements in regulated 
default prices and retail margins under regulatory or 
government decisions. The decisions relate to the supply 
of electricity by host retailers to customers on standing 
offer contracts. As noted, several jurisdictions have 
allowed significant increases in default prices. Some have 
also taken measures to allow further revisions to default 
price paths in the event of ongoing volatility in the 
wholesale market.
Victoria cited the effect of the drought on the cost 
of generating electricity as the primary reason for 
substantial increases in default prices. The Department 
of Primary Industries noted that the drought reduced 
the output of hydroelectric plants in favour of more 
Figure	6.9	
Retail	electricity	price	index	(inflation	adjusted)	—	
Australian	capital	cities,	June	1991	to	march	2008
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Figure	6.10	
Change	in	the	real	price	of	electricity	
—	Australia,	June	1991	to	march	2008
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Note: The household index is based on the CPI for household electricity, deflated 
by the CPI series for all groups. The business index is based on the producer price 
index for electricity supply in ‘Materials used in Manufacturing Industries’, deflated 
by the CPI series for all groups.
Sources for figure 6.9 and figure 6.10: ABS, Consumer Price Index, March quarter 
2008, cat. no. 6401.0 and 6427.0.
Figure	6.11	
Real	electricity	prices	for	households	—	Australian	capital	cities,	July	1996	to	march	2008
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KWh, kilowatt hours.
Note: 
1. The dashed lines are estimates based on extrapolating ESAA data published in 2004 using the CPI series for electricity and other household fuels for each capital city.
2. 2007 – 08 is the three quarters to March 2008.
Sources: ABS, Consumer Price Index, March quarter 2008, cat no. 6401; ESAA, Electricity prices in Australia 2003 – 04, 2003.
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Table	6.9	 Recent	regulatory	decisions	—	electricity	retail	prices
JuRIsdICTIOn CuRREnT	
PERIOd
RETAIlERs InCREAsE	
In	REGulATEd	
TARIFF
PAss-THROuGH	mECHAnIsm	
FOR	wHOlEsAlE	EnERGy	COsTs
RETAIl	
mARGIn
New South 
Wales
1 July 2007 
to 30 June 
2010
EnergyAustralia
Integral Energy
Country Energy 
CPI + 4.1%
CPI + 4.9%
CPI + 3.7%
(annual 
adjustments)
Annual review of electricity 
purchase costs. The retail price 
path will be adjusted if the review 
finds that forecast electricity 
purchase costs differ by more than 
10% from the costs used to set the 
price path.
5% of EBITDA
Victoria 1 January 2008 
to 31 December 
2008
AGL Energy
Origin Energy
TRUenergy
CPI + 10.7%
CPI + 10.9%
CPI + 15.5%
Annual price determination. 
No adjustments permitted.
5 – 8% of total 
revenue
Queensland 1 July 2008 
to 30 June 
2009
All licenced 
retailers
5.4% Prices are adjusted annually 
in accordance with a benchmark 
retail cost index. 
5% of total 
revenue
South 
Australia
1 January 2008 
to 30 June 
2011
AGL Energy 12.3% in 1 Jan 08 
to 30 Jun 08; and 
then CPI — only 
increase to Jul 
2011
No provision to adjust price path 
due to changes in electricity 
purchase costs. However, 
the price determination can 
be reopened in circumstances 
where a fundamental basis of the 
price determination has been 
undermined. 
10% of 
controllable 
costs 
(equivalent 
to about 
5% of sales 
revenue)
Tasmania 1 January 2008 
to 30 June 
2010
Aurora Energy 16.0% in 1 Jan 08 
to 30 Jun 08; 
4.0% in 2008 – 09; 
and 3.8% 
in 2009 – 10
No provision to adjust price path 
due to changes in electricity 
purchase costs as the average 
price the regulator is to assume 
for each period is set out 
in regulations. The regulator also 
has limited discretion to reopen 
a price determination in the event 
of an unforeseen material change 
in circumstances. 
3% of sales 
revenue
ACT 1 July 2008 
to 30 June 
2009
ActewAGL Retail 7.11% Annual price determination. 
No adjustments permitted.
5% of sales 
revenue
Western 
Australia
1 July 2009 Synergy
Horizon Power
10.0% Government decision to be 
implemented through by-laws. 
Further price rises will be phased 
in over 6 to 8 years (after 30 June 
2010).
n/a
n/a, not available; EBITDA, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; EBIT, earnings before interest and tax.
Note: Frontier Economics estimates that a 5 per cent EBITDA is equivalent to around 4 per cent on an EBIT basis.
Sources: Frontier Economics, Mass market entrant retail costs and retail margins, Fınal report, March 2007, p. 68; New South Wales: IPART, Regulated electricity retail 
tariffs and charges for small customers 2007 to 2010 Electricity: Final report and final determination, June 2007; Victoria: Department of Primary Industries, Victorian Energy 
Prices Fact Sheet, November 2007; Queensland: QCA, Final decision: benchmark retail cost index for electricity 2008 – 09, May 2008; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2007 
Review of retail electricity price path final inquiry report and price determination, November 2007; Tasmania: OTTER, Investigation of prices for electricity distribution services 
and retail tariffs on mainland Tasmania: Final report and proposed maximum prices, September 2007; ACT: ICRC, Final decision and price direction retail prices for non-
contestable electricity customers report 4 of 2008, June 2008; Western Australia: Energy Operators (Regional Power Corporation) (charges) By-laws 2006 (WA); Premier (WA) 
(Hon. Alan Carpenter), State government to phase in electricity price increases, media statement, 4 April 2007.
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expensive gas-fired generation and that the increase 
in regulated electricity tariffs is an accurate reflection 
of increased costs incurred by retailers.37 Similarly, 
the ACT has identified the lack of availability 
of hydroelectric power from the Snowy region and 
the lack of water for cooling base load generators 
in Queensland as driving factors behind the need 
to increase regulated retail tariffs by 16.7 per cent 
in 2007 – 08.38
In Western Australia, the Office of Energy is reviewing 
the electricity retail market in 2008. The Office of 
Energy noted in April 2008 that residential prices 
have not increased since June 1997 and that by June 
2009 this will represent a real price reduction of about 
30 per cent.39 It also recommended that prices would 
need to increase by 47 per cent in 2009 – 10 and 
15 per cent the following year to achieve cost reflective 
outcomes.40 The Western Australian Government 
rejected the draft recommendation and announced that 
residential prices will increase by 10 per cent in 2009 – 10, 
with further increases to be phased in over the following 
6 – 8 years.41
6.4.4 International price comparisons
Fıgure 6.12 compares estimated residential electricity 
prices in Australian capital cities with prices in selected 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries. The data indicate 
that average electricity prices in Australian capital cities 
are generally lower than in many OECD countries. 
Figure	6.12	
International	electricity	prices	for	households,	2006
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kWh, kilowatt hours.
Note: Price data for Australia are AER estimates converted to US$. The data for each jurisdiction is for 2006 and is estimated by extrapolating the ESAA data published 
in 2004 using the CPI series for electricity and other household fuels for each capital city.
Sources: IEA, Electricity information 2007, table 3.7, Electricity prices for households in US dollars/kWh; ATO, Foreign exchange rates, End of financial year rates, 
US rate for 31 December 2006; ESAA, Electricity prices in Australia 2003 – 04, 2003; ABS, Consumer price index, cat. no. 6401.0, tables 3 and 4.
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37 Minister for Energy and Resources (Victoria) (Hon Peter Batchelor), Drought impact on power prices, media statement, 30 November 2007; Department of Primary 
Industries, Energy retail price adjustments 2008, November 2007.
38 ICRC, Final decision increases retail electricity tariff, media statement, 15 June 2007.
39 Office of Energy, Electricity Market Review draft recommendations report — Review of electricity tariff arrangements, April 2008, p. 7.
40 Office of Energy, Electricity Market Review draft recommendations report — Review of electricity tariff arrangements, April 2008, p. 3.
41 Premier (WA) (Hon Alan Carpenter), State government to phase in electricity price increases, media statement, 4 April 2007.
Figure	6.13	
Electricity	residential	disconnections	as	a	percentage	of	small	customer	base
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Notes: 
1. Fıgure relates to outcomes for residential customers on a state-wide basis. State regulators also publish outcomes for particular retailers and for business customers 
in their jurisdiction.
2. Queensland data are only available to 2004 – 05. Western Australian data are available only for 2006 – 07.
Source: see figure 6.16.
Figure	6.14	
Electricity	residential	reconnections	within	seven	days	as	a	percentage	of	disconnected	customers
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Notes: 
1. New South Wales includes all reconnections (not just within seven days of disconnection)
2. Queensland data is only available to 2004 – 05. Western Australian data is available only for 2006 – 07.
Source: see figure 6.16.
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For example, average prices in the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Spain and France are higher than in Australian 
capital cities. However, prices in most Australian capital 
cities are higher than average prices in the United States.
6.5	 Quality	of	retail	service
The jurisdictional regulators monitor and report 
on quality of service in the retail sector to enhance 
transparency and accountability, and to facilitate 
‘competition by comparison’.42 The Utility Regulators 
Forum (URF) developed a national framework in 2002 
for electricity retailers to report against common criteria 
on service performance.43 The criteria address:
> access and affordability of services
> quality of customer service.
The URF measures apply to the small customer retail 
market.44 All NEM jurisdictions have adopted the URF 
reporting template but each jurisdiction applies its own 
implementation framework. In addition, jurisdictions 
have their own monitoring and reporting requirements. 
This results in some differences in approach.
URF data published by jurisdictional regulators are 
derived from the reporting of individual retailers. 
The regulators consolidate and publish the data 
annually. It should be noted that the validity of any 
performance comparisons may be limited because 
of differences in approach between jurisdictions. 
In particular, measurement systems, audit procedures 
and classifications may differ between jurisdictions 
and within the same jurisdiction over time. Similarly, 
regulatory procedures and practices differ; for example, 
the procedures a retailer must follow before a customer 
can be disconnected.
6.5.1 Affordability and access indicators
With the introduction of retail contestability, 
governments have strengthened consumer protection 
arrangements, with a particular focus on access and 
affordability issues. These protections are often given 
effect through regulated minimum standards regimes 
and codes.
Retailers provide options to help customers manage 
their bill payments. The URF reporting template covers 
a number of affordability indicators, including rates 
of customer disconnections and reconnections.
The rate of residential customer disconnections 
for failure to meet bill payments (figure 6.13) and 
the rate of disconnected residential customers who 
are reconnected within seven days (figure 6.14) 
are key affordability and access indicators. The rate 
of disconnections fell in all jurisdictions other than 
Victoria in 2006 – 07, and rates are below 2002 – 03 
levels in all jurisdictions except New South Wales 
and Queensland. A range of factors, varying between 
jurisdictions, may have contributed to these outcomes. 
For example, recently introduced hardship policies 
and the recommendations of the newly established 
disconnection working group in New South Wales may 
have contributed to the reduction in the disconnection 
rate of 0.2 per cent in that state since 2005 – 06.45 Also, 
the decrease in disconnection rates in South Australia 
may have been assisted by an increase in the use 
of instalment plans.46 More generally, the data should 
be considered in conjunction with reconnection data 
(figure 6.14).
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42 See, for example, ESC, Energy retail businesses, comparative performance report for the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007.
43 Utility Regulators Forum, National regulatory reporting for electricity distribution and retailing businesses, Discussion paper, March 2002.
44 See footnote 2 for jurisdictional classifications of ‘small customers’.
45 IPART, Electricity retail businesses’ performance against customer service indicators 2002 – 2007, 2008.
46 ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007.
The rate at which disconnected residential customers 
are reconnected within seven days (figure 6.14) 
increased in most jurisdictions in 2006 – 07, although 
rates are below 2002 – 03 levels in all jurisdictions except 
New South Wales. When considered in conjunction 
with falling disconnection rates, the data indicate 
that retailers may have improved their customer 
management services by reducing the rate of avoidable 
disconnections — perhaps through better use of payment 
plans, as in South Australia, and through other account 
management options.47
6.5.2 Customer service indicators
There are a range of methods by which customers 
can seek to resolve service issues with energy retailers. 
In the first instance, customers can raise complaints 
directly with their retailer through the retailer’s dispute 
resolution procedure. If further action is needed, they can 
refer complaints to their state energy ombudsman or an 
alternative dispute resolution body. Additionally, retail 
competition allows customers to transfer away from 
a business providing poor service.
URF monitoring in this area includes:
> customer complaints — the degree to which a retailer’s 
services meet customers’ expectations
> telephone call management — the efficiency 
of a retailer’s call centre service.
In 2006 – 07, the rate of customer complaints fell slightly 
from the previous year in New South Wales, Tasmania 
and South Australia. While the rate rose in Victoria, 
complaints remain below 1 per cent of customers in 
all jurisdictions (see figure 6.15). Western Australia 
recorded a relatively low complaints rate for its first year 
of published data (2006 – 07).
Call centre performance varied across the jurisdictions 
in 2006 – 07 (see figure 6.16), when the percentage 
of customer calls answered within 30 seconds ranged 
from about 65 to 82 per cent. Tasmania and South 
Australia have recorded consistently high call centre 
performance results. In New South Wales and Victoria, 
the rate in 2006 – 07 was lower than the previous year, 
but remained higher than in 2003 – 04. The ACT has 
improved its call centre performance from 64 per cent 
in 2002 – 03 to 77 per cent in 2007 – 08.
6.5.3 Consumer protection
Governments regulate aspects of the electricity retail 
market to protect consumers and ensure they have 
access to sufficient information to make informed 
decisions. Most jurisdictions require designated host 
retailers to provide electricity services under a standing 
offer or default contract to particular customers. 
Most jurisdictions impose this obligation on retailers 
on a geographical basis. Queensland, however, requires 
default contracts to be offered by the financially 
responsible market participant — generally the current 
retailer — for each property. Obligations for new 
connections are imposed on a geographical basis.48
Default contracts cover minimum service conditions, 
billing and payment obligations, procedures for 
connections and disconnections, information disclosure 
and complaints handling. During the transition 
to effective competition, default contracts also include 
some form of regulated price cap or prices oversight 
(see section 6.4.1).
Some jurisdictions have established industry codes that 
govern the provision of electricity retail services to small 
customers, including under market contracts. Industry 
codes cover consumer protection measures, including:
> minimum terms and conditions under which a retailer 
can provide electricity retail services
> standards for the marketing of energy services
> processes for the transfer of customers from one 
retailer to another.
Most jurisdictions have an energy ombudsman or an 
alternative dispute resolution body to whom consumers 
can refer a complaint they were unable to resolve directly 
with the retailer. In addition to general consumer 
protection measures, jurisdictions have introduced 
supplier of last resort arrangements to ensure customers 
can be transferred from a failed retailer to another.
194 statE OF tHE ENErGy markEt
47 ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007.
48 The AEMC, in its review of the effectiveness of the Victorian energy retail market, recommended Victoria move to a financially responsible market participant model.
Figure	6.15	
Electricity	retail	customer	complaints	as	a	percentage	of	total	customers
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Note: Queensland data are only available to 2004 – 05. Western Australian data are available only for 2006 – 07.
Source: see figure 6.16.
Figure	6.16	
Percentage	of	electricity	retail	customer	calls	answered	within	30	seconds
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Notes: 
1. South Australian data for 2005 – 06 and 2006 – 07 include electricity and gas customers. Call response rates in Tasmania are for calls answered within 20 seconds.
2. Queensland data are only available to 2004 – 05. Western Australian data are available only for 2006 – 07.
Sources for figures 6.13 – 6.16: Reporting against URF templates and performance reports on the retail sector by IPART (New South Wales), ESC (Victoria), ESCOSA 
(South Australia), OTTER (Tasmania), QCA and the Department of Mines and Energy (Queensland) and ICRC (Australian Capital Territory); ERA, 2006 – 07 Annual 
performance report electricity retailers, January 2008 (Western Australia). The 2005 – 06 and 2006 – 07 data for the ACT are preliminary data provided by the ICRC.
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States and territories also provide a range of community 
service obligation payments to particular customer 
groups — often low incomes earners. Traditionally, the 
payments were often ‘hidden’ in subsidies and cross-
subsidies between different customer groups, which 
caused distortions to pricing and investment signals. 
As part of the energy reform process, governments are 
making community service obligations more transparent 
and are directly funding them out of their budgets rather 
than using cross-subsidises.
In April 2008, the Productivity Commission 
recommended establishing a national consumer protection 
regime for energy services and a single set of consumer 
protection requirements in all NEM jurisdictions.49 
The commission also recommended a more consistent 
approach to complaint-handling and reporting processes 
by jurisdictional energy ombudsmen and, ultimately, the 
establishment of a national energy ombudsman.50
6.6	 	demand	management	and	
energy	efficiency
Energy efficiency and demand management measures 
are an important feature of an effective energy market. 
Demand management relates to strategies that 
address growth in demand (especially peak demand) 
for electricity. Energy efficiency refers to products 
or strategies that use less energy for the same or higher 
performance than an existing system or product. While 
energy efficiency and demand management measures 
can improve the efficiency of energy use, there are 
wider benefits. For example, the measures can help ease 
congestion in network infrastructure, allow the deferral 
of some capital expenditure, reduce the incidence 
of wholesale electricity price spikes (and retailers’ 
hedging costs) and improve security of supply. A number 
of measures to improve energy efficiency are currently 
being implemented through the retail sector, as set 
out in the following text. Some demand management 
programs operate via the distribution network sector (see 
section 6.6.3).
6.6.1  National framework for 
energy efficiency
The National Framework for Energy Efficiency was 
launched in 2004 to better utilise energy efficient 
technologies to lower greenhouse gas emissions 
and deliver other benefits from reduced energy use. 
The framework is being implemented cooperatively 
by the Australian and state and territory governments.
Stage one of the framework focused on improved 
national coordination of existing energy efficiency 
measures. It focused on policies such as design 
standards for residential, commercial, industrial and 
government buildings; commercial and industrial 
efficiency; appliance and equipment efficiency; trade and 
professional training and accreditation; and consumer 
and finance sector awareness.
Stage two of the framework, agreed by the MCE 
in December 2007, covers schemes such as extending 
the Minimum Energy Performance Standards program 
and increasing the efficiency of heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, lighting and hot water systems.51
6.6.2  Jurisdictional energy 
efficiency initiatives
Many state governments are implementing programs 
to promote energy efficiency:
> The Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Scheme, 
commencing in 2009, will set an overall target for 
energy savings (2.7 million tonnes annually for the 
first three years). The scheme will require energy 
retailers to meet individual targets through energy 
efficiency activities, such as providing householders 
with energy saving products and services.52
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49 Productivity Commission, Inquiry report: Review of Australia’s consumer policy framework, 30 April 2008, pp. 66 – 67.
50 Productivity Commission, Inquiry report: Review of Australia’s consumer policy framework, 30 April 2008, p. 71.
51 MCE, Communiqué, 31 December 2007; The National Framework for Energy Efficiency, viewed June 2008, http://www.nfee.gov.au.
52 Victorian Department of Primary Industries, Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Scheme fact sheet.
> South Australian retailers will be subject to the 
Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme from January 
2009. The scheme requires retailers to meet targets 
to improve household energy efficiency (for example, 
through the use of ceiling insulation, draught proofing 
and more efficient appliances) and provide energy 
audits to low income households. A consultation paper 
on the scheme was released in February 2008.53
> The New South Wales Energy Savings Fund 
is providing $200 million over five years for projects 
to save energy and reduce peak electricity demand. 
It also aims to stimulate investment in innovative 
measures and increase public awareness of the benefits 
of energy savings.
Similarly, the Queensland Sustainable Energy 
Innovation Fund provides grants to assist organisations 
with the development and commercialisation 
of sustainable technologies. In May 2008, Queensland 
also introduced the Smart Energy Savings Program. 
This program requires medium to large energy users 
to complete energy conservation audits and develop 
action plans to reduce their energy use. The program 
also includes a fund that encourages energy efficiency 
initiatives by encouraging investment in commercial 
energy saving projects.
6.6.3 Demand management
As noted, demand management relates to strategies 
to manage growth in demand (especially peak demand) 
for electricity. One strategy is to encourage customers 
to adjust their energy consumption in response to price 
signals. For example, a customer may be offered financial 
incentives to reduce consumption at times of high 
system demand.
While demand management schemes ultimately target 
retail customers, some measures are implemented via the 
network sector. In particular, some jurisdictions provide 
incentives to distribution businesses to undertake 
demand management projects:
> In New South Wales, network businesses are 
permitted to recover expenditure on approved demand 
management projects through their regulated prices.
> In South Australia, ETSA Utilities was provided with 
a $20 million allowance in its current determination 
to undertake pilot demand management 
initiatives — for example, load control for domestic 
equipment such as air conditioners and pool 
pumps; incentive payments to customers to reduce 
demand at peak times; and working with developers 
to encourage more sophisticated design of air 
conditioning and lighting control systems. Similar 
incentives are offered in Victoria.
> While there are currently no demand-management 
incentives for distribution businesses in the other 
NEM jurisdictions, Queensland distributors are 
undertaking a number of projects. For example 
ENERGEX is conducting a trial of the direct control 
of small customer air conditioner loads (known 
as ‘Cool Change’). Under this trial, some small 
customers have permitted ENERGEX to connect 
a controlling device that cycles their air conditioner 
compressors on and off.
In November 2007, the AEMC published a proposal 
from the Total Environment Centre to amend the 
National Electricity Rules to improve the incentives 
offered to electricity network businesses to undertake 
demand management in preference to network 
expansion.54 The AEMC is also reviewing demand 
management in the NEM to determine whether there 
are barriers to effective demand management, including 
in the regulation of electricity networks and network 
planning.55
In addition to the national and jurisdictional 
schemes, some large customers manage their demand 
by purchasing electricity only when it remains below 
a given price. Some retailers also manage demand 
by asking customers to load shed if the price reaches 
a predetermined level.
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53 South Australian Department for Transport, Energy and Infrastructure, Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme consultation paper, February 2008.
54 AEMC, Demand management, viewed 11 June 2008, http://www.aemc.gov.au/electricity.php?r=20071115.124352.
55 Australian Energy Market Commission, Review of demand side participation in the national electricity market, viewed 11 June 2008, http://www.aemc.gov.au/electricity.
php?r=20071025.174223.
6.6.4 Metering
Effective metering can encourage more active demand 
management by customers. Meters record the energy 
consumption of end-use customers at the point 
of connection to the distribution network. There are two 
main types of meters:
> The older-style ‘accumulation meters’ record the total 
consumption of electricity at a connection point, but 
not the time of consumption. Consumers are billed 
solely on the volume of electricity consumed.
> ‘Interval meters’ are more sophisticated and record 
consumption in defined time intervals (for example, 
half-hour periods). This allows time-of-use billing 
so the charge for electricity can be varied with the time 
of consumption. Interval meters are generally used 
by industry.
To provide better signals to consumers and investors 
on consumption, price and energy use, plans are being 
considered at the national and state levels to introduce 
‘smart meters’, an advanced type of interval meter. 
Smart meters have remote communication capabilities 
between retailers and users that allow for remote meter 
reading, connection and disconnection of customers. 
They also allow retailers and distributors to manage 
loads to particular customers and appliances. Add-ons 
such as an in-house display may provide information 
on prices, greenhouse gas emissions and other aspects 
of electricity consumption. The primary benefit of smart 
meters is that, together with an appropriate price 
structure, they can help energy users self-manage their 
demand in response to price signals.
At June 2007, interval meters accounted for about 
10 per cent of all meters in Australia. The rollout has 
varied among jurisdictions, with the greatest number 
of meters having been installed in New South Wales:
> In New South Wales, distribution businesses are 
rolling out interval meters for customers using more 
than 15 MWh of electricity a year. For smaller 
customers, interval meters are provided on a new and 
replacement basis.
> The Victorian Government has initiated a program 
to provide smart meters to all small customers over 
a four-year period from 2009.
> The Queensland Energy Competition Committee has 
recommended the rollout of interval meters on a new 
and replacement basis for small customers.
> Since 2005, the Independent Competition and 
Regulatory Commission (ACT) has required 
the installation of interval meters on a new and 
replacement basis and when requested by a customer.
> In Western Australia, all new meters installed must 
support time-of-use pricing.
> The South Australian and Tasmanian governments 
concluded that the rollout of interval meters to small 
customers is not currently justified.
In 2007, the Council of Australian Governments agreed 
to a national implementation strategy for the progressive 
rollout of smart meters where the benefits outweigh 
costs. A cost – benefit assessment published in March 
2008 found that a national rollout would achieve a net 
benefit.56 In June 2008, the MCE reviewed the cost-
benefit analysis for the national smart meter rollout and 
estimated that a continued rollout in Victoria and New 
South Wales should result in more than 50 per cent 
of all Australian meters being replaced by 2017. 
It considered that other jurisdictions should progress 
pilot programs. The MCE will consider a timetable for 
any further rollout of smart meters by June 2012.57
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56 NERA, Cost Benefit Analysis of Smart Metering and Direct Load Control Overview Report for Consultation, 29 February 2008, for Smart Meter Working Group, 
Phase 2.
57 MCE, Communiqué, 13 June 2008.
6.7	 Future	regulatory	arrangements
State and territory governments are currently responsible 
for the regulation of retail energy markets. Governments 
agreed in the Australian Energy Market Agreement 
2004 (amended 2006) that NEM jurisdictions would 
transfer non-price regulatory functions to a national 
framework to be administered by the AEMC and the 
AER. These functions include:
> the obligation on retailers to supply small customers
> small customer market contracts and marketing
> retailer business authorisations, ring-fencing and 
retailer failure
> balancing, settlement, customer transfer and 
metering arrangements
> enforcement mechanisms and statutory objectives.58
Under the current proposals, the states and territories 
will retain responsibility for price control of default 
tariffs unless they choose to transfer those arrangements 
to the AER and the AEMC.
The legislative changes required to implement the 
national framework are scheduled for introduction to the 
South Australian parliament in September 2009.59
The Retail Policy Working Group is developing the 
framework for consideration by a standing committee of 
the MCE.
The reform process to June 2008 involved the release 
of a series of working papers (prepared by Allens Arthur 
Robinson on behalf of the MCE), discussions with 
a stakeholder reference group and consultation with 
interested parties.
The standing committee published a policy paper in June 
2008. This will form the basis for the legislative package 
on the national framework.
The standing committee expects to release an initial 
exposure draft of the legislative package in late 2008, 
followed by a final exposure draft in May 2009.60
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58 Australian Energy Market Agreement 2004 (amended 2006).
59 MCE, Energy Market Reform Bulletin No. 114, 13 February 2008.
60 MCE Standing Committee of Officials, A national framework for regulating electricity and gas (energy) distribution and retail services to customers — Policy response paper, 
June 2008, pp. 1 – 5.
	 7	Beyond the 
national 
electricity 
Market
Two jurisdictions have electricity markets that are not interconnected with the National 
Electricity Market: Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Western Australia has 
recently introduced a number of electricity market initiatives, including a new wholesale 
market. The Northern Territory has introduced electricity reforms, but at present there is 
no competition in generation or retail markets.
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7.1	 	Western	Australia
Western Australia’s electricity market is thousands of 
kilometres away from the National Electricity Market 
(NEM), which extends through eastern and southern 
Australia. There is neither physical interconnection nor 
governance linkages between the two markets.
With a customer base spread over a third of the national 
landmass, Western Australia’s electricity industry faces 
some unique challenges. State-wide, around 60 per cent 
of installed generation capacity is fuelled by natural gas, 
35 per cent by coal and 2 per cent by oil. Gas is used 
in base load cogeneration plants and peaking units. 
There has been growth in electricity generation from 
renewable sources, of which more than half consists of 
wind, with hydro and biomass comprising the balance. 
Renewable sources fuelled about 4 per cent of generation 
in 2006 – 07. Electricity generated from renewable energy 
has increased six-fold since 2003.1
The Western Australian Government has set a target of 
6 per cent of electricity to be sourced from renewable 
energy by 2010. The planned development of the WA 
Biomass Plant in 2009 – 10 is expected to lift the share of 
renewable energy production over this target.
7.1.1 The networks
Reflecting Western Australia’s geography, industry 
and demographics, the state’s electricity infrastructure 
consists of several distinct systems (see figure 7.1):
> the South West Interconnected System (SWIS)
> the North West Interconnected System (NWIS)
> 29 regional, non-interconnected power systems.
The largest network, the SWIS, serves Perth and other 
major population centres in the south-west of the state, 
while the NWIS serves towns and the mining and 
resource industries in the north-west of the state.
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1 Sustainable Energy Development Office (WA), Renewable energy, fact sheet, 2008.
The South West Interconnected System
The SWIS is the major interconnected electricity 
network in Western Australia, supplying the bulk of 
the south-west region. It extends to Kalbarri in the 
north, Albany in the south, and Kalgoorlie in the 
east. The network supplies 840 000 retail customers 
with 6000 kilometres of transmission lines and 
64 000 kilometres of distribution lines. It comprises 
4200 megawatts (MW) of installed generation capacity, 
of which about 75 per cent is owned by the state utility, 
Verve Energy. The remaining 25 per cent is privately 
owned, but the energy is principally dedicated to 
resource projects. Verve Energy’s share of installed 
generation will fall to 66 per cent in 2008 – 09 as its 
program of retiring old plant continues.
The principal base load generators are located near 
Collie, about 200 kilometres south of Perth, near 
the state’s only coal mining facilities. The majority 
of principal peak load (open cycle gas turbine) 
generators are located near the Dampier to Bunbury 
natural gas pipeline north of Perth. There are also 
plants at Kemerton and Kalgoorlie, and a large mixed 
fuel generation station at Kwinana, south of Perth. 
A 320 MW combined cycle gas turbine station is under 
construction at Kwinana to supply power from late 
2008. Most independent power producers with plants 
connected to the SWIS use gas as their primary fuel 
(see table 7.1).2
Western Australia introduced a wholesale electricity 
market in the SWIS in September 2006 (see 
section 7.1.3).
Table	7.1	 Installed	generation	capacity	in	the	South	
West	Interconnected	System	by	fuel	source,	2008
Fuel	Source ToTAl	generATIon	cApAcITy	(%)
Open cycle gas turbine 40
Coal fired 38
Gas cogeneration 12
Combined cycle gas turbine 5
Renewable 5
Source: IMO.
The North West Interconnected System
The NWIS operates in the north-west of the state and 
centres around the industrial towns of Karratha and 
Port Hedland and resource centres. The network is 
significantly smaller than the SWIS and its purpose is to 
supply the resource industry’s operations and associated 
townships in the area.
The NWIS has a generation capacity of 400 MW. 
The plants are mainly fuelled by natural gas, some of 
which is shipped on the Pilbara Energy Pipeline, which 
runs from Karratha to Port Hedland.
Horizon Power is responsible for the transmission, 
distribution, and retailing of electricity to customers 
through the NWIS. Horizon purchases power from 
private generators in the region and sells it to residential 
and commercial customers. Private generators serve the 
major resource companies in the Pilbara. These include 
Hamersley Iron’s 120 MW generation plant at Dampier, 
Robe River’s 105 MW plant at Cape Lambert and 
Alinta’s 105 MW plant at Port Hedland.
Due to the small scale of this system, the NWIS will not 
see a wholesale market introduced in the manner of the 
SWIS in the foreseeable future.
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2 Griffin Power is currently constructing two coal base load plants near Collie in the south-west of the state.
Figure	7.1	
electricity	infrastructure	map—Western	Australia
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Source: Economic Regulation Authority (Western Australia).
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Regional non-interconnected systems
Further small, non-interconnected distribution systems 
operate around towns in rural and remote areas beyond 
the SWIS and NWIS networks.3 Horizon Power 
operates the 29 distribution systems located in these 
regions, but independent generators supply much of 
the electricity.
7.1.2 Electricity market reform
In 1993, when Australian governments decided to 
create a national electricity market, it was impractical for 
Western Australia to join. Geography dictated that its 
networks could not be physically interconnected with 
the other states.
Consistent with the eastern and southern states, Western 
Australia’s electricity industry was historically dominated 
by a single, vertically integrated utility under government 
ownership. Western Australia retained this structure 
for almost a decade longer than other jurisdictions. The 
lack of competition, in combination with relatively high 
generation costs (due to relatively expensive coal sources 
and the remoteness of major gas fields), led to high 
electricity prices.
The Western Australian Government began 
implementing a series of electricity reforms in 2003. The 
central reform was the disaggregation of the electricity 
utility Western Power Corporation into four separate, 
state-owned entities in April 2006. The entities are:
> Verve Energy — generation
> Western Power — transmission and distribution 
networks
> Synergy — retail
> Horizon Power — regional supply.
Other key reforms included:
> establishing, in 2006, a wholesale electricity market 
(see section 7.1.3)
> establishing, in 2004, an electricity networks access 
code for access to transmission and distribution 
networks (see section 7.1.4)
> extending, in 2005, the retail contestability threshold 
to all customers using more than 50 megawatt hours 
(MWh) per year (see section 7.1.5)
> implementing consumer protection measures, 
including a network reliability and quality of supply 
code and an energy ombudsman scheme (see 
section 7.1.5).
7.1.3 Wholesale electricity market
In September 2006, Western Australia launched a 
wholesale electricity market in the SWIS. Energy 
trading is facilitated through a combination of bilateral 
contracts, a day-ahead short-term energy market 
(STEM) and a balancing market. The wholesale market 
was designed to suit Western Australian conditions at 
that time and differs considerably from the NEM.
The rule development body and market operator is the 
Independent Market Operator (IMO), a government 
entity established in 2004.4 The IMO has no commercial 
interest in the market and no connection with any 
market participant, including Western Power.
The physical system operator, System Management, 
is a ring-fenced entity within Western Power tasked 
with maintaining safe, secure and reliable operation of 
the power system. It is responsible for the operation 
and control of generator facilities, transmission and 
distribution networks, and large customer retailer 
supply management.
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3 The networks are located in such areas as Broome, Gascoyne Junction, Menzies, Camballin, Halls Creek, Mount Magnet, Carnarvon, Hopetoun, Norseman, Cue, 
Kununurra, Nullagine, Denham, Lake Argyle Village, Sandstone, Derby, Laverton, Wiluna, Esperance, Leonora, Wittenoom, Exmouth, Marble Bar, Wyndham, 
Fıtzroy Crossing, Meekatharra and Yalgoo.
4 Information on the market can be found on the IMO website (http://www.imowa.com.au).
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State-owned corporations will continue to dominate the 
market for some time for the following reasons:
> Verve Energy owns about 75 per cent of installed 
generation capacity in the SWIS. This will fall to 
66 per cent in 2008 – 09. The government expects that 
Verve’s market share will continue to fall in subsequent 
years with the phasing out of transitional vesting 
contracts implemented with the disaggregation of 
Western Power.5
> Western Power owns the bulk of the transmission and 
distribution systems.
> Until full retail contestability is introduced, Synergy 
will serve all customers using less than 50 MWh 
per year, including small business and residential 
consumers. At this stage, Western Australia has not 
determined a date to introduce full retail contestability. 
Most contestable customers still have access to 
gazetted tariffs, which in the current environment of 
rising electricity costs reduce the incentive to switch to 
another supplier.
Table	7.2	 participants	in	Western	Australia’s	wholesale	electricity	market
pArTIcIpAnT generATorS cuSTomerS
2006 2008 2006 2008
Alcoa  
Alinta Sales Pty Ltd
Barrick (Kanowna) Limited
Bioenergy Limited
EDWF Manager Pty Ltd
Eneabba Gas Limited
Enebba Energy Pty Ltd
Goldfields Power Pty Ltd
Griffin Power Pty Ltd
Landfill Gas and Power Pty Ltd
Mount Herron Engineering Pty Ltd
Namarkkon Pty Ltd
NewGen Power Kwinana Pty Ltd
Newmont Power Pty Ltd
Perth Energy Pty Ltd
Premier Power Sales Pty Ltd
Southern Cross Energy
South West Cogeneration Joint Venture
Synergy
TransAlta Energy (Australia)
Transfield Services Kemerton Pty Ltd
Verve Energy
Walkaway Wind Power Pty Ltd
Waste Gas Resources Pty Ltd
Water Corporation
Worsley Alumina
Source: Economic Regulation Authority (Western Australia).
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ensure that Synergy could meet the sales obligations that it inherited from Western Power, and initially covered a substantial proportion of wholesale supply in the 
SWIS. The arrangements will be phased out as competition is introduced.
However, the extent of dominance by state-owned 
energy corporations may reduce over time with new 
market entry and greater interaction between state-
owned corporations and independent power producers. 
In particular:
> The Western Australian Government has placed a 
3000 MW cap on Verve Energy’s ability to invest in 
new generation plant to allow independent generators 
to increase their market share over time.
> Synergy is not permitted to own or control generation 
plant until the Western Australian Government is 
satisfied that new market entry has occurred. It is also 
required to conduct regular displacement tenders of 
energy currently sourced under transitional vesting 
arrangements.
It is expected that by 2009 – 10, Verve Energy’s share 
of generation capacity will fall to around 60 per cent 
of generation capacity, with three new participants 
acquiring significant generation capacity (NewGen 
Power, Griffin Power and Alcoa).6 Table 7.2, which sets 
out market participants in 2006 and 2008, indicates the 
extent of new entry since the market began.
Differences between the Western Australian electricity 
market and the National Electricity Market
Fıgure 7.2 illustrates the key elements of the Western 
Australian Wholesale Market in the SWIS. There are 
three main differences between the market design for 
the SWIS and the NEM:
> gross pool versus net pool
> capacity market arrangements
> ancillary services.
Figure	7.2	
Western	Australian	wholesale	electricity	market
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6 Economic Regulation Authority, Annual wholesale electricity market report for the Minister for Energy, 2007 (p. 11).
Gross pool versus net pool
The NEM is a gross pool in which the sale of all 
wholesale electricity occurs in a spot market. NEM 
participants also enter into formal hedge contracts to 
manage spot market risk. In contrast, energy in the 
SWIS is mainly traded through bilateral contracts 
outside the pool. These may be entered into years, weeks 
or days prior to supply. Before the trading day, generators 
must inform the IMO of the quantity of energy to be 
sold under bilateral contracts and to whom it will be sold 
so the IMO can schedule that supply.
In the lead-up to dispatch, System Management issues 
instructions to ensure that supply equals demand in 
real-time. Rather than being dispatched on a least-cost 
basis, dispatch mainly reflects the contract positions of 
participants. Generators submit daily resource plans 
that inform the IMO of how their facilities will be 
used to meet their contract positions. Generators are 
obliged to follow these plans, unless they are superseded 
by dispatch instructions. Verve Energy’s facilities are 
scheduled around the resource plans of other generators. 
If it appears that supply will not equal demand, the IMO 
will schedule Verve Energy generation first, and then 
issue dispatch instructions to other market participants 
as necessary.
Beyond bilateral contracts, the STEM and a balancing 
market are used to trade wholesale electricity (see 
figure 7.2). The STEM supports bilateral trades by 
allowing market participants to trade around their net 
contract positions a day before energy is delivered. If, for 
example, a generator does not have sufficient capacity 
to meet its contracted position, it can bid to purchase 
energy in the STEM. Participation in the STEM is 
optional. Participating generators must offer generation 
plant at short run marginal cost. Each morning, market 
participants may submit to the IMO bids to purchase 
energy and/or offers to supply energy.7 The IMO then 
runs an auction, in which it takes a neutral position to 
determine a single price for each trading interval of 
the day.
A market participant’s actual supply or consumption 
of electricity during a trading interval may deviate 
from their net contract position (the sum of their 
bilateral position and STEM trades) due to unexpected 
deviations in demand and unplanned plant outages. 
The shortfall or surplus is traded on the balancing 
market. The IMO calculates balancing prices, which 
for Verve Energy plant are generally equal to the short 
run marginal cost of the last unit dispatched. Any 
independent power producer plant dispatched for 
balancing or ancillary service provision is ‘paid as bid’.
Capacity market arrangements
The SWIS market includes both an energy market 
(the STEM) and a capacity market (see figure 7.2). 
The capacity market is intended to provide incentives 
for investment in generation to meet peak demand. In 
particular, it is intended that the capacity market will 
provide sufficient revenue for investment without the 
market experiencing high and volatile energy prices.
The IMO administers a reserve capacity mechanism to 
ensure that there is adequate installed capacity to meet 
demand. The IMO determines how much capacity is 
required to meet peak demand each year and allocates 
the costs of obtaining the necessary capacity to buyers 
— mostly retailers. Generators are assigned capacity 
credits, which entitle them to payments for offering 
their capacity into the market at all times. Payments of 
$10 625 per MW of capacity per month were provided 
for the period from the start of the market to 1 October 
2008. For the twelve months from 1 October 2008, 
generators will receive $8152 per MW of capacity per 
month. These amounts are intended to cover the fixed 
costs of an open cycle peaking gas turbine and will 
partially cover the capital costs of base load units.
In the NEM there is no capacity market. Instead, 
generators are paid only for energy sent out, and a high 
price cap provides incentives to invest in generation 
and establish demand side responses. The provision of 
capacity payments means that wholesale spot energy 
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7 In order to receive reserve capacity payments, generators must offer all registered capacity into the STEM.
prices in Western Australia are unlikely to need to peak 
as high as NEM prices to stimulate investment. The 
Market Rules specify that the maximum STEM price 
is adjusted periodically to reflect CPI changes.8 For the 
year from 1 October 2006 to 30 September 2007, the 
STEM price cap was $159.84 per MWh. For the year 
from 1 November 2007 to 1 October 2008, the cap is 
$206 per MWh. This price is based on the marginal cost 
of an open cycle gas turbine using natural gas as fuel. 
In comparison, the NEM operates with a $10 000 per 
MWh price cap.9
The IMO determines annual reserve capacity 
requirements and releases an annual statement of 
opportunities report that covers a period of 10 years, the 
first having been released in 2005. Western Australia’s 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) approves the 
maximum reserve capacity price and the energy price 
caps in the short-term market that are proposed by 
the IMO.
Ancillary services
There are eight frequency control ancillary services spot 
markets in the NEM in which participants may bid to 
provide services. Network control ancillary services are 
procured through long-term contracts. In contrast, there 
are no spot markets for ancillary services in the SWIS. 
System Management determines ancillary services 
requirements and procures them from Western Power 
or other participants under contract arrangements.
Energy market outcomes
While it is too early to assess the outcomes of the 
Western Australian energy market, a number of 
developments can be observed. The number of market 
participants is increasing, with new retailers and 
generators entering the market. Table 7.3 shows that 
Premier Power has entered the retail market and that 
a number of generators have been built recently or are 
planned for the near future.
There has been strong interest in investing in the energy 
market, including in renewable energy. In total, the 
number of generators has risen from 10 to 22 since the 
market began. The number of retailers has risen from 
11 to 14. More varied plant sizes, technologies and fuel 
types are being encouraged, as are cost-efficient plant 
upgrades. Another outcome has been the introduction 
of more cost-reflective prices in the STEM, which 
recognise the cost of energy during system peaks and 
Table	7.3	 new	entrants	in	the	South	West	Interconnected	System	—	generation	and	retail
pArTIcIpAnT InveSTmenT
Alinta Sales > 80 MW wind farm at Walkaway opened in late 2005
> 130 MW cogeneration plant opened in April 2006
> 130 MW cogeneration plant commissioned in February 2007
> 350 MW open cycle plant under construction for end 2007
Stanwell/Griffin > 80 MW wind farm at Emu Downs opened October 2006
NewGen Power Kwinana > 320 MW Kwinana combined cycle plant under construction for end 2008
Griffin Power > 200 MW Bluewaters 1 coal fired plant under construction for end 2008
> 200 MW Bluewaters 2 plant under construction for end 2009
> 330 MW gas-fired plant near Neerabup proposed for 2010–11
Perth Energy > Combined cycle gas plant under consideration
Eneabba Gas > 168 MW Centauri 1 gas-fired plant near Eneabba due to begin operation in 2009
Western Australian Biomass > 40 MW boiler/steam turbine power station fired by biomass to begin operation in 2009–10
Western Energy > 80 MW Kwinana combined cycle gas-fired plant due for 2010
Aviva > 400 MW Coolimba coal-fired plant near Eneabba due for 2012
Premier Power Sales > New retailer
Source: IMO, Office of Energy (WA).
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8 The Market Rules can be found on the IMO website (http://www.imowa.com.au).
9 Information on price caps can be found on the IMO website (http://www.imowa.com.au).
short-term pressures such as fuel shortages and strong 
demand. However, there is less cost reflectivity in the 
retail market, where transitional vesting arrangements 
and gazetted tariffs apply.10 To address the lack of cost 
reflectivity and transparency, the Western Australian 
Government announced in April 2008 a $780 million 
subsidy payment to Verve Energy over three years.11
The volume of energy traded in the STEM and the 
balancing markets has ranged from about 4.5 to 
6.5 per cent of total sales, although unpublished data 
since late 2007 suggest it has frequently dropped below 
1 per cent (see figure 7.3).
There was relatively strong trading activity in the STEM 
at the commencement of the market, which later 
declined as the market evolved. Recently, STEM trades 
have risen again, largely between generators seeking 
access to lower cost plant.
On most days the number of market participants 
placing STEM bids fluctuates between four and seven. 
Given the limited number of participants, the STEM 
is relatively active despite the limited quantities traded. 
While Verve Energy accounts for a majority of capacity 
in the market, figure 7.4 shows that other participants 
have been active in the STEM. In contrast, the level of 
competition in the bilateral contract market is difficult to 
gauge because such contracts are confidential.
The ERA has stated it is not aware of outcomes in the 
STEM that indicate market power is an issue. However, 
it has raised concerns about:
> the appropriateness of the investment signals provided 
by the market
> the appropriateness of the timing of the reserve 
capacity mechanism and whether this can create 
barriers to investment for facilities with long 
lead times
> whether the timing of planned network outages 
impacts on the effectiveness of the market
> whether there are barriers to the participation of 
consumers in demand-side management programs.12
According to the IMO, there have been five STEM 
suspensions since the market commenced. Settlement 
processes and participant understanding of the market 
systems and rules has been improving.13
Price outcomes
Price outcomes in the STEM and balancing markets 
provide transparent price signals on the cost of electricity. 
The mean peak STEM price from the commencement 
of the market until 31 July 2007 was $68.90 per MWh, 
while the mean off-peak price was $32.30 per MWh.14 
Fıgure 7.5 shows the weighted average weekly STEM 
prices from the commencement of the market to the 
end of February 2008. The early high prices were due 
to fuel restrictions and low generator availability. The 
price peaks in 2007 reflect high demand periods and 
fuel shortages.15
7.1.4 Network access
In 2004, Western Australia implemented the Electricity 
Networks Access Code for access to transmission and 
distribution network services. At present, the Code only 
covers Western Power’s networks within the SWIS, 
but other networks may be covered in the future if they 
meet the access regime’s coverage tests. In July 2006, 
the Commonwealth Treasurer certified the Code as 
an effective access regime under the Trade Practices 
Act 1974.
The ERA administers the Code, which prescribes 
commercial arrangements, including access charges 
that electricity generators and retailers must pay to use 
Western Power’s networks. The regulatory framework 
sets out criteria for the ERA’s acceptance or rejection of 
an access arrangement proposed by the service provider.
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10 See also section 7.1.5.
11 Alan Carpenter, Premier, Ministerial Media Statement, State Government to phase in electricity price increases, 4 April 2008.
12 Economic Regulation Authority, Annual wholesale electricity market report for the Minister for Energy, 2007, p.viii.
13 Independent Market Operator, Western Australian Electricity Market, presentation by Bill Truscott, 24 September, 2007.
14 Economic Regulation Authority, Annual wholesale electricity market report for the Minister for Energy, 2007, p. 12.
15 Independent Market Operator, Western Australian electricity market, presentation by Bill Truscott, 24 September, 2007.
Figure	7.3	
composition	of	electricity	trading	in	the	South	West	
Interconnected	System
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Figure	7.4	
number	of	active	participants	in	short-term	energy	
market	auctions
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Figure	7.5	
Weighted	average	weekly	prices	—	short-term	energy	market
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The ERA released a decision in April 2007 on Western 
Power’s access arrangement under the Code. Western 
Power’s access tariffs under the decision are published 
on the ERA website. Under the access arrangement, 
Western Power is required to submit to the ERA, for 
approval, a proposed price list (to apply for the next 
pricing year). The 2008 – 09 price list was approved on 
8 May 2008.16
7.1.5 Retail arrangements
In January 2005, Western Australia extended retail 
contestability to electricity customers using at least 
50 MWh per year. Customers below this threshold who 
are connected to the SWIS are served by Synergy, the 
state-owned energy retailer. Most customers outside 
the SWIS are served by Horizon Power. Currently, 
around 60 per cent of the Western Australian market, 
by volume, is contestable.17
The Western Australian Government has not set an 
implementation date for full retail contestability in 
electricity. The Electricity Corporations Act 2005 requires 
the Minister for Energy to undertake a review in 2009 
to consider a further extension of contestability. While 
full contestability has not commenced, there has been 
some degree of retailer switching by large market 
customers.18
Companies, other than Synergy, that currently offer retail 
electricity products in the SWIS include Alinta Sales, 
Griffin Power, Landfill Gas & Power, Perth Energy, 
Premier Power Sales and TransAlta Energy (Australia). 
The ERA website publishes a list of licenced retailers.
It is Western Australian government policy that all 
Synergy and Horizon Power customers are entitled to a 
uniform tariff, irrespective of their geographic location. 
The Western Australian Government approves the tariff 
and implements the scheme through a combination of 
statutory requirements. Regional electricity tariffs are 
subsidised by the Tariff Equalisation Fund, which is 
administered by the Office of Energy and funded by 
SWIS network users.
In April 2008 the Western Australian Government 
announced that domestic electricity charges would 
increase by 10 per cent in 2009 – 10, with further 
increases to be phased in over six to eight years. It 
rejected an Office of Energy recommendation to increase 
prices by 47 per cent in 2009 – 10 and 15 per cent the 
following year — in line with substantial increases in the 
cost of supplying electricity. The cost pressures include 
higher fuel prices, infrastructure upgrades, and rising 
labour costs. The Western Australian Government 
announced a $780 million subsidy to fund the shortfall 
between the cost of providing electricity and the prices 
charged to households.19
In addition to the uniform tariff, Western Australia has 
other consumer protection measures, including:
> an independent energy ombudsman
> a code of conduct for the supply of electricity to small-
use customers
> regulations to ensure that residential and small 
business customers can be connected to a distribution 
network at the least cost to the customer
> standard form contracts for small customers
> supplier of last resort arrangements.20
213
	
c
H
A
p
Ter
	
7	B
e
yo
n
d
 th
e
 
n
atio
n
a
l 
e
le
c
tr
ic
ity 
M
a
r
k
e
t
16 Chapters 4 and 5 of this report include some data on the Western Power networks.
17 Independent Market Operator, Annual Report 2006/07, 2007, p. 24.
18 Independent Market Operator, Annual Report 2006/07, 2007, p. 24.
19 Alan Carpenter, Premier, Ministerial Media Statement, State Government to phase in electricity price increases, 4 April 2008.
20 For further information on the electricity retail market in Western Australia, see Chapter 6 of this report.
7.2	 The	northern	Territory
The Northern Territory’s electricity industry is small, 
reflecting its population of around 215 000. There are 
three relatively small regulated systems,21 of which the 
largest is the Darwin – Katherine system, with a capacity 
of around 340 MW (as at 30 June 2007) (see figure 7.6). 
In 2006 – 07, the Territory consumed around 1675 
gigawatt hours of electricity. Two new generators are 
being constructed at Weddell, each with a capacity of 40 
MW, and are expected to be operational in 2008.
The Territory uses gas-fired plants to generate public 
electricity, using gas sourced from the Amadeus Basin in 
Central Australia. However, the Amadeus fields cannot 
sustain increasing demand and the majority of the 
current contracts for gas supply are due to end in 2009. 
An alternative source, which will be used from 2009, is 
the Blacktip Fıeld in the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf. The gas 
will come onshore to a processing plant near Wadeye 
and will then be transported by a new gas pipeline that 
will connect to the existing Amadeus Basin to Darwin 
Pipeline. It is expected that this arrangement will meet 
the Territory’s forecast gas demand for the next 25 years.
7.2.1 Market arrangements
Given the scale of the Northern Territory market, it was 
not considered feasible to establish a wholesale electricity 
spot market. Rather, the Territory uses a ‘bilateral 
contracting’ system in which generators are responsible 
for dispatching the power their customers require.
The industry is dominated by a government-owned 
corporation, Power and Water, which owns the 
transmission and distribution networks. Currently, it is 
the monopoly retail provider and generator. Power and 
Water is also responsible for power system control. There 
are six independent power producers in the resource and 
processing sector that generate their own requirements 
and also generate electricity for the market under 
contract with Power and Water.
Figure	7.6	
northern	Territory	electricity	system
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21 The Darwin–Katherine, Alice Springs and Tennant Creek systems.
From around 2000, the Territory Government 
introduced measures to open the electricity market to 
competition. It:
> commenced a phased introduction of retail 
contestability, originally scheduled for completion 
by April 2005 but rescheduled for April 2010
> corporatised the vertically integrated electricity 
supplier (Power and Water) and ring-fenced its 
generation, power system control, network and retail 
activities
> allowed new suppliers to enter the market
> established an independent regulator, the Utilities 
Commission, to regulate monopoly services and 
monitor the market
> introduced a regulated access regime for transmission 
and distribution services. In 2002, the Australian 
Government certified the regime as effective under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974. The Utilities Commission 
made its second five-year determination on network 
access arrangements (for 2004 – 05 to 2008 – 09) 
in 2004.
There has been one new entrant in generation and retail 
since the reforms — NT Power, which acquired some 
market share. However, NT Power withdrew from the 
market in September 2002 citing its inability to source 
ongoing gas supplies for electricity generation. In light 
of this, the government suspended the contestability 
timetable in January 2003. This effectively halted 
contestability at the 750 MW per year threshold 
until prospects for competition re-emerge. A single 
subsequent applicant was not granted an electricity 
retail licence due to the applicant’s ‘inability to meet 
reasonably foreseeable obligations for the sale of 
electricity’.22 The introduction of full retail contestability 
is currently scheduled for April 2010.
When Power and Water reverted to a retail monopoly, 
the government approved prices oversight by the 
Utilities Commission of Power and Water’s generation 
business for as long as the business is not subject to a 
tangible threat of competition. The government regulates 
tariffs for non-contestable customers via electricity 
pricing orders. The Utilities Commission regulates 
service standards, including standards for reliability 
and customer service.
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22 Department of Business, Economic and Regional Development (NT Government), The NT electricity, water and gas supply sector, fact sheet, 2005.
	 	Part	three	
Natural gas
Natural gas is predominately made up of methane, a colourless and odourless gas. 
There are two main sources of natural gas in Australia. Conventional natural gas is found 
in underground reservoirs trapped in rock, often in association with oil. It may occur 
in onshore or offshore reservoirs. Coal seam gas is produced during the creation of coal 
from peat. The methane is adsorbed onto the surface of micropores in the coal. There are 
also renewable sources of methane, including biogas (landfill and sewage gas) and biomass, 
which includes wood, wood waste and sugarcane residue (bagasse). Renewable sources 
supply around 16 per cent of Australia’s primary gas use.
W
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The natural gas supply chain begins with exploration 
and development activity, which may involve geological 
surveys and the drilling of wells. Exploration 
typically occurs in conjunction with the search 
for other hydrocarbon deposits, such as oil. At the 
commercialisation phase, the extracted gas is processed 
to separate the methane from the liquids and other gases 
that may be present, and to remove any impurities, such 
as water and hydrogen sulphide.
The gas extracted from a well may be used on‑site 
as a fuel for electricity generation or for other purposes. 
More commonly, however, gas fields and processing 
facilities are located some distance from the cities, towns 
and regional centres where the gas is consumed. High 
pressure transmission pipelines are used to transport 
natural gas from the source over long distances. 
A network of distribution pipelines then delivers 
gas from points along the transmission pipelines 
to industrial customers, and from gate stations (or 
city gates) to consumers in cities, towns and regional 
communities. Gate stations measure the natural gas 
leaving a transmission system for billing and gas 
balancing purposes, and are used to reduce the pressure 
of the gas before it enters the distribution network.
Retailers act as intermediaries in the supply chain. 
They enter into contracts for wholesale gas, transmission 
and distribution services, and ‘package’ the services 
together for on‑sale to industrial, commercial and 
residential consumers.
Unlike electricity, natural gas can be stored, usually 
in depleted gas reservoirs, or it can be converted 
to a liquefied form for storage in purpose‑built facilities. 
Liquefied natural gas is transported by ship to export 
markets. It is also possible to transport liquefied natural 
gas by road or pipeline.
Part 3 of this report provides a chapter‑by‑chapter 
survey of each link in the supply chain. Chapter 8 
considers upstream gas markets, including exploration, 
production and wholesale trade. Chapters 9 and 10 
provide data on the gas transmission and distribution 
sectors, and chapter 11 considers gas retailing.
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Gas	supply	chain
traNSMISSION
High pressure 
transmission pipelines 
are used to transport 
natural gas over 
long distances
PrOCeSSING
Extracted gas often 
requires processing  
to separate the 
methane and to 
remove impurities
PrODUCtION
Gas is extracted 
from wells in 
explored fields
retaIL
Retailers act as 
intermediaries, 
contracting for gas 
with producers and 
pipeline operators 
to provide a bundled 
package for on-sale 
to customers
DIStrIBUtION
Distribution networks 
are used to deliver gas 
to industrial customers 
and cities, towns and 
regional communities
CONSUMPtION
Customers use gas for a 
number of applications, 
ranging from electricity 
generation and 
manufacturing to 
domestic use such as 
heating and cooking
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Image sources: Production, Woodside; Processing, Origin Energy; Transmission, Nicholas White (supplied by KT Pty Ltd); Retail, Origin Energy;  
Consumption, Jupiterimages.
	 8	Upstream 
Gas markets
The upstream gas industry encompasses several phases, including exploration for gas 
resources, field development, gas gathering and, finally, the processing of natural gas 
to meet customer and regulatory requirements. The wholesale gas market involves sales 
by producers to energy retailers and other major customers. While the gas wholesale 
market remains characterised by confidential long-term contracts, there have been 
a number of recent initiatives to increase market transparency and competitive conditions.
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8.1	 Exploration	and	development
Exploration for natural gas typically occurs 
in conjunction with the search for other hydrocarbon 
deposits. The exploration process is characterised by large 
sunk costs and a relatively low probability of success. 
Activity levels are driven by a range of factors, including 
projected energy prices; the availability of acreage; 
equipment costs; perceptions of risks and rewards; and 
the availability of finance.
The costs incurred during this phase relate to surveying 
and drilling to identify possible resources and the 
acquisition of exploration permits. In recent years, 
rising equipment costs have significantly increased the 
cost of offshore exploration and development.1 Given 
the cost and risk characteristics, exploration tends 
to be undertaken through joint venture arrangements 
to enable costs to be shared. If exploration is successful, 
the joint venture parties may proceed to the production 
phase or sell their interest to other parties.
This chapter considers:
> Australia’s natural gas resources
> exploration and development of gas resources
> gas production and consumption, including coal seam gas and liquefied natural gas
> upstream industry structure, including participants and ownership changes
> gas wholesale markets
> gas prices
> current market developments, including a gas market bulletin board and short-term 
trading market
> reliability of supply.
	 8	Upstream 
Gas markets
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1 ERA, Gas issues in Western Australia, Discussion paper, Perth, 2007.
In 2007 – 08, petroleum exploration expenditure 
in Australia was forecast to increase by around 
41 per cent to $3.2 billion — the highest on record.2 
The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) has linked the sharp increase 
to rising global oil prices. The rise is mainly accounted 
for by growth in offshore exploration in Western 
Australia. There has also been a significant rise 
in exploration activity in Queensland, mostly associated 
with coal seam gas (CSG) (see section 8.2).3
The right to conduct exploration activity — including 
seismic acquisition and exploratory drilling — and develop 
gas fields is controlled by governments. In Australia, 
the states and territories control onshore resources 
and resources in coastal waters while the Australian 
Government has jurisdiction over resources in offshore 
waters outside the three nautical mile boundary. 
Governments release acreage each year for exploration 
and development.
The rights to explore, develop and produce gas 
and other petroleum products in a specified area 
or ‘tenement’ are documented in a lease or licence 
(also referred to as a ‘title’ or ‘permit’). Licences allocated 
in Australia include exploration, assessment (retention) 
and production licences.
> An exploration licence provides a right to explore for 
petroleum, and to carry on such operations as are 
necessary for that purpose, in the permit area.
> An assessment or retention licence provides a right 
to conduct geological, geophysical and geochemical 
programs to evaluate the development potential of the 
petroleum believed to be present in the permit area.
> A production licence provides a right to explore for and 
recover petroleum, and carry on such operations as are 
necessary for those purposes, in the permit area.
Governments usually allocate petroleum tenements 
through a work program bidding process, which 
operates like a competitive tendering process. Under 
this approach, anyone may apply for a right to explore, 
develop or produce in a tenement based on offers 
to perform specified work programs. The relevant 
minister chooses the successful applicant by assessing the 
merits of the work program, the applicant’s financial and 
technical ability to carry out the proposed work program, 
and any other criteria relevant to a tender. While the 
approach to issuing licences is relatively consistent across 
states and territories, there are significant differences 
in licence tenure and conditions.
8.2	 Australia’s	natural	gas	resources
Natural gas consists mainly of methane. The two main 
types of natural gas in Australia are conventional 
natural gas and CSG. Conventional natural gas 
is found in underground reservoirs trapped in rock, 
often in association with oil. CSG is produced during 
the creation of coal from peat. In addition, renewable 
gas sources such as biogas (landfill and sewage gas) 
and biomass (including wood, wood waste and sugar 
cane residue) were forecast to supply about 4 per cent 
of Australia’s primary energy consumption in 2007 – 08.4
Australia has abundant natural gas reserves (see 
table 8.1). At June 2008, total proved and probable 
reserves — those with reasonable prospects for 
commercialisation — stood at around 52 000 petajoules, 
comprising:
> 40 000 petajoules of conventional natural gas
> 12 000 petajoules of CSG.5
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2 ABARE, Minerals and energy: Major development projects – April 2008 listing.
3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Mineral and Petroleum Exploration, ABS Cat. no. 8412.0, March 2008; ABARE, Minerals and energy: Major development projects – April 
2008 listing.
4 A Syed, R Wilson, S Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke, Australian energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, prepared for 
the Australian Government Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Canberra, 2007, Table A3, p. 55. ‘Primary energy’ refers to the use of primary fuel in the 
conversion and end use sectors. It includes the consumption of fuels to produce electricity.
5 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
Table	8.1	 Natural	gas	reserves	and	production	in	Australia,	2008
GAs	bAsiN PRoduCTioN	
(yEAR	To	JuNE	2008)
PRovEd	ANd	PRobAblE	REsERvEs2	
(JuNE	2008)
PetAjoules PercentAge oF 
doMestic sAles
PetAjoules PercentAge 
oF AustrAliAn 
reserves
CoNvENTioNAl	NATuRAl	GAs1
Western AustrAliA
carnarvon 332 32.6 29 723 56.4
Perth 9 0.9 30 0.1
northern territory
Amadeus 21 2.0 205 0.4
Bonaparte 0 0.0 1663 3.2
eAstern AustrAliA
cooper (sA–Qld) 131 12.9 1129 2.1
gippsland (vic) 267 26.2 5602 10.6
otway (vic) 85 8.3 1429 2.7
Bass (vic) 18 1.8 306 0.6
surat–Bowen (Qld) 22 2.2 221 0.4
total conventional natural gas 885 86.9 40 308 76.5
CoAl	sEAm	GAs
surat–Bowen (Qld) 128 12.6 11 632 22.1
sydney (nsW) 5 0.5 743 1.4
total coal seam gas 133 13.1 12 375 23.5
domEsTiC	ToTAls 1018 100.0 52	683 100.0
liquifiEd	NATuRAl	GAs	(ExPoRTs)
carnarvon (WA) 669
Bonaparte (nt) 13
total liquified natural gas 682
ToTAl	PRoduCTioN 1700
Notes: 
1. Conventional natural gas reserves include liquefied natural gas and ethane.
2. Proved reserves are those for which geological and engineering analysis suggests a 90 per cent probability of commercial recovery. Probable reserves are those for which 
geological and engineering analysis suggests at least a 50 per cent probability of commercial recovery.
Source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
These estimates rise sharply to around 173 000 petajoules 
if contingent resources — known accumulations that 
are not yet commercially viable — are factored in.6 
The development of CSG has expanded rapidly in the 
current decade and ongoing exploration will likely 
add to Australia’s natural gas reserves. For example, 
proved and probable reserves of CSG increased 
by around 145 per cent in the period from January 2007 
to June 2008.7
Australia produced over 1700 petajoules of natural 
gas in the year to June 2008, of which around 
60 per cent was for the domestic market (see figure 8.1). 
CSG accounts for around 8 per cent of total production, 
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6 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, 
September 2007, p. 7.
7 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008, p. 27.
but its share is rising rapidly. Around 40 per cent 
of Australia’s gas production — all currently sourced from 
offshore basins in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory — is exported as liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
At current projected rates of production, Australia has 
sufficient proved, probable and contingent reserves 
to meet domestic and export demand for around 
66 years.8
8.2.1 geographical distribution
Fıgure 8.3 (overleaf ) shows the location of Australia’s 
major natural gas basins, including reserves and 
production levels. Fıgure 8.2 sets out the contribution 
of each basin to Australia’s natural gas production for 
the domestic market. The principal sources of natural gas 
production are Western Australia’s offshore Carnarvon 
Basin and Victoria’s offshore Gippsland Basin. The 
Cooper Basin (in South Australia and Queensland) 
has been the principal historical source of gas for 
New South Wales and South Australia, but its reserves 
are declining. Production in Queensland’s Surat – Bowen 
Basin and Victoria’s Otway Basin has risen sharply 
during the current decade.
Western Australia’s Carnarvon Basin holds about 
56 per cent of Australia’s natural gas reserves. It supplies 
around one-third of Australia’s domestic market and 
98 per cent of Australia’s LNG exports. The small Perth 
Basin supplies about 1 per cent of the domestic market.
The Bonaparte Basin along the north-west coast 
contains around 3 per cent of Australia’s gas reserves. 
The basin’s development has focused on LNG for 
export. The first LNG exports from the basin were 
shipped from Darwin in 2006. The Amadeus Basin, 
which currently supplies gas for use within the Northern 
Territory, is in decline and will soon be supplemented 
by gas from the Bonaparte Basin.
figure	8.1	
Australian	natural	gas	production,	2007	–	08	
IdiVaegdYjXi^dc2&,%%eZiV_djaZh
8H<. AC<*&8dckZci^dcVacVijgVa\Vh+(
CSG, coal seam gas; LNG, liquefied natural gas.
Source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
figure	8.2	
Natural	gas	production	for	domestic	use	by	location,	
2007	–	08
8ddeZg') <^eehaVcY(, DilVn.8VgcVgkdc))
HjgVi"7dlZc
8H<')
HjgVi"7dlZc
XdckZci^dcVa(
HnYcZn8H<' Di]Zg*
Notes: ‘Other’ consists of the Perth, Amadeus and Bass basins.
Source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
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8 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, 
September 2007, p. 7.
figure	8.3	
Australia’s	gas	reserves	and	production,	2008
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Note: Production data for year ended 30 June 2008. Reserves at June 2008.
Sources: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008; K Donaldson, Energy in Australia 2006, ABARE report, prepared for the Australian Government Department 
of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Canberra, 2007.
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Eastern Australia has around 40 per cent of Australia’s 
natural gas reserves, the majority of which are CSG. 
The principal sources are the Surat – Bowen Basin 
in Queensland (which meets around 15 per cent 
of national demand), the Gippsland Basin off coastal 
Victoria (26 per cent) and the Cooper Basin in central 
Australia (13 per cent). Production in Victoria’s offshore 
Otway (8 per cent) and Bass (2 per cent) basins has risen 
significantly since 2004.9
A number of changes are forecast in the geography 
of gas production in eastern and central Australia over 
the next 25 years (see figure 8.4). In particular, the 
Cooper Basin is a mature gas producing region with 
diminishing reserves. ABARE has predicted a rapid 
decline in production rates in the Cooper Basin after 
about 2011, to be replaced by increased supplies from 
the Victorian basins and CSG from Queensland.
Production of CSG has risen exponentially since 2004 
(see figure 8.5), with the bulk of activity occurring in the 
Surat – Bowen Basin, which extends from Queensland 
into northern New South Wales. While the basin is an 
established supplier of conventional natural gas, it also 
contains most of Australia’s proved and probable CSG 
reserves. There are also significant reserves of CSG 
in the Sydney Basin, where commercial production 
began in 1996.
The development of CSG stemmed initially from the 
Queensland Government’s energy and greenhouse gas 
reduction policies, but recent improvements in extraction 
technology have spurred sustained rapid growth. 
Rising domestic and international gas prices have also 
strengthened the commercial viability of the resource.
Queensland CSG has a variety of commercial 
advantages, including that it is found closer to the 
surface and under lower pressure than conventional 
natural gas. It also tends to have a relatively high 
concentration of methane, lower levels of impurities 
and is closer to some markets. These features also allow 
for a more incremental investment in production and 
transport than is required when bringing a conventional 
natural gas development on stream.
figure	8.4	
forecast	sources	of	eastern	Australia’s	natural	
gas	production
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CSG, coal seam gas.
Note: ‘Other’ consists of conventional natural gas from the Surat – Bowen and 
Bass basins.
Source: C Cuevas-Cubria and D Riwoe, Australian energy: National and state 
projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 06.26, prepared for the Australian 
Government Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Canberra, 2006.
figure	8.5	
Coal	seam	gas	production
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Note: 2008 data are for the year ended 30 June. Other data are for calendar years.
Source: EnergyQuest.
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9 Data sourced from EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
While CSG is produced only in Queensland and 
New South Wales, it is the fastest growing gas 
production sector: it supplied almost 20 per cent 
of gas produced in eastern Australia in the year to 
June 2008,10 and meets around 70 per cent of the 
Queensland market.11 ACIL Tasman forecasts that 
Queensland production may rise by around 60 per cent 
during 2008 to about 160 petajoules.12
ABARE published forecasts in 2007 that CSG 
production will supply around 32 per cent of the eastern 
Australian gas market by 2011 – 12. It also forecast that 
production will reach around 529 petajoules by 2029 – 30, 
making it the principal source of gas supply in eastern 
Australia (as shown in figure 8.4).13
8.2.2 regional markets
The geography of Australia’s gas basins and transmission 
networks gives rise to distinct regional markets. Market 
analysis often distinguishes between three regional 
markets — eastern Australia, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory.14
An interconnected transmission pipeline network 
enables gas producers in the Cooper, Gippsland, 
Otway, Bass and Sydney basins to sell gas to customers 
across South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, 
the ACT and Tasmania. The construction of a new 
transmission pipeline — the QSN Link — will interconnect 
Queensland with the south-eastern jurisdictions from 
2009. This will allow gas producers in the Surat – Bowen 
Basin to market gas throughout southern and eastern 
Australia.15 At present, there is no LNG export facility 
in eastern Australia.
Western Australia has no pipeline interconnection 
with other jurisdictions. It is the largest gas producer 
nationally, and supplies both the domestic market and 
most of Australia’s LNG exports. The state’s LNG 
export capacity creates exposure in the domestic market 
to international energy market conditions.
Similarly, the Northern Territory has no pipeline 
interconnection with other jurisdictions. It has a small 
domestic market and commenced LNG exports from 
the Bonaparte Basin in 2006.
8.3	 	domestic	and	international	demand	
for	Australian	gas
Australia consumed around 1020 petajoules of natural 
gas in the year to June 2008, including conventional 
natural gas and CSG.16 Natural gas has a range 
of industrial, commercial and domestic applications 
within Australia. It is an input to manufacturing 
pulp and paper, metals, chemicals, stone, clay, glass, 
and certain processed foods. In particular, natural 
gas is a major feedstock in ammonia production 
for use in fertilisers and explosives. Natural gas 
is increasingly used for electricity generation, mainly 
to fuel intermediate and peaking generators. It is also 
used in the mining industry, to treat waste materials, 
and for incineration, drying, dehumidification, heating 
and cooling. In the transport sector, natural gas 
in a compressed or liquefied form is used to power 
vehicles. The residential sector uses natural gas mainly 
for heating and cooking.
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10 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
11 Minister for Mines and Energy (Qld) (Hon. Geoff Wilson), Coal seam methane for a cleaner energy future, Press Release, 13 September 2007.
12 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 3.
13 A Syed, R Wilson, S Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke, Australian energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, prepared for 
the Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra, 2007.
14 See, for example, Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas 
Supply, September 2007, pp. 7 – 8; ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 2.
15 For further information on the gas transmission network, see chapter 9 of this report.
16 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
Fıgure 8.6 sets out ABARE forecast data on primary 
consumption of natural gas by state and territory 
in 2007 – 08 and 2029 – 30. Western Australia and 
Victoria have the highest consumption levels, while 
demand growth is forecast to be strongest over the next 
20 years in Queensland, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory.
The consumption profile varies between the jurisdictions 
(see figure 8.7). Natural gas is widely used in most 
jurisdictions for industrial manufacturing. Western 
Australia, South Australia, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory are especially reliant on natural gas 
for electricity generation. In Western Australia, the 
mining sector is also a major user of gas, mainly for 
power generation. Household demand is relatively small, 
except in Victoria where residential demand accounts for 
around one-third of total consumption. This reflects the 
widespread use of natural gas for cooking and heating in 
that state.
8.3.1 liquefied natural gas exports
LNG is produced by converting natural gas into liquid. 
The development of an LNG export facility requires 
large up-front capital investment in processing plant and 
port and shipping facilities. The magnitude of investment 
means that a commercially viable LNG project requires 
access to substantial reserves of natural gas. The reserves 
may be sourced from the LNG owner’s interests in a gas 
field, a joint venture arrangement with a natural gas 
producer or through long-term gas supply contracts.17
Australia has LNG export projects in the North West 
Shelf (annual capacity of 11.9 million tonnes but 
scheduled to rise to over 16 million tonnes in 2008) 
and Darwin (annual capacity of 3.5 million tonnes). 
ABARE forecasts that expansion of existing projects 
and greenfield LNG projects will increase export 
capacity to around 24 million tonnes by 2011 – 12 and 
76 million tonnes by 2029 – 30. This would support 
an annual growth in LNG exports of 7.8 per cent over 
the period to 2029 – 30.18
Australia is the world’s fifth largest LNG exporter after 
Qatar, Indonesia, Malaysia and Algeria (see figure 8.8). 
In the year to June 2008, Australia exported around 682 
petajoules of LNG, mostly from the Carnarvon Basin.19 
LNG shipments from Darwin began in February 2006. 
LNG accounts for around 40 per cent of Australia’s 
natural gas production. ABARE projects that this ratio 
will rise to around 68 per cent by 2029 – 30.20
Rising international LNG prices together with rapidly 
expanding reserves of CSG in Queensland have recently 
improved the economics of developing LNG export 
facilities in eastern Australia. Several LNG proposals 
reliant on CSG have been announced for construction 
in Queensland since early 2007. The proposals range 
in size from 0.5 to 4 million tonnes of LNG per year. 
ACIL Tasman assessed in 2008 that the economics 
of the projects appear to be sound.21 EnergyQuest 
figure	8.6	
Primary	gas	consumption	(forecasts)
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Source: A Syed, R Wilson, S Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke, Australian 
energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, 
prepared for the Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and 
Tourism, Canberra, 2007.
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17 NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, A report to the AEMC, March 2008, p. 16.
18 A Syed, R Wilson, A Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke, Australian energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, prepared for 
the Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra, 2007, p. 43.
19 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
20 A Syed, R Wilson, A Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke. Australian energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, prepared for 
the Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra, 2007, p. 44.
21 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 26.
argued in August 2008 that the increasing involvement 
of major international players in east coast LNG projects 
makes it ‘no longer a question of whether east coast 
LNG will proceed but rather when and how much’.22
8.3.2 Adequacy of supply
ACIL Tasman estimates that underlying gas demand 
in Australia could grow on average by around 
2.4 per cent annually over the next 20 years. It also 
estimates that LNG exports from Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory could reasonably increase 
by around 90 per cent over this period.23 ABARE 
projects that domestic demand will rise most strongly 
in Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory (figure 8.6). Key contributors to the growth 
include greater use of gas in electricity generation, 
mining and energy-intensive refining.
There has been some debate as to the adequacy 
of domestic sources to satisfy Australia’s natural gas 
demand over time. Recent assessments have highlighted 
contrasting conditions between Western Australia, the 
Northern Territory and eastern Australia.
The Western Australian gas market has experienced 
considerable tightening since 2006, with rising 
figure	8.7	
Primary	natural	gas	consumption	by	industry
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Note: Data for year ended 30 June 2005.
Source: ABARE.
figure	8.8	
World	liquefied	natural	gas	exports	by	country,	2006
6a\Zg^V'( >cYdcZh^V'* BVaVnh^V')6jhigVa^V/
FViVg'+ Di]Zgh(/C^\Zg^V.
Source: IEA statistics, Natural gas information 2007, table 19.
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22 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008, p. 19.
23 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 28.
production costs and strong domestic demand occurring 
at a time when most producers have fully contracted 
their developed reserves. In addition, Western Australia’s 
LNG export capacity makes the domestic market 
relatively sensitive to international energy prices, which 
have increased significantly since 2005.
In combination, these factors have led to a substantial 
rise in domestic prices in Western Australia, with 
some contracts in 2007 being negotiated at around 
$7 per gigajoule compared to typical prices of around 
$2.50 earlier in the decade.24 In June 2008, an explosion 
at the Varanus Island gas facility reduced domestic gas 
supplies by 30 per cent for over two months and put 
further pressure on short-term prices (see section 8.6). 
There have been projections that Western Australia will 
face difficulties achieving a supply – demand balance until 
at least 2010.25
There have been some suggestions that the opening 
of an LNG export facility in the Northern Territory 
in 2006 could affect the availability of gas supplies 
there. While supply contracts in the Territory appear 
to cover the needs of existing customers for up to 
15 years, competition to supply LNG exports could pose 
risks to the market in sourcing additional gas supplies 
to support major new industrial projects.26
In eastern Australia, an interaction of several factors 
will affect the supply – demand balance over the 
next few years. Since the 1990s, improved pipeline 
interconnection between the eastern gas basins has 
enhanced the flexibility of the market to respond 
to customer demand. The construction in 2008 of the 
QSN Link pipeline from Queensland to southern 
Australia will result in an interconnected pipeline 
network linking Queensland, New South Wales, 
the ACT, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania 
(see chapter 9). In addition, the rapid escalation of CSG 
reserves in Queensland has at least delayed the need 
to invest in new pipelines to ship gas from sources such 
as Papua New Guinea.
While new pipeline investment and rising CSG reserves 
are strengthening the supply base, a number of factors 
may also put upward pressure on demand. While eastern 
Australia is currently insulated from global gas markets, 
this may change if any of several proposed LNG 
export projects comes to fruition.27 The introduction 
of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will also 
likely increase reliance on natural gas as a fuel for 
electricity generation.
Fıgure 8.9 illustrates ACIL Tasman forecasts of the 
demand for natural gas over the next 20 years, taking 
into account the projected effects of the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme. ACIL Tasman forecasts 
that demand growth will be principally driven by rising 
LNG production — in western, northern and eastern 
Australia — and the increasing use of gas for electricity 
generation. According to this view, total gas demand 
would more than double to around 4300 petajoules 
(including exports) over the next 20 years.28
The net impact of rising demand for natural gas (from 
electricity generation and LNG exports) coupled with 
rising reserves (particularly from CSG) is difficult 
to predict. In a report published in July 2007, McLennan 
Magasanik Associates found that the eastern market 
supply outlook was relatively benign in the medium 
to long term, and that buyers and sellers appear willing 
to contract ahead to avoid supply shocks.29
ABARE reached similar findings in a December 2007 
report, which projected that the positive outlook for 
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24 Department of Industry and Resources (WA), Western Australian Oil and Gas Review, 2008; ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of 
competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008.
25 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, 
September 2007, p. 10.
26 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, 
September 2007, p. 11.
27 See ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008 for a more detailed discussion of these factors.
28 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008.
29 R Lewis, M Goldman and R Farmer, Report to the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply: Natural gas in Australia, McLennan Magasanik Associates, July 2007.
natural gas production from CSG would result in the 
eastern gas market remaining in balance over the period 
to 2029 – 30. The assessment did not account for the 
effects of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
or LNG exports from eastern Australia.30
A recent ACIL Tasman assessment found that a 
4 million tonne per year LNG plant (as proposed 
by Santos in 2007) would potentially divert very 
significant quantities of gas to exports. ACIL Tasman 
argues that while this may not leave the domestic market 
short of supply, it would likely require earlier reliance 
on higher-cost and less productive sources of CSG than 
in the absence of the LNG projects. This would have 
implications for domestic gas prices.31
A joint working group established by the Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE) reported in September 2007 
on how best to balance the dual objectives of building 
Australia’s LNG export capabilities while ensuring 
the long-term supply of competitively priced gas for 
domestic users.32 The report recommended that attention 
be centred on:
> improving acreage management processes
> improving gas market efficiency, including through the 
development of a bulletin board covering major gas 
production fields, demand centres and transmission 
pipelines, and the development of a short-term 
trading market for natural gas (these reforms are being 
progressed in 2008: see section 8.7 and appendix A)
> developing an annual national gas statement 
of opportunities, similar to the statement currently 
prepared for the electricity sector (this reform 
is also being progressed in 2008: see section 8.7 and 
appendix A).
8.4	 industry	structure
The prevalence of high sunk costs and the relatively 
small number of Australian gas fields means that the 
supply of natural gas is concentrated in the hands 
of a small number of producers.33 It is common for oil 
and gas companies to establish joint ventures to help 
manage risk. Typically, the operator holds a substantial 
interest in the project. For example, the Cooper Basin 
partnership comprises Santos (the operator and majority 
owner), Beach Petroleum and Origin Energy.
There are some differences between the structure 
of the exploration and development sector 
and the gas production sector, although many 
participants — especially the large corporations — are 
active in both.
There are three main types of entities involved in gas 
and oil exploration. These are:
figure	8.9	
Australian	gas	demand	outlook
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Source: ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence 
of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008.
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30 A Syed, R Wilson, A Sandu, C Cuevas-Cubria and A Clarke, Australian energy: National and state projections to 2029 – 30, ABARE research report 07.24, prepared for 
the Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra, 2007, pp. 1, 42, 43.
31 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 26.
32 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, September 
2007. The lead essay of this report considers the Joint Working Group report in more detail.
33 NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, A report to the AEMC, March 2008, p. 14.
> international majors — multinational corporations with 
large production interests and substantial exploration 
budgets (eg BP, BHP Billiton, Esso, Chevron and 
Apache Energy)
> Australian majors — major Australian energy 
companies with significant production interests and 
exploration budgets (eg Woodside Petroleum, Santos 
and Origin Energy)
> juniors — smaller exploration and production 
companies, that may or may not engage in gas 
production (eg Australian Worldwide Exploration, 
Arrow Energy and Queensland Gas Company).
International majors tend to be involved in the larger 
offshore oil and LNG projects. Australian majors and 
smaller companies mainly focus on onshore discoveries, 
typically for natural gas sales to the domestic market. 
Junior explorers often play a significant role in higher-
risk greenfields exploration, such as the early phase 
of CSG developments.
Gas production in Australia is relatively concentrated. 
While over 100 companies are involved in gas and oil 
exploration, only around 30 produce gas. Six majors 
supplied around 77 per cent of the domestic market 
in 2007 – 08. Santos supplied around 21 per cent, 
followed by BHP Billiton (19 per cent), Esso 
(13 per cent), Woodside (10 per cent), Origin Energy 
(7 per cent) and Apache Energy (7 per cent). The next 
tier of players in terms of market share include BP, 
Chevron, Beach Petroleum, Shell and Queensland Gas 
Company (see figure 8.10).
The rise of CSG has seen the entry of several new 
players in both the exploration and production sectors 
over the past decade. New entrants include Queensland 
figure	8.10	
Natural	gas	producers	supplying	the	domestic	market,	2007	–	08
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B>B>/F@ BV\ZaaVc.F@ Di]Zg)-F@6<A:cZg\n''F@
PJ, petajoules.
Note: Some corporate names have been shortened or abbreviated.
Source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
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Gas Company, Sydney Gas, Sunshine Gas and coal 
producers Anglo Coal and Xstrata. Smaller producers 
and new entrants to the production sector — including 
Queensland Gas Company, Sydney Gas, AGL Energy 
and Arrow Energy — accounted for around 50 per cent 
of CSG production in 2007 – 08 (see figure 8.11), 
which is considerably higher than their market share 
in conventional gas production.
8.4.1 vertical integration
The increasing use of natural gas as a fuel for electricity 
generation creates synergies for energy retailers 
to manage price and supply risk through equity in gas 
production and gas-fired electricity generation. The 
energy retailers Origin Energy and AGL Energy 
each have substantial interests in gas production and 
electricity generation:
> Origin Energy has held a minority interest in gas 
production in the Cooper Basin for some time, but 
since 2000 has expanded its equity in CSG production 
in Queensland and in conventional gas production 
in Victoria’s Otway and Bass basins.34 Origin Energy 
is currently developing new gas-fired electricity 
generation capacity in Queensland, Victoria, South 
Australia and New South Wales. Origin Energy 
is a leading energy retailer in Queensland, Victoria and 
South Australia.
> AGL Energy, a relative newcomer to gas production, 
began acquiring CSG interests in Queensland and 
New South Wales in 2005. It has continued to expand 
its portfolio through mergers and acquisitions (see 
section 8.4.3). AGL Energy is a major electricity 
generator in eastern Australia (especially in Victoria 
and South Australia) and is a leading energy retailer 
in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia 
and Queensland.
8.4.2 Market concentration by basin
Market concentration within particular gas basins 
depends on a variety of factors, including the number 
of fields developed, the ownership structure of the 
fields, and acreage management and permit allocation. 
Table 8.2 and figure 8.12 set out EnergyQuest 
estimates of market shares in the major basins, based 
on production for the domestic market. Table 8.3 sets 
out market share data based on proved and probable 
gas reserves (including reserves available for export).
Several major companies have equity in Western 
Australia’s Carnarvon Basin — Australia’s largest 
producing basin. Woodside is the largest producer 
for the domestic market (around 30 per cent), but 
Apache Energy (19 per cent), Chevron (11 per cent), 
BP (11 per cent), Santos (9 per cent), BHP Billiton 
(7 per cent) and Shell (6 per cent) each have significant 
market share. Ownership of gas reserves is split 
between these and other entities such as MIMI (owned 
by Mitsubishi and Mitsui) and CNOOC (China 
National Offshore Oil Company). The businesses 
figure	8.11	
Coal	seam	gas	producers	in	Australia,	2007	–	08
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PJ, petajoules.
Note: Some corporate names have been shortened or abbreviated.
Source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
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Table	8.2	 market	shares	in	domestic	gas	production	by	basin,	2007
ComPANy CARNARvoN	
(WA)
PERTH	
(WA)
AmAdEus	
(NT)
CooPER	
(sA/qld)
suRAT–
boWEN	
(qld)
sydNEy	
(NsW)
GiPPslANd	
(viC)
oTWAy	
(viC)
bAss	
(viC)
All	
bAsiNs
Agl 6.5% 29.3% 1.1%
Anglo coal 3.0% 0.4%
Apache 19.3% 6.3%
Arc 57.1% 6.8% 0.7%
Arrow 10.3% 1.3%
AWe 14.2% 30.2% 1.7%
Beach 20.8% 1.1% 3.0%
Benaris 0.1% 0.0%
BhP Billiton 6.7% 41.5% 49.1% 37.9% 19.0%
BP 11.2% 3.7%
calenergy 15.0% 0.3%
chevron 11.2% 3.7%
cs energy 0.9% 0.1%
esso 0.2% 49.1% 13.5%
inpex 0.1% 0.8% 0.1%
Kufpec 2.3% 0.7%
Magellan 37.9% 0.8%
MiMi 1.7% 0.6%
Mitsui 2.9% 14.0% 4.8% 1.5%
Molopo 0.3% 0.0%
Mosaic 1.5% 0.2%
origin 42.9% 15.1% 31.3% 1.3% 42.4% 7.3%
Qld gas 14.3% 1.8%
santos 9.2% 62.1% 64.1% 27.1% 1.7% 32.3% 19.5%
shell 6.4% 2.1%
sydney gas 29.3% 0.2%
tap 1.4% 0.5%
Woodside 30.2% 0.2% 9.9%
other 0.7% 0.1%
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ToTAl	(PJ) 331 9 21 137 129 9 277 79 19 1011
Notes: 
1. Excludes liquefied natural gas.
2. Some corporate names have been shortened or abbreviated.
Source: EnergyQuest 2008 (unpublished).
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figure	8.12	
market	shares	in	domestic	gas	production	by	basin,	2007
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participate in a number of joint ventures, typically with 
overlapping ownership interests.
Gas for the Northern Territory is currently sourced 
from the Amadeus Basin and produced by Santos and 
Magellan. The principal reserves are located in the 
Bonaparte Basin in the Timor Sea. The Italian energy 
firm ENI owns the majority of reserves in the basin.
While around 22 entities have equity in natural gas fields 
in eastern Australia, control of the more substantial fields 
in the Gippsland and Cooper basins is concentrated 
among the established producers Santos, Origin Energy, 
BHP Billiton and Esso. In 2007, these four entities 
accounted for around 82 per cent of production and 
owned around 69 per cent of proved and probable 
reserves in eastern Australia.35
A joint venture led by Santos (64 per cent) dominates 
production in South Australia’s Cooper Basin. The 
other participants are Beach Petroleum (21 per cent) 
and Origin Energy (15 per cent). The same companies 
participate with slightly different shares on the 
Queensland side of the basin. There has been some 
new entry by smaller explorers in the Cooper Basin 
in recent years.
A joint venture between Esso and BHP Billiton 
accounts for around 98 per cent of production 
in Victoria’s offshore Gippsland Basin — the largest 
producing basin in eastern Australia. There has been 
some new entry in the basin, for example, the Manta 
and Gummy gas project is being developed by Beach 
Petroleum, Anzon and Itochu.
The Otway Basin off south-western Victoria has a more 
diverse ownership base, with BHP Billiton (38 per cent), 
Santos (32 per cent), Australian Worldwide Exploration 
(14 per cent) and Mitsui (14 per cent) accounting for 
the bulk of production. Origin Energy is currently 
a relatively small producer but holds significant reserves. 
The principal producers in the smaller Bass Basin are 
Origin Energy and Australian Worldwide Exploration.
The growth of the CSG industry has led to considerable 
new entry in Queensland’s Surat – Bowen Basin over 
the past decade and a diverse ownership profile. 
A number of smaller businesses such as Queensland 
Gas Company and Arrow Energy have developed 
considerable market share alongside more established 
entities such as Origin Energy and Santos. Overall, 
the largest producers in the basin are Origin Energy 
(31 per cent), Santos (27 per cent), Queensland Gas 
Company (14 per cent), Arrow Energy (10 per cent) and 
AGL Energy (7 per cent). These businesses also own the 
bulk of reserves. There has been significant ownership 
consolidation in the basin since 2005.
8.4.3 Mergers and acquisitions
There has been significant merger and acquisition 
activity in the gas production sector in recent years, 
with interest since 2006 focused mainly on CSG (and 
associated LNG proposals) in Queensland. Table 8.4 
lists a number of proposed and successful acquisitions 
from June 2006 to September 2008.
Queensland Gas Company, the third largest 
producer in the Surat – Bowen Basin, has been a focus 
of acquisition interest. Following an unsuccessful 
takeover attempt by Santos in 2006, the company 
formed a strategic partnership with AGL Energy 
in 2007, which allowed AGL Energy to acquire 
a 27.5 per cent stake in the business. Queensland 
Gas Company sold a further 20 per cent stake in its 
assets to BG Group (formerly British Gas) in 2008. 
The agreement was based around the development 
of CSG resources for LNG exports.
BG Group sought to further expand its market profile 
in 2008 by attempting to acquire Origin Energy. 
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35 NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, A report to the AEMC, March 2008, p. 22.
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Origin Energy rejected the offer in June 2008, and 
in September 2008 announced a LNG joint venture 
with Conoco – Phillips. BG Group subsequently 
announced that it would not pursue the acquisition 
of Origin Energy.
Further acquisitions in 2008 based around the 
development of CSG and LNG export facilities 
in Queensland included the following:
> In May 2008, Santos agreed to sell a 40 per cent 
stake in its proposed LNG project at Gladstone 
to Malaysian energy business Petronas.
> In June 2008, Arrow Energy agreed to sell 30 per cent 
of its CSG resources in Queensland to Shell.
> In August 2008, Queensland Gas Company reached 
an initial agreement to acquire Sunshine Gas.
> In August 2008, ARC Energy merged with Australian 
Worldwide Exploration.
8.5	 Gas	wholesale	markets
Wholesale gas markets involve the sale of gas 
by producers, mainly to energy retailers that on-sell 
it to business and residential customers. In addition, 
some major industrial, mining and power generation 
customers buy gas directly from producers in the 
wholesale market.
8.5.1 Wholesale market contracts
In Australia, wholesale gas is mostly sold under 
confidential, long-term take or pay contracts. There 
has been a trend in recent years towards shorter-term 
supply, but most contracts still run for at least five years. 
Foundation contracts underpinning new production 
projects are still often struck for terms of up to 20 years. 
It is commonly argued that such long-term contracts 
are essential to the financing of new projects because 
they provide reasonable security of gas supply as well 
as a degree of cost and revenue stability. CA
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For example, a 540 petajoule gas supply agreement 
between AGL Energy and Queensland Gas Company 
in 2006 was for supply over a period of 20 years.36
In Western Australia, strong domestic demand and 
rising LNG export prices have led to tight market 
conditions since 2006. The Economic Regulation 
Authority of Western Australia reported in 2007 
that gas producers were only offering contracts with 
a maximum term of five years with volumes restricted 
to about 10 terajoules a day.37
Wholesale gas contracts typically include take or pay 
clauses that require the purchaser to pay for a minimum 
quantity of gas each year regardless of the actual quantity 
used. Prices may be reviewed periodically during 
the life of the contract. Between reviews, prices are 
typically indexed (often to the consumer price index). 
Contract prices therefore do not tend to fluctuate on 
a daily or seasonal basis. However, the many variations 
in provisions such as term, volume, volume flexibility and 
penalties associated with failure to supply mean that there 
can be significant price differences between contracts.38
While contracts form the basis of most gas sales 
arrangements, Victoria also operates a spot market 
to facilitate gas sales to manage system imbalances and 
pipeline network constraints (see box 8.1).
8.5.2 joint marketing
Joint venture parties in gas production have to date 
mainly sold their gas through joint marketing 
arrangements under authorisation from the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission. More 
recently, there have been some instances of joint venture 
parties in new gas fields undertaking separate marketing. 
For example, Santos has separately marketed gas from 
its interest in the Casino field (Otway Basin), as has 
Woodside with its interest in the Geographe/Thylacine 
field (also in the Otway Basin).39
Table	8.4	 upstream	gas	merger	and	acquisition	activity,	June	2006	–	september	2008
dATE PRoPosEd	mERGER/ACquisiTioN GAs	bAsiNs sTATus	AT	sEPTEmbER	2008
jun-06 Arrow energy acquisition of ch4 surat–Bowen (Qld) completed
sep-06 Beach Petroleum acquisition of delhi Petroleum cooper (Qld/sA) completed
oct-06 santos acquisition of Queensland gas company surat–Bowen (Qld) Proposal withdrawn
jan-07 Agl energy and origin energy merger various Proposal withdrawn
jan-07 Agl energy acquisition of a 27.5 per cent stake in Queensland 
gas company
surat–Bowen (Qld) completed
nov-07 Agl energy–Arrow energy joint venture acquisition of 
enertrade’s Moranbah gas assets
surat–Bowen (Qld) completed december 2007
Apr-08 Bg group acquisition of about 20 per cent of Queensland 
gas company
surat–Bowen (Qld) completed April 2008
May-08 Bg group acquisition of origin energy various Proposal withdrawn september 2008
May-08 Petronas acquisition of 40 per cent of santos’ lng project 
at gladstone (joint venture)
surat–Bowen (Qld) FirB approval july 2008
jun-08 shell acquisition of 30 per cent of Arrow energy’s csg 
resources
surat–Bowen (Qld) Preliminary agreement june 2008
Aug-08 Queensland gas company acquisition of sunshine gas surat–Bowen (Qld) Preliminary agreement 
september 2008
Aug-08 Arc energy and Australian Worldwide exploration merger Perth (WA) and Bass (vic) completed september 2008
FIRB, Foreign Investment Review Board.
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36 AGL Energy, AGL secures cornerstone investment in QGC, press release, 5 December 2006.
37 ERA, Gas issues in Western Australia, Discussion paper, Perth, 2007.
38 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008.
39 NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, report to the AEMC, March 2008, p. 26.
8.5.3 scheduling and balancing
Wholesale market arrangements must take account 
of the physical properties of natural gas and 
transmission pipelines:
> Unlike electricity, gas takes time to move from point 
to point. In Victoria, gas is typically produced and 
delivered within 6 – 8 hours because most demand 
centres are within 300 kilometres of gas fields. But 
gas delivered from the Cooper Basin into Sydney, 
or from the Carnarvon Basin into Perth, can take 
2 – 3 days because the gas must be transported over 
much longer distances.
> Natural gas is automatically stored in pipelines (known 
as linepack). It can also be stored in depleted reservoirs 
or in liquefied form, which is economic only to meet 
peak demand or for use in emergencies.
> Natural gas pipelines are subject to pressure 
constraints for safety reasons. The quantity of gas that 
can be transported in a given period depends on the 
diameter and length of the pipeline, the maximum 
allowable operating pressure and the difference 
in pressure between the two ends.
These features make it essential that daily gas flows are 
managed. In particular, deliveries must be scheduled 
to ensure that gas produced and injected into a pipeline 
system remains in approximate balance with gas 
withdrawn for delivery to customers. To achieve this, 
gas retailers and major users must estimate requirements 
ahead of time and nominate these to producers and 
pipeline operators, subject to any pre-agreed constraints 
on flow rates and pipeline capacity.
Each day, producers inject the nominated quantities 
of gas into the transmission pipeline for delivery 
to customers. There are typically short-term variations 
between a retailer’s nominated injections and their 
actual withdrawals from the system, creating imbalances. 
A variety of systems operate in Australia for dealing 
with physical imbalances, as well as financial settlements 
to address imbalances between the injections and 
withdrawals of particular shippers.
In most jurisdictions, physical balancing is managed 
by pipeline operators, while financial settlements for 
system imbalances are managed by independent system 
operators: VENCorp (Victoria and Queensland), 
REMCo (South Australia and Western Australia) and 
the Gas Market Company (New South Wales and 
the ACT). In Victoria, VENCorp operates a gas spot 
market to manage system imbalances and constraints 
(see box 8.1). Similar market arrangements are currently 
being developed for a number of major gas hubs 
in eastern Australia (see section 8.7).
8.5.4 secondary trading
There is some secondary trading in gas, in which 
contracted bulk supplies are traded to alter delivery 
points and other supply arrangements. Types 
of secondary trades include backhaul and gas swaps.
Backhaul can be used for the notional transport 
of gas in the opposite direction to the physical flow 
in a pipeline. It is achieved by redelivering gas at a point 
upstream from the contracted point of receipt. Backhaul 
arrangements are most commonly used by gas-fired 
electricity generators and industrial users that can cope 
with intermittent supplies.
A gas swap is an exchange of gas at one location for 
an equivalent amount of gas delivered to another 
location. Shippers may use swaps to deal with regional 
mismatches in supply and demand. Swaps can also help 
deal with physical limitations imposed by the direction 
or capacity of gas pipelines and may delay the need 
to invest in new pipeline capacity.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that swaps are reasonably 
common in Australia, but are mostly conducted on 
a minor scale.40 Origin Energy and the South West 
Queensland Gas Producers (SWQP) entered into a major 
swap arrangement in 2004 to enable Origin Energy 
to meet supply obligations in south-eastern Australia 
using gas produced by the SWQP. In return, Origin 
Energy delivered gas from its central Queensland field 
to meet supply obligations of the SWQP in that state.41
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40 Fırecone Ventures, Gas swaps, Report prepared for the National Competition Council, 2006.
41 Details of the swap arrangement are provided in AER, State of the Energy Market 2007, box 8.4, p. 248.
box	8.1	 The	victorian	gas	wholesale	market
victoria established a spot market for gas in 1999 
to manage gas flows on the victorian transmission 
system (vts). the market allows participants 
to trade gas supply imbalances (the difference 
between contracted gas supply quantities and actual 
requirements) on a daily basis. vencorp operates both 
the wholesale market and the vts.
Participants bid into the spot market on a daily basis via 
a bulletin board. Bids may range from $0 per gigajoule 
(the floor price) to $800 per gigajoule (the price cap).
Market participants (mostly retailers) inform vencorp 
of their nominations for gas one and two days ahead 
of requirements. At the beginning of each day, schedules 
are drawn up that set out the hourly gas injections 
into and withdrawals from the system. the schedules 
rely on information from market participants and 
vencorp, including demand forecasts, bids, conditions 
or constraints affecting bids, hedge nominations and 
vencorp’s modelling of system constraints.
At the beginning of each day, vencorp stacks supply 
offers and selects the least cost bids to match demand 
across the market. this establishes a spot market 
clearing price. As the victorian market is a net market, 
this price applies only to net injections or withdrawals 
(the difference between contracted and actual amounts).
overall, gas traded at the spot price accounts for 
around 10 – 20 per cent of wholesale volumes in victoria, 
with the balance sourced via bilateral contracts 
or vertical ownership arrangements between producers 
and retailers.
in effect, the spot market provides a clearing house 
in which prices reflect short-term supply – demand 
conditions, while underlying long-term contracts 
insulate parties from price volatility. nevertheless, 
a comparison of the likely spot market price with 
underlying contract prices allows a retailer to choose 
to take a position to modify its own injections of gas and 
then trade gas at the spot price.
until 2007, a single price applied in each 24-hour period 
without reference to system constraints or unforeseen 
events. reforms to the gas market in February 2007 
introduced rescheduling and rebidding at five defined 
time intervals over the day. the reforms aim to enhance 
flexibility, create incentives to respond to the spot price 
and provide clearer and more certain pricing signals. 
they also bring the gas market into closer alignment 
with the national electricity Market.
sometimes vencorp needs to schedule additional 
injections of gas (typically lng) that have been 
offered at above market price to alleviate short-term 
constraints. Market participants that inject the higher-
priced gas receive ancillary payments. these are 
recovered from uplift charges paid, as far as practicable, 
by the market participants whose actions resulted 
in a need for injections. A user’s authorised maximum 
interval quantity (AMiQ) is a key allocation factor 
in determining who must contribute uplift payments 
to pay for this gas.
in particular, market participants that exceed their 
AMiQ on a day when congestion occurs may face uplift 
charges, which provides price signals to gas users 
to adjust their usage patterns.
Market participants with AMiQ credits also have higher 
priority access to the pipeline system if congestion 
requires the curtailment of some users to maintain 
system pressure. this has not been necessary 
in recent years as sufficient gas (including lng) has 
been available to support all users on the system. 
nevertheless, in the event of severe congestion, 
those users without AMiQ must reduce their usage 
ahead of authorised users. A party can acquire AMiQ 
certificates by injecting gas into the victorian system 
at longford or by entering a contract with the vts 
owner, gasnet.
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until winter 2007, there had been sufficient available 
gas and capacity on the vts to meet customer 
requirements. congestion occurred on only a few 
days a year, usually in winter. however, during winter 
2007 there was a greater incidence of vencorp 
having to inject higher-priced lng to manage 
constraints and maintain minimum pressures. A key 
factor was that drought constrained the availability 
of coal-fired and hydroelectric generation, resulting 
in greater reliance on gas-fired generation and 
increased demand for natural gas.
however, with the easing of drought effects and the 
commissioning of new pipeline capacity in 2008, the 
need for high-cost injections of lng was less evident 
in winter 2008.
While prices on the spot market are relatively 
stable, there are occasional troughs and spikes. 
For example, while in 2007 the average daily spot 
price was about $3.50 per gigajoule, it fell to close 
to zero on 1 May 2007, but achieved a record high 
on 17 july 2007 of $336 per gigajoule in the day’s 
final trading interval. to date, vencorp has found 
that price spikes in the market have been mostly 
due to operational and market issues, often 
related to severe or unpredictable weather. Further 
information on victorian gas prices is set out in 
section 8.6 and figure 8.14.
in 2007, vencorp engaged crA international 
to undertake a strategic review of the ‘top end’ 
arrangements in the market, with particular 
emphasis on risk issues. the review was ongoing 
at August 2008.
Further information: http://www.vencorp.com.au
8.5.5 trading hubs
A gas hub is an interconnection point between gas 
pipelines in which trading in gas and pipeline capacity 
may occur. In Australia, gas hubs include Moomba 
(South Australia), Wallumbilla (Queensland) and 
Longford (Victoria).
VicHub at Longford was established in 2003 and 
connects the Eastern Gas Pipeline, Tasmania Gas 
Pipeline and Victorian Transmission System. This 
connection allows for the trading of gas between 
New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. VicHub 
allows for the posting of public buy and sell offers, 
but is not a formal trading centre that provides 
brokering services.
The establishment of a gas market bulletin board 
in July 2008 and the development of a short-term 
trading market at defined gas hubs (scheduled 
to commence by winter 2010) are likely to enhance 
market transparency and opportunities for gas trading 
at the major hubs.
8.6	 Gas	prices
Australian gas prices have historically been low 
by international standards. They have also been 
relatively stable, defined by provisions in long-term 
supply contracts. In the United States and Europe, gas 
prices closely follow oil prices. Conversely, natural gas 
in Australia has generally been seen as a substitute for 
coal and coal-based electricity. Australia’s abundant, low-
cost coal sources have effectively capped gas prices.
Because gas contracts are not transparent outside 
Victoria, comprehensive price information is not readily 
available. A number of price estimates for Cooper Basin 
gas in 2004 – 05 were published during a public process 
on the regulation of the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline. 
The estimates ranged from around $2.90 to $3.15 per 
gigajoule. Core Collaborative’s Australian Gas Sector 
Outlook estimated that in 2005, gas prices in the Cooper 
and Gippsland basins were around $3.15 per gigajoule.42 
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42 Estimates published in NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, A 
report to the AEMC, March 2008, pp. 35 – 36. 
ACIL Tasman published forecasts that in 2007 – 08, 
electricity generators in southeastern Australia would 
pay around $2.95 to $3.20 per gigajoule for natural gas.43
Since 2005, a number of interacting factors have put 
upward pressure on gas prices, including the following:
> A substantial rise in resource costs affecting 
exploration, development and production activities.
> High oil prices have flowed on to international gas 
prices, including for Australian LNG exports. This has 
put upward pressure on domestic gas prices in Western 
Australia, which has substantial LNG export capacity. 
In eastern Australia, a range of proposed LNG 
developments are also influencing price expectations.
> Drought led to greater demand for gas-fired 
generation in eastern Australia in 2007, with flow-on 
effects for gas prices.
> Market participants may be factoring in the effects 
of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme into 
demand projections and pricing on long-term 
gas contracts.44
Fıgure 8.13 sets out indicative price data from 2005 
to 2008 for domestic gas and LNG exports. The data 
relating to particular producers is based on average prices 
and in some cases may understate prices struck under 
new contracts.
8.6.1 Western Australia
Western Australia experienced low domestic gas prices 
for several years as a result of competition between 
the North West Shelf Venture and smaller producers 
dedicated to the domestic market. More recently, 
significant imbalances have arisen, with high demand for 
gas contracts — driven in part by the mining boom — at 
a time when most producers have fully contracted 
their developed reserves. This has been accompanied 
by substantial increases in gas field development costs.
At the same time, Western Australia’s LNG export 
capacity creates exposure in the domestic market 
to international energy prices. Average LNG prices 
received by Australian producers rose by 48 per cent 
between the June quarters of 2007 and 2008.45
In combination, these factors have led to substantial 
price escalations in Western Australia’s domestic gas 
market. The Western Australian Department of Industry 
and Resources reported that Santos secured domestic gas 
prices in July 2007 of more than $7 per gigajoule in two 
separate contracts with mining entities,46 which is almost 
three times higher than the wholesale prices of around 
$2.50 per gigajoule that prevailed until 2006. Short-term 
wholesale prices averaged almost $17 per gigajoule 
in July 2008 following the Varanus Island incident, 
which cut domestic supply by around 30 per cent.47
8.6.2 eastern Australia
There is also some evidence of rising prices on the east 
coast. While for several years CSG prices in Queensland 
were typically lower than for conventional natural 
gas, the development of LNG proposals has raised 
price expectations.
Core Collaborative’s Australian Gas Sector Outlook 
estimated that Queensland prices in 2006 were 
around $2.50 to $2.90 per gigajoule.48 ACIL Tasman 
has reported that Queensland customers are now 
facing significantly higher prices, in excess of $4 per 
gigajoule.49 EnergyQuest has reported that one CSG 
provider earned an average price for Queensland gas 
in the first quarter of 2008 of $7.79 per gigajoule 
($5.77 in the second quarter), compared with $2.22 per 
gigajoule in the first quarter of 2006.50 While these were 
significantly higher than the average prices received 
by other Queensland producers, they are nonetheless 
indicative that CSG prices may be trending higher.
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43 ACIL Tasman, Fuel resource, new entry and generation costs in the NEM, 6 June 2007.
44 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008, p. 30.
45 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008.
46 Department of Industry and Resources (WA), Western Australian Oil and Gas Review, 2008.
47 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, August 2008. See note to figure 8.13.
48 Estimates published in NERA, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia, A report to the AEMC, March 2008, p. 36.
49 ACIL Tasman, Australia’s natural gas markets: The emergence of competition? (lead essay of this report), 2008.
50 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, May 2008.
in Victoria, its price outcomes are widely used as a guide 
to underlying contract prices.
Fıgure 8.14 charts price and volume activity since 
the market started in 1999. Despite a winter peaking 
demand profile, prices remained relatively stable until 
2005. There has since been greater volatility, with 
significantly higher winter prices in 2006 and 2007. 
The average price for July 2007 reached a monthly 
record of almost $9 per gigajoule. Spot prices peaked 
at $336 per gigajoule on 17 July 2007, a market record. 
The price spikes were partly due to drought causing 
a shift to gas-fired electricity generation, which 
significantly increased demand for gas. Prices have since 
eased back towards trend levels. The spot price averaged 
$3.55 per gigajoule in the first quarter of 2008, slightly 
below the current contract price of about $3.59 per 
gigajoule.51 An expansion of the Victorian Transmission 
System — the Corio Loop — eased capacity constraints 
on the network in winter 2008. Weighted average prices 
in June and July 2008 were below contract prices.
8.7	 Gas	market	development
The Ministerial Council on Energy in 2005 appointed 
a Gas Market Leaders Group52 to consider the need for 
further reform of the Australian gas market. In 2006, the 
Group recommended the establishment of:
> a gas market bulletin board
> a short-term trading market in gas
> a national gas market operator to administer the 
bulletin board and short-term trading market 
and to produce an annual national statement 
of opportunities on the gas market covering 
supply – demand conditions.
The bulletin board was implemented on 1 July 2008 
and there has been significant progress towards 
implementing the other initiatives. The reforms aim 
to improve transparency and efficiency in Australian gas 
markets. They also aim to provide information to help 
manage gas emergencies and system constraints.
figure	8.13	
indicative	wholesale	natural	gas	prices
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CSG, coal seam gas; LNG, liquefied natural gas.
Notes: 
1. Western Australian spot prices are indicative only: 2007 prices are estimates 
for new Santos contracts signed in July; 2008 prices are based on the weighted 
average price of gas trades notified to Western Australia’s Independent Market 
Operator in July 2008. Western Australian prices in July 2008 were unusually 
high due to a major plant outage at Varanus Island.
2. All series (except Western Australian spot) are data from the second quarter 
of the year.
3. Data for Producers A, B, C and D are average company realisations for specific 
Australian gas producers.
Sources: WA spot 2007: Department of Industry and Resources (WA), 
Western Australian Oil and Gas Review, 2008; other data: EnergyQuest, Energy 
Quarterly, August 2005, August 2006, August 2007 and August 2008; LNG data 
is sourced from the ABS.
8.6.3 victorian spot prices
The Victorian spot market (see box 8.1) provides 
transparent price and volume data on sales of natural 
gas to balance daily requirements between retailers 
and suppliers. Market volumes range from around 
400 to 1200 terajoules per day. While the market only 
accounts for about 10 – 20 per cent of wholesale volumes 
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51 EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly, May 2008, p. 65.
52 The group comprises 12 gas industry representatives and an independent chairperson.
8.7.1 gas market bulletin board
The gas market bulletin board, which commenced 
on 1 July 2008, is a website covering major gas 
production fields, storage facilities, demand centres 
and transmission pipelines, in southern and eastern 
Australia.53 Provision has been made for Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory to participate 
in the future.
The bulletin board aims to provide transparent, real-time 
and independent information to gas customers, small 
market participants, potential new entrants and market 
observers (including governments) on the state of the 
gas market, system constraints and market opportunities. 
Information provision by relevant market participants 
is mandatory and covers:
> gas pipeline capacity and daily aggregated 
nomination data
> production capabilities (maximum daily quantities) 
and three-day outlooks for production facilitates
> storage capabilities and three-day outlooks for 
storage facilities.
Participants may also advise of spare capacity and make 
offers through the bulletin board.
The bulletin board facilitates trade in gas and pipeline 
capacity through the provision of readily available system 
and market information. For example, the bulletin board 
will provide information on outages or maintenance 
at production points and pipelines, including updated 
daily demand, actual or expected changes in supply 
capacity to demand centres and potentially, in the 
event of significant outages or system incidents, a flag 
indicating likely interruptions to customer supplies.
VENCorp is the interim bulletin board operator, 
pending the establishment of the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO). Under the National Gas 
Law, the Australian Energy Regulator monitors and 
enforces the compliance of market participants with the 
rules of the bulletin board.
Western Australia created its own limited bulletin 
board, run by the Independent Market Operator, 
to assist with the gas emergency during 2008. Though 
figure	8.14	
victorian	gas	market	—	monthly	prices	and	volumes
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Source: VENCorp.
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low volumes of trade were reported, the bulletin board 
provided some indication of prices during this period 
of restricted supply.
8.7.2 short-term trading market
The MCE has approved the development, by the 
Gas Market Leaders Group, of a short-term trading 
market in gas, to commence by winter 2010. The 
proposed market is intended to facilitate daily trading 
by establishing a mandatory price-based balancing 
mechanism at defined gas hubs. The market would 
initially cover network hubs in New South Wales and 
South Australia, and replace existing gas balancing 
arrangements. Victoria has had a transparent balancing 
market in place since 1999 (see box 8.1).
The rationale for the market stems from concerns 
that the current gas balancing mechanisms 
in New South Wales and South Australia present 
barriers to retail market entry and impede gas supply 
efficiency. In particular, the current mechanisms create 
substantial financial exposures that are disproportionate 
to underlying costs. New entrants have faced 
difficulties acquiring appropriate hedging to manage 
these risks. The issues are especially pertinent for 
Sydney and Adelaide, which are sourced by multiple 
transmission pipelines.54
A daily market clearing price will be determined at each 
hub based on bids by gas shippers to deliver additional 
gas. The difference between each user’s daily deliveries 
and withdrawals of gas will then be settled by the 
market operator at the clearing price. The mechanism 
is aimed at providing price signals to shippers and users 
to stimulate trading — including secondary trading — and 
demand-side response by users.
The short-term trading market is intended to operate 
in conjunction with longer-term gas supply and 
transportation contracts. It will provide an additional 
option for users to buy or sell gas on a spot basis 
without needing to enter delivery contracts in advance. 
It will also allow contracted parties to manage 
short-term supply and demand variations to their 
contracted quantities.
Structural and operational details of the market are 
undergoing further development during 2008.
8.7.3 Australian energy Market operator
The Council of Australian Governments agreed in 2007 
to establish AEMO by 1 July 2009 to ultimately replace 
gas and electricity market operators such as VENCorp 
and the National Electricity Market Management 
Company. It is envisaged that the AEMO will operate 
both the gas market bulletin board and the short-term 
trading market. It is also envisaged that the AEMO 
will publish an annual Gas Statement of Opportunities 
(GSOO) — a national gas supply and demand 
statement — of a similar nature to the annual Statement 
of Opportunities currently published for electricity.
The GSOO is intended to provide information 
to assist gas industry participants in their planning and 
commercial decisions on infrastructure investment. The 
Gas Market Leaders Group commenced work on the 
design of the GSOO in 2008.55
8.7.4 Futures markets
The risk of participating in a commodity market 
can usually be hedged using physical or financial 
instruments. However, a futures gas market tends 
to develop only after the physical gas market reaches 
a certain level of maturity — with significant trading 
under transparent short-term contracts — as in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
At present there is no futures market for gas in Australia 
and current opinion suggests that there is little prospect 
that a market will develop soon. The new gas market 
bulletin board and the proposed short-term trading 
market may facilitate future development of a formalised 
market for financial risk-hedging instruments (such 
as forward, futures, swap and option contracts).
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54 Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources / Ministerial Council on Energy, Final report of the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, September 
2007, p. 19; McLennan Magasanik Associates, Report to the Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, July 2007.
55 MCE, Communiqué, 13 June 2008.
8.8	 Reliability	of	supply
Reliability relates to the continuity of gas supply 
to customers. Various factors — planned and 
unplanned — can lead to outages that interrupt supply. 
These may occur in gas production facilities or in the 
pipelines that deliver gas to customers.56 A planned 
outage may occur for maintenance or construction 
works and can be timed for minimal impact. Unplanned 
outages occur when equipment failure causes the supply 
of gas to be interrupted.
A distinguishing feature of reliability issues in the 
gas sector compared with the electricity sector is the 
management of safety issues. While incidents such 
as gas explosions and fires at upstream facilities are rare, 
the risk of widespread damage and injury is serious. 
In extreme cases, an upstream gas incident may also lead 
to the load shedding of customers.
Major upstream incidents occurred at Longford 
(Victoria) in 1998, Moomba (South Australia) in 2004 
and Varanus Island (Western Australia) in 2008. Victoria 
experienced a major supply outage in 1998 following gas 
fires at the Longford gas plant, which killed two people 
and shut down the state’s entire gas supply for three 
weeks. The incident created significant economic costs. 
There was limited pipeline interconnection in 1998, 
which restricted Victoria’s ability to import gas from 
other states to alleviate the shortage.
An explosion at South Australia’s Moomba gas plant 
in January 2004 caused a significant loss of production 
capacity from the Cooper Basin, which restricted gas 
supplies into New South Wales. The issue was managed 
in part by importing gas from Victoria along the Eastern 
Gas Pipeline (constructed in 2000).
The incidents at Longford and Moomba led 
Australian governments to agree in 2005 on protocols 
to manage major gas supply interruptions on the 
interconnected networks.57 The agreement established 
a government – industry National Gas Emergency 
Response Advisory Committee to report on the risk 
of gas supply shortages and options for managing 
potential shortages. A working group developed 
a communications protocol and a procedures manual 
which sets outs detailed instructions for officials and 
industry members in the event of an incident.
In the event of a major gas supply shortage, the protocol 
requires as far as possible that commercial arrangements 
operate to balance gas supply and demand and maintain 
system integrity. Emergency powers are available as a last 
resort. The gas market bulletin board includes a facility 
to support the emergency protocol. The bulletin board 
will gather emergency information, as required, from 
relevant market participants and jurisdictions.
There were significant reliability issues in New South 
Wales and the ACT in June 2007 when capacity 
on the Eastern Gas Pipeline and gas flows on the 
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline were insufficient to meet 
higher than expected demand. While there was 
no infrastructure failure by gas producers or transmission 
pipeline operators, the New South Wales Government 
established a Gas Continuity Scheme in 2008 
to mitigate the risk of a recurrence. The scheme will 
provide commercial incentives for producers to increase 
supplies and customers to reduce gas usage in the 
event of a shortfall.
Western Australia’s domestic gas supply was severely 
disrupted by an explosion at Varanus Island on 3 June 
2008. The incident shut down Apache Energy’s gas 
processing plant and reduced Western Australia’s gas 
supply by around 30 per cent for over two months. 
Woodside Petroleum, which operates the North West 
Shelf joint venture, became the state’s only major 
domestic gas supplier during this period. While 
it increased domestic supplies by around 150 terajoules 
per day, this was short of the 300 terajoules per day that 
Apache Energy supplied prior to the explosion.58
248 state OF tHe eNerGY market
56 A discussion of reliability issues in the gas distribution sector appears in section 10.7 of this report.
57 Memorandum of Understanding in Relation to National Gas Emergency Response Protocol (Including Use of Emergency Powers), June 2005 (available at 
http://www.mce.gov.au).
58 Office of Energy (WA), Gas supply disruption recovery update, 8 July 2008.
Spot prices for gas rose sharply as a result of the 
explosion, with some reports of a tripling of prices.59 
The Australian and Western Australian governments 
cautioned that the events would cause significant 
economic disruption, including to mining exports.60 
Limited gas supplies forced several mining and industrial 
companies to scale back production, and some electricity 
generators switched to emergency diesel stocks. Some 
coal-fired power plants that had been closed were also 
brought back online.61 Western Australia’s Independent 
Market Operator (which operates the state’s wholesale 
electricity market) established a gas bulletin board 
to facilitate trading during the disruption.
Apache Energy began to resume gas supply 
incrementally in August 2008. A resumption of full 
production was not expected until the end of 2008.62
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59 J Freed, ‘Spot price for gas soars after supply cut’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 2008.
60 D Shanahan, ‘Growth fears as lights start to go out’, The Australian, 17 June 2008.
61 D Shanahan ‘Growth fears as lights start to go out’, The Australian, 17 June 2008.
62 Office of Energy (WA), Energy Update, 5 August 2008.
	 9	Gas 
transmission
Transmission pipelines transport natural gas from production fields to major demand 
centres. The pipelines typically have wide diameters and operate under high pressure to 
optimise shipping capacity. They are mainly placed underground, which helps to minimise 
damage that could pose safety issues and interrupt gas services. In total, Australia’s 
transmission pipeline network covers about 25 000 kilometres.
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Australia’s gas transmission pipeline network has 
almost trebled in length since the early 1990s. Around 
$3.8 billion has been invested in new gas transmission 
pipelines and expansions since 2000.1 Much of this 
investment is in long-haul interstate pipelines that 
have introduced new supply sources and improved the 
security of gas supplies into markets in south-eastern 
Australia. The new cross-border infrastructure includes 
the 795 kilometre Eastern Gas Pipeline (Longford 
to Sydney, completed in 2000), the 732 kilometre 
Tasmanian Gas Pipeline (Longford to Hobart, 2002) 
and the 660 kilometre South East Australia (SEA) 
This chapter considers:
> Australia’s gas transmission sector
> the structure of the sector, including industry participants and ownership changes over time
> the economic regulation of the gas transmission sector
> new investment in transmission pipelines
> pipeline access and tariffs
> financial indicators for the transmission pipeline sector.
	 9	Gas 
transmission
9.1	 	Australia’s	gas		
transmission	pipelines
Until the 1990s natural gas was supplied under separate 
state-based regimes. In all states and territories, a single 
transmission pipeline shipped gas to major demand 
centres from a single gas basin. Since the late 1990s, 
rising demand and regulatory reform have led to a 
significant rise in exploration and development activity, 
and rising gas production. In turn, this has stimulated 
investment in new gas transmission pipelines and the 
expansion of existing pipelines.
252 statE oF tHE EnErGY marKEt
1 This Australian Energy Regulator estimate is derived from regulatory determinations and other public sources. The estimate comprises around $2.1 billion investment 
in new pipelines and $1.7 billion capital expenditure to expand existing networks. See figure 9.5 and table 9.3.
Gas Pipeline (Port Campbell to Adelaide, 2003). The 
VicHub in eastern Victoria was constructed in 2002 to 
physically interconnect three major pipeline systems: 
the Victorian Transmission System, the Tasmanian Gas 
Pipeline and the Eastern Gas Pipeline.
New investment in the past decade has created an 
interconnected pipeline network covering New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania 
and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). While 
Queensland is not yet interconnected with the southern 
jurisdictions, Epic Energy is constructing a new pipeline 
(the QSN Link) to achieve this.2 The QSN Link, 
which is scheduled for completion by early 2009, will 
interconnect the Queensland transmission network 
with major pipelines in South Australia and New 
South Wales.
The interconnection of the eastern jurisdictions creates 
wider options to source gas from alternative gas basins. 
For example, a customer in Sydney can potentially 
source natural gas from the Cooper Basin or Sydney 
Basin (using the Moomba to Sydney pipeline) or Bass 
Strait (using the Eastern Gas Pipeline). The QSN 
Link will also provide Sydney customers with access to 
coal seam gas from Queensland. These developments 
promote a more competitive environment among gas 
producers, pipeline operators and gas retailers.
Transmission pipelines in Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory are not interconnected with other 
jurisdictions. The populated south-west of Western 
Australia is serviced by three main pipelines. The 
Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline and the Goldfields 
Pipeline deliver gas from the Carnarvon Basin, and 
the Parmelia Pipeline transports gas from both the 
Carnarvon and Perth basins. There has been substantial 
investment in Western Australian pipelines in the 
current decade, including an expansion of the Dampier 
to Bunbury Pipeline and new pipelines to supply gas 
to the mining and resources sector. In the Northern 
Territory, the Amadeus Basin to Darwin Pipeline 
transports gas from the Mereenie and Palm Valley 
gas fields.
Table 9.1 sets out summary details of Australia’s 
major transmission pipelines. Fıgure 9.1 
illustrates pipeline routes.
9.2	 Ownership	of	transmission	pipelines
Government reforms to the gas sector in the 1990s 
led to structural reform and significant ownership 
changes. In particular, vertically integrated gas utilities 
were disaggregated and most government-owned 
transmission pipelines were privatised. Fıgure 9.2 sets 
out changes in the ownership of major transmission 
pipelines since 1994.
Privatisation led to the entry of a number of US-based 
energy utilities. In the 1990s, PG&E, GPU GasNet, 
Tenneco and Epic Energy acquired major pipelines in 
Victoria, South Australia, Queensland and Western 
Australia, while Duke Energy — another US utility 
— constructed major new pipelines in eastern Australia. 
The principal domestic player was the New South 
Wales energy utility AGL, which owned or acquired 
major transmission assets in New South Wales and 
Queensland. In 2000, AGL’s gas transmission assets 
were transferred to the Australian Pipeline Trust, which 
is now part of the APA Group.3
Over time, the US-based utilities exited the Australian 
market, selling their transmission assets to new 
entrants such as Alinta and existing players such as 
the APA Group. The transmission pipeline landscape 
experienced a major shift in 2007 with the sale of Alinta 
to Singapore Power International and the Babcock & 
Brown group. Origin Energy and the CLP Group also 
withdrew from the gas pipeline sector, with the sale 
of their network assets to the APA Group and Retail 
Employees Superannuation Trust respectively.4
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2 At present, only a raw gas pipeline from Ballera to Moomba connects the Queensland and South Australian pipeline systems.
3 In 2006, the Australian Pipeline Trust began trading as part of the APA Group, which comprises Australian Pipeline Ltd, the Australian Pipeline Trust and the APT 
Investment Trust.
4 The AER State of the energy market 2007 report provides a more detailed account of historical changes in the ownership of gas transmission infrastructure. See section 
9.3. The report is available on the AER website.
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Figure	9.1	
Major	gas	transmission	pipelines
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Principal sources: ABARE, Energy in Australia 2008, Canberra, 2007; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, February 2008, 2008; NERA, The Gas Supply Chain in 
Eastern Australia — A report to Australian Energy Market Commission, 2007.
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A significant feature of the past few years has been 
the emergence of Singapore Power International 
and the APA Group as major owners and operators 
of transmission pipelines. Investment trusts such as 
Babcock & Brown Infrastructure, Hastings (trading as 
Epic Energy) and DUET Group have also acquired 
significant ownership profiles.5
In recent years, there was a tendency to separate the 
ownership and operation (management control) of gas 
transmission pipelines, but this pattern has reversed 
since the sale of Alinta in 2007. In particular, the APA 
Group, Singapore Power International and Babcock 
& Brown Infrastructure have moved to an integrated 
Figure	9.2	
Transmission	pipeline	ownership
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
G
as
 T
ra
ns
m
is
si
on
So
ut
h-
ea
st
 a
us
tr
al
ia
Moomba–Sydney Govt aGL 51%, Gasinvest 49% aPa Group
eastern Gas Pipeline duke energy alinta Singapore 
Power
Victorian 
Transmission System
Govt GasNet aPa Group
Sea Gas Pipeline origin, IP, CLP 
33.3% each
aPa, IP, CLP 
33.3% each 
Moomba–adelaide Govt Ten-
neco
epic energy epic energy (hastings)
Tasmanian Gas 
Pipeline
duke energy alinta BBI
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d
Wallumbilla–
Gladstone
Govt duke energy alinta Singapore 
Power
Gladstone–
Rockhampton
Govt PG&e duke energy alinta Singapore 
Power
Roma–Brisbane aGL aPT aPa Group
Carpentaria Gas 
Pipeline
aGL aPT aPa Group
Ballera–Wallumbilla epic energy epic energy (hastings)
W
es
te
rn
 a
us
tr
al
ia dampier–Bunbury Govt epic energy alinta 20%,  
dueT 60%, alcoa 
20%
BBI 20%,  
dueT 60%, 
alcoa 20%
Goldfields Gas 
Pipeline
GGT JV WMC 63% Southern Cross Pipelines australia 88% aPa Group 88.2%, 
alinta 11.8%
aPa Group 
88%, 
BBP 12%
Parmelia Pipeline WaPeT joint venture CMS Gas Transmission aPa Group
N
T
amadeus 
Basin–darwin
amadeus Gas Trust aGL 96% aPa Group 96%
Palm Valley– 
alice Springs
NT Gas & holyman envestra (CKI 17%, origin 17%, other 66%)
APT, Australian Pipeline Trust (assets now part of the APA Group); BBI, Babcock & Brown Infrastructure; BBP, Babcock & Brown Power; CKI, Cheung Kong Infrastructure; 
GGT JV, Goldfields Gas Pipeline Joint Venture; IP, International Power; WMC, Western Mining Company. PG&E, Pacific Gas and Electric; WAPET, West Australian 
Petroleum Pty Limited joint venture (Chevron, Texaco and Shell with a two-seventh interest each, and Ampolex with a one-seventh interest).
Notes:
1. Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
2. Changes in ownership are shown in the year they occurred.
3. From 1996 – 2003, Epic Energy was owned by El Paso Energy (30%), CNG International (30%), Allgas Energy (10%), AMP Investments (10%), Axiom Funds 
Management (10%) and Hastings (10%).
4. The CLP Group sold its share in the SEA Gas Pipeline to Retail Employees Superannuation Trust in September 2008.
Principal sources: Australian Gas Association, Gas Statistics Australia (various years); and company websites.
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5 DUET Group comprises a number of trusts, the responsible entities for which are jointly owned by Macquarie Bank (50%) and AMP Capital Holdings (50%). 
Hastings Diversified Utilities Fund is managed by a fund acquired by Westpac in 2005.
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model, in which a group entity operates and manages 
all pipeline assets in the group.
In the past year, the APA Group has brought its 
management in-house by terminating its management 
contract with Agility. It now operates its transmission 
pipeline assets internally in the group through a 
single management company. In August 2008, 
the former Alinta assets now owned by Singapore 
Power International were rebranded as Jemena. 
The new name applies to both the asset ownership 
and asset management entities. The Epic Energy 
(Hasting) pipelines continue to be operated by group 
management companies.
By 2008, ownership consolidation had reduced the 
number of principal players in the gas transmission 
sector to four:
> The APA Group owns the Moomba to Sydney 
and Central West pipelines in New South Wales; 
the Victorian Transmission System; two major 
Queensland pipelines (Carpentaria and Roma to 
Brisbane); four major Western Australian pipelines 
(Goldfields Gas, Parmelia, Telfer and Midwest); 
and the principal pipeline (Amadeus Basin to 
Darwin) in the Northern Territory. It is also a part 
owner of the SEA Gas Pipeline and two other 
Northern Territory pipelines.
> Singapore Power International acquired a portfolio 
of gas transmission assets from Alinta in 2007. It 
now owns the Eastern Gas Pipeline, VicHub, and the 
Queensland Gas Pipeline. In August 2008, Singapore 
Power International rebranded its ownership and asset 
management entities in the energy sector as Jemena.
> Babcock & Brown Infrastructure acquired a 
20 per cent interest in the Dampier to Bunbury 
Pipeline from Alinta in 2007. It now operates the 
pipeline through its management services business 
WestNet Energy. It also owns the Tasmanian Gas 
Pipeline and has a minority interest in Western 
Australia’s Goldfields Gas Pipeline.
> The investment fund Hastings acquired Epic 
Energy’s gas transmission assets in 2000, including 
the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline (South Australia), 
the Pilbara Energy Pipeline (Western Australia) 
and the South West Queensland Pipeline. In 2008, 
Epic Energy is constructing the QSN Link from 
Queensland to South Australia and New South Wales.
Other players include:
> DUET Group, the majority owner (60 per cent) of the 
Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline
> International Power and Retail Employees 
Superannuation Trust, which each have ownership 
interests in the SEA Gas Pipeline
> Cheung Kong Infrastructure, which part owns a 
Northern Territory pipeline via its interest in Envestra
> Anglo Coal/Mitsui has ownership interests in 
Queensland pipelines (see table 9.1).
9.3	 	Economic	regulation	of	gas	
transmission	pipelines
Gas pipelines are capital intensive and incur relatively 
low operating costs. This gives rise to economies of scale 
that make it cheaper to use a single pipeline than to 
construct multiple pipelines between a particular gas 
basin and a major load (demand) centre. Rising demand 
can usually be accommodated more cheaply by adding 
compressors or looping (duplicating part or all of ) an 
existing pipeline than by constructing a second pipeline.
If a major load centre is served by only one gas basin, the 
transmission pipeline is likely to have significant market 
power, and may charge prices above underlying costs. 
As noted, all Australian load centres historically relied 
on a single gas basin and transmission pipeline to supply 
gas. Australian governments have tended to apply price 
regulation in these circumstances to address the risk of 
market power.
The National Gas Law and National Gas Rules 
(Gas Rules), which took effect on 1 July 2008, provide 
the overarching regulatory framework for the gas 
transmission sector. The law and rules replace the 
Gas Pipeline Access Law and National Gas Code 
(Gas Code), which provided the regulatory framework 
from 1997 to 30 June 2008.
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The Gas Code initially applied to most Australian 
transmission pipelines, but this position has changed 
over the past decade. Significant new investment in gas 
pipelines has led to improved interconnection between 
gas basins and retail markets in the south-eastern states. 
This has improved supply options and, in some instances, 
may limit the ability of pipeline operators to exercise 
market power.
The Gas Rules (previously the Gas Code) anticipate 
the potential for market conditions to evolve over time, 
and include a coverage test to allow for an independent 
review of whether there is a need to regulate a particular 
pipeline. The National Competition Council is the 
coverage review body, but the final decision on coverage 
is made by government. Decisions are open to review 
by the Australian Competition Tribunal. In 2001, the 
tribunal reversed a ministerial decision to cover the 
Eastern Gas Pipeline.
The coverage process has led to the lifting of economic 
regulation — in whole or part — from several major 
pipelines, including the Eastern Gas Pipeline,6 Western 
Australia’s Parmelia Pipeline and a significant portion of 
the Moomba to Sydney pipeline. The South Australian 
Minister for Energy revoked coverage of the Moomba to 
Adelaide pipeline in 2007. The Queensland Government 
passed legislation in 2008 that terminated the coverage 
of two major Queensland pipelines — the South West 
Queensland and Queensland Gas pipelines.7
The Gas Rules include a process to cover newly 
constructed pipelines. Only one pipeline constructed 
during the current decade (the Central Ranges Pipeline 
in New South Wales) is currently covered. Other major 
pipelines — including the SEA Gas and Tasmanian Gas 
pipelines and several new pipelines in Western Australia 
— are not covered. As of July 2008, no transmission 
pipeline into Adelaide or Hobart was subject to 
economic regulation.
The service provider8 of a covered pipeline must comply 
with the provisions of the National Gas Law and Gas 
Rules. Typically this requires submitting an access 
arrangement — including pipeline tariffs — to the regulator 
for approval. The legislation also allows for light 
regulation in some circumstances, in which the service 
provider is obliged only to publish terms and conditions 
of access on its website.9
Pipelines that are not covered are subject only to the 
general anti-competitive provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974. Access to non-covered pipelines is a matter 
for the access provider and an access seeker to negotiate, 
without regulatory assistance.
9.3.1 Regulation of covered pipelines
As of 1 July 2008, 11 gas transmission pipelines were 
regulated under the Gas Rules (see table 9.2). In the 
southern and eastern jurisdictions, the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) replaced the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) as the regulator 
on 1 July 2008.
The Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) of 
Western Australia is the regulator of covered pipelines 
in that state, in recognition that there is no pipeline 
interconnection with other jurisdictions. Western 
Australia will implement legislation equivalent to the 
National Gas Law, and will review its institutional 
arrangements for gas within five years — or earlier, in 
the event of pipeline interconnection with another 
jurisdiction.
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6 The Eastern Gas Pipeline was covered by a Ministerial decision on 16 October 2000. The Australian Competition Tribunal reversed this decision on 4 May 2001.
7 Any party may apply to the National Competition Council to consider whether a previously covered pipeline should be covered once again. The Dawson Valley 
Pipeline was revoked from coverage in 2000, but a later application reversed this decision in 2006. See table 9.2. The National Gas (Queensland) Regulation 2008 
provides that no person may apply to reactivate coverage of the South West Queensland Pipeline for a period of one year, or the Queensland Gas Pipeline for a period 
of two years.
8 In accordance with the National Gas Law, the service provider may be the owner or operator of the whole pipeline or any part of the pipeline.
9 The Second Reading Speech for the National Gas (South Australian) Bill 2008 at p. 15 indicates that light regulation may be relevant for point-to-point transmission 
pipelines with a small number of users that each have countervailing market power.
9.3.2 Regulatory framework
In Australia, the providers of most transmission 
pipelines offer gas transportation services to third parties 
via access contracts. Typically, a party negotiates a long-
term bilateral contract with the operator, which sets out 
the conditions of use. A contract typically features a 
maximum daily quantity allocation and sets a capacity 
charge, which must be paid regardless of the amount of 
gas a customer transports on the pipeline.
In Victoria, an independent operator (VENCorp) 
manages the Victorian Transmission System, and users 
are not required to enter into contracts. Instead a party’s 
daily gas flow is determined by its bids into the wholesale 
gas market. The bids enter a market clearing engine 
where the lowest priced supply offers are dispatched to 
meet demand. Pipeline charges are based on actual gas 
flows following this dispatch selection process.
Table	9.2	 Covered	transmission	pipelines	at	1	March	2008
JuRisdiCTiOn	And	PiPElinE COMMEnTs
NeW SouTh WaLeS
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline Partially covered1
Central West (Marsden to dubbo) Covered since 19982
Central Ranges Pipeline Covered in May 2004
VICToRIa
Victorian Transmission System Covered since 1997
QueeNSLaNd
Roma (Wallumbilla) to Brisbane Pipeline Covered since 1997; derogations expired in 2006, enabling the regulator to set 
tariffs for the first time
dawson Valley Pipeline Coverage revoked in 2000 but reinstated in 2006
Carpentaria Pipeline (Ballera to Mt Isa) Covered since 1997; light regulation only3
WeSTeRN auSTRaLIa4
dampier to Bunbury Pipeline Covered since 1999
Goldfields Gas Pipeline Covered since 1999
Kalgoorlie to Kambalda Pipeline5 Covered since 1999
NoRTheRN TeRRIToRY
amadeus Basin to darwin Pipeline Covered since 1997
Notes:
1. Coverage of the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline was partially revoked in 2003. The revoked portion runs from Moomba to the offtake point of the Central West Pipeline at 
Marsden. See figure 9.1.
2. Under the National Gas Law, the Central Ranges Pipeline will cease to be covered once the current access arrangement expires.
3. The service provider of a light regulation pipeline must publish the terms and conditions of access, including tariffs, on its website. There is no requirement to submit an 
access arrangement to the regulator for approval.
4. The Gas Code commenced in Western Australia in 1999.
5. The regulator has not approved an access arrangement for this pipeline.
To assist pipeline customers, the Gas Rules require 
pipeline operators to develop access arrangements that 
set out terms and conditions of access. These typically 
include reference tariffs for the pipeline. Most access 
arrangements apply for a fixed term, after which they are 
subject to review.
An access arrangement must comply with the provisions 
of the Gas Rules and underpinning legislation, including 
pricing principles, ring-fencing requirements and rules 
for associate contracts. The regulator may require a 
pipeline operator to amend an access arrangement that 
fails to meet the code’s provisions. Once approved, an 
access arrangement is enforceable. In particular, an access 
seeker may request the regulator to arbitrate a dispute 
and enforce the provisions of an access arrangement.10
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10 In Western Australia a separate arbitrator hears access disputes.
The regulatory approach in gas is broadly similar to 
that applied to electricity networks. In particular, the 
regulator aims to determine revenue outcomes that cover 
efficient costs, including asset depreciation and a proxy 
for a commercial return on capital. As in electricity, the 
Gas Rules provide for incentive mechanisms to reward 
efficient operating practices.
A point of difference is that while electricity transmission 
regulation is based around the setting of revenue caps, the 
approach in the Gas Rules is to set reference (benchmark) 
tariffs for reference services that are commonly sought 
by customers. The reference tariff is intended to form 
a basis for negotiation between the pipeline owner 
and customers, but is enforceable if a party notifies the 
regulator of a dispute. The negotiation of tariffs may be 
complex if a pipeline is operating at capacity and requires 
an expansion to make access possible.
Typically, reference tariffs apply to firm haulage services, 
the most commonly sought service on most pipelines.11 
Gas users seeking short-term or interruptible supplies 
can try to negotiate those services with the pipeline 
operator or other gas shippers directly. The regulated 
tariffs for reference services may be of assistance in these 
negotiations.
The Gas Rules allow a number of options for 
determining regulated revenue. The two methods 
currently in use are the cost of service method and the 
net present value method:
> The cost of service method is a building block 
approach in which revenue is set to recover efficient 
costs, including operating and maintenance expenses, 
asset depreciation costs and a return on capital. This 
method, which is similar to that applied in electricity 
transmission, is used to set benchmark total revenues 
for most transmission pipelines. For example, it 
was recently used to set revenues for the Victorian 
Transmission System.
> The net present value method applies a discount rate to 
forecast costs and sales to set revenues that will deliver a 
net present value for the pipeline equal to zero. Central 
West is the only transmission pipeline that applies this 
method to set benchmark total revenue.12
Fıgures 9.3 and 9.4 show the revenue components under 
the access arrangements for the Victorian Transmission 
System for the period 2008 – 2012 and the Roma to 
Brisbane Pipeline for the period 2007 – 2011. The charts 
provide a guide to the typical composition of the revenue 
components in a determination. In these decisions, 
returns on capital and depreciation account for almost 
three-quarters of regulated revenue. Operating and 
maintenance costs account for most of the balance.
9.3.3 New regulatory framework — 2008
The regulatory framework for the gas transmission 
sector underwent significant change in 2008, including 
the transfer of regulatory functions to new bodies. In 
2004, the Productivity Commission completed a review 
of the Gas Code, which proposed several changes to 
address industry concerns that the regime was deterring 
investment. This led to the development of a new 
National Gas Law and Gas Rules, with new provisions 
to enhance regulatory certainty for investment.
The new framework commenced on 1 July 2008. While 
the framework mirrors its predecessor in many respects, 
there are a number of changes to the regulation of 
transmission pipelines, including the following:
> The AER replaces the ACCC as the transmission 
regulator, except in Western Australia.
> For certain pipelines, ‘light’ regulation without upfront 
price and revenue regulation may apply. The National 
Competition Council has the role of determining 
whether a pipeline is subject to light regulation. The 
policy intent is that this form of regulation is suited to 
some transmission pipelines.13 Where light regulation 
applies, the pipeline provider must publish access 
prices and other terms and conditions on its website. 
In the event of a dispute, an access seeker may request 
the regulator to arbitrate.
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11 Fırm forward-haulage services enable the customer to reserve capacity on a pipeline and receive a high priority service. Interruptible services are sold on an ‘as available’ 
basis and may be interrupted or delayed, especially if a pipeline has capacity constraints.
12 The Gas Rules also allow for an internal rate of return approach, in which total revenues are set to provide a rate of return for the pipeline on the basis of forecast 
demand and costs.
13 The Second Reading Speech for the National Gas (South Australian) Bill 2008 at p. 15 indicates that light regulation may be relevant for point-to-point transmission 
pipelines with a small number of users that each have countervailing market power.
Figure	9.3	
Revenue	composition	for	the	victorian	Transmission	
system	(2008	–	12)
DeZgVi^c\VcYbV^ciZcVcXZ(,
9ZegZX^Vi^dc(.GZijgcdcXVe^iVa*,
Source: ACCC, Revised Access Arrangement by GasNet Australia Ltd for the 
Principal Transmission System, Fınal Decision, 30 April 2008.
Figure	9.4	
Revenue	composition	for	Roma	to	Brisbane	pipeline	
(2007	–	11)
DeZgVi^c\VcYbV^ciZcVcXZ(/ IVm(
9ZegZX^Vi^dc('GZijgcdcXVe^iVa*.
Source: ACCC, Revised Access Arrangement by APT Petroleum Pipelines Ltd for the 
Roma to Brisbane Pipeline, Fınal Decision, 20 December 2006.
> Stronger incentives apply for investment in greenfields 
pipelines and international pipelines to Australia. 
Pipeline owners can apply for a determination that 
provides a 15-year exemption from coverage for 
greenfields pipelines and a 15-year exemption from 
price regulation for international pipelines.
> New information-gathering powers apply in different 
circumstances and for different regulatory purposes 
and functions.
> Mandated decision-making processes and timeframes 
for key regulatory decisions apply.
> A new investment test that takes a cost-benefit 
analysis approach to assessing whether new facilities 
investment in existing pipelines may be rolled into the 
regulated asset base. The test aims to promote efficient 
investment in existing pipelines to meet rising demand 
for natural gas.14
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14 The test allows for capital expenditure to be rolled into the regulated asset base if (1) the overall economic value is positive; or (2) the present value of incremental 
revenue is greater than the present value of the capital expenditure; or (3) the expenditure is necessary to maintain and improve safety of services, or maintain integrity 
of services or maintain a service provider’s capacity to meet levels of demand for existing services.
 In determining the overall economic value, only the economic value directly accruing to the service provider, gas producers, users and end users is to be considered. 
There are additional criteria for capital expenditure for Western Australian transmission pipelines that reflect the value that may accrue directly to electricity market 
participants from additional gas-fired generation capacity.
 According to the Second Reading Speech, National Gas (South Australian) Bill 2008, the test is ‘designed to capture net increases in producer and consumer surpluses 
in upstream and downstream gas markets, while also capturing the system security and reliability benefits that were considered by regulators to constitute system wide 
benefits. The test … unambiguously includes benefits that accrue to users and end users of gas when they are able to purchase additional quantities of gas, or to gas 
producers when they are able to sell additional quantities of gas’ (p. 18).
9.4	 investment	in	transmission	pipelines
Investment in the transmission sector typically involves 
large and lumpy capital projects to expand existing 
pipelines (through compression, looping and extensions) 
or construct new pipelines.15 Around $3.8 billion 
has been invested in new transmission pipelines and 
expansions since 2000.16 This represents a combination 
of substantial real investment in new infrastructure as 
well as rising resource costs in the construction sector.17
Fıgure 9.5 shows the underlying asset base and forecast 
investment over the current access arrangement period 
for a selection of pipelines where data is available.18 
The data for covered pipelines (shown as blue and 
pink bars in figure 9.5) is derived from regulatory 
determinations.
The estimates for non-covered pipelines (shown as 
green bars in figure 9.5) reflect initial construction costs 
derived from information in pipeline websites, corporate 
annual reports, prospectuses and media releases. While 
the owners of non-covered pipelines are not required to 
report publicly on investment data, the estimates indicate 
the scale of some recent investments in unregulated 
infrastructure.19
Fıgure 9.5 illustrates that the initial construction costs 
of transmission pipelines are substantial. Subsequent 
capital costs are relatively modest, except in the case 
of major capacity expansions (through the addition of 
compressors or duplication of sections of the pipeline 
through looping).
Fıgure 9.5 reflects significant expansion programs for 
the Victorian Transmission System and the Dampier to 
Bunbury Pipeline in Western Australia. There is little 
projected recurring investment for the Moomba to 
Sydney or Roma to Brisbane pipelines in their respective 
current regulatory periods. It should be noted that a 
major expansion may undergo a separate regulatory 
approval process, and may not be reflected in projected 
investment data.20
9.4.1 New pipelines and major expansions
Table 9.3 provides details of major investments since 
2000, including those currently under construction. 
Recently completed projects include:
> the $500 million SEA Gas Pipeline from Port 
Campbell (Victoria) to Adelaide, completed in 2003
> the $160 million North Queensland Gas Pipeline 
from Moranbah to Townsville, completed in 2004
> the $430 million stage 4 expansion of the Dampier 
to Bunbury Pipeline (Western Australia), completed 
in December 2006, and the $660 million Stage 5A 
expansion, completed in April 2008
> the $114 million Telfer Pipeline, from Port Hedland 
to the Telfer Goldmine (Western Australia), 
completed in 2004
> the $70 million Corio Loop (Brooklyn to Lara) on 
the Victorian Transmission System, completed in 
2008. The loop facilitates gas flow from Port Campbell 
(Otway Basin) to Melbourne.
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15 Pipeline capacity can be increased by adding compressor stations to raise the pressure under which gas flows and by looping (duplicating) sections of the pipeline. 
Extending the length of the pipeline can increase line-pack (storage) capacity.
16 AER estimate derived from regulatory determinations and other public sources. The estimate comprises $2.1 billion of investment in new pipelines and $1.7 billion of 
capital expenditure to expand existing networks. See figure 9.5 and table 9.3.
17 Some resource costs in the energy construction sector are rising faster than general inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Chapter 4 provides data on 
rising costs. See section 4.4, including figures 4.7 and 4.8.
18 The data is not available for several Queensland pipelines due to historical derogations that constrained the role of the regulator in revenue determination.
19 The National Gas Law established a National Gas Market Bulletin Board on 1 July 2008. The bulletin board provides system and market information on gas 
transmission pipelines, including non-covered pipelines, in southern and eastern Australia. Over time this may improve public information about the non-covered 
pipeline sector. Chapter 8 includes background information on the bulletin board.
20 An extension or expansion that is not approved in the access arrangement cannot be rolled into the asset base until the following access arrangement review.
Current and planned activity suggests that the pipeline 
network will continue to expand at a rapid rate. The 
following major projects are currently under construction 
or advanced planning:
> Stage 1 ($140 million) of the QSN Link from 
Queensland to South Australia, scheduled for 
completion by early 2009. Epic Energy has committed 
to a $64 million stage 2 expansion by 2013.
> The continuing expansion of the Dampier to Bunbury 
Pipeline in Western Australia. The $690 million Stage 
5B expansion was announced in April 2008 (subject 
to finance).
> A compressor to expand the capacity of the Eastern 
Gas Pipeline by more than 25 per cent by late 2008.
> A two-staged expansion of the South West 
Queensland Pipeline, announced in 2007. Stage 1 
(170 terajoules a day) is to be completed by 2009 
and stage 2 (220 terajoules a day) is to be completed 
by 2013.
> A progressive 20 per cent expansion of the Moomba 
to Sydney Pipeline to support the construction of 
the Uranquinty Power Station in New South Wales, 
commencing in 2008.
> The $170 million Bonaparte gas pipeline to connect 
the Blacktip gas field with the Amadeus Basin to 
Darwin Pipeline. The APA Group expects to complete 
the pipeline by early 2009.
> A $70 million pipeline from Berwyndale to 
Wallumbilla, to be operational by 2009. AGL Energy 
and Queensland Gas Company have agreed to develop 
the pipeline.21
Figure	9.5	
Transmission	pipeline	assets	and	investment	(real)
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VTS, Victorian Transmission System; EGP, Eastern Gas Pipeline; SEA, SEA Gas Pipeline; NQGP, North Queensland Gas Pipeline; RAB, regulated asset base.
Notes:
1. For covered pipelines, asset values are regulated asset bases as at the start of the current regulatory period. Investment is total forecast investment over the current 
regulatory period.
2. For non-covered pipelines, assets values are estimated construction costs.
3. All estimates are converted to June 2007 dollars.
Sources: Access arrangements for covered pipelines; company websites; press releases.
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21 ABARE Energy in Australia 2008, 2008; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, November 2007 and February 2008.
Table	9.3	 Major	gas	pipeline	investment	since	2000
PiPElinE lOCATiOn OwnER/PROPOnEnT lEngTH	
(kM)
COsT	
($	MilliOn)
PROJECT	
COMPlETiOn
CoMPLeTed
eastern Gas Pipeline (Longford to Sydney) Vic – NSW Singapore Power International 795 450 2000
Vichub Vic Singapore Power International n/a n/a 2003
Sea Gas Pipeline (Port Campbell to 
adelaide)
Vic – Sa International Power, aPa 
Group, Retail employees 
Superannuation Trust
680 500 2003
Kambalda to esperance Pipeline Wa WorleyParsons, aNZ 
Infrastructure Services
350 45 2004
Telfer Pipeline (Port hedland to Telfer 
Goldmine)
Wa aPa Group 443 114 2004
Tasmanian Gas Pipeline (Longford to 
hobart)
Vic – Tas Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure
734 440 2002 – 05
North Queensland Gas Pipeline (Moranbah 
to Townsville)
Qld aGL energy/arrow 391 160 2005
dampier to Bunbury Stage 4 expansion Wa dueT Group (60%), alcoa 
(20%), Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure (20%)
200 430 2006
dampier to Bunbury Stage 5a expansion Wa dueT Group (60%), alcoa 
(20%), Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure (20%)
570 660 2008
Corio Loop (expansion of Victorian 
Transmission System)
Vic aPa Group 57 70 2008
uNdeR CoNSTRuCTIoN
QSN Link — Stage 1 Qld – Sa and 
NSW
epic energy 180 140 2009
eastern Gas Pipeline 
(addition of compressor)
Vic – NSW Singapore Power International Compressor 
(25% 
expansion)
n/a 2008
Bonaparte Gas Pipeline NT aPa Group 285 170 2009
CoMMITTed
Berwyndale to Wallumbilla Pipeline Qld aGL energy and Queensland 
Gas Company
115 70 2009
dampier to Bunbury Stage 5B expansion Wa dueT Group (60%), alcoa 
(20%), Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure (20%)
440 690 2010
South West Queensland Pipeline — Stage 1 Qld epic energy Compressor 
(expansion to 
170 terajoules 
a day)
n/a 2009
South West Queensland Pipeline — Stage 2 Qld epic energy Compressor 
(expansion to 
220 terajoules 
a day)
64 2013
Queensland Gas Pipeline expansion Qld Singapore Power International 25 petajoules n/a 2010
QSN link — Stage 2 expansion Qld – Sa and 
NSW
epic energy Compressors 64 2013
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline 
capacity expansion
NSW aPa Group 20% capacity 
expansion
100 progressive 
from 2008
n/a, not available.
Principal sources: ABARE, Energy in Australia 2008, 2008; EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, August 2008; company websites and press releases.
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9.4.2 effects on competition
Investment over the past decade has led to the 
development of an interconnected gas pipeline system 
covering New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania and the ACT. New discoveries of 
coal seam gas in Queensland (see chapter 8) and rising 
gas demand in New South Wales led to Epic Energy’s 
decision to construct the QSN Link, which, from 2009, 
will connect the Queensland network via Moomba 
with South Australia and New South Wales. Within 
Queensland, customers will continue to have choice 
between gas from the Cooper Basin and coal seam gas 
from southern Queensland.
While gas tends to be purchased from the closest 
possible source to minimise transportation costs, the 
expansion of the pipeline network provides energy 
customers with greater choice and enhances the 
competitive environment. Table 9.4 lists the pipelines 
and gas basins serving each major Australian market. The 
construction of new pipelines has opened the Cooper, 
Sydney, Gippsland, Otway and Bass basins to increased 
interbasin competition in south-eastern Australia. In 
some cases, it may only be possible to source gas from 
a particular basin using backhaul or swap arrangements 
(for example, such arrangements have been used to 
supply Sydney Basin gas into Victoria).22
While Santos, Origin Energy and BHP Billiton have 
production interests in several gas basins, the expansion 
of the pipeline network has provided new markets 
for smaller producers such as Beach Petroleum and 
Queensland Gas Company. The expansion of the 
pipeline network may also bring benefits in the wider 
energy sector. In particular, it may enhance competition 
in electricity markets by creating opportunities for 
further investment in gas-fired generators.
The extent to which new investment delivers 
competition benefits to customers depends on a 
range of factors, including the availability of natural 
gas and pipeline access from alternative sources. In 
particular, capacity constraints may limit access on 
some pipelines. For example, the SEA Gas and Roma 
to Brisbane pipelines have tended to operate at or near 
capacity in recent years. It is up to access seekers to try 
to negotiate an expansion of capacity. For a covered 
pipeline, the regulator (or in Western Australia, a 
separate arbitrator) may be asked to arbitrate a dispute 
in relation to capacity expansions.
9.5	 Pipeline	tariffs
The National Gas Law requires that for covered 
pipelines, service providers must publish reference tariffs 
(prices) and other conditions of access. This information 
must be maintained on the service provider’s website 
— either within its approved access arrangement or 
separately. There is no requirement for service providers 
to disclose tariffs for non-covered pipelines, or 
negotiated tariffs for covered pipelines agreed outside 
the reference tariffs. Some operators publish these 
tariffs on a website or make them available on request 
to access seekers.
Fıgure 9.6 estimates indicative tariffs for pipeline 
services on a selection of routes between gas basins 
and Australian capital cities and gas hubs (pipeline 
interconnection points). The tariffs are based on rates for 
firm forward-haulage services, and assume a 100 per cent 
swing factor.23 The tariffs are enforceable for spare 
capacity in covered pipelines, but are only indicative for 
non-covered pipelines.
Fıgure 9.6 allows for some comparison of transmission 
pipeline costs from alternative gas basins into major 
centres. It should be noted that while some tariffs in 
figure 9.6 represent alternative routes to a particular 
market (for example, SEA Gas and Moomba to 
Adelaide provide alternative services to Adelaide), others 
do not (for example, gas sourced from the Cooper 
Basin into Brisbane must travel via both the Ballera to 
Wallumbilla and the Roma to Brisbane pipelines).
267
	
C
H
A
P
TER
	
9	G
a
s 
tr
a
n
sm
issio
n
22 Backhaul and swap arrangements are discussed in chapter 8, section 8.5.
23 NERA, The Gas Supply Chain in Eastern Australia, June 2007. In gas contracts the swing factor (or ‘load factor’) measures a buyer’s flexibility to vary the daily 
quantity shipped up to a predetermined maximum. A 100 per cent swing factor means that the average daily quantity shipped equals the maximum daily quantity.
Table	9.4	 Pipeline	links	between	major	gas	sources	and	markets
PiPElinE	(OwnER) gAs	BAsin PROduCERs
SYdNeY aNd CaNBeRRa
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline (aPa Group) Cooper
Sydney
Santos, Beach Petroleum, origin energy
aGL energy, Sydney Gas
eastern Gas Pipeline (Singapore Power 
International) NSW – Vic Interconnect 
(aPa Group)
Gippsland, otway, Bass BhPB, exxonMobil, origin energy, Santos 
aWe, Beach Petroleum, Mitwell
QSN Link (under construction) (hastings) Surat – Bowen Mosaic, origin energy, Santos, Sunshine Gas, 
arrow energy, Mitsui, Molopo, Queensland 
Gas Company
MeLBouRNe
NSW – Vic Interconnect (aPa Group) Cooper (via MSP)
Sydney
Santos, Beach Petroleum, origin energy
aGL energy, Sydney Gas
Victorian transmission system (aPa Group) Gippsland, Bass, otway BhPB, exxonMobil, origin energy, Santos 
aWe, Beach Petroleum, Mitwell
TaSMaNIa
Tasmanian Gas Pipeline 
(Babcock & Brown Infrastructure)
Cooper (via MSP and NSW – Vic Interconnect), 
Gippsland, otway, Bass
Santos, Beach Petroleum, origin energy
BRISBaNe
South West Queensland Pipeline 
(epic energy)
Cooper Santos, Beach Petroleum, origin energy
Roma to Brisbane pipeline (aPa Group) Surat – Bowen Mosaic, origin energy, Santos, 
Sunshine Gas, arrow energy, Mitsui, Molopo, 
Queensland Gas Company
adeLaIde
Moomba to adelaide Pipeline (epic energy) Cooper Santos, Beach Petroleum, origin energy
Sea Gas Pipeline (aPa Group, International 
Power, Retail employees Superannuation 
Trust)
otway and Gippsland BhPB, exxonMobil, origin energy, Santos 
aWe, Beach Petroleum, Mitwell
QSN Link (under construction) (epic energy) Surat – Bowen Mosaic, origin energy, Santos, Sunshine Gas, 
arrow energy, Mitsui, Molopo, Queensland 
Gas Company
daRWIN
amadeus Basin to darwin (96% aPa Group) amadeus Magellan, Santos
PeRTh
dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline 
(dueT (60%), alcoa (20%), Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure (20%))
Carnarvon 
 
Perth
apache energy, BhPB, BP, Chevron, 
exxonMobil, Inpex, Kufpec, Santos, Shell, 
Tap oil, Woodside Petroleum
aRC energy, origin energy
Parmelia Pipeline (aPa Group) Perth aRC energy, origin energy
Notes:
1. In some cases, it may only be possible to source gas from a particular basin using backhaul and swap arrangements. See chapter 8.
2. Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
Principal source: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, August 2008.
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The significant differences between pipeline charges 
reflect various factors, including differences in 
transportation distances; differences in underlying 
capital costs; the age and extent of depreciation on the 
pipeline; technological and geographical differences; and 
the availability of spare pipeline capacity. In general, it 
is cheaper to transport gas into Sydney, Canberra and 
Adelaide from the Cooper Basin than it is from the 
Victorian coastal basins.
In practice, pipeline charges may vary considerably from 
the indicative rates set out in figure 9.6. In all cases it 
is open to an access seeker to try to negotiate discounts 
against published rates, including for non-standard 
requirements such as interruptible services.24
Conversely, some tariffs may be considerably higher 
than those set out in figure 9.6, especially if a pipeline is 
capacity-constrained and requires an expansion to make 
access possible. For example:
> limited capacity on the Eastern Gas Pipeline led to 
tariffs of up to $7.35 per gigajoule in 2008
> capacity issues on the SEA Gas Pipeline led to a 
withdrawal of all offers to sell capacity to third parties 
in 2008.
Tariffs for interruptible services are typically 30 per cent 
higher than they are for firm transportation charges, but 
are paid on the actual quantities shipped rather than on 
reserved capacity.25
It should be noted that the relevant consideration for 
customers is the cost of delivered gas — the bundled cost 
of gas and transportation services — from alternative 
sources. The lead essay of this report (Australia’s 
natural gas markets: The emergence of competition?) 
provides ACIL Tasman estimates of the composition 
of delivered gas prices in mainland state capital cities. 
Retail prices range from around $15.50 per gigajoule 
in Melbourne to almost $28 per gigajoule in Brisbane. 
Transportation through the high pressure transmission 
system is the smallest contributor to delivered costs for 
residential consumers in the capital cities. Transmission 
charges range from around 2 per cent of delivered gas 
Figure	9.6	
indicative	pipeline	tariffs	to	major	centres
=dWVgi Adc\[dgYid=dWVgi
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Notes:
1. Tariffs are based on rates for firm forward-haulage services, and assume a 100 per cent swing factor.
2. Gas sourced from the Cooper Basin for Brisbane customers must travel via both the South West Queensland and the Roma to Brisbane pipelines.
3. Distances are indicative.
Sources: EnergyQuest, Energy Quarterly Report, February 2008 (Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline); NERA, The Gas Supply Chain in Eastern Australia, March 2008, p. 51 
(other pipelines).
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24 Interruptible services are provided intermittently, depending on available pipeline capacity.
25 NERA, The Gas Supply Chain in Eastern Australia, June 2007, p. 42 and p. 52. Backhaul arrangements are discussed in chapter 8 of this report.
prices in Adelaide and Melbourne to 7 per cent in 
Perth. For larger industrial users, this proportion rises 
steadily with scale as the fixed costs associated with 
downstream services are spread across much larger gas 
supply volumes.
9.6	 Financial	indicators
There is limited performance data for the gas 
transmission sector. Historically, performance reports 
have not been published for covered pipelines, although 
the National Gas Law enables the AER to publish such 
reports in the future. Regulatory determinations include 
some historical performance data, as well as forward 
projections.
As noted, the owners of non-covered pipelines are not 
required to report publicly on historical performance 
or projected outcomes. The gas market bulletin board, 
which commenced in July 2008, will increase the 
availability of information about transmission pipelines — 
including capacity and supply information. The bulletin 
board covers most transmission pipelines in southern 
and eastern Australia, including non-covered pipelines.26
The limited financial data currently available 
mainly comprises financial forecasts in regulatory 
determinations for covered pipelines. There has been 
little historical reporting of service quality outcomes. 
The following sections set out summary data on 
forecast revenues and operating expenditure for 
covered pipelines.
9.6.1 Regulated revenues
Fıgure 9.7 charts annual revenues for a selection of 
transmission pipelines, based on forecasts in regulatory 
decisions. The variation in forecast revenues across 
pipelines reflects a range of factors, including differences 
in demand, age, capacity and length of the pipelines. 
The data indicates stable or modest revenue growth 
over time, consistent with rising demand and capital 
expenditure requirements. The data for the Dampier to 
Bunbury Pipeline reflects the impact of capital-related 
cost increases associated with the looping and extension 
of the pipeline.
Figure	9.7	
Regulated	revenue	forecasts	for	transmission	pipelines
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Notes:
1. All data is converted to June 2007 dollars.
2. The data for the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline terminates after 2004 
due to a revocation of coverage.
Sources: Approved access arrangement for each pipeline.
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26 See chapter 8, section 8.7.
9.6.2 operating expenses
Fıgure 9.8 charts the forecast operating and maintenance 
expenditure approved in access arrangements for major 
covered transmission pipelines. Consistent with the 
front-loaded nature of pipeline investment, the data 
suggests that transmission pipelines incur relatively 
stable and modest operating costs. The upward trend in 
operating expenses for the Dampier to Bunbury Pipeline 
reflects both the impact of a major capacity expansion 
(including the costs of operating new compressors) and 
rising resource costs in the energy construction sector.
Figure	9.8	
Forecast	operating	and	maintenance	expenditure	for	
major	pipelines
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Notes:
1. All data is converted to June 2007 dollars.
2. The data for the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline terminates after 2004, due to a 
revocation of coverage.
Sources: Approved access arrangement for each pipeline.
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	10	Gas 
distribution
Natural gas distribution networks transport gas from gas transmission pipelines and 
reticulate it into residential houses, offices, hospitals and businesses. Their main customers 
are energy retailers, which aggregate loads for sale to end users. For small gas users, 
distribution charges for metering and transport often represent the most significant 
component — up to 60 per cent — of retail gas prices.
Distributors can further adjust gas pressure at regulating 
stations in the network to ensure that the delivered gas 
is at a suitable pressure for the operation of customer 
equipment and appliances.
Australian laws require odorant to be added to gas that 
enters a distribution system. This promotes safety by 
making leaks easier to detect. The odorant is usually 
added at the gate station.
10.2	 Australia’s	distribution	networks
The total length of Australia’s gas distribution networks 
expanded from around 67 000 kilometres in 1997 to 
over 81 000 kilometres in 2007. The networks deliver 
This chapter considers:
> Australia’s gas distribution sector
> the structure of the sector, including industry participants and ownership changes over time
> the economic regulation of distribution networks
> new investment in distribution networks
> financial indicators and service performance of the distribution sector.
	10	Gas 
distribution
10.1	 Role	of	distribution	networks
A distribution network typically consists of high, 
medium and low pressure pipelines. The high and 
medium pressure mains provide a ‘backbone’ that 
services areas of high demand and transports gas 
between population concentrations within a distribution 
area. The low pressure pipes lead off the high pressure 
mains to end customers.
Gate stations (city gates) link transmission pipelines 
with distribution networks. The stations measure the 
natural gas entering a distribution system for billing and 
gas balancing purposes. They also adjust the pressure 
of the gas before it enters the distribution network. 
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over 300 petajoules of gas a year and have a combined 
valuation of over $7 billion. Investment to augment and 
expand the networks is forecast at around $2 billion 
in the current regulatory cycle. Table 10.1 provides 
summary details of the major networks.
Fıgure 10.1 shows the location of gas distribution 
networks in Australia. In the past few years, new 
networks have been rolled out in north-western 
New South Wales (Central Ranges) and Tasmania 
following the construction of transmission pipelines into 
these regions. Natural gas is now reticulated to most 
Australian capital cities, major regional areas and towns.
10.3	 Ownership	of	distribution	networks
The major gas distribution networks in Australia are 
privately owned. South Australia, Victoria, Western 
Australia and Queensland privatised their state-owned 
networks in 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2006, respectively. 
The principal New South Wales network has always 
been in private hands.1 Over time, structural reform 
and capital market drivers have led to specialist 
network businesses acquiring most assets in the sector. 
Fıgure 10.2 shows key ownership changes since 1994.
Two significant ownership changes in 2006 were the sale 
of AGL’s New South Wales networks to Alinta and the 
privatisation of Queensland’s Allgas network, which was 
sold to the APA Group. In 2007, the sale of Alinta led to 
Singapore Power International and Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure acquiring gas distribution assets.
By 2008, ownership consolidation had reduced the 
number of principal players in the gas distribution sector 
to four:
> Singapore Power International owns the principal New 
South Wales gas distribution network (Alinta AGN). 
It has a 51 per cent share in the Victorian network 
(SP AusNet) and a 50 per cent share of the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) network (ActewAGL). 
In August 2008, Singapore Power International 
rebranded its gas distribution entities as Jemena.
> Envestra, a public company in which the APA 
Group and Cheung Kong Infrastructure each have a 
17 per cent shareholding, owns networks in Victoria, 
South Australia and Queensland, as well as a small 
Northern Territory network.
> Babcock & Brown Infrastructure owns the Tasmanian 
distribution network (Powerco) and is the majority 
owner of the Western Australian network.
> The APA Group owns the Allgas network in 
Queensland, and has a 17 per cent stake in Envestra.
Other players include:
> DUET Group, which is the majority owner of 
Victoria’s Multinet network and a minority owner 
of the Western Australian network. DUET Group 
contracts out the operation of its networks.
> Cheung Kong Infrastructure, which owns a 
17 per cent interest in Envestra.
There are increasing ownership linkages between gas 
distribution and other energy networks. In particular, 
Singapore Power International, Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure and the APA Group own and operate 
both gas transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
In addition, Singapore Power International, the APA 
Group, Cheung Kong Infrastructure and DUET Group 
all have ownership interests — in some cases, substantial 
interests — in the electricity network sector (see chapters 
4, 5 and 9).
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1 There are remnants of state-owned gas distribution networks in rural New South Wales and Queensland.
2 DUET Group comprises a number of trusts, the responsible entities for which are owned by Macquarie Bank and AMP Capital Holdings.
Table	10.1	 Australian	natural	gas	distribution	networks
DisTRibuTiOn	
nETwORk
LOCATiOn LEngTH	
Of	
mAins	
(km)
AssET	bAsE	
($	miLLiOn	
2007)
invEsTmEnT	
—	CuRREnT	
REguLATORy	
PERiOD	
($	miLLiOn	2007)
CuRREnT	
REguLATORy	
PERiOD
OwnER
New South waleS aNd aCt
NSw Gas 
Networks 
(alinta aGN)
Sydney, Newcastle/
Central Coast and 
wollongong
23 800 2088 518 1 July 2005 – 
 30 June 2010
Jemena (Singapore Power 
International (australia))
Central Ranges 
System
dubbo to tamworth 
region
250 n/a n/a 2006 – 2019 aPa Group
wagga wagga 
distribution
wagga wagga and 
surrounding areas
622 47 8 1 July 2005 – 
 30 June 2010
Country energy (NSw Govt)
actewaGl 
distribution 
(Canberra 
network)
aCt and 
Queanbeyan
3 621 247 49 1 July 2004 – 
 30 June 2010
aCtew Corporation (aCt Govt) 
50%; Jemena (Singapore Power 
International (australia)) 50%
VICtoRIa
Multinet Melbourne’s 
eastern and south-
eastern suburbs
9 513 888 251 1 Jan 2008 – 
31 dec 2012
duet Group 79.9%; BBI 20.1%
envestra (Stratus) Melbourne, north-
east and central 
Victoria, and albury 
— wodonga region
9 350 859 394 1 Jan 2008 – 
31 dec 2012
envestra (Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 17%, 
aPa Group 17%)
SP ausNet 
(westar)
western Victoria 9 140 955 343 1 Jan 2008 – 
31 dec 2012
SP ausNet (listed company: 
Singapore Power International 
51%)
QueeNSlaNd
allgas South of the 
Brisbane River
2 515 307 155 1 July 2006 – 
 30 June 2011
aPa Group
envestra Brisbane, Gladstone 
and Rockhampton
2 261 235 100 1 July 2006 – 
 30 June 2011
envestra (Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 17%, 
aPa Group 17%)
South auStRalIa
South australian 
distribution
adelaide and 
surrounds
7 377 851 204 1 July 2006 – 
30 June 2011
envestra (Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 17%, 
aPa Group 17%)
weSteRN auStRalIa
alinta Gas 
Networks
Mid-west and 
south-west regions
12 157 708 157 1 Jan 2005 – 
31 dec 2009
BBI 74.1%, duet Group 25.9%. 
operated by westNet energy 
(owned by BBI)
taSMaNIa
tasmanian Gas 
Network
hobart, launceston 
and other towns
683 100 n/a Not covered Powerco (BBI)
National totals 81 289 7285 2179
BBI, Babcock & Brown Infrastructure; n/a, not available.
Notes:
1. For Tasmania, the asset value is an estimated construction cost. For other networks, the asset value is the opening regulated asset base for the current regulatory period, 
adjusted to June 2007 dollars.
2. Investment data are forecasts for the current asset arrangement period, adjusted to June 2007 dollars.
3. Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
Sources: Access arrangements for covered pipelines; company websites.
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figure	10.1	
gas	distribution	networks	in	Australia
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Notes:
1. Locations of the distribution systems are indicative only.
2. Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
Source: Australian Gas Association submission to the Productivity Commission, Review of the gas access regime, August 2003, submission 13, p. 102; supplemented with 
additional information.
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10.4.1 Regulatory framework
The regulation of covered distribution networks was 
transferred from state and territory regulators to the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) on 1 July 2008.5 
In Western Australia, the local regulator — the Economic 
Regulation Authority — will continue to regulate 
covered networks.
The AER’s first regulatory review in gas distribution will 
assess prices and other access terms and conditions from 
July 2010 for covered networks in New South Wales and 
the ACT. The AER is working closely with jurisdictional 
regulators and network businesses to maintain regulatory 
certainty in the transition period.
The service provider6 of a covered distribution network 
must comply with the provisions of the National Gas 
Law and Gas Rules. Typically this requires submitting 
an access arrangement — including pipeline tariffs — to the 
regulator for approval. The legislation also allows for a 
light regulation option in some circumstances, in which 
the service provider is obliged only to publish terms and 
conditions of access on its website.
An access arrangement must set out the terms and 
conditions of third party access. It must specify at 
least one reference service that is commonly sought by 
customers, and a reference (benchmark) tariff for that 
service. The reference service can be set for different 
zones (different customer locations across the network) 
and may comprise different components.
A reference tariff provides a benchmark for negotiating 
prices, but is also enforceable by the regulator. Reference 
tariffs may apply to one or more of the network services 
offered, including capacity reservation (managed capacity 
services), volume (throughput services), peak, off-peak 
and metering (data) services. A network may also deliver 
non-reference services.
10.4	 Regulation	of	distribution	networks
Gas distribution networks are capital intensive and 
incur declining costs as output increases. This gives rise 
to a natural monopoly industry structure. In Australia, 
the networks are regulated to manage the risk of 
monopoly pricing.
The National Gas Law and National Gas Rules 
(Gas Rules), which took effect on 1 July 2008, provide 
the overarching regulatory framework for the gas 
distribution sector. These instruments replace the 
Gas Pipelines Access Law and the National Gas Code 
(Gas Code), which provided the regulatory framework 
from 1997 to 30 June 2008.
The Gas Rules (previously the Gas Code) include 
a coverage mechanism to determine which pipelines 
are subject to economic regulation. At July 2008, the 
Gas Rules covered 12 distribution networks, including 
all major networks in New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia. 
The only major unregulated network is the Tasmanian 
distribution network, which is currently being rolled out. 
In addition, a number of small regional networks are 
not covered.3
The main aim of regulating a distribution network is to 
ensure that energy retailers and other third parties can 
negotiate access on reasonable terms and conditions. 
This may require an independent regulator to vet prices 
to ensure they are not set at monopolistic rates.4
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3 A party may seek a change in the coverage status of a pipeline by applying to the National Competition Council. At present, the non-covered networks include the 
South West Slopes and Temora extensions of the NSW Gas Network; the Dalby and Roma town systems in Queensland; the Alice Springs network in the Northern 
Territory; and the Mildura system in Victoria.
4 The new gas access regime, which took effect in 2008, allows a light regulation option, without direct price control, under certain conditions. See section 9.3.
5 While the AER assumed the role of economic regulator of distribution networks on 1 July 2008, existing access arrangements will continue to be administered by the 
jurisdictional regulators – in Victoria, the Essential Services Commission of Victoria (ESC); in South Australia, the Essential Services Commission of South Australia 
(ESCOSA); in New South Wales, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART); in Queensland, the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA); and 
in the Australian Capital Territory, the Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission (ICRC).
6 In accordance with the National Gas Law, the service provider may be the owner or operator of the whole pipeline or any part of the pipeline.
Most network providers use a building block approach 
to determine total revenues. Under the Gas Rules, 
total revenues should reflect efficient costs, recover 
depreciation and operating expenditure, and provide a 
return on capital. Reference tariffs are set by dividing 
total revenue by forecast sales volumes for the relevant 
reference services. Tariffs are typically adjusted annually 
for inflation and other approved factors.7
While the new regulatory framework — which 
commenced on 1 July 2008 — makes some changes 
to the decision-making process and the timing of 
regulatory decisions, the approach to assessing reference 
tariffs remains largely unchanged. Chapter 9 provides a 
summary of key changes affecting regulatory decision 
making under the new legislation.
Fıgure 10.3 shows the revenue components in the latest 
access arrangement for Multinet in Victoria (owned by 
DUET Group and Babcock & Brown Infrastructure). 
It illustrates the relative importance of the building block 
components in a typical reference tariff determination. 
Returns on assets and depreciation account for around 
two-thirds of the revenue determination. Operating and 
maintenance costs; tax; and efficiency carry-overs account 
for the balance.
figure	10.2	
Distribution	network	ownership
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BBI, Babcock & Brown Infrastructure; SECWA, State Energy Commission of Western Australia; WAGH, WA Gas Holdings.
Note: Some corporate names have been abbreviated or shortened.
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7 See also chapter 9 for background on the regulatory framework for gas transmission. The frameworks for gas transmission and distribution are similar.
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10.5	 investment	in	distribution	networks
Investment in gas distribution typically involves 
capital works to upgrade and expand the capacity of 
existing networks and extend the networks into new 
residential and commercial developments, regional 
centres and towns. While most major centres already 
have a distribution network in place, there are also 
recent examples of new networks being constructed 
— for example, the Central Ranges (New South Wales) 
and Tasmanian networks. Mostly, however, distribution 
investment relates to discrete development and upgrade 
projects that are relatively small compared to capital 
projects in gas transmission. This tends to result in 
distribution investment recording relatively stable trends 
over time, compared to the ‘lumpy’ investment cycles 
often seen for gas transmission.
The cost of distribution investment depends on a range 
of factors, including:
> the distance of new infrastructure from access points 
on gas transmission lines or gas distribution mains
> the density of housing and the presence of other 
industrial and commercial users in the area.
Fıgure 10.4 shows the opening regulated asset bases 
(RABs)8 and forecast investment over the current 
regulatory period (typically five years) for the major 
networks. Fıgure 10.5 shows annual investment in each 
network in the current decade, based on actual data 
where available, and forecast data for other years. The 
forecast data relates to proposed investment that the 
regulator has approved as efficient. The chart excludes 
the Tasmanian distribution network, which is not 
covered by the Gas Rules. The graphs depict real data in 
June 2007 dollars.
Investment in gas distribution networks has grown 
steadily in recent years:
> Investment was forecast at around $400 million in 
2007 – 08, and grew on average, by around 8 per cent 
annually over the preceding five years.
> Over the longer term, real investment of around 
$2 billion is forecast during the current regulatory 
periods for the major networks. This represents both 
substantial real investment in new infrastructure as 
well as rising resource costs in the construction sector.9
> Investment over the current regulatory cycle is running 
at around 25 per cent of the underlying asset base in 
most networks, but around 35 per cent for SP AusNet 
(Victoria) and 40 – 50 per cent for Envestra (Victoria) 
and the Queensland networks.
> The combined Victorian networks attract significantly 
higher investment than New South Wales, in part 
reflecting the penetration of natural gas as a major 
heating source in Victoria. More generally, different 
outcomes between jurisdictions reflect a range of 
variables, including development activity; incentives or 
policies that encourage gas supply; market conditions; 
and investment drivers such as the scale and age of 
the networks.
figure	10.3	
Revenue	components	for	victoria’s	multinet	gas	
network,	2008	–	12
9ZegZX^Vi^dc(/DeZgVi^c\Xdhih(+ GZijgcdcVhhZih).
IVm):[[^X^ZcXn+
Source: ESC, Gas access arrangement review 2008 – 2012, Final decision, 2008.
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8 The regulated asset base estimates the depreciated optimised replacement cost of an asset.
9 Some resource costs in the energy construction sector are rising faster than general inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Chapter 4 provides data on 
rising costs. See section 4.4, including figures 4.7 and 4.8.
> Investment is forecast to rise strongly during the 
current decade in Queensland, South Australia 
and Victoria. Recent regulatory determinations for 
these jurisdictions reflect a significant step-increase 
in forecast investment in the current regulatory 
cycle. Looking forward, the introduction of carbon 
emission reduction policies may further accelerate the 
development of natural gas as an energy source, and 
influence investment.
> The investment data mostly reflects the incremental 
expansion of existing networks. For example, Envestra 
began a $3.7 million project in 2005 to upgrade and 
extend its Queensland network. The construction of 
new transmission pipelines also provides opportunities 
to develop new distribution networks. For example, 
the Tasmanian distribution network is being rolled out 
in major cities and towns following the construction of 
a transmission pipeline from Victoria to Tasmania.
> Gas distribution investment tends to reflect more 
stable trends over time than gas transmission. This 
reflects the nature of gas distribution investment, 
which typically focuses on roll-out and upgrade 
projects. There is some volatility due to factors such 
as timing differences between the commissioning 
and completion of projects. More generally, the 
network businesses have some flexibility to manage 
and reprioritise the timing of capital expenditure over 
the regulatory period. Transitions between regulatory 
periods, and from actual to forecast data, also cause 
some data volatility.
10.6	 financial	indicators
Some jurisdictional regulators have published annual 
performance reports on gas distribution networks. 
The reports reflect the dual roles of some jurisdictional 
agencies as technical and economic regulators. In 
addition, regulatory determinations include both 
historical performance data for the preceding regulatory 
period and forecasts of future outcomes. The data set out 
in section 10.6 are derived from regulatory forecasts.
10.6.1 Revenues
Fıgure 10.6 charts real revenues for the major networks, 
based on forecasts in regulatory decisions. Real 
revenues have remained stable over time, with modest 
growth — reflecting rising demand — in some instances. 
figure	10.4	
gas	distribution	assets	and	investment	—	current	regulatory	period	(real)
b
'
%%
,
%
*%%
&%%%
&*%%
'%%%
'*%%
;dgZXVhiXVe^iVaZmeZcY^ijgZG67
6XiZl6<A
68I
:ckZhigV
FaY
6aa\Vh
FaY
6a^ciV
L6
:ckZhigV
H6
HE6jhCZi
K^X
:ckZhigV
K^X
Bjai^cZi
K^X
CHL
<VhCZildg`h
Notes:
1. The asset valuation for each pipeline is the RAB published in a regulator-approved access arrangement.
2. Investment data represents forecast capital expenditure over the current regulatory period (see table 10.1). 
3. All estimates are converted to June 2007 dollars.
Sources: Access arrangements and regulatory determinations published by ESC (Vic); IPART (NSW); QCA (Qld); ESCOSA (SA); ERA (WA); and ICRC (ACT).
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figure	10.5	
network	investment	(real)
Notes:
1. The asset valuation for each pipeline is the RAB published in a regulator-approved access arrangement.
2. Actual data (unbroken lines) used when available and forecasts (broken lines) for other years.
Sources: Access arrangements, regulatory determinations and network performance reports published by ESC (Vic); IPART (NSW); QCA (Qld); ESCOSA (SA); ERA 
(WA); and ICRC (ACT).
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The variations between networks reflect differences in 
market conditions and cost drivers such as the scale and 
age of the networks. For example, the relatively high 
revenues for NSW Gas Networks in part reflects that 
the network covers most of the state. In comparison, 
Victoria has three major networks.
10.6.2  operating and maintenance 
expenditure
Fıgure 10.7 compares forecast operating and 
maintenance expenditure for the networks on a per 
kilometre basis. Most networks have expenses ranging 
from about $4000 to $7000 per kilometre of network 
line length. Differences may arise for a number of 
reasons, including the age and condition of the networks 
and geographical factors. Normalising on a per kilometre 
basis may bias against high-density urban networks with 
relatively short line lengths. Envestra, which has been 
expanding its Queensland network, recorded higher per 
kilometre costs than the other networks.
figure	10.6	
Revenue	forecasts	(real)
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Notes: 
1. Forecast data for year ended 30 June. Victorian data are for previous calendar year (for example, 2006 – 07 refers to calendar year 2006).
2. All data converted to 2007 dollars.
Source: Approved access arrangement for each pipeline.
figure	10.7	
Operating	and	maintenance	expenditure	per	kilometre	
of	pipeline,	2007

eZ
g
`^
ad
b
Zi
gZ
%
&%%%
'%%%
(%%%
)%%%
*%%%
+%%%
,%%%
-%%%
.%%%
&%%%%
6a^ciV
L6
:ckZhigV
H6
:ckZhigV
FaY
6aa\Vh
FaY
6XiZl
6<A68I
CHL
<Vh
CZildg` h
HE
6jhCZi
K^X
:ckZhigV
K^X
Bjai^ cZi
K^X
Notes:
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2. All data converted to 2007 dollars.
Sources: Approved access arrangement for each pipeline; network performance 
reports published by ESC (Vic); IPART (NSW); QCA (Qld); ESCOSA (SA); 
ERA (WA); and ICRC (ACT).
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Table	10.2	 gas	distribution	performance:	reporting	arrangements
JuRisDiCTiOn REPORTing	ARRAngEmEnTs
New South wales distribution businesses report annually to the department of water and energy on network integrity and safety 
information, network reliability and consumer-related matters. as of 1 March 2008, the most recent published data 
was for 2001 – 02.
Victoria the essential Services Commission publishes annual performance reports for the three gas distribution 
businesses, covering financial performance, reliability of supply, network integrity, and customer service.
Queensland the Queensland Competition authority publishes annual performance reports for the two distribution businesses, 
covering unaccounted-for gas, reliability of supply and customer service.
South australia the essential Services Commission of South australia publishes annual performance reports, covering financial 
performance, reliability of supply, network integrity and customer service.
western australia the economic Regulation authority published its first compliance report for gas distribution in 2007, covering 
reliability of supply and network integrity. New licensing arrangements will widen the range of published data over 
time, including performance indicators based on the Victorian model.
tasmania the office of the tasmanian energy Regulator publishes annual performance reports, covering reliability of supply, 
network integrity, and customer service.
aCt the Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission publishes annual performance reports, covering 
network performance and consumer protection. as of 1 March 2008, the most recent published data was 
for 2004 – 05.
10.7	 Quality	of	service
Quality of service monitoring for gas distribution 
services typically relates to:
> reliability of gas supply (the provision of a continuous 
gas supply to customers)
> network integrity (gas leaks; the effectiveness of 
operational and maintenance activities)
> customer service (responsiveness to issues such as 
complaints and reported gas leaks).
While the Utility Regulators Forum established national 
reporting indicators on service quality for electricity 
distribution and energy retailing, there are no equivalent 
indicators for gas distribution. Instead, the practice has 
been to develop jurisdiction-specific service standards 
and reporting arrangements. Some of these technical 
and service standards are connected with jurisdictional 
licensing requirements. The jurisdictional reporting 
arrangements are outlined in table 10.2.
As noted, the monitoring and reporting of service 
quality is less comprehensive in the natural gas sector 
than in the electricity sector. This reflects:
> different approaches to reporting across jurisdictions
> the greater reliance on electricity than natural gas as 
a major energy source for most end-users
> technical characteristics inherent in the distribution 
of gas.
A distinguishing feature of reliability and network 
integrity issues in the gas sector compared with the 
electricity sector is the management of safety issues 
and the scope for widespread damage and injury from 
incidents such as gas explosions. The oversight of these 
gas network integrity and safety issues is undertaken 
by technical jurisdictional regulators, and is generally 
administered through licensing requirements.
10.7.1 Reliability of supply
The reliability of gas supply refers to the continuity of 
supply to customers. Most jurisdictions impose reliability 
requirements on gas distributors as part of their licence 
conditions and publish performance data. In some cases, 
jurisdictions impose statutory obligations for network 
operators and owners, relating to the continuity of 
gas supply.
From a reliability perspective, gas distribution networks 
can maintain continuous gas flow to most customers in 
the event of a disruption to part of the network. In the 
case of planned renewals, or unplanned incidents such 
as gas explosions, third party damage, water entering 
the mains or directions from the technical regulator, 
customers in the vicinity of the incident or those 
affected by the technical direction of the regulator may 
experience a loss of gas flow. However, even if a gas 
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main is damaged, the gas can usually still flow across the 
distribution network, leaving supply to most customers 
unaffected. If necessary, a distribution network operator 
can load-shed some customers to manage a more 
serious supply interruption (as will be discussed later 
in the chapter).
Fıgure 10.8 shows the most recent data for each 
jurisdiction on the number of significant10 unplanned 
supply interruptions per 1000 customers. The Victorian, 
Queensland and South Australian regulators publish 
these data annually. Tasmania also publishes annual 
data, but not on a comparable basis to the mainland 
networks. The Tasmanian data are likely to record 
volatility while the state’s distribution network is being 
rolled out. The ACT recorded negligible interruptions 
in the only year of published data. The New South 
Wales Department of Water and Energy collects annual 
reliability data from network businesses, but the latest 
published data are for 2001 – 02.
Fıgure 10.8 indicates that the rate of interruptions is 
low for all networks, with most recording fewer than 
0.05 events per 1000 customers. The Essential Services 
Commission (ESC) reported in 2007 that the average 
Victorian customer may expect to lose supply about 
once every 40 years.11 In part, these outcomes reflect the 
inherently reliable nature of gas distribution networks. 
Envestra’s Queensland network, which recorded a 
higher rate of interruptions than other networks, 
received a significant increase in investment allowances 
in the current regulatory period. This may improve the 
network’s reliability performance over time.
There were significant reliability issues in New South 
Wales and the ACT from 22 – 24 June 2007 when 
capacity on the Eastern Gas Pipeline and gas flows on 
the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline were insufficient to 
meet higher than expected demand. The distribution 
network operator was able to manage this issue by load-
shedding large industrial and commercial customers, 
resulting in interruptions to their gas supplies. This 
enabled gas flows to continue without interruption to 
smaller retail customers. While there was no underlying 
infrastructure failure in this instance, the New South 
Wales Government established a Gas Continuity Scheme 
in 2008 to mitigate the risk of a recurrence. The scheme 
will provide commercial incentives for producers to 
increase supplies and customers to reduce gas usage in 
the event of a shortfall event.
figure	10.8	
significant	unplanned	interruptions	per	1000	customers
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Sources: Network performance reports published by ESC (Vic); QCA (Qld); ESCOSA (SA); ICRC (ACT); and Department of Water and Energy (NSW).
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10 Affecting five or more customers.
11 ESC, Gas Distribution Businesses, Comparative Performance Report 2006, 2007, p. 2.
10.7.2 Network integrity
Network integrity issues relate to matters such as the 
frequency of gas leaks and the amount of unaccounted-
for gas. Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and the 
ACT publish data on gas leaks, but the indicators differ 
between jurisdictions. Victoria and the ACT publish 
annual data on the number of gas leaks per kilometre 
of pipe. The Victorian networks typically record around 
1.3 gas leaks per kilometre each year, but most leaks 
affect few customers. In 2007, Western Australia began 
publishing data on the number of reported gas leaks 
occurring in public areas. Queensland reports a separate 
data series on the response time to repair gas leaks. The 
data indicate a typical response time of just under one 
hour for a network business to secure the site of a leak.
Unaccounted-for gas refers to the difference between 
the amount of gas injected into a distribution network 
and the amount of gas ultimately delivered to customers. 
Losses can occur for a number of reasons, including 
gas leaks, meter reading errors and theft. Queensland, 
South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania report 
annually on this data. The Western Australian regulator 
published these data for the first time in 2007. The ACT 
last published data on unaccounted-for gas in 2004 – 05. 
The latest reported New South Wales data are for 
2001 – 02. Fıgure 10.9 sets out the latest three years of 
data for Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, and 
the limited data available for Western Australia, New 
South Wales and the ACT.
Fıgure 10.9 indicates that up to 7 per cent of gas injected 
into a pipeline may be unaccounted for. The Essential 
Services Commission of South Australia noted in its 
2006 – 2007 performance report that unaccounted-for 
gas had almost doubled in the Envestra network since 
2002 – 03. The issue may be linked to the existence of 
older cast iron pipelines in parts of network. Envestra 
is undertaking a capital works program to replace 
around 100 kilometres of cast iron pipes a year.12 
In 2007, the Queensland Competition Authority 
also noted a high rate of unaccounted-for gas in 
Envestra’s Queensland network. Envestra reported that 
infrastructure replacement programs would likely reduce 
unaccounted-for gas over time.13 Conversely, the low 
figure	10.9	
unaccounted-for	gas
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Note: Limited data available for New South Wales, Western Australia and the ACT.
Sources: Network performance reports published by ESC (Vic); QCA (Qld); ESCOSA (SA); ICRC (ACT); and Department of Water and Energy (NSW)
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12 ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of South Australian energy networks, 2007, p. 77.
13 Queensland Competition Authority, Gas Distribution — Service Quality Performance for the Year Ending 30 June 2007, 2007, p. 7.
figure	10.10	
Customer	complaints	per	1000	customers
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Sources: Network performance reports published by ESC (Vic), QCA (Qld); and ESCOSA (SA).
figure	10.11	
guaranteed	service	level	payments	—	victoria
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rate of unaccounted-for gas in Tasmania may in part 
reflect the fact that the distribution network is relatively 
new and embodies more recent technology than some 
other networks.
10.7.3 Customer service
The level of customer service achieved by a distributor 
can be measured in terms of timeliness and 
responsiveness across a range of customer interactions, 
including customer calls, arranging new connections, 
keeping appointments, and the number and nature 
of complaints made about service providers. Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia report annually on 
this information (figure 10.10). The latest reported 
New South Wales data is for 2001 – 02. As of 1 March 
2008, the latest data for the ACT were for 2004 – 05.
The number of customer complaints has tended to lie 
in a range of 0.5 to 2 complaints per 1000 customers. 
Envestra achieved a significantly lower rate of 
complaints in both Queensland and South Australia. 
The complaints rate has tended to fall in Victoria over 
the past three years. A number of factors may limit the 
validity of comparisons between the networks, including 
differences in measurement and auditing systems.
Victoria applies guaranteed service levels that 
distributors must meet, or pay penalties for breaches. 
Fıgure 10.11 sets the number of payments made by each 
distributor for failures to meet target service levels over 
a three-year period. The ESC reported that, in 2006, 
distributors made 307 payments worth almost $30 000. 
The number of payments declined by 12 per cent and 
their total value by 8 per cent from 2005, although 
performance levels varied between networks.14
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14 Essential Services Commission (ESC), Victoria, Gas distribution businesses — comparative performance report 2006, 2007.
	11	Gas Retail 
MaRkets
The retail market is the final link in the gas supply chain. It provides the main interface 
between the gas industry and customers, such as households and small business. Retailers 
enter into contracts with producers and pipeline operators and package these together 
as an aggregated service for sale to consumers. Because retailers deal directly with 
consumers, the services they provide significantly affect perceptions of the performance 
of the gas industry.
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State and territory governments are responsible for 
the regulation of retail energy markets. Governments 
agreed in 2004 to transfer non-price regulatory functions 
to a national framework to be administered by the 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) and 
the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE) has scheduled the regulatory 
package to be introduced to the South Australian 
parliament in September 2009.1
Retail customers include residential, business and 
industrial gas users. This chapter focuses on the retailing 
of gas to small customers,2 including households 
and small business users. Many energy retailers are 
active in both gas and electricity markets and offer 
dual fuel products. This chapter should therefore 
be read in conjunction with Chapter 6, ‘Electricity 
retail markets’.
This chapter provides a survey of gas retail markets. It covers:
> the structure of the retail market, including industry participants and trends towards 
vertical integration
> the development of retail competition
> retail market outcomes, including price, affordability and service quality
> the regulation of the retail market.
	11	Gas Retail 
MaRkets
292 state OF tHe eNeRGY MaRket
1 Sections 11.6 and 6.7 provide an update on the transition to future regulatory arrangements.
2 Small customers are defined as those using less than 1 terajoule of gas a year.
Figure	11.1	
Introduction	of	full	retail	contestability
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FRC, full retail contestability.
While this chapter reports some data that might enable 
performance comparisons to be made between retailers 
and jurisdictions, such analysis should note that a variety 
of factors can affect relative performance.
11.1	 Retail	market	structure
Historically, gas retailers in Australia were integrated 
with gas distributors and operated essentially 
as monopoly providers in their state or region. 
In the 1990s, governments began to reform the 
industry through restructuring, privatisation and the 
introduction of competition.
South Australia (in 1993), Victoria (in the late 1990s), 
Western Australia (in 2000) and Queensland3 (in 2007) 
have privatised their state-owned gas retailers. While 
New South Wales has some government ownership, 
its gas retail sector has always been mainly in private 
hands.4 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
Government operates a joint venture with the private 
sector to provide gas retail services. Before the formation 
of the joint venture in 2000, the ACT gas retailer was 
privately owned. One of the two active retailers in the 
relatively new Tasmanian gas retail sector is state-owned.
All state and territory governments have introduced full 
retail contestability (FRC) for gas customers, meaning 
that customers can enter a supply contract with a retailer 
of their choice (see figure 11.1). Most governments 
chose to phase in retail contestability by introducing 
competition for large industrial customers, followed 
by small industrial customers and, finally, small business 
and household customers.
The retail players in most jurisdictions include one 
or more host retailers, that are subject to various 
regulatory obligations, and new entrants. New entrants 
include new players in the gas retail sector, established 
interstate gas retailers, and electricity retailers branching 
into gas retailing.
Table 11.1 lists licensed gas retailers that are currently 
active in the market for residential and small business 
customers.5 Privately owned retailers are the major 
players in most jurisdictions.
> In the eastern states, the leading retailers are AGL 
Energy, Origin Energy and TRUenergy. Each has 
significant market share in Victoria and South 
Australia. AGL Energy is the leading gas retailer 
in New South Wales and jointly owns (with the ACT 
Government) the leading ACT retailer. AGL Energy 
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3 In Dalby and Roma the local councils operate distribution and retail services in their local areas.
4 The New South Wales Government owns EnergyAustralia and Country Energy.
5 Active retailers are those retailers that are offering gas supply to new small customers.
acquired significant market share in Queensland 
via the 2006 – 07 privatisation process, while Origin 
Energy was already an established retailer in that state.
> In Western Australia, Alinta (owned by Babcock & 
Brown Power) is the leading retailer and is the only 
retailer licensed to retail to customers consuming less 
than 0.18 terajoules a year.
> In Tasmania, Option One competes with the state-
owned Aurora Energy.
> Government-owned retailers account for a significant 
minority of the New South Wales market.
> Various niche players are active in most jurisdictions.
The following survey provides background on 
developments in each jurisdiction.
11.1.1 Victoria
At May 2008, Victoria had 12 licensed retailers, seven 
of which were active in the residential and small business 
market. These were:
> TRUenergy, AGL Energy and Origin Energy, 
each of which is the host retailer in designated 
areas of Victoria6
> four new players in the gas retail market, which were 
Australian Power & Gas, Red Energy, Simply Energy 
and Victoria Electricity.
Momentum Energy and Dodo Power & Gas held 
retail licences but were not actively marketing to small 
customers in May 2008.
Table	11.1	 Active	gas	retailers:	small	customer	market,	May	2008
RETAIlER1 OwnERsHIP VIC nsw Qld sA TAs2 ACT wA nT
ActewAGL Retail ACT Government and AGL Energy
AGL Energy AGL Energy
Alinta Babcock & Brown Power
Aurora Energy Tasmanian Government
Australian Power & Gas Australian Power & Gas
Country Energy NSW Government
EnergyAustralia NSW Government
Red Energy Snowy Hydro3
Simply Energy International Power
Option One Babcock & Brown Infrastructure
Origin Energy Origin Energy
TRUenergy CLP Group
Victoria Electricity Infratil
Active retailers 7 6 2 4 2 4 1 1
Approx. market size (’000 000 customers)4 1.68 1.02 0.15 0.37 0.003 0.09 0.57 0.001
n Host (incumbent) retailer n New entrant
Notes: 
1. Not all licensed retailers are listed. Some of the retailers listed only offer gas services as part of a gas and electricity contract. The list also excludes three small retailers 
(BRW Power Generation (Esperance), Dalby Town Council and Roma Town Council).
2. There is no host retailer in Tasmania as gas distribution and retail services have only been available for a short time and FRC existed from market start.
3. Snowy Hydro is owned by the New South Wales Government (58 per cent), the Victorian Government (29 per cent) and the Australian Government (13 per cent).
4. Customer numbers for Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory are based on ESAA data on the number of residential and small commercial and 
industrial connections to the distribution network, consuming less than 10 terajoules a year (at 30 June 2007).
Source: Jurisdictional regulator websites; ESAA Electricity Gas Australia 2008; updated by information on retailer websites and other public sources.
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6 In the late 1990s, Victoria split the Gas and Fuel Corporation into multiple retail businesses, each linked to a distribution network area, and sold each to different 
interests: Utilicorp and AMP Society (operating as United Energy and Pulse Energy), TXU, and Origin Energy. AGL acquired the former United Energy business 
in 2002 and TXU sold its retail interests to Singapore Power in 2004, which in turn sold the business to China Light and Power (now CLP Group) in 2005. 
The new owners rebadged TXU as TRUenergy.
Table 11.2 and figure 11.2 set out the market share 
of Victorian retailers (by customer numbers) at 30 June 
2007. The three host retailers (TRUenergy, AGL Energy 
and Origin Energy) account for about 89 per cent of the 
market and each retails beyond its ‘local’ area. While 
the market share of new entrants is small, new entrant 
penetration increased from 6 per cent of small customers 
in June 2006 to over 11 per cent in 2007.
Table	11.2	 Gas	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	
Victoria,	30	June	2007
RETAIlER CusTOMERs
Domestic Business Total retail
AGL Energy 29.6% 25.5% 29.4%
Origin Energy 33.4% 29.6% 33.3%
TRUenergy 25.7% 39.0% 26.0%
Other 11.4% 5.9% 11.2%
Total customers 1 634 871 44 940 1 679 811
Source: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 
2006/07 financial year, December 2007, p. 3.
Figure	11.2	
Gas	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	Victoria
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Note: figures at top of columns are total small customer numbers.
Source: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report, various years.
11.1.2 South Australia
At May 2008, South Australia had 12 licensed retailers, 
four of which were active in the residential and small 
business market. These were:
> the host retailer, Origin Energy
> three new entrants, which were South Australia’s host 
retailer in electricity (AGL Energy), an established 
interstate retailer (TRUenergy) and Simply Energy 
(a relatively new player in the retail market).
Country Energy, EnergyAustralia, Australian Power 
& Gas, Dodo Power & Gas, Jackgreen, Momentum 
Energy and South Australian Electricity held retail 
licences but were not actively marketing to small 
customers in May 2008. Several of these businesses are 
active in the South Australian electricity retail market.
Table 11.3 sets out the market share of South 
Australian retailers (by customer numbers) at June 2007. 
New entrants account for about 40 per cent of the small 
customer market — up from 30 per cent in 2006 and 
20 per cent in 2005 (see figure 11.3).
Table	11.3	 Gas	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	
south	Australia,	30	June	2007
RETAIlER CusTOMERs
Domestic Business Total retail
Origin Energy 59.3% 88.7% 59.9%
AGL Energy 17.3% 3.4% 17.0%
TRUenergy 13.1% 5.6% 13.0%
Simply Energy 10.3% 2.3% 10.1%
Total customers 365 077 7340 372 417
Source: ESCOSA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of the South 
Australian energy retail market, November 2007, p. 66.
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Figure	11.3	
Gas	retail	market	share	(small	customers)	—	
south	Australia
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Note: figures at top of columns are total small customer numbers.
Source: ESCOSA, Annual performance report: Performance of the South Australian 
energy retail market, various years.
11.1.3 New South Wales
At May 2008, New South Wales had 13 licensed 
retailers, six of which were active in the residential and 
small business market. These were:
> the host retailers, AGL Energy, Country Energy and 
ActewAGL Retail
> three new entrants, which were electricity retailer 
EnergyAustralia, established interstate retailer 
TRUenergy and Australian Power & Gas (a new 
player in the energy retail market).
Integral Energy and Jackgreen held retail licences 
but were not actively marketing to small customers 
in May 2008.
NERA Economic Consulting reported that at June 
2007, AGL Energy continued to supply the majority 
of the Sydney retail gas market and had a market 
share of 79 per cent, while the other significant gas 
retailer, EnergyAustralia, had a market share of around 
16 per cent.7
11.1.4 Queensland
At May 2008, Queensland had seven licensed retailers, 
two of which were active in the residential and small 
business market. These were the host retailers, AGL 
Energy (previously Sun Gas Retail)8 and Origin Energy.
In addition, the local councils in Dalby and Roma 
provide gas services in their local government areas. 
In June 2008, Australian Power & Gas withdrew 
from actively retailing in the gas retail market. 
EnergyAustralia obtained a retail licence in July 2007 
and Dodo Power & Gas in March 2008, but neither 
were actively retailing to small customers in May 2008.
11.1.5 Australian Capital Territory
At May 2008, the ACT had seven licensed retailers, four 
of which were active in the residential and small business 
market. The active retailers include the host retailer, 
ActewAGL Retail, and three new entrants, which were 
established interstate retailers EnergyAustralia, Country 
Energy and TRUenergy.
Dodo Power & Gas and Jackgreen held retail licences 
but were not actively marketing to small customers 
in May 2008.
NERA Economic Consulting reported that at June 
2007, ActewAGL Retail had a market share 
of 92 per cent.9 EnergyAustralia and Country Energy 
held the remaining 8 per cent.
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7 NERA Economic Consulting, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia — A report to the Australian Energy Market Commission, March 2008, p. 89.
8 AGL Energy acquired the government-owned Sun Gas Retail in 2006.
9 NERA Economic Consulting, The gas supply chain in eastern Australia — A report to the Australian Energy Market Commission, March 2008, p. 91.
11.1.6 Tasmania
At May 2008, Tasmania had two gas retailers active 
in the small customer market: the state-owned Aurora 
Energy and Option One (owned by Babcock & 
Brown Infrastructure through Powerco, the Tasmanian 
distribution network business). TRUenergy and Country 
Energy obtained retail licences in 2008 but were not 
actively marketing to small customers in May 2008.
11.1.7 Western Australia
Although the Western Australian retail market is open 
to retail competition, Alinta is the only active retailer for 
customers using less than 0.18 terajoules of gas a year. 
In May 2007, Babcock & Brown Power acquired Alinta’s 
Western Australian gas retail business.
The state’s host retailer in electricity, Synergy, applied for 
a gas trading licence in April 2007 to sell gas to small 
customers. However, restrictions imposed by the 
Western Australian Government prevent Synergy 
from supplying gas to customers using less than 0.18 
terajoules a year.10
11.1.8 The Northern Territory
In the Northern Territory, gas is mainly used for 
electricity generation. Origin Energy retails gas to small 
customers in Alice Springs, and NT Gas supplies a small 
quantity of gas to commercial and industrial customers 
in Darwin.
11.2	 Trends	in	market	integration
There has been considerable ownership consolidation 
in the energy retail sector, including:
> retail market convergence between electricity and gas
> vertical integration between gas production and 
gas retail.
Efficiencies in the joint provision of electricity and 
gas services have encouraged retailers to be active 
in both markets, and offer dual fuel retail products. 
The convergence between the gas and electricity retail 
markets is considered in section 6.2.1 of this report.
There is a continuing trend towards vertical integration 
between privately owned gas retailers and gas producers. 
Investment in gas production provides gas retailers 
with a natural hedge against rising wholesale gas prices 
and enhances security of supply. The retailers AGL 
Energy, Origin Energy and TRUenergy each have 
interests in gas production and/or gas storage. Origin 
Energy is a gas producer in Queensland, Western 
Australia, South Australia and Victoria. AGL Energy 
has become a producer of coal seam gas in Queensland 
and New South Wales. TRUenergy has gas storage 
facilities in Victoria. AGL Energy, Origin Energy and 
TRUenergy are also major electricity generators.
In addition, there are some ownership linkages between 
the gas pipeline and gas retail sectors. For example, 
the retailers TRUenergy and Simply Energy (owned 
by International Power) have ownership shares in the 
SEA Gas Pipeline from Victoria to South Australia.
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10 ERA, Decision on gas trading licence application for Synergy (Electricity Retail Corporation), 26 June 2007.
11.3	 Retail	competition
While most jurisdictions have introduced FRC in gas, 
it can take time for a competitive market to develop. 
As a transitional measure, some jurisdictions require 
host retailers to supply small customers in nominated 
geographical areas under a regulated standing offer (or 
default) contract (see section 11.4.1). Standing offer 
contracts often cover minimum terms and conditions 
and include a regulated price that is subject to some 
form of cap or oversight. These contracts apply to all 
customers who do not have a market contract. At July 
2008, four jurisdictions — New South Wales, Victoria, 
South Australia and Western Australia — applied some 
form of retail price regulation.
Australian governments have agreed to review the 
continued use of retail price caps and remove them 
where effective competition can be demonstrated.11 
The AEMC is assessing the effectiveness of retail 
competition in each jurisdiction to advise on the 
appropriate time to remove retail price caps. The relevant 
state or territory government makes the final decision 
on this matter. The AEMC conducted a review of the 
Victorian market in 2007 and is reviewing the South 
Australian market in 2008. In response to the review, 
the Victorian Government announced in September 
2008 the introduction of new legislation to remove retail 
price caps. Further information on the AEMC reviews 
is provided in box 6.1 in chapter 6 of this report.
The following is a sample of public data that may 
be relevant to an assessment of the effectiveness of retail 
competition in Australia. The data show the diversity 
of price and product offerings of retailers; the exercise 
of market choice by customers, including switching 
behaviour; and customer perceptions of competition. 
Elsewhere, this chapter touches on other barometers 
of competition: for example, section 11.1 considers new 
entry in the gas retail market. The AER does not seek 
to draw conclusions on the information provided and 
does not attempt to assess the effectiveness of retail 
competition in any jurisdiction.
11.3.1  Price and non-price diversity 
of retail offers
There is some evidence of price and product diversity 
in gas retail markets in Australia. Under market 
contracts, retailers generally offer a rebate and/or 
discount from the terms of a standing offer contract. 
Often discounts are tied to the term of the contract; for 
example, longer-term contracts typically attract larger 
discounts than more flexible arrangements. Discounts 
may also be available for prompt payment of bills and 
payments by direct debit.
Some product offerings bundle gas services with 
inducements such as loyalty bonuses, competitions, 
membership discounts, shopper cards and free products. 
Some retailers also offer discounts for contracting jointly 
for gas and electricity services.
In assessing the effectiveness of competition in gas retail 
markets in Victoria, the AEMC noted:12
Retailers offer non-price benefits in an effort 
to differentiate their offers from those of their 
rivals and to attract those customers for whom 
a price discount is not sufficient encouragement 
to switch. For some customers, the offer 
of physical products or other less tangible benefits 
such as improved environmental outcomes 
or community support may be greater, or an 
additional, inducement for switching to a market 
contract with a different retailer than simple 
discounts from the standing offer price.
The AEMC also reported that nine of 13 Victorian 
retailers surveyed had offered at least one non-price 
benefit in conjunction with market offers over the past 
five years. The most common non-price benefits were 
magazine subscriptions and vouchers.13
The variety of discounts and non-price inducements 
makes direct price comparisons between retail offers 
difficult. There is also variation in the transparency 
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11 Australian Energy Market Agreement 2004 (amended 2006), p. 28.
12 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria — First final report, 19 December 2007, p. 60.
13 AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria — First final report, 19 December 2007, p. 62.
of price offerings. Some retailers publish details of their 
products and prices, while others require a customer 
to fill out online forms or arrange a consultation. Box 
11.1 provides case study material on the diversity 
of price and product offerings in South Australia, 
Queensland and Victoria.
Note that the price offers set out in box 11.1 relate 
to a variety of time periods and product structures, and 
rely on different measurement techniques. The price 
offers are therefore not directly comparable between 
jurisdictions. Section 11.4 of this report also considers 
data on retail price outcomes.
11.3.2 Customer switching
The rate at which customers switch their supply 
arrangements (or churn) is an indicator of customer 
participation in the market. Switching rates can also 
indicate competitive activity. High rates of switching 
can reflect the availability of cheaper and/or better 
offers from competing retailers, successful marketing 
by retailers, and customer dissatisfaction with some 
service providers.
However, switching rates should be interpreted with 
care. Switching is sometimes high during the early stages 
of market development when customers are first able 
to exercise choice. Switching rates sometimes stabilise 
even as the market acquires more depth. Similarly, it is 
possible to have low switching rates in a competitive 
market if retailers are delivering good quality service that 
gives customers no reason to switch.
Switching rates may also be affected by factors such 
as the number of competitors in the market, customer 
experience with competition, demographics, demand 
and the cost of the service in relation to household 
budgets. For example, consumers are more likely to be 
responsive to energy offers and actively seek out cheaper 
services if the cost of gas services represents a relatively 
high proportion of their budget.
Gas churn data is published by independent market 
operators: the Gas Market Company (New South Wales 
and the ACT), VENCorp (Victoria and Queensland) 
and REMCo (South Australia). For each, churn 
is measured as the number of switches by gas customers 
from one retailer to another in a period, including 
switches from a host retailer to a new entrant, switches 
from new entrants back to a host retailer, and switches 
from one new entrant to another (see table 11.5 and 
figure 11.4).17
The data do not include customers who have switched 
from a standing offer contract to a market contract with 
their existing retailer. This exclusion may understate the 
true extent of competitive activity as it does not account 
for the efforts of host retailers to maintain market share.
Fıgure 11.4 illustrates that switching activity continued 
strongly in Victoria and South Australia in 2007 – 08. 
Queensland, New South Wales and the ACT had 
switching rates of less than half those recorded in the 
other states. Table 11.5 shows that only 5 per cent 
of small customers in Queensland, New South 
Wales and the ACT changed gas retailer in 2007 – 08, 
compared to 23 per cent in Victoria and 13 per cent 
in South Australia. At June 2008, cumulative switching 
rates in Victoria (99 per cent) and South Australia 
(67 per cent) were more than double the New South 
Wales and ACT rate (27 per cent). The relatively low 
rate of customer switching in Queensland reflects the 
recent introduction of FRC in that state (1 July 2007). 
The gas retail switching rates in each jurisdiction were 
lower than switching rates in electricity.
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17 The New South Wales, ACT, Queensland and Victorian data are based on transfers at delivery points. As most residential customers receive gas from only one delivery 
point, the data approximates the number of customers transferring to another retailer.
Box	11.1	 Case	study	—	diversity	of	price	and	product	offerings	to	small	customers
Information is available in South Australia, Queensland 
and Victoria on the price and product offerings of gas 
retailers.
The Essential Services Commission of South Australia 
(ESCOSA) and the Queensland Competition Authority 
(QCA) provide online estimator services that allow 
consumers to make rough but quick comparisons 
of retail offers.14 The estimators do not account for all 
elements of retail offers, such as sign-up bonuses. Table 
11.4 sets out the estimated annual gas bill in April 2008 
for customers in South Australia and Queensland using 
60 gigajoules of gas per year, based on peak usage and 
not using gas for hot water.
Victoria’s Essential Services Commission (ESC) 
undertakes annual independent research that compares 
some gas market contract prices in different host 
retailer areas.15 The ESC found that market offers 
at a discount from the standing contract price were 
available in all host retailer areas, as well as additional 
monetary inducements of up to $50 a year. Table 11.4 
sets out results of the ESC research from May 2007.
Table 11.4 indicates that there is some price diversity 
in the gas retail markets, though often less so than 
for electricity (see box 6.2 in chapter 6 of this report). 
The price spread in Victoria was about $200, and 
just over $100 in South Australia. In Queensland the 
price spread was just under $80. Discounts off the 
regulated retail price of up to 14 per cent were available 
in Victoria (compared with 10 per cent for electricity), 
and of up to 7 per cent in South Australia (consistent 
with electricity). Retail gas prices in Queensland are 
not regulated.
Market analysis in Victoria undertaken by CRA 
International in August 2007 found that market contracts 
typically have a range of monetary and non-monetary 
inducements. Variable-term contracts tended to offer 
smaller discounts and fewer non-monetary benefits than 
fixed-term contracts.16
300 state OF tHe eNeRGY MaRket
14. The estimators are available at http://www.escosa.sa.gov.au and http://www.qca.org.au.
15. ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007.
16. CRA International, Impact of prices and profit margins on energy retail competition in Victoria, November 2007, pp. 65 – 66. 
Table	11.4	 Gas	retail	price	offers	for	a	customer	using	60	GJ	per	year	in	south	Australia	(April	2008),	Queensland	
(April	2008)	and	Victoria	(May	2007)
AnnuAl	COsT	($)1,2
PROVIDER
Nº Of 
PRODUCTS 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 ADDITIONAL BENEfITS 
sOuTH	AusTRAlIA	(ORIGIn	EnERGy)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 4 Joining bonus
Origin Energy 3 Prompt payment discount
TRUenergy 2 Joining bonus; loyalty bonus
QuEEnslAnd	(nO	REGulATEd	PRICE)
AGL Energy 2 —
Australian Power & Gas 4 Joining bonus; prompt payment discount
Origin Energy 2 —
VICTORIA	(AGl	sOuTH)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
Origin Energy 1 Joining bonus
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(AGl	nORTH)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(ORIGIn	METRO)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
Origin Energy 1 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(ORIGIn	sOuTH	EAsT)
Regulated price —
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
Origin Energy 1 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(ORIGIn	nORTH)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(TRu	EAsT)
Regulated price —
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Origin Energy 1 Loyalty bonus
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
VICTORIA	(TRu	CEnTRAl)
Regulated price Prompt payment discount
AGL Energy 1 Joining bonus
EnergyAustralia3 2 Loyalty bonus
TRUenergy 1 Prompt payment discount
Origin Energy 1 Loyalty bonus
Victoria Electricity 1 Prompt payment discount
Notes: 
1. Coloured bars represent the approximate range of annual charges for each retailer’s products.
2. The annual costs exclude additional benefits such as prompt payment discounts, and joining and loyalty bonuses.
3. In July 2007 International Power announced its acquisition of the Energy Australia–International Power Retail Partnership. This partnership retailed 
gas services in Victoria under the Energy Australia trading name. International Power has since rebadged the retail business as Simply Energy.
Sources: South Australia: ESCOSA estimator, viewed 17 April 2008, http://www.escosa.sa.gov.au; Queensland: QCA estimator, viewed 17 April 2008, 
http://www.qca.org.au; Victoria: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report for the 2006 – 07 financial year, December 2007.
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Figure	11.4	
Cumulative	monthly	customer	switching	of	retailers	
as	a	percentage	of	small	gas	customers,	to	June	2008
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Sources: New South Wales and ACT: Gas Market Company, Market activity 
data January 2002 – June 2008; South Australia: REMCo, Market activity 
reports August 2004 – June 2008; Victoria and Queensland: VENCorp, Gas market 
reports: Transfer history January 2002 – June 2008.
Switches to market contracts
An alternative approach to measuring customer churn 
is to measure switching from standing offer contracts 
to market contracts. In June 2008, South Australia was 
the only jurisdiction that periodically published this data. 
In Victoria, the AEMC reported on customer switching 
to market contracts as part of its 2007 review of the 
effectiveness of retail competition.18
Table 11.6 summarises available data on switches 
to market contracts in South Australia and Victoria. 
The data are not directly comparable because 
of differences in data collection methods and the 
periods covered.
The data indicate that in addition to customer 
movement between retailers, a significant number 
of residential customers in Victoria and South Australia 
are choosing to move away from standing offer contracts 
but remain with their host retailer. Once again, switching 
rates are lower than for electricity (see table 6.7 in 
chapter 6).
International comparisons
The VaasaETT Utility Customer Switching Research 
Project published its fourth report on customer 
switching in world energy markets in 2008. VaasaETT 
classified the Victorian and South Australian energy 
retail markets as ‘hot’ and the New South Wales and 
Queensland retail energy markets as ‘warm active’. Box 
6.3 in chapter 6 of this report provides further details.
11.3.3 Customer perceptions of competition
Surveys on customer perceptions of retail competition 
are undertaken from time to time. Recent 
reviews include:
Table	11.5	 small	customers	switching	retailers,	2008
IndICATOR nsw	And	ACT VICTORIA QuEEnslAnd sOuTH	AusTRAlIA
Percentage of small customers that changed gas retailer 
during 2007 – 08
5% 23% 5% 13%
Customer switches as a percentage of the small customer 
base from fRC start to June 2008 (cumulative) — Gas
27% 99% 5% 67%
Customer switches as a percentage of the small customer 
base from fRC start to June 2008 (cumulative) — Electricity
44% 105% 20% 86%
Note: 
1. If a customer switches to a number of retailers in succession, each move counts as a separate switch. Cumulative switching rates may therefore exceed 100 per cent.
2. The customer base is estimated at 30 June 2008.
Sources: New South Wales and ACT: Gas Market Company, Market activity data January 2002 – June 2008; South Australia: REMCo, Market activity reports 
August 2004 – June 2008; Victoria and Queensland: VENCorp, Gas market reports: Transfer history January 2002 – June 2008.
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> surveys as part of the AEMC reviews of the 
effectiveness of retail competition in Victoria (2007) 
and South Australia (2008)
> the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal’s 
(IPART’s) survey of residential energy and water use 
in Sydney, the Blue Mountains and Illawarra (2006)
> surveys conducted as part of ESCOSA’s monitoring 
of the development of energy retail competition 
in South Australia.
Table	11.7	 Residential	customer	perceptions	of	competition
sOuTH	AusTRAlIA VICTORIA nEw	sOuTH	wAlEs
INDICATOR 2004 2006 2008 2004 2007 2003 2006
Customers aware of choice 78% 79% 84% 83% 91% 92% 93%
Customers receiving at least one retail offer 20% 34% 20% 22% 45% 29%1 36%1
Customers approaching retailers about taking 
out market contracts
8% 6% 5% 6% 6% n/a n/a
n/a, not available.
Note: 
1. Does not include customers approached to switch to a market contract by their current retailer. By 2006, 43 per cent of households had been approached to switch 
to a market contract by their existing retailer.
Sources: South Australia: McGregor Tan Research, Monitoring the development of energy retail competition — residents, prepared for ESCOSA, February 2006, September 
2004 and November 2003; McGregor Tan Research, Review of effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets, prepared for AEMC, June 2008; 
Victoria: The Wallis Group, Review of competition in the gas and electricity retail markets — consumer survey, prepared for AEMC, August 2007; New South Wales: IPART, 
Residential energy and water use in Sydney, the Blue Mountains and Illawarra – Results from the 2006 household survey, November 2007.
Issues covered by the surveys include:
> customer awareness of their ability to choose a retailer
> customer approaches to retailers about taking out 
a market contract
> retailer offers received by customers
> customer understanding of retail offers.
Table 11.7 provides summary data. The surveys suggest 
that customer awareness of retail choice has risen 
over time to high levels, particularly in New South 
Wales and Victoria. It remains unusual for customers 
to approach retailers about taking out a market contract. 
However, increasing numbers of customers are being 
approached by retailers.
Table	11.6	 small	customer	transfers	to	market	contracts
JuRIsdICTIOn dATE sMAll	CusTOMERs	On	MARkET	COnTRACTs	(%	OF	sMAll	CusTOMER	BAsE)
Victoria 31 December 2006 60% of residential customers
31% of small business customers
South Australia 30 June 2007 56% of residential customers (16% with the host retailer and 40% with new entrants)
14% of small business customers (3% with the host retailer and 11% with new entrants)
Sources: Victoria: AEMC, Review of the effectiveness of competition in electricity and gas retail markets in Victoria — First final report, 19 December 2007, p. 89; South 
Australia: ESCOCA, 2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of South Australian energy retail market, November 2007, pp. iii and 23.
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11.4	 Retail	prices
Gas retail prices paid by customers cover the costs 
of a bundled product made up of gas, transport 
through transmission and distribution pipelines, and 
retail services.
Fıgure 11.5 provides an indication of the typical 
make-up of a residential gas bill in Victoria and South 
Australia in 2007. Wholesale gas costs and pipeline 
(transmission and distribution) charges account for the 
bulk of retail gas prices. Retail operating costs and retail 
margins account for around 16 per cent of retail prices 
in Victoria and 19 per cent in South Australia.
The lead essay of this report sets out ACIL Tasman 
estimates of the composition of residential gas 
prices in five mainland capital cities (see figure E.2). 
The analysis notes that prices vary significantly for 
customers with different volume requirements and 
at different locations.
By far the highest proportion of total cost is associated 
with the distribution system, reflecting the high capital 
cost of servicing each customer.
11.4.1 Regulation of retail prices
While all jurisdictions have introduced FRC, at July 
2008 New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Western Australia continued to regulate gas retail prices 
for small customers. Typically, host retailers must offer 
standing offer contracts to sell gas at default prices 
based on some form of regulated price cap or oversight. 
These contracts apply to customers who have not 
switched to a market contract. Retail gas prices are not 
regulated in Queensland, Tasmania, the ACT or the 
Northern Territory.
Price cap regulation was intended as a transitional 
measure during the development phase of retail 
markets. To allow efficient signals for investment 
and consumption, governments are moving towards 
removing retail price caps. As noted, the AEMC 
is reviewing the effectiveness of competition in electricity 
and gas retail markets to determine an appropriate time 
to remove retail price caps in each jurisdiction (see box 
6.1 in chapter 6).
In setting default prices, jurisdictions take into 
consideration gas purchase costs, pipeline charges, 
retailer operating costs and a retail margin. The approach 
varies between jurisdictions:
> In New South Wales, prices under standing offer 
contracts are controlled through voluntary agreements 
with host retailers that limit annual price increases.
> Since 2003, the Victorian Government has entered 
into agreements with host retailers on a pricing 
structure for default retail prices for households and 
small businesses. Default arrangements ceased to apply 
to small businesses from 1 January 2008 and will cease 
for residential customers from 1 January 2009.
> The South Australian regulator (ESCOSA) sets 
default prices for the host retailer by considering the 
costs that a prudent retailer would incur in delivering 
the services.
> In Western Australia, gas retail prices for the major 
distribution systems are capped by regulations. During 
2008, the Office of Energy is reviewing the level and 
structure of regulated retail prices.
Section 11.4.3 considers recent retail price 
determinations and provides detail on the progress of the 
Western Australian review of regulated retail prices.
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Figure	11.5	
Indicative	composition	of	a	residential	gas	bill	—	Victoria	and	south	Australia,	2007
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Notes: 
1. Based on 2007 – 08 prices and average annual residential consumption 
of 60 gigajoules.
2. Retailer operating costs are exclusive of full retail competition costs.
Source: ESCOSA, 2008 gas standing contract price path inquiry draft inquiry report 
and draft price determination, April 2008; ESCOSA, gas standing contract price path 
final inquiry report and final price determination, June 2005.
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Notes: 
1. Based on 2007 prices and average annual residential consumption 
of 60 gigajoules.
2. Pipeline charges are an average for the three Victorian host retailers — Origin 
Energy, AGL Energy and TRUenergy.
3. Retail margin based on standing offer contracts.
Source: CRA International, Final report: Impact of prices and profit margins 
on energy retail competition in Victoria, November 2007, Prepared for 
AEMC review of effectiveness of competition in the electricity and gas 
retail markets — Victoria.
11.4.2 Retail price outcomes
Retail price outcomes should be interpreted with care. 
Trends in retail prices may reflect movements in the cost 
of any one or a combination of the bundled components 
in a retail product — for example, movements in wholesale 
gas prices, transmission and distribution pipeline 
charges or retail operating costs. In addition, retail price 
movements are affected by regulatory arrangements. 
As noted in section 6.4.2, while competition tends 
to deliver efficient outcomes, it may sometimes give 
a counter intuitive outcome of higher prices — especially 
in the early stages of competition as historical cross-
subsidies are phased out.
Sources of price data
There is little systematic publication of actual gas retail 
prices in Australia. The Australian Gas Association 
(AGA) previously published data on retail gas prices but 
discontinued the series after 1998. Some jurisdictions 
publish price information:
> Jurisdictions that regulate prices publish schedules 
of default prices. The schedules are a useful guide 
to retail prices but their relevance as a price 
barometer is reduced as more customers transfer 
to market contracts.
> The South Australian regulator (ESCOSA) publishes 
annual data on default and market prices.
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> ESCOSA and the Queensland and Victorian 
regulators (QCA and ESC) provide an estimator 
service on their websites that can be used to compare 
the price offerings of different retailers (see box 11.1).
> Retailers are not required to publish the prices struck 
through market contracts with customers.
Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index
The consumer price index (CPI) and producer price 
index, published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
track movements in gas retail prices paid by households 
and businesses.19 The indexes are based on customer 
surveys and therefore reflect both market and 
regulated prices.
Fıgure 11.6 tracks real gas price movements for 
households and business customers since 1991. There 
is considerable disparity between the movement of real 
retail gas prices for households and businesses. The 
real price of gas for businesses has fallen 13 per cent 
since 1991, while the real gas price for households 
has increased by 18 per cent (see figure 11.7). In part, 
the disparity may reflect the rebalancing of retail 
prices to remove cross-subsidies from business 
to household consumers.
It is possible to estimate retail price outcomes for 
households by using CPI data to extrapolate from the 
historic AGA price data. Fıgure 11.8 applies this method 
to estimate real gas prices for households in the major 
capital cities since July 1996. Real household gas prices 
have risen since 1996 in all states except Victoria, but 
the pattern and rate of adjustment has varied. Customers 
in New South Wales and South Australia have 
experienced moderate real price increases from 2000 – 01 
to 2007 – 08 of 24 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively, 
while real prices in Western Australia, Victoria and 
the ACT have remained relatively stable. Prices 
in Queensland were relatively stable from 2000 – 01 
to 2004 – 05 but have since risen sharply.
ACIL Tasman has developed estimates of gas retail 
prices in mainland capital cities (published in the lead 
essay of this report; see figure E.2). The data indicate that 
gas retail prices range from around $15.50 per gigajoule 
in Melbourne to almost $28 per gigajoule in Brisbane.
Caution should be exercised when making price 
comparisons. Price variation between the cities (and 
between individual customers) reflects a variety 
of factors, including variations in the wholesale 
price of gas and the distances over which gas 
must be transported, and differences in regulatory 
arrangements. Consumption patterns and industry scale 
also play a role. For example:
> Victoria has a relatively large residential consumer base 
with consumers located close to the gas fields.
> Western Australia traditionally has relatively low 
wholesale gas prices but high transport costs as most 
residential consumers are located a long distance from 
gas basins. Volumes are also relatively low.
> Queensland prices reflect a small residential customer 
base and low rates of residential consumption because 
of that state’s warm climate.
11.4.3 Update: retail price trends in 2007 – 08
Several jurisdictions have experienced rising gas 
wholesale and transportation costs in 2007 and 2008. 
These developments have raised concerns about possible 
effects on retailer profitability and retail prices.
Several of the jurisdictions that continue to regulate 
retail gas prices have taken measures to allow pass-
through of rising costs into retail prices. Table 11.8 
compares recent movements in regulated tariffs 
in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and 
Western Australia and the mechanisms to allow further 
tariff revision. The decisions relate to the supply of gas 
by host retailers to customers on default arrangements. 
Different approaches between jurisdictions reflect 
a range of factors and should be interpreted with care. 
In particular, there are differences in the operating 
environments of retail businesses.
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Figure	11.6	
Retail	gas	price	index	(inflation	adjusted)	—	Australian	
capital	cities,	June	1991	–	March	2008
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Figure	11.7	
Change	in	the	real	price	of	gas	—	Australia,	June	
1991	–	March	2008
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Note: The households index is based on capital city consumer price indexes for ‘gas 
and other household fuels’ deflated by the capital city consumer price index (CPI) 
series for all groups. The business index is based on the producer price index for gas 
supply in ‘Materials used in Manufacturing Industries’ deflated by the CPI series 
for all groups. The household index was affected by the introduction of the GST 
on 1 July 2000, which increased prices paid by households for gas services.
Sources for figures 11.6 and 11.7: ABS cat. no. 6401.0 and 6427.0.
Figure	11.8	
Real	retail	gas	prices	—	state	and	territory,	July	1996	–	June	2008

eZ
g
\^
\V
_d
ja
Z
-
&%
&'
&)
&+
&-
'%
''
')
'+
'-
(%
('
()
68IL6H6FaYK^XCHL
'%%,Ä%-'%%+Ä%,'%%*Ä%+'%%)Ä%*'%%(Ä%)'%%'Ä%('%%&Ä%''%%%Ä%&&...Ä%%&..-Ä..&..,Ä.-&..+Ä.,
Note: The dashed lines are estimates based on inflating 1998 – 99 AGA data by the CPI series for gas and other household fuels for the capital city in that state.
Sources: AGA, Gas statistics Australia, Canberra, August 2000, p. 73; ABS, Consumer price index, Australia, March quarter 2008, Canberra, cat. no. 6401.0.
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In 2008, the New South Wales regulator (IPART) 
approved special retail price increases of between 5.24 
and 12.2 per cent20 for the host retailers AGL Energy, 
ActewAGL Retail and Country Energy because 
of rising wholesale gas and transmission costs:
> AGL Energy and ActewAGL Retail were unable 
to secure sufficient transmission on the Eastern Gas 
Pipeline for gas required for peak winter usage and 
incurred additional costs in sourcing gas from the 
Cooper Basin via the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline. 
There were also significant changes to the contractual 
arrangements for transport of gas on the Moomba 
to Sydney Pipeline.
> Following compression issues in the Victorian 
transmission system during winter 2007, Country 
Energy incurred additional costs in securing 
alternative gas supply arrangements.
In Western Australia, wholesale gas prices rose sharply 
in 2007 to levels of up to three times those experienced 
earlier in the decade. The Office of Energy expressed 
concern that these increases could act as a barrier 
to entry in the gas retail market and could affect retail 
margins in the future — particularly for new entrant 
retailers needing to secure wholesale gas supplies.21 
In 2008, the Office of Energy reviewed the level 
and structure of gas tariffs and in June 2008 made 
an interim recommendation to increase regulated tariffs 
by between 5.4 per cent and 16.5 per cent (depending 
on the customers’ geographic location and the level 
of their gas consumption).22 The Minister for Energy 
confirmed that the Western Australian Government will 
accept this interim recommendation.23
The South Australian regulator (ESCOSA) has 
indicated that an increase in the regulated tariff 
of 8.25 per cent in 2008 – 09 largely reflects an increase 
in wholesale gas supply costs and an increase in the 
retail margin.24
Table	11.8	 Recent	changes	in	regulated	gas	retail	prices
JuRIsdICTIOn CuRREnT	PERIOd RElEVAnT	
RETAIlERs
InCREAsE	In	
REGulATEd	TARIFF
PAss	THROuGH	MECHAnIsM	FOR	
wHOlEsAlE	EnERGy	COsTs
Victoria 1 January 2008 – 
31 December 2008
TRUenergy
Origin Energy
AGL Energy
CPI + 3.1%
CPI + 5.3%
CPI + 5.4%
Annual price determination. No further 
adjustment permitted.
New South Wales 1 July 2007 – 
30 June 2010
Origin Energy
ActewAGL Retail
AGL Energy
Country Energy
CPI annually in all 
areas except the Murray 
Valley district (Origin), 
which increases by CPI 
+ 2% annually
Retailers can apply to IPART in special 
circumstances to vary prices outside the 
limit. In 2008, IPART made a determination 
under these provisions to increase tariffs 
for Country Energy (by 12.2%), ActewAGL 
Retail (by 5.8 – 6.1%) and AGL Energy 
(by 5.24%).1
South Australia 1 July 2008 – 
30 June 2011
Origin Energy 2008 – 09: 8.25%
2009 – 10 to 2010 – 11: 
CPI + 1% annually
Increased costs incurred from prescribed 
events can be recovered through 
tariff increases and the determination 
may be reopened.
Western Australia 1 July 2008 – 
30 June 2009
Alinta 5.4 to 16.5% Government decision to be implemented 
through regulations.
CPI, Consumer Price Index; IPART, Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal.
Note:
1. Estimated increase for a typical retail customer in each of the Country Energy, ActewAGL Retail and AGL Energy supply areas.
Sources: Victoria: Department of Primary Industries, Victorian energy prices factsheet, p. 2; New South Wales: IPART, Regulated gas retail tariffs and charges for small 
customers 2007 – 10: Gas Final report and voluntary transitional pricing arrangements June 2007, p. 2; South Australia: ESCOSA, 2008 Gas standing contract price path 
inquiry: Final inquiry report and final price determination, June 2008; Western Australia: Energy Coordination (Gas Tariffs) Regulations 2000; Office of Energy, Gas tariffs 
review — Interim Report, June 2008.
308 state OF tHe eNeRGY MaRket
20 Estimated increase for a typical retail customer. 
21 Office of Energy, Gas Tariffs Regulations review report, October 2007, pp. 9, 15 – 17, 20.
22 Office of Energy, Gas tariffs review — Interim report, June 2008.
23 Minister for Energy (WA) (Hon. Francis Logan), Review of gas tariff cap, media statement, 20 June 2008.
24 ESCOSA, 2008 Gas standing contract price path inquiry: Final inquiry report and final price determination, June 2008.
Figure	11.9	
International	gas	prices	for	households,	2006
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Notes: 
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2. Price data for Australia is based on AER estimates benchmarked against the US average. The data for each jurisdiction is for 2006 and is estimated by inflating 2000 
AGA data by the capital city consumer price index series for gas and other household fuels.
Sources: AGA, Gas statistics Australia 2000, Canberra, August 2000, p. 118; ABS, Consumer price index, Australia, March quarter 2008, Canberra, cat. no. 6401.0; IEA, 
Natural gas information, table 20, Natural gas price for households in $US, Q4 2006, published 2007; ATO, Foreign exchange rates: End of financial year rates, US rate for 
31 December 2006; Energy Administration Information, Official energy statistics from the US Government, Natural gas prices from 2006.
Queensland does not regulate retail prices but has 
recently experienced significant retail price increases 
(see figure 11.8). In 2008, the Queensland Minister for 
Mines and Energy directed the Queensland regulator 
(QCA) to review small customer prices and competition 
in the gas retail market to determine whether additional 
measures are required to encourage competitive 
outcomes for customers, existing retailers and new 
entrants.25 The QCA released an issues paper for the 
review in May 2008.26
11.4.4 International price comparisons
Fıgure 11.9 compares estimated residential gas 
prices in six Australian states and territories with 
selected Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries. The data indicate 
that Australian gas retail prices are generally lower than 
in many OECD countries. For example, retail prices 
in most Australian states are lower than in New Zealand, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Korea. However, 
Australian retail prices are generally higher than prices 
in the United States. Only Victoria — with among the 
world’s lowest gas retail prices — has lower prices than the 
United States.
11.5	 Quality	of	retail	services
Competition provides incentives for retailers to improve 
performance and quality of service as a means 
of maintaining or increasing market share. In addition, 
governments have established regulations and codes 
on minimum terms and conditions, information 
disclosure and complaints handling requirements that 
retailers must meet when supplying gas to small retail 
customers. As discussed in section 6.5, jurisdictional 
regulators monitor and report on quality of service in the 
retail sector to enhance transparency and accountability. 
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25 Minister for Mines and Energy (Qld) (Hon. Geoff Wilson), Minister directs review of gas market pricing, media statement, 2 May 2008.
26 QCA, Review of small customer gas pricing and competition in Queensland — Issues Paper, May 2008.
Most jurisdictions also have an ombudsman who 
investigates and reports on complaints.
In May 2007, the Utility Regulators Forum (URF) 
recommended an extension of national reporting 
arrangements for electricity retail businesses to include 
the gas retail sector from 2007 – 08.27 The URF reporting 
criteria address:
> customer affordability and access to services
> quality of customer services.
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the 
ACT have reported performance against the URF 
indicators but each jurisdiction applies different 
methodologies and assumptions. The validity of any 
national performance comparisons may be limited 
by differences in approach between the jurisdictions.
11.5.1 Affordability and access indicators
The rate of residential customer disconnections for 
failure to meet bill payments (see figure 11.10) and 
the rate of disconnected customers reconnected within 
seven days (see figure 11.11) are key affordability and 
access indicators.
In 2006 – 07, the rate of residential customer 
disconnections rose from the previous year 
in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. 
Disconnection rates in Victoria and South Australia 
remained below 1 per cent, but exceeded 2 per cent 
in New South Wales. The ACT has recorded rising 
disconnection rates since 2002 – 03.
Figure	11.10	
Gas	residential	disconnections	as	a	percentage	of	the	
customer	base
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Notes: 
1. ACT figures include residential and non-residential customers but exclude 
disconnections by EnergyAustralia.
2. New South Wales data is only available from 2005 – 06. ACT data is only 
available to 2005 – 06.
Source: See figure 11.13.
Figure	11.11	
Residential	gas	customers	reconnected	within	seven	
days	as	a	percentage	of	customers	disconnected
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Notes: 
1. Victorian data for 2005 – 06 only includes six months of data from 
January – June 2006.
2. New South Wales and Victorian data is only available from 2005 – 06. 
South Australian data is only available from 2004 – 04. ACT data is only 
available to 2005 – 06.
Source: See figure 11.13.
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27 Utility Regulator Forum, National energy retail performance indicators, Final paper, May 2007, p. ii.
A number of factors may have contributed to these 
outcomes. For example, the ESC noted that 2005 – 06 
rates were very low in Victoria following the 
introduction of legislation to compensate customers for 
wrongful disconnection. The ESC observed that the 
increase in rates since 2005 – 06 may indicate that rates 
are returning to average historical levels.28
The rate at which disconnected customers were 
reconnected in 2006 – 07 (figure 11.11) fell slightly from 
the previous year in South Australia but improved 
sharply in Victoria to around 36 per cent. The rate 
was around 50 per cent in New South Wales and 
South Australia.
11.5.2 Customer service indicators
Customer service measures provide an indication 
of customer satisfaction with the quality of retailer 
service. Indicators include:
> the percentage of customer calls answered within 
30 seconds (see figure 11.12)
> retail customer complaints as a percentage of total 
customers (see figure 11.13).
Call centre performance varied across the jurisdictions 
in 2006 – 07 (figure 11.12). In Victoria and South 
Australia, around 80 per cent of customer calls were 
answered within thirty seconds. New South Wales 
recorded a lower rate of about 60 per cent.
Figure	11.12	
Percentage	of	gas	retail	customer	calls	answered	within	
30	seconds
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Notes: 
1. South Australian statistics include data for gas and electricity.
2. New South Wales data is only available from 2005 – 06. South Australian data 
is only available from 2004 – 05. ACT data is only available to 2005 – 06.
Source: See figure 11.13.
Figure	11.13	
Retail	gas	customer	complaints	as	a	percentage	
of	total	customers
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Note: New South Wales data is only available from 2005 – 06. South Australian 
data is only available from 2004 – 05. ACT data is only available to 2005 – 06.
Sources for figures 11.10, 11.11, 11.12 and 11.13: New South Wales: IPART, Gas 
retail businesses’ performance against customer service indicators for the period of 1 July 
2005 – 30 June 2007, 2008. Victoria: ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative 
performance report 2006 – 07, December 2007; South Australia: ESCOSA, 
2006 – 07 Annual performance report: Performance of South Australian energy 
retail market, November 2007; ACT: ICRC, Licensed electricity, gas and water and 
sewerage utilities performance report, various years.
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28 ESC, Energy retail businesses comparative performance report 2006 – 07, December 2007, p. 39.
The rate of gas complaints by residential customers 
was around 0.3 per cent of the customer base in New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia in 2006 – 07. 
The rate has increased in Victoria since 2003 – 04, but 
fallen in New South Wales since 2005 – 06 and South 
Australia since 2004 – 05. The ACT tends to have a lower 
complaints rate than the other jurisdictions shown 
in figure 11.13. The ESC noted that the increase in the 
number of Victorian complaints in 2006 – 07 was mainly 
associated with issues other than affordability.29
As noted in section 6.4.2, customers have a range 
of options to redress customer service issues: customers 
can raise complaints directly with their retailer, refer 
complaints to their state energy ombudsman or transfer 
away from a business providing poor service.
11.5.3 Consumer protection
Governments regulate aspects of the energy retail 
market to protect consumers’ rights and ensure 
they have access to sufficient information to make 
informed decisions. Victoria, New South Wales, South 
Australia and Western Australia require designated 
host retailers to provide gas services under a standard 
contract to nominated customers. Standard contracts 
cover minimum service conditions relating to billing; 
procedures for connections and disconnections; 
information disclosure; and complaints handling. 
During the transition to effective competition, default 
contracts also include regulated retail tariffs (see section 
11.4.1). While prices in Queensland are not regulated, 
there is still a requirement for host retailers to offer 
small customers a standard contract. This contract must 
be published on the retailers’ website and notified to the 
Queensland regulator (QCA).
Some jurisdictions have established industry codes that 
apply to all retail gas services, including those sold under 
market contracts. The codes govern market conduct and 
establish minimum terms and conditions under which 
a retailer can sell gas to small retail customers.
The codes may:
> constrain how retailers may contact potential customers
> require precontract disclosure of information, 
including commissions for market contracts
> provide for cooling-off periods
> provide rules for the conduct of door-to-door sales, 
telemarketing and direct marketing.
Most jurisdictions also have an energy ombudsman 
or alternative dispute resolution body to whom 
consumers can refer a complaint they were unable 
to resolve directly with the retailer. In addition to general 
consumer protection measures, jurisdictions have 
introduced supplier of last resort arrangements to ensure 
customers can be transferred from a failed or failing 
retailer to another. Section 6.5.3 provides further 
background on consumer protection arrangements for 
energy retail customers.
11.6	 Future	regulatory	arrangements
State and territory governments are currently responsible 
for the regulation of retail energy markets. Governments 
agreed in the Australian Energy Market Agreement 
2004 (amended 2006) to transfer non-price regulatory 
functions to the national framework.30 These functions 
include:
> the obligation on retailers to supply customers 
at a default tariff with minimum terms and conditions
> arrangements to ensure customer supply continuity 
and wholesale market financial integrity in the event 
of a retailer failure
> minimum contract terms and conditions applying 
to small customer market contracts
> small customer marketing conduct obligations
> retailer general business authorisations (where 
necessary for matters other than technical capability 
and safety).
This framework will be administered by the AEMC and 
AER. Further information on the transfer of regulatory 
arrangements is set out in section 6.7 of this report.
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30 This commitment did not cover the Northern Territory or Western Australia.
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The process of energy market reform has been steadily 
unfolding since the early 1990s. In 2004, the Australian, 
state and territory governments set the agenda for 
a transition to national energy regulation in the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement. The most recent 
wave of reform is underpinned by revisions to that 
agreement in 2006. The revisions include streamlined 
regulatory, planning, governance and institutional 
arrangements for the National Energy Market (NEM).
Reform activity since 2006 has focused on a number 
of key areas, including:
> transition to a national energy framework
> effect of climate change policies on the energy sector
> electricity market reform, covering the wholesale 
market and networks
> development of an open and transparent gas 
wholesale sector
> removal of retail price regulation.
A.1  National institutional framework
At the national level, two intergovernmental bodies 
determine the direction of Australia’s energy policy — the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and the 
Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE).
COAG is the peak intergovernmental forum 
in Australia. The council comprises the Prime Minister, 
state premiers, territory chief ministers and the president 
of the Australian Local Government Association. The 
role of COAG is to initiate, develop and monitor the 
implementation of policy reforms that are of national 
significance and that require cooperative action 
by Australian governments. This includes energy 
market reform.
The MCE comprises Australian, state and territory 
energy ministers. Ministers from New Zealand and 
Papua New Guinea have observer status. The MCE’s 
role is to initiate and develop energy policy reforms 
for consideration by COAG. It also monitors and 
oversees implementation of energy policy reforms 
agreed by COAG.
  A energy 
market 
reform
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Special-purpose bodies have been created to develop 
and implement specific reform packages for the 
energy sector:
> In 2006, COAG established an Energy Reform 
Implementation Group (ERIG) to report on measures 
that may be necessary to achieve a fully national 
electricity transmission grid. ERIG also addressed 
industry structure and financial market issues that 
may affect the ongoing efficiency and competitiveness 
of the energy sector.
> The MCE has established:
> the Retail Policy Working Group to oversee the 
transfer of energy distribution (non-economic) 
and retail regulation functions to the national 
legislative framework
> an industry-led Gas Market Leaders Group 
to produce a market development plan for the gas 
wholesale sector.
There are several other key agencies in the national 
energy framework:
> The Australian Energy Regulator (AER), which is the 
national energy regulator.
> The Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC), which is responsible for rule making and 
market development in the NEM. The AEMC also 
undertakes reviews of the energy market framework 
and provides policy advice to the MCE.
> Market operators, such as the National Electricity 
Market Management Company (NEMMCO), 
which is responsible for the day-to-day operation and 
administration of the power system and electricity 
wholesale spot market in the NEM.
Although the AER, AEMC and market operators are 
not policy bodies, each participates in energy market 
reform processes. Fıgure A.1 outlines the roles and 
responsibilities of key bodies involved in national energy 
policy, regulation and market operation.
A.2   Transition to a national 
energy framework
Transfer of regulatory functions
The AER and AEMC were established under the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement in 2004. However, 
the transfer of functions from other Australian, state and 
territory regulators is still in progress. Table A.1 sets out 
the institutional arrangements that will apply once the 
transfer of functions is complete.
Electricity networks
The AER has been responsible for the regulation 
of electricity transmission networks since 1 July 2005.
This role was previously undertaken by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).
On 1 January 2008, revisions to the National Electricity 
Law and Rules refined the regulatory process for 
electricity networks. The new framework also established 
the AER as the economic regulator of electricity 
distribution networks in the NEM jurisdictions.1
In 2008, the AER released guidelines to assist 
electricity distribution businesses and their customers 
to understand the AER’s approach to distribution 
network regulation. It also released details of the 
incentive schemes that will apply to electricity 
distribution businesses.
Gas networks
The National Gas Law and Rules, which took effect 
on 1 July 2008, provide the overarching regulatory 
framework for the gas transmission and distribution 
sectors. These instruments replace the Gas Pipelines 
Access Law and the National Gas Code (Gas Code), 
which had provided the regulatory framework 
since 1997.
315
 
 
	
A
p
p
eN
d
ix A
 
e
n
e
r
g
y m
a
r
k
e
t r
e
fo
r
m
1. The regulation of distribution networks in Western Australia and the Northern Territory remain under state and territory jurisdiction.
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Figure A.1 
National energy market — institutional framework
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      AEMC, Australian Energy Market Commission; AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator; 
AER, Australian Energy Regulator; ANTS, Annual National Transmission Statement; COAG, Council 
of Australia Governments; ERIG, Energy Reform Implementation Group; MCE, Ministerial Council 
on Energy; NEM, National Energy Market; NEMMCO, National Energy Market Management 
Company; SOO, Statement of Opportunities.
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The new legislation transferred the regulation of covered 
distribution networks outside Western Australia 
from state and territory regulators to the AER. It also 
transferred the regulation of covered transmission 
pipelines outside Western Australia from the ACCC 
to the AER. As of July 2008, the AER regulated 
eight covered transmission pipelines and 11 covered 
distribution networks.2
The AER is working closely with jurisdictional 
regulators and network businesses to maintain regulatory 
certainty in the transition to the national framework. 
In September 2008, the AER released guidelines 
to assist gas network businesses and their customers 
to understand the AER’s approach to the regulation 
of gas distribution businesses.
Retail
The Retail Policy Working Group has been 
developing recommendations to the MCE Standing 
Committee of Officials on retail functions for transfer 
to national regulation.
The areas under review include:3
> retailer obligations for supply to small customers
> customer market contracts
> marketing
> business authorisations
> ring-fencing
> retailer failure arrangements (retailer of last resort).
The Standing Committee of Officials published its final 
recommendations on the transfer of retail functions 
to the AER in June 2008.4 Under the current proposals, 
the AER will:
> be a gatekeeper for authorisation and exemptions
> publish standing tariffs
> undertake monitoring and enforcement in the areas of:
> customer financial hardship
> compliance with terms of regulated contracts and rules
> marketing conduct
> issue guidance to market participants on the 
application of the new framework and the AER’s 
enforcement strategy.
Table A.1  energy regulation after implementation of national framework
Qld NSW ACT Vic SA Tas NT WA
Gas transmission
Economic 
Regulation 
Authority
Gas distribution
Electricity wholesale
Australian Energy Regulator
Utilities 
Commission
Electricity transmission
Electricity distribution
Retail (non-price)
Retail (pricing) QCA IPART ICRC ESC ESCOSA OTTER and GPOC
Rule changes Australian Energy Market Commission
Competition regulation Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ESC, Victorian Essential Services Commission; ESCOSA, Essential Services Commission of South Australia; GPOC, Government Prices Oversight Commission; ICRC, 
Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission; IPART, Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal; QCA, Queensland Competition Authority; OTTER, 
Office of the Tasmanian Energy Regulator.
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2. There are three covered transmission pipelines and one covered distribution network in Western Australia. These assets are regulated by the Economic 
Regulation Authority.
3. MCE, Communiqué, 19 May 2006.
4. MCE Standing Committee of Officials, A National Framework for Regulating Electricity and Gas (Energy) Distribution and Retail Services to Customers, 2008.
It is expected that the legislative package will 
be introduced into the South Australian Parliament 
by September 2009, after which the states and territories 
will transition to the national framework.
Establishing the Australian Energy 
Market Operator
In April 2007, COAG agreed to establish an Australian 
Energy Market Operator (AEMO) as a single, industry-
funded national energy market operator for both 
electricity and gas.5 The AEMO is scheduled to begin 
by 1 July 2009.6
The AEMO will merge the roles of the current 
national electricity market operator (NEMMCO) 
with gas market operators in New South Wales, the 
Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Victoria and 
South Australia.
Impact of climate change policies on the 
energy sector
The Australian government is committed to reducing 
carbon emissions by 60 per cent of 2000 levels 
by 2050. Policy measures that have been announced 
to assist in the achievement of this target include 
a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, involving 
the trading of emissions rights,7 and a 20 per cent 
mandatory renewable energy target for Australia, to be 
reached by 2020.8
Recognising the potential for significant impacts on the 
energy sector as a result of these climate change policies, 
the MCE requested that the AEMC review the energy 
market frameworks. The review is to consider both the 
electricity and gas markets in all states and territories. 
The AEMC is to identify potential market risks arising 
from climate change policies and present options 
to refine the energy market frameworks to mitigate 
those risks. The review is scheduled for completion 
by September 2009.9
One likely outcome of the introduction of climate 
change policies is an increasing reliance on intermittent 
generation (such as wind farms), which can raise 
reliability and security issues for the power system.10 
To manage these issues, NEMMCO submitted a Rule 
change proposal to the AEMC that would require 
significant intermittent generators to participate in the 
central dispatch process and to limit their output 
at times when that output would otherwise violate secure 
network limits.
The AEMC published a Rule determination on 1 May 
2008 that requires new intermittent generators to 
register under the new classification of semi‑scheduled 
generator. These generators will be required to 
participate in the central dispatch process, including 
submitting offers and limiting their output when 
requested by NEMMCO. This Rule will take effect 
on 31 March 2009.11
A.3  National electricity Market reform
National transmission planner and 
regulatory investment test
In 2007, ERIG reported that there was a need 
to strengthen transmission planning arrangements 
in the NEM. In particular, it found that current 
approaches focused on priorities within individual 
jurisdictions, rather than on the national grid as a whole. 
It recommended that a national planning body 
be established and housed within a reformed market 
operator body.12 In addition, it recommended that the 
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5. COAG, Communiqué, 13 April 2007.
6. MCE, Communiqué, 13 December 2007.
7. Australian Government Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, July 2008.
8. COAG Working Group on Climate Change and Water, Design options for the expanded national renewable energy target scheme, July 2008.
9. MCE, Terms of reference — AEMC review of energy market framework in light of climate change policies, 2008.
10. See discussion in Executive overview.
11. AEMC, Rule determination — National Electricity Amendment (central dispatch and integration of wind and other intermittent generation) Rule 2008, May 2008.
12. ERIG, Energy Reform — the way forward for Australia — A report to the Council of Australian Governments by the Energy Reform Implementation Group, January 2007.
regulatory test for transmission investment be reformed 
to enable consideration of reliability and market benefits 
within one process.13
COAG adopted the ERIG recommendations 
in April 2007.14 The MCE subsequently directed the 
AEMC to develop a detailed implementation plan for 
a national transmission planning function, and to advise 
on a project assessment and consultation process 
to replace the current regulatory test.
The AEMC released its final report in June 2008, 
which recommended the development of a national 
transmission planner within the AEMO.15 The planning 
body would publish an annual national transmission 
network development plan outlining the efficient 
development of the power system. The plan would 
provide a long-term strategic outlook (minimum 
20 years), focusing on national transmission flow paths.
The development plan would not replace local 
planning and would not be binding on transmission 
businesses or the AER. Rather, the plan would 
complement shorter-term investment planning 
by transmission businesses.
With respect to the regulatory test, the AEMC 
recommended the removal of the current distinction 
between reliability-driven projects and projects driven 
by the delivery of market benefits. All projects would 
be assessed through a single consultation and assessment 
framework, which aims to identify investments that 
maximise net economic benefits and, where applicable, 
meet reliability standards. The revised assessment process 
would be more comprehensive than the current test, and 
would apply to a wider range of investment projects.
The AEMC also released a report by Frontier 
Economics, which assesses various models 
of interregional transmission charging.16 Under current 
arrangements, customers in an importing region 
of the NEM do not pay a charge to transmission 
network providers in the exporting region to cover 
the costs incurred to serve their load. The AEMC 
has recommended that a more detailed review 
be carried out on the appropriate mechanism for 
implementing a formal interregional transmission 
charging arrangement.
Jurisdictional reliability standards
ERIG reported in 2007 that the current transmission 
reliability standards need greater clarity and 
transparency. In particular, it formed a view that 
clause 5.1 of the National Electricity Rules and the 
majority of jurisdictional reliability obligations require 
significant interpretation.17
In April 2007, COAG accepted ERIG’s 
recommendations for a nationally consistent framework 
for setting transmission reliability standards.18 The 
AEMC Reliability Panel is undertaking a review 
of jurisdictional transmission reliability standards. 
An interim report in August 2008 set out the panel’s 
preferred option for a nationally consistent framework.19 
Key features include:
> economically derived and deterministically expressed 
standards set on a jurisdictional basis by an 
independent jurisdictional authority
> the introduction of a national reference standard
> a clear and transparent standard setting process.
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13. The regulatory test is an analysis tool used by transmission and distribution businesses in the NEM to assess the efficiency of network investment.
14. COAG, Communiqué, 13 April 2007.
15. AEMC, National transmission planning arrangements — final report to MCE, 30 June 2008.
16. Frontier Economics, Advice on the application of AEMC options for an inter‑regional charging mechanism in the NEM — A report prepared for the Australian Energy 
Market Commission, April 2008.
17. ERIG, Energy Reform — the way forward for Australia — A report to the Council of Australian Governments by the Energy Reform Implementation Group, January 2007.
18. COAG, Communiqué, 13 April 2007.
19. AEMC Reliability Panel, Towards a nationally consistent framework for transmission reliability standards review — Interim report, 5 August 2008.
Congestion management review
Although the reliability of transmission networks 
in the NEM is consistently high, network congestion 
sometimes impedes the dispatch of the most cost-
efficient generation to satisfy demand. In October 2005, 
the MCE directed the AEMC to review congestion 
management issues in the NEM and, in particular, 
to consider the scope for enhanced market-based 
solutions to manage trading risks.
The AEMC released the Final report: congestion 
management review in June 2008.20 It recommended 
a number of changes to current market arrangements 
to reduce network congestion and better manage the 
effects of this problem. The recommendations included:
> formalisation in the National Electricity Rules 
of NEMMCO’s current process for determining 
which generators to dispatch in the market
> amendment of the National Electricity Rules 
in respect of settlement residues to reduce uncertainty 
for holders of settlement residue units — in particular, 
it was recommended that new arrangements 
be introduced for the management and funding 
of negative settlement residues
> publication of a congestion information resource 
by NEMMCO to consolidate and enhance 
information on network congestion
> clarification and strengthening of the rights 
of generators that fund transmission augmentations 
to manage congestion risk — in particular, ensuring that 
future network users contribute to investment costs 
where they benefit from them.
In 2008, the AER launched a scheme that provides 
incentives for network businesses to better manage 
factors within their control that can lead to transmission 
congestion — for example, the scheduling of outages.21
Abolition of the Snowy region
In late 2006 and early 2007, the AEMC received five 
Rule change proposals on the ineffective management 
of network congestion in the NEM. In August 2007, the 
AEMC found that abolishing the Snowy region of the 
NEM would improve incentives for generators to bid 
in a competitive way, improve dispatch efficiency and 
result in more cost-reflective spot prices. The AEMC 
also found that this would provide clearer signals for 
efficient investment and electricity use.22
The Snowy region of the NEM was abolished on 1 July 
2008. The areas previously covered by the region are now 
located in the New South Wales and Victoria regions.
Comprehensive Reliability Review
Over the past couple of years some concerns have been 
raised about the future reliability of electricity supply 
in the NEM. This led to the AEMC Reliability Panel 
conducting a review of reliability settings in the NEM, 
the Comprehensive Reliability Review.
The panel’s report, published in 2007, recommended 
an increase in the wholesale market price cap (VoLL) 
from $10 000 to $12 500, effective from 1 July 2010.23 
It also recommended an increase in the cumulative price 
threshold (which triggers administered wholesale pricing) 
to $187 500, or fifteen times the value of VoLL.
The review also recommended that the current reserve 
trader mechanism be changed to a Reliability and 
Emergency Reserve Trader. The revised mechanism 
would provide NEMMCO with greater flexibility 
in sourcing reserve capacity. Changes from the current 
mechanism include an extended timeframe for 
contracting with reserve providers and the introduction 
of multiple rounds of tendering.
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20. AEMC, Final report: Congestion management review, June 2008.
21. AER, Final decision — Service target performance incentive scheme version 2, March 2008.
22. AEMC, Rule determination — National Electricity Amendment (abolition of Snowy region) Rule, August 2007.
23. AEMC Reliability Panel, Final report — Comprehensive reliability review, 2007.
Another significant recommendation was for a new 
energy adequacy assessment projection. This mechanism 
would improve market participants’ ability to forecast 
and respond in times where there may be energy 
constraints that would affect reliability.
Review of demand-side participation in the 
National Electricity Market
An increasing focus of reform has been to increase the 
responsiveness of electricity demand to price signals. 
In particular, the AEMC is reviewing options to better 
facilitate demand-side participation in the NEM. The 
review consists of three stages:24
> stage 1 — investigating demand-side participation issues 
in the context of the current AEMC work program
> stage 2 — reviewing the National Electricity Rules 
to identify barriers to efficient demand-side 
participation and to develop proposals to reduce 
or remove those barriers
> stage 3 — identifying any additional barriers to efficient 
demand-side participation.
The AEMC published a report by NERA25 on stage 1 
and released an issues paper26 on stage 2 in May 2008. 
The issues paper focused on:
> the economic regulation of networks
> network planning
> network access and connection arrangements
> wholesale markets and financial contracting
> the use of demand-side participation for 
reliability purposes.
In August 2008, the AEMC released a report by CRA 
International on ways in which electricity customers 
can participate in the wholesale market, elements of the 
National Electricity Rules that may limit demand-side 
participation, and options for reform.27
Demand management activities aimed at energy 
customers require smart meters to record patterns 
of energy use. In 2007, COAG agreed to a national 
implementation strategy for the progressive rollout 
of smart meters where the benefits outweigh costs.28 
A cost – benefit assessment published in March 
2008 found that a national rollout would achieve 
a net benefit.29
A.4  Gas wholesale market reform
In 2005, the MCE established the Gas Market Leaders 
Group to accelerate the development of a competitive, 
reliable and secure natural gas market, that promotes 
efficient investment and provides efficient management 
of supply interruptions.30 The MCE has endorsed 
several of the group’s recommendations, including the 
development of the gas market bulletin board, a short-
term trading market in gas and an annual national 
statement of opportunities on the gas market covering 
supply – demand conditions.
The bulletin board, which started on 1 July 2008, 
is a transparent, real-time and independent information 
source for gas market participants and market observers 
on the status of natural gas supplies around the country. 
Industry participants must publish three days ahead 
information on production and storage capabilities and 
pipeline capacity, to provide a snapshot for gas users.
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24. AEMC, Statement of approach — review of demand side participation in the National Electricity Market, March 2008.
25. NERA, Stage one final report — review of demand side participation in the National Electricity Market, May 2008.
26. AEMC, Stage two issues paper — review of demand side participation in the National Electricity Market, August 2008.
27. CRA International, Final report — the wholesale market and financial contracting: AEMC review of demand side participation in the NEM, August 2008.
28. COAG, Communiqué, 13 April 2007.
29. NERA, Cost – Benefit Analysis of Smart Metering and Direct Load Control Overview Report for Consultation, 29 February 2008, for Smart Meter  
working Group, Phase 2.
30. MCE, Energy reform market bulletin no. 55, 7 December 2005.
The short-term trading market in gas is scheduled 
to begin by winter 2010. The proposed market will 
establish a mandatory price-based balancing mechanism 
at gas hubs in New South Wales and South Australia. 
Victoria already has a transparent balancing market 
in place. Structural and operational details of the market 
are undergoing further development during 2008.
An annual Gas Statement of Opportunities — similar to the 
annual Statement of Opportunities currently published 
for electricity — is intended to provide information 
to assist gas industry participants in their planning and 
commercial decisions on infrastructure investment. The 
Gas Market Leaders Group began work on the design 
of the publication in 2008.31
In 2006, the MCE and Ministerial Council on Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources created a Joint Working 
Group on Natural Gas Supply to consider the adequacy 
of domestic gas supplies and related infrastructure. 
A particular focus of the review was to look at balancing 
the exploitation of resources for export with ensuring 
sufficiency of gas supplies for domestic use. The final 
report of the Joint Working Group was released 
in September 2007.32
Further details on the reforms to the gas wholesale 
sector are set out in chapter 8, section 8.7.
A.5   Review of the effectiveness 
of retail competition
In line with the Australian Energy Market Agreement, 
all jurisdictions have agreed to remove energy market 
retail price caps where it can be shown that effective 
competition exists. The AEMC is reviewing the 
effectiveness of retail competition in jurisdictions 
to inform these decisions.
In May 2007, the MCE requested that the AEMC 
provide advice on the state of energy retail competition 
in Victoria. The AEMC found that competition 
is effective in both electricity and gas retail markets.33 
In response to the review, the Victorian Government 
announced in September 2008 the introduction 
of new legislation to remove retail price caps. The 
legislation includes provisions for the Essential Services 
Commission of Victoria to undertake expanded price 
monitoring and report publicly on retail prices. Retailers 
will also be required to publish a range of their offers 
to assist consumers in comparing energy prices.34 
Other obligations on retailers, including the obligation 
to supply and the consumer protection framework, will 
not be affected by the removal of retail price regulation. 
The Victorian Government will retain a reserve power 
to reinstate retail price regulation if competition is found 
to be no longer effective in the future.
In 2008, the AEMC reviewed the South Australian 
electricity and gas retail markets. The AEMC’s first final 
report, released in September 2008, found that retail 
competition in both markets was effective.35
The next scheduled reviews are for New South Wales 
(2009) and the ACT (if required; 2010).36 Further details 
of the AEMC review process are provided in chapter 6, 
box 6.1.
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31. MCE, Communiqué, 13 June 2008.
32. Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources/Ministerial Council on Energy Joint Working Group on Natural Gas Supply, Final Report, September 2007.
33. AEMC, Review of Effectiveness of Competition in Electricity and Gas Retail Markets in Victoria — First Final Report, December 2007.
34. Premier of Victoria, Brumby Government Boosts Transparency in Power Pricing, media release, 11 September 2008.
35. AEMC, Review of Effectiveness of Competition in Electricity and Gas Retail Markets in South Australia — First Final Report, September 2007.
36. MCE, Communiqué, 25 May 2007.

